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Art. 1.—GERMAN 'KULTUR.'

I.—AS ILLUSTRATED BY GERMAN SCIENCE.

THE present war has directed the attention of thinking men to the mental and moral outlook of the German nation. What kind of men must they be, who have deliberately involved practically the whole of Europe in a terrible strife? What are their ideals? What are their objects?

So far as one can learn, they think that they have a mission to disseminate what they term 'Kultur' among the human race by force of arms. This leads to the enquiry—what is 'Kultur'? Now, the word 'Kultur' has the same origin as our 'culture,' yet the conceptions conveyed by these two words must obviously be very different. There is a German equivalent, too, for 'culture'; it is approximately 'Bildung': formation of character, and of a correct taste, by education. It will be attempted, in the following pages, to define German 'Kultur,' as illustrated by German scientific achievements in the realm of pure and applied science.

Everyone is agreed that it is desirable that the human race should progress—that is, everyone of the western nations, for the natives of India have not this ideal; that people is, as a whole, content to live as of old. There are two absolutely different views as to how progress may best be made. One is individualism; it postulates that, left to himself, man will gain by the struggle for existence; that his best qualities will be strengthened by personal effort. The other view is that progress is more rapidly and satisfactorily made by

collectivism; that by combining together, men can achieve more than by separate effort. One form of collectivism is Socialism. The Socialist sees that effort is not always equally rewarded—that some possess much, while others are poor; and he looks forward to a day when equality of effort will always gain equality of wealth, when there shall be universal brotherhood, and strife will cease. Most of us believe that he seeks an unattainable Utopia; and we doubt whether this Utopia can be reached without leaders so unselfish that they will subdue all claim to special reward for their special powers. Such leaders will be hard to find.

The other form of collectivism is 'Kultur.' The leaders of the German nation, having learned that much can be done by organisation, have made it a fetish. Theirs is a kind of socialism, inculcated from above by self-elected rulers. They have spent more than a century in gaining experience in organising their army and their education; they have more recently organised their trade; and they now believe that the world is to be reformed only by having this system thrust upon it, by German methods, and by German bayonets.

The general opinion as to the origin of this war held in Germany, and by nearly all Germans, is that it is due to envy, and to jealousy of their superior powers. That the nation as a whole is and has long been disliked, cannot be denied; but no other nation has wished to adopt their system. It has tended towards what is generally held to be dishonesty, immorality, and suppression of individual initiative. And in no branch of affairs is this so clearly illustrated as by their doings in pure and in applied science, during the last half-century, since the prepossession of their infallibility began to gain credence among themselves. For the Germans of fifty years ago were a kindly, plodding, somewhat dull race, among whom there were a few very remarkable men, as indeed there were also remarkable men in every other European country. The race has now lost its kindly feelings; it still remains plodding, dull, and bourgeois.

This national catastrophe (for it is a catastrophe when a nation suddenly throws civilisation to the winds, and engages in an immoral attack upon peaceful neighbours) has excited our horror, and has amazed us. The

writer spent some years of his early life as a student in a South German university; he looks back with the utmost pleasure on his student days. He made many friends, most, alas, now gone; and with those who remain he has kept up friendly intimacy. He has visited Germany frequently, and has always been welcomed with the kindest hospitality. He has had several interviews with the Emperor, who always evinced cordiality, and interest in scientific subjects, on which he was remarkably well informed for a layman. The Emperor gave the impression of great vitality and extraordinary alertness. The view which the writer held for many years was that, whatever his successor might do, the Kaiser, at least, would do his best to keep peace. This was probably the almost universal opinion of Englishmen who knew Germany well. But we must confess ourselves mistaken. We knew of the cry for 'Kultur'; we knew of the admirable organisation which had been introduced into various spheres of human endeavour; and we thought it worthy of imitation. But we did not realise that it had become a fetish; that Germans believed that by organisation the world would be reformed; and that it was the mission of Germans to compel the world to accept this doctrine as necessary for civilisation.

It may be interesting to enquire what share Germans have had in scientific discovery and invention; and there is a work, termed '400 Jahre Pionier-Arbeit in den exacten Wissenschaften' ('400 years of pioneer work in the exact sciences') by L. Darmstaedter and R. du Bois-Reymond, one a Jew, the other of French extraction, from which the following data are taken. The book was published in 1904.

Beginning with the 16th century, 39 German names are mentioned between the years 1500 and 1600, out of a total of 176, or 22 per cent. Among these, are to be found the first operator who employed the Cæsarian operation, Jacob Nufer; Albrecht Dürer; Paracelsus; Michael Stifel, who gave to algebra its modern notation; Agricola, the great metallurgist; and Simon Stevinus, who introduced decimal fractions. These were all Germans. Among non-Germans, we are struck by the names of Amerigo Vespucci, Columbus, Leonardo da Vinci, Fernando Cortez, Bernard Palissy, Copernicus,

Tycho Brahe, Sir Francis Drake, Sir Walter Raleigh, Davis (of Davis' Straits), Galilei and Gilbert (who wrote the first treatise on the magnet), to mention only those of world-wide fame.

Between the years 1600 and 1700, out of a total number of 312 entries, 48 are German, or 15 per cent.; among the names mentioned are those of Bacon, Briggs and Napier (of logarithm fame); Dudley, who introduced coal for iron-smelting; Harvey, famous for his discovery of the circulation of the blood; Descartes and Pascal; Torricelli, Hooke and Huygens; Boyle, the 'father of modern chemistry'; Malpighi, who confirmed Harvey's discovery; Thomas Willis and John Mayow, the precursors of Lavoisier; Papin of 'digestor' fame; Halley, the astronomer; and Savoy, the precursor of Watt. The distinguished Teutons on this list are Kepler, Glauber, Kunckel, Leibnitz and Bernoulli.

During the next century, the entries are 517, of which 72, or 14 per cent., refer to German discoveries. We note the names of Newton, Newcomen, Boerhaave, Flamsteed, Maclaurin, Réaumur, Stephen Hales, Swedenborg, Linnæus; Darby, who first introduced coke in iron-smelting; Roebuck, the first to use lead chambers in the manufacture of oil of vitriol; Benjamin Franklin, Smeaton and Watt, the engineers; Black, Cavendish, Lavoisier, the chemists; Arkwright of the spinning-jenny; Coulomb, the physicist; Buffon, the naturalist; the anatomist Hunter; Priestley and Schele, the discoverers of oxygen; Count Rumford; the Montgolfiers of balloon fame; Josiah Wedgwood; de Saussure, the geologist; Haüy, the crystallographer; Berthollet and Laplace; Hutton, the founder of geological science; Lagrange and Euler, the mathematicians; Galvani and Volta, the early pioneers of electricity; Jenner, the inventor of vaccination; Charles Tennant, the manufacturer of bleaching-powder, besides others omitted for economy of space. The German entries of notables are Böttger, the manufacturer of Meissen porcelain; Immanuel Kant, the philosopher; Niebuhr, the traveller; Peter Woulfe, the first to make picric acid; Wenzel and Richter, who discovered chemical equivalence; Herschel, the astronomer, the discoverer of Uranus; Werner, the geologist; Gauss, the mathematician; and Alexander von Humboldt.

The period from 1800 to 1850 comprises 901 entries; of these Germans and Austrians form 234, or nearly 26 per cent. We note Thomas Young, the physicist; Robert Fulton, the engineer; Proust, Humphry Davy, Gay-Lussac, and Dulong and Petit, Wollaston, Henry and Dalton, illustrious chemists; Arago and Biot, the French physicists; Berzelius and Oersted, the Swedish savants; Lamareck, the precursor of Darwin; Avogadro and Ampère, Italian and French savants; Thenard, the French physicist, and Cuvier, the naturalist; David Brewster and Decandolle; George Stephenson; Prout, the chemist, and William Smith, the geologist; Chevreul, the discoverer of the nature of fatty bodies; Cauchy, the mathematician, and Fresnel, the discoverer in optics; Babbage, of the calculating machine; Niepce and Daguerre, the pioneers of photography; and Fourier, whose name is known in connexion with the propagation of heat; Michael Faraday; Macintosh, the inventor of water-proof materials; Sadi Carnot, famous for 'Carnot's cycle'; Brown, the botanist; Becquerel, the physicist, and Balard, the discoverer of bromine; Telford, the engineer; Graham and Dumas, the chemists; Wheatstone, the electrician, and Airey, the astronomer; Charles Darwin and Louis Agassiz; Schönbein, the Swiss inventor of high explosives; Regnault, the chemist; Armstrong and Whitworth, the engineers; Joule, the discoverer of the equivalence of heat and work, and Bain, the American inventor of telegraphy. Among Germans, we meet with Hahn, the founder of homœopathy; Fraunhofer, the investigator of the solar spectrum; Mitcherlich, Liebig and Wöhler, the chemists; von Baër, the anatomist; von Mohl, the botanist; Weber, the colleague of Gauss and Bessel, mathematician; Müller, the comparative anatomist; von Buch and Bischoff, the geologists; Doppler, the discoverer of a valuable astronomical principle; Siemens, the electrician; and Kirchhof, the inventor of the spectroscope in its modern form.

It would be invidious to name the discoverers and inventors between 1850 and 1900; suffice it to say that the records comprise 1021 entries, of which 477, or 46 per cent., can be ascribed to Teutonic sources.* But here

* It should be remembered, in connexion with the large percentages of German names in this list, that it was compiled by two German savants.

we note the characteristic of recent years; as a rule, the principal advances in all subjects have been made by non-Germans; and as soon as these have been announced, an army of Teutons has intervened to mop up the spoil.

The awards of the Swedish Nobel Committee are, unbiased by any national spirit; four prizes of the approximate value of 8000*l.* each are distributed annually, one for physics, one for chemistry, one for medicine, and one for literature. During the twelve years from 1901 to 1912 inclusive, 58 prizes have been awarded, of which 17, or nearly 30 per cent., were received by Germans or Austrians. An almost identical result is arrived at by finding the ratio of German and Austrian Foreign Members and Associates of the principal Academies of the world, viz. 28 per cent. It must, however, not be forgotten that it is the older men of science who are elected to honorary membership, and that this last method of computation refers to these, and not, as a rule, to the men under fifty.

This enquiry shows that the German race has had an honourable share in the progress of science; but their influence has not been preponderating; and with some brilliant exceptions, their scientific men have rather amplified in detail the work of the inventors of other nations. Such work is very useful and is by no means to be decried; but it partakes rather of the character of that of the organ-blower, contrasted with that of the organist. Some years ago, the writer was discussing with two eminent French chemists the reason of the fecundity of the German output in chemistry; and they somewhat regretfully confessed that, while a German professor can bring a small army of young men to bear on the experimental attack of a problem which he is investigating, the young Frenchman, more versatile, and more original, objects to be kept in bonds, and insists on opportunity of giving expression to his own views.

The progress of science is advanced in two ways; one is in the conception of a useful idea, which is then applied in various directions; the other is what may be termed 'the method of exhaustion,' that is, to attempt all possible methods of solving a problem, until a suitable one is found. The first plan involves genius; the second continuous work, if possible with the aid of numerous

assistants. Great discoveries and inventions have been the result of the first method of attack; much useful work is achieved by the second. Speaking broadly, the Germanic races have progressed by the second, the Anglo-Saxon and Latin races by the first method. One might even go so far as to say that the first represents the masculine, and the second the feminine turn of mind; for no woman has been a great inventor, and yet women are unsurpassed for patient, laborious attention to detail.

How has it come about that a plodding, industrious race like the Germans have so altered their mentality as to have become bloodthirsty aggressors? Apparently by an overweening sense of the importance of plodding organisation as having contributed to their own success, and a conviction that in it civilisation consists. One would have thought that their failure as colonists might have taught them that it is impossible to rule races to which their methods are distasteful and foreign. It must, moreover, never be forgotten that they have applied precisely these methods to the organisation of their army; that they had compulsory service, and that their educational and military systems are closely inter-linked; that this huge engine of war, maintained partly by fear of attack, partly by desire of aggression, is governed by a small oligarchy of which the Kaiser is the supreme head; that from their earliest youth, German children are trained to regard the State as omnipotent, and are made to feel its direct influence from their cradles to their graves. Naturally, the directors of this vast military machine were desirous of testing it; and they have now the opportunity of trying its power against the combined force of nearly all Europe.

It must also be remembered that the German race, during the last half-century, has been growing less religious, and at the same time less moral. Like Gallio, they 'care for none of these things.' Their collective morality has seriously declined. Any foreigner who has tried to secure a German patent knows how the Berlin Patent Office, by trivial objections and tiresome delays, has rendered it a heartbreaking task. Many English manufacturers have suffered from a species of organised piracy, consisting in the deliberate infringement by Germans of the patents which they hold; from the

difficulty of securing justice in the German Courts, or the reappearance of the infringers under a new name, until from sheer weariness, or reluctance to throw good money after bad, the unequal contest has been abandoned.

Their rapid success in trade has been due in part to excellent organisation—their 'Kultur'—and in part to the important fact that their individual efforts have been officially subsidised. Their commerce, like their army, has been supported by the State. Thus the plan has been to attack, in a methodical manner, some industry carried on outside of Germany. Heavy import duties are imposed on the article which they desire to manufacture; bounties are given on exports of the article; freights are reduced on its carriage; and the ships which convey it to foreign countries are subsidised. In course of time this tells; it becomes unprofitable for manufacturers in a free-trade country to compete with a State-aided manufacture; prices fall, and after a struggle, the manufacture is abandoned. There exists at Berlin a council whose duty it is to consider each proposition on its merits; if there is a reasonable prospect of success, the attack is made; naturally, if it is successful, prices rise, and the manufacture is monopolised by Germans.* The reputation of the Germans as honest traders has, in fact, been steadily declining for years, and yet they have acquired an exaggerated sense of their own superiority. This has doubtless led them to believe that all men were their enemies; they have lived in a state of apprehension, tempered by a conviction that their imagined superiority would lead them to come out of any struggle victorious. In a word, they have become Prussianised. The southern races do not like the Prussian arrogance, yet they submit to Prussian domination, and have been infected by Prussian methods and morals.

It is obvious that this is ordinary commercial warfare, and that it is by no means unknown here or in the United States, but there is this difference; with us it is confined to individuals, in Germany it is backed by the whole machinery of the State. It would indeed be extraordinary if the talent which the Germans have

* This was pointed out by the writer in 1903, and is reported in the *Journal of the Society of Chemical Industry* for that year.

expended on the organisation of their army had not been also devoted to the organisation of their industries on a similar plan. It remains to be seen whether either will find itself in the long run justified by success.

Much as there is to admire in the German educational system, it is doubtful whether it has not been carried so far as to destroy whatever originality has existed in the Teutonic race; but we give two examples. A young Swede, who had spent a year in touring all over the globe, remarked, in conversation with me, on the fact that, wherever he went, he found English or Americans at the head of all important undertakings. He expressed himself as doubtful whether the countries of the European continent were not over-educating their children, and making of them merely well-trained machines, incapable of striking out new lines. An American acquaintance, who possessed a large electrical factory at Berlin, remarked some years ago that he was unable to employ German foremen; he said that Germans, owing to their obedience and method, make admirable workmen; but, after trial, he had to import American foremen, on account of their 'hustle,' their sharpness, and their keenness; and this in spite of the necessity for paying them nearly double the wages which the Germans received.

To revert to the thesis at the beginning of this article:—it is open to argument whether human progress is best achieved by the sum of individual efforts, or whether it can be hastened by socialism or by 'Kultur.' This, at all events, is certain, that the Allies will fight to the bitter end to avoid being subjected to domination by the German idea of the means for regenerating the world. This resolve has been enormously strengthened by the ruthless methods which have been adopted by the German Army Council in enforcing its demands on the Allied countries, and by their utter disregard for truth, honour, and uprightness. Knowing what we now do, it is manifest that conquest by Germany would involve the world in poverty and misery; it would destroy all ideals of justice and righteousness; and it would, even if carried out humanely, result in a ghastly failure.

It is not to be supposed that, even after the military power of Germany has been destroyed, they will abandon their unfair methods of attacking the commerce of other

nations. They will endeavour to undersell their competitors, regardless of the morality of the means they employ to secure their markets. If we are to oppose such an attack successfully, we have two alternatives—to copy their methods, or to refuse to deal with Germans. Perhaps these alternatives are not exclusive, for there are many things in their methods which we might with advantage copy; for instance, their skilled staffs, their widely extended agencies, and their careful organisation, not merely of any one industry, but of all allied industries. And it would perhaps be possible to boycott trade conducted on a system which we consider dishonourable or underhand. Time alone will show. But this is a fitting opportunity to consider our position; and by organisation, by co-operation among our manufacturers rather than by competition between them, and by scientific education of our directors and employees, we might do much to forestall the attack which will undoubtedly be made on our commercial position, if, at the end of the war, any prospect of recuperation is left to Germany.

WILLIAM RAMSAY.

II.—ART AND LITERATURE.

PROBABLY few English people had been prepared, by anything they had formerly learned about Germany, for certain aspects of the German mind and character revealed in eight months of war. They feel now, perhaps, that they ought to have been. They had of late read Nietzsche and Bernhardi; they had, many of them, heard some of the opinions of Treitschke and Clausewitz; and they had been a little startled by the Kaiser's speech to his soldiery on their departure for Peking, the speech in which he urged them to emulate the ferocity of the Huns against a people who, however guilty they may have been on the occasion which led to this intervention, had certainly suffered much more at the hands of Europe than Europe has ever suffered from them. But all this, it was thought, could not represent the real Germany. There was something about these utterances and ideas

so fantastic in its inhumanity, so raw in its aggressiveness, that it simply could not be reconciled with what one knew of this friendly, home-loving people, with their simple social life, their flourishing industries, their love for good music, good plays and good living. And now we begin to wonder whether we ought not to have known better. In its imaginative literature and in its plastic arts, a nation expresses most unconsciously and therefore most truly its general conceptions of life. What should these have told us about Germany? What have been the achievements of the 'Kultur' on which Germans pride themselves so highly?

In 'Kultur,' be it understood, I do not intend to include the applications of scientific discovery. A people might be essentially barbarians, and yet be equipped with every device for the attainment of physical comfort and convenience which the mastery of material forces can put into their hands. Again, a people can be highly cultured, and yet, as we see in many parts of India and until recently in Japan, remain almost entirely strangers to the scientific developments which have been so great a factor in the European type of civilisation for the past hundred years. The Germans are not so cultured a people as the Japanese, perhaps on the whole no nation ever has been; but in the application of science, intelligence and method to industry, commerce and social organisation, it is idle to deny that they lead the world. But these things are not in themselves culture. Culture is a sense of the relations, the proportions, the deeper and more permanent values of things; and that Germans, in the intense cultivation of science and method, have missed a great deal that true culture would have valued, is plain to everyone outside Germany, and indeed to many Germans also. One of these things is freedom. Every Englishman who has lived in Germany for any length of time feels a vague sense of uneasiness in his surroundings. He finds everything foreseen and arranged to a degree which produces in a people accustomed to shape life for themselves a reaction, which according to one's temperament may be humorous or indignant, or both. One cannot take a walk in the woods without being led by ingeniously contrived paths to a view-point with its little fenced platform, or to an

artificial pond presided over by an appropriate piece of sculpture. In a railway station one is carefully herded through appointed antechambers into a carriage which, it must be confessed, is a model of comfort and convenience, incomparably superior to anything which one will find in wealthy England. If one walks across a bridge, although there may be hardly another soul on it at the time, the injunction 'Rechts Gehen' forbids one to take which side one likes. The words 'Nach Vorschrift' confront one at every turn, in all the ways whether of business or of pleasure, and they are meant to be obeyed. At last the Englishman begins to understand that he is in presence of a system-ridden people, and he discovers, if he reflects at all on the subject, that this devotion to the idea of system is the source at once of Germany's immense strength and of her fatal weakness. This national trait was noted long ago by Tolstoi, who wrote of one of the characters in his 'War and Peace': 'Pfuhl was evidently one of those men of one idea who would go to the stake on the assurance they derive from their faith in the infallibility of some principle. Such natures are found among the Germans, who alone are capable of such entire confidence in an abstract idea.' It is really a kind of Vaticanism in the sphere of secular life, and it works there to just the same effect. It is capable of making the kindest people—and I venture to affirm that the Germans are naturally most kindly—inhumanly cruel, of making an honest people faithless and treacherous, and of rousing in all free peoples an instinctive horror of a sway which on the surface promises, if only you will submit to it, to make everything smooth and easy. Germans themselves did not accept it without a resistance which has never been wholly overcome.

The comparison with Vaticanism is curiously close and very instructive. Just as a Catholic, who may be one of the most estimable and upright of men, feels bound to defend the principle of coercion in matters of religious opinion—that is to say, a war upon the human conscience—because the Church has definitely committed itself to that principle, so we find German Professors, like Eucken, who are reckoned among the chief ethical teachers of the day, defending the flagrant iniquity of

the invasion of Belgium—a deed which ought to have revolted the conscience of every man in whom conscience had not been paralysed by the dogma of Prussian infallibility. But Eucken, like every other German Professor, is a State servant, and is bound more or less to the service of the official machine.

Let us see what goes on in the sphere of free creative literature. Here again we shall find our analogy still holding good. Nothing is more striking about the great literature of Catholicism—while it still produced a great literature—than the fact that it is nearly all a literature of revolt against ecclesiasticism. There is no trait which Dante—who was for a time on the Index—Boccaccio, the author of 'Piers Plowman,' Chaucer, Erasmus, Rabelais, have so much in common as this. It is hard to think of a really illustrious name in which the tendency is not distinctly to be observed. And similarly in Germany, with the rise of the hegemony of Prussia, which made the Germans the system-ridden people they now are, one may note the growing dominance of this note of revolt—the effort of literature, striking about it, often recklessly enough, to shape for itself a space in which it can breathe more freely. As I have remarked in an earlier study of this subject, it was the German poets quite as much as Bismarck who brought the German *Reich* into being.* But a survey of German literature since 1870 shows this class, in the main, to be profoundly discontented with its creation, and disposed to look on it much as Frankenstein did on the monster which made its creator's life a burden. Naturally, the war, with its terrible and imminent possibilities, has silenced for the time being all these voices of revolt, or has turned them, like Hauptmann's, into the chorus of 'Deutschland über Alles.' But nothing which has appeared in English papers and pamphlets for the past few months on the subject of the German Empire and its leading figures could exceed the severity, the drastic satire, of some of the attacks on German chauvinism and militarism which have come in recent years from strictly German sources.

A slight but amusing instance may be mentioned. We have all lately been laughing over Mr E. V. Lucas's

* 'The Quarterly Review,' July 1914.

capital adaptation of that children's classic, 'Struwpeter,' to the history of the war. We have also read the remarkable 'Hymn of Hate' against England published in a recent number of the Munich illustrated paper, 'Jugend.' I have before me a copy of this paper for October 21, 1913, in which Mr Lucas's idea has been anticipated. There is a 'Struwpeter' page representing the Crown Prince as 'Fidgety Phil' bringing down the German dinner-table with its contents, while the Kaiser and his Chancellor look on in helpless dismay. Another Munich paper, the well-known 'Simplicissimus,' which has been made by the genius of Olaf Gulbranson and his colleagues the ablest journal of social and political satire in the world, has been prosecuted again and again, and forbidden entrance into Prussia, on account of its incessant and unsparing attacks on precisely those characteristics of modern German policy against which we consider ourselves to be doing battle at the present moment with other weapons. To the literary editor of this journal I once ventured to hint that the scathing destructiveness of its criticisms of imperial Germany might usefully be modified by something not so wholly negative, some influence that might build towards a better ideal as well as destroying the false ones. 'We are not in sight of that yet,' he replied. 'There is still too much to pull down (*herunterreißen*) before we can begin to build.'

Of the more serious side of modern German literature, one must regret that so little has yet been made accessible to English readers. The special interest attaching just now to writers like Nietzsche, Treitschke and Bernhardi has so riveted attention on them that we are disposed to think that Germany produces nothing else. This is a great mistake. Apart from Carl Hauptmann, whose dramas are now appearing in an admirable English translation and are documents of great value for the social history of Germany, and leaving aside also writers of wide celebrity like Sudermann, Clara Viebig and Ricarda Huch, there are many contemporary German authors whose work is well worth knowing and who stand as far aloof from Prussian materialism and mechanical organisation as any English, French or Russian writers could possibly do. Books of which one never hears in

England, such as 'Der Erzketzer' by Wolzogen, or 'Es war ein Bischof' by Adam Müller-Guttenbrunn (one of an interesting group of Austrian writers), or Otto Reuling's 'Quellen im Sande,' or 'Der Thor,' an earlier and much better work by the now famous author of 'Der Tunnel,' are examples among many of a school of fiction which is treating modern life and its problems with courage, insight and sincerity, as well as with a mastery of style which is comparatively new in German prose.

There is, however, a quality which is wanting in a good deal, though by no means in all, of this literature. Delicacy is perhaps the best word to describe this missing element. The modern German writer has learned much, but he has not quite mastered the supreme lesson of the economy of force. He wishes to *imponieren*. Phrases and descriptions are deliberately used for their power to stun and shock. Thus writers so unlike each other as Carl Hauptmann and Arthur Schnitzler—both of them masters of language for whom no nuance is out of reach—sometimes express themselves with a crudity worthy of Swift or of Rabelais. But Swift was crude, like Hogarth, because that was his type of humour; he delighted in the racy vocabulary, the boisterous *abandon* of gutter badinage. With the German writers brutality is not sought for its own sake; it is merely an inverted form of finesse, and it strikes one on that account as being all the more disagreeable.

In the plastic arts the same trait is to be observed, and here indeed it is much more emphasised than in literature. Some thirty years ago, when I first made acquaintance with German sculpture and painting, those arts, taking the general run of what was shown at exhibitions, bought by the public, praised by the critics, were chiefly notable for a quality best exemplified perhaps by Schilling's colossal statue of Germania on the Niederwald. This kind of art was both academic and sentimental; it was stupendously complacent and self-satisfied. It was not heroic, but it was bulky; it was not tender, but it was soft; one felt that, like wax before a flame, it would collapse into an amorphous mass in presence of any genuine artistic passion, any keen perception of life. And so indeed it has collapsed, but the

art which has taken its place is far from being as strong and sincere as the literary art which has put Gustav Freytag, Felix Dahn and Georg Ebers out of fashion. And owing perhaps to the nature of the medium, it strikes a foreign observer as being decidedly more brutal. Thus in the Munich *Kunstausstellung* and other exhibitions of last year one might have noticed, as compared with the French Salon, a certain crude violence, an obvious tendency to *imponieren*, in the renderings of the nude, of which not a single example was to be found the same year in the Salon at Paris—a city not exactly noted for prudish restraint in these matters.

Curiously similar is the tale which is told by modern German architecture—the feature of the country which perhaps most impresses the traveller who is gathering surface impressions during a short tour. Every such traveller must have become aware of a new type of design which is showing itself in public buildings and monuments of all kinds, and of which I may name as salient examples the new University buildings at Freiburg im Breisgau, and the huge Leipzig memorial erected on the centenary of the national uprising of 1813. Here is something peculiar to Germany, widely diffused throughout the country, and recognisable at once as a consistent and expressive style. But what does it express? In the first place, the deliberate avoidance of any concession to the principles of grace and charm. All is bare, solid, and unfriendly; to impress at all it must make a massed attack; on a small scale this kind of building would be merely uninteresting. There is a tendency to avoid overhanging eaves and cornices with their suggestions of a protective and alluring shade—they would interfere with the designed impression. The best analogy for this new German style was furnished since the war broke out, when our newspapers began to publish illustrations of the enormous German siege guns with their muzzles pointing skyward. The German buildings I refer to give exactly the same impression of a blunt, truncated strength, aggressive and domineering—it is the howitzer style of architecture. The conception of physical force and mass are all that it seeks to convey. It is impossible not to see here the expression of a definite attitude of mind in modern Germany.

A nation's mind and character are always more faithfully expressed in its building than in any other art. But it must be remembered that the buildings here in question are mostly public works, and embody what one may call the public and official expression of national sentiment. It has, however, been the constant aim of German officialism to impress its sentiment upon the whole nation. But a study of contemporary German literature shows us that this has not been achieved with anything like the success that might at present be supposed. Hence the bitter complaints of writers like Treitschke, Bernhardi, Bülow and many others, of the 'defective patriotism' of the German people—complaints which must surprise those who do not know Germany from the inside, and who witness only the extraordinary unanimity and zeal produced by the sudden revelation of the hostile forces which German policy has called into action. These dangers have compelled the German people to put itself for the moment wholly in the hands of the autocracy. But it is impossible that it should not ultimately realise that the dangers against which the autocracy is endeavouring to shield the country are simply the creation of the autocracy itself. As Graf von Reventlow has pointed out in a recent important work ('Deutschlands auswärtige Politik, 1888–1913'), it was only with the greatest difficulty that the German people could be got to sanction the preparations of the naval chiefs for a challenge to the maritime supremacy of England. According to Bernhardi's estimate of his countrymen, 'no people is so little qualified to direct its own destinies.' But which was the more prescient and truly patriotic policy—that of the people, or that of the military party by whom they were despised and overborne? The answer is being written in letters of blood; and, when Germany has read it to the end, it can hardly be doubted that there is in the country a sufficient store of freedom, courage and sanity to ensure that German destinies shall never again be decided by irresponsible directors over the heads of the German people. The mind of this better Germany must be sought for in the neglected imaginative literature of the country. Those who seek it there will be rewarded in every way; not least by the discovery of points of contact, possibilities

of sympathy and understanding, which they would certainly never suspect from the kind of German literature which circumstances have made best known to us to-day.

T. W. ROLLESTON.

III.—GERMAN SCHOLARSHIP.

- In sheer straightforward professional erudition Germany easily leads the way. And the more professional the work is—the more it depends on labour, method and
- organisation—the more absolute and incontestable is her lead. This comes out most clearly in the great works of reference. It is Germany which publishes the *Corpus of Greek Inscriptions* and the *Corpus of Latin Inscriptions*; Germany which is now, or has been until lately,
- undertaking the great *Latin Thesaurus* and the best *Greek Lexicon*. For *Greek Grammar* there is no book in any other language which stands beside the four volumes of Kühner-Blass and Kühner-Gerth. There is
- no classical encyclopædia which, for thoroughness and mastery of the whole subject, can vie with the 'Real-encyclopædie' of Pauly-Wissowa, though in some ways the French work of Darenberg and Saglio is more convenient. No dictionary of mythology can compare with Roscher's 'Ausführliches Lexicon.' No manual of Greek or Roman religion is as comprehensive as the volumes of Iwan Müller's 'Handbuch' by Gruppe and Wissowa. Indeed that 'Handbuch' itself is, by English standards, an unapproached marvel.

If we take the great works of collection, the result is much the same. The fragments of the Pre-socratic Greek Philosophers have been recently edited by Diels, the fragments of the Stoics by von Arnim. Now in point of quality neither of these works could be pronounced superior to the late Prof. Bywater's edition of the fragments of Heraclitus; but, as collections, no work produced by another country could for a moment compete with either. The Epicurean fragments still need doing, but the material which the editor will use will be mostly the work of Germans—Usener's 'Epicurea,' Sudhaus's 'Philodemus' (based on English work at Herculaneum),

and divers lesser works, such as William's 'Diogenes of Oenoanda.' The 'Fragmenta Historicorum' have still to be sought in Karl Müller's Didot edition of 1848 and onward to 1885; the fragments of the tragedians in Nauck's admirable collection of 1884; the fragments of the Comedians in Kock and Meineke. In the issuing of cheap but well-executed texts of Greek and Latin authors of all periods the Teubners easily lead the way. The Oxford series of texts, though generally in detail better and more cautiously edited, does not cover nearly so wide a field. Again, a little series like Lietzmann's 'Kleine Texte' leaves one greatly impressed both by the excellence of the work and the large educational demand which the series seems to imply.

If we take works by a single author as our basis of comparison, the lead of Germany is not so marked. True, no one scholar in any other country can be compared for range and brilliancy with the Professor of Greek in Berlin, Ulric von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff. It would be hard to put any general Greek history, since Grote, on a level with Eduard Meyer's; or any book on style and language above Norden's 'Antike Kunstprosa.' Still there are books in English which clearly take the lead in their own subjects. In the matter of texts, for instance, the English Plato and the English Cicero are undoubtedly the best. I shrink from such personal comparisons; but, to take the recent work of one English University alone, it would be hard to find any German book on a kindred subject more learned and complete than Sir James Frazer's 'Pausanias,' or the account of 'Zeus, the Indo-European Sky-God,' by Mr A. B. Cook.

Lastly, one must not forget the periodical literature and the small dissertations. Here the German lead is enormous. I cannot find the actual figures, but I should judge that the bulk of specialist journals and magazines must be fully ten times as great in Germany as in England, and that of tracts and dissertations even more disproportionate. In quality it might be safe to pronounce that, as a rule, the English work shows sounder scholarship and less lack of judgment, while the German shows far more thoroughness and daring and power of research. But we must remember that these results

are largely caused by the university systems in vogue in the two countries. In Germany students, to get their degree, have to write, and often to publish, a thesis. In England they get their degree by a very hard and wide examination. To win teaching appointments in Germany a man has to publish a book and, probably, to plunge into a controversy; in Great Britain men are usually appointed on private evidence of their teaching capacity, intellect and general character. The Germans, therefore, tend to put most of their force into writing and publishing, the English into life and teaching.

Is there anything whatever to be said on the other side of this account? Anything in which English or French or Italian or American or Russian scholarship can be said to be equal or superior to that of Germany? I think there is. I will not lay stress on certain achievements which happen to be great but are not specially characteristic. The greatest advance of the past century in the realm of classical antiquity was, I suppose, the excavation of Cnossus, the work chiefly of an Englishman, Sir Arthur Evans. The next, perhaps, was the discovery of Egyptian papyri, where again the most important part has fallen to Englishmen, Dr Grenfell, Dr Hunt and Sir Frederick Kenyon. If Germany had been in occupation of Egypt or had obtained the permission to excavate at Cnossus, it is quite likely that Germans would have done the work as well or nearly as well; they could hardly have done it better. Much the same conclusion holds about Numismatics. The English habit of travel brought many collections of coins to this country in the 18th century; consequently a large amount of the work on coins has been done by Englishmen, and it is certainly not inferior in quality to the work of any other nation.

This point is worth dwelling upon for a moment. Great Britain is, on the whole, a somewhat silent member of the international comity of scholars. Her output is rather small, and sometimes it is hard to tell how much competence or incompetence her silence covers. Now the various excavations and the discoveries of papyri have, as it were, compelled her to speak. They have put suddenly into British hands new and enormous enigmas, each demanding its answer. And the answers received,

whether you take the case of Crete, of Sparta, of the Oxyrhyncus Papyri or any similar test, have been obviously and undeniably in the very first rank of competence. For my own part, I can hardly imagine a severer or more searching test of any scholar's knowledge of Greece and Greek, than to make him edit for the first time a mass of unsifted fragments of papyrus out of an ancient rubbish-heap.

These branches of work, therefore, give us reason for confidence in the general adequacy of English scholarship; and one may, perhaps, in all humility, raise the question whether there is any region or any aspect of scholarship in which Great Britain can actually claim a superiority over Germany. It is easy to deceive oneself in such matters, but the point on which I would lay stress is this. If, instead of looking merely at the effectiveness of the book, we try to estimate some quality in the mind of the writer, the comparison will come out in a very different way. The quality in question may be some form of what in England is called 'scholarship'; it may be something much wider. For instance, I have said above that the best Greek Grammar is that of Kühner-Blass-Gerth. But supposing I wanted guidance on some very delicate point of Greek usage, and was looking for some one with a subtle *flair* and feeling for the language, there are two Americans and also certain English people whom I would consult in preference. Where a thing can be ascertained and proved, and the instances counted, I go to the German; where it is a question of feeling, no. This difference goes along with a great difference in method. In England we write Greek and Latin, both prose and verse. In Germany the best scholars have a great command of fluent Latin and can often speak it without hesitation; but otherwise they are not good at 'composition.' I have certainly had undergraduate pupils who wrote better Greek prose and incomparably better Greek verse than any German known to me, except, perhaps, two. Germans do not write Greek verses; they write books on Greek 'Metrik.' They aim more at knowing; we at feeling and understanding. They are professionals, we are amateurs.

An institution like the Greek and Latin Verse competitions in the 'Westminster Gazette'—competitions

sometimes won by elderly K.C.s and Indian civilians as well as by dons and schoolmasters—may or may not be defensible as a social fact, but it certainly shows an attitude of mind towards the classics which is characteristically English. Scholarship with us is an art rather than a science, though, of course, like other arts it has its scientific basis. It is even expected to form an integral part of character; it helps to make 'a scholar and a gentleman.' And, if one tries to analyse that old-fashioned phrase, assuredly the 'scholar' is one who feels certain beauties and delicacies, not merely one who knows many recondite facts. We may put the same distinction from another point of view. Both nations, of course, use classical study mainly as a general foundation on which the later practice of the literary and learned professions is based. But it would seem that in England the study of the classics has conserved to a greater extent this general and foundational character; in Germany, it was either dropped or became professional. From what I can make out, I do not suppose it would be possible to find in Germany men like Mr Gladstone, Mr Asquith, Lord Bryce, Lord Cromer, Lord Halsbury, Lord Morley, and many others, statesmen in the first rank of public life who read and enjoy their Homer and Plato and Lucretius. The corresponding German phenomenon would, perhaps, be a specialist professor who might be given a title and commissioned to write a pamphlet about some political question. With us the statesman, in many cases, is a good Greek and Latin scholar and takes an interest in ancient studies. With them the professor is apt to be decorated and produced in public with *éclat* when he is wanted.

We may illustrate the strength and weakness of German professional scholarship, at its average level, by two concrete cases. There is an ancient writer of choliambics named Phoinix of Colophon, represented to us by some five quotations, mostly in Athenæus. Some further fragments have recently been found on a papyrus. The total comes to about one hundred complete or nearly complete verses and another hundred very fragmentary. This small amount of moderately interesting verse has been edited by Dr Gerhard of Heidelberg in a book of three hundred pages, full of

learning, replete with parallel passages from all parts of Greek literature, and leading up to some generally sound conclusions. I read the book with much interest and profit. But the editor's first task, of course, was to treat the text and, where possible, emend it. And in this task, which an average English scholar would not have thought difficult, the learned man makes mere 'howlers.' In line 41 he emends ἀπιστή γε πάντων, making a spondee in the fourth foot; in 39 ὦ γε θαύμαστον, making an impossible position of γε; and in 40 ἐν θηρίοισι σιλλαίνειν, again making a spondee in the fourth foot and inventing a new verb to do it with. I write this not in order to attack Dr Gerhard. The book is a valuable book. Few English scholars could have collected so much learning on so limited a subject; but no English scholar would have undertaken the task without much more complete scholarship.

Take, again, the work of a distinguished and fertile writer like Dr Nicholas Wecklein. Wecklein has been doing school editions of Greek tragedies for some thirty years, as well as other valuable work. Whenever I lecture on a play I get the Wecklein edition, if it exists; and probably most English scholars do the same. The editions are admirably thorough. Parallel passages, grammatical explanations, MS. readings, discussions of the development of the myth are all fully given. Yet there is hardly one volume which does not occasionally make a competent English Greek scholar smile. Perhaps we cannot write such good books, but we certainly would not write such bad ones. Sometimes it is a mere blunder in verse-writing—an emendation violating Porson's canon, or the like; sometimes it is a general lack of perception; sometimes it is a violent rewriting of the text because the editor has not understood it. I remember a competition being held for the worst emendation of a Greek text that any of those present could recall. Wecklein won, perhaps unjustly, both the first and the second prize. His books are more useful, more learned, more methodical, and vastly more numerous, than, let us say, the works of Professor Butcher or Professor A. Croiset; yet one feels that his mind compared with Croiset's or Butcher's is like that of an industrious journeyman compared with an artist.

The professional against the amateur; the specialist professor against the 'scholar and gentleman'—these two antitheses take us a long way in understanding the general difference between German and English scholarship. We are always aiming at culture—in Arnold's sense, not Bernhardt's; they are aiming at research or achievement. The weaker sort of scholar on both sides shows the contrast best. The weaker English scholar has probably a certain small number of great classical books, which he knows pretty nearly by heart and expounds in lectures or lessons which are sound as far as they go, but devoid of intellectual curiosity; he can also write prose and verse in the classical languages with a good deal of taste and a slight deficiency of exact knowledge. At the end of his life he will have added nothing to our knowledge of his subject, but he may have made a number of other people read some great literature and study some fine and intricate structures of language with a fair amount of appreciation and thoroughness. The weaker sort of German will set himself to some obscure piece of work which can be achieved by industry without understanding, and which, to the best of his belief, no one has yet done. (If some one has already done it, war ensues; war of an outspoken bitterness which is out of fashion in Great Britain.) There are many such jobs which can be performed by collecting instances of the occurrence of a particular phenomenon in a given author, or even by reading and cataloguing articles in learned periodicals. And the results of such studies are often valuable.

I have taken the weaker type of scholar on both sides to point my antithesis. If one took the best scholars in England and Germany one would, of course, not find these weaknesses. No one could dream of saying that such men as Wilamowitz and Blass and Norden do not know their Greek literature. They know it up and down, in and out, and with a range that could probably not be equalled by any Hellenist of the last two or three generations in England. And one can think of some English scholars who would be hard to beat either in their exact professional learning or in their knowledge of periodical literature.

Prof. von Wilamowitz stands rather apart from

other German scholars. (I have even heard him say in his wrath that the only hope for the future of Greek scholarship was in England.) He has doubtless the imperiousness and energy of the Prussian noble, but he has the passion and imagination of the Slav. He is impatient, brilliant, original, magnificent, unmethodical, a man of genius as well as of enormous learning. He covers a vast field and sometimes splashes superbly into subjects that are not quite his own. He has on occasion made resounding blunders—apparently from sheer haste, because his scholarship is really above reproach. His references are continually a line or two wrong; at times it almost looks as if, instead of verifying his quotations, he was merely trusting to a colossal memory. His sheer learning and technical skill would put him in the front rank of European savants; it would be hard to mention any living scholar who could compare with him. But he adds to his learning a number of gifts which belong rather to the amateur than the professional; vitality, eternal freshness, a real sense of literature and a power of entering into and expounding the thoughts of a poet. And he is never betrayed into wildness or eccentricity. His range reminds one of Hermann; his vitality of Bentley; his sense of literature perhaps of Dr Verrall.

I can recall two German criticisms of English scholarship which tell an interesting tale. One was an obituary notice of Sir Richard Jebb, which concluded by the pronouncement that 'as a philolog he was nothing,' but that as a statesman and man of affairs he commanded the highest respect. The judgment was not dictated by mere perversity. The critic judged a 'philolog' by his achieved 'Forschung,' by the mass of his actual discoveries; and such 'Forschung' was not Jebb's line. On the other hand, the critic found, as a kind of by-product of Jebb's activity, a considerable amount of public work, especially on educational questions, performed with an ease and familiarity and mastery of ordinary political conditions which genuinely astonished him. He failed to appreciate one side of Jebb's work and was honestly dazzled by the other. The second criticism in my mind is a review of Miss Jane Harrison's 'Prolegomena,' which enquired in a bewildered manner what sort of a book it was and what public it could possibly be meant for? For

Fachgenossen? No, because it was full of imaginative writing and *belles lettres*, and it gave translations, and even poetical translations, of the passages which it cited from Greek authors. For the 'ordinary public'? No, because it was full of learning and argument and new theories which could only be followed by a specialist in Greek. There was no public in Germany, said the critic, which would read such a book.

I am inclined to think that the difference here indicated goes deep. There have been several books produced of recent years in England of which one could say this: they are the work of professional scholars possessed of much exact learning and a decided spirit of research, yet the moving impulse which produced the books is really the impulse of an artist. For example, the writings of Mr Cornford, Mr A. E. Zimmern, Mr R. W. Livingstone, Mr Edwyn Bevan's 'Stoics and Cynics,' Mr J. A. K. Thomson's 'Studies in the Odyssey,' to say nothing of older works like some by Mr Mackail or Mr Warde Fowler; all these are books that stand as much by their sense of beauty and their imaginative suggestiveness as by the particular conclusions which they try to prove. Yet they are all of them works of definitely technical and professional scholars, men who would probably dally with the thought of suicide if guilty in public of a false quantity or a grammatical blunder. Such books represent an ideal quite different from that of Jebb or Conington, who wrote good editions of the classics in good English and with thorough intelligence, but not from an artistic impulse; and equally different from that of J. A. Symonds, who wrote artistic criticism of Greek poetry with no pretence to professional scholarship or research.

The nearest class of German books would be, perhaps, the best works of popularisation. Schwartz's two volumes of 'Charakterköpfe aus der Antiken Literatur' are very good and the work of a fine scholar. But they have not much actual beauty of thought or writing about them, and they have not the spirit of research. The author tells us his results, he does not try to lead us groping on. Wendland's 'Hellenistisch-Römische Kultur' is a wonderfully competent, valuable and interesting book; it has the charm of research in it as well as an

extraordinary command of relevant information. So has Seeck's '*Geschichte des Untergangs der Antiken Welt*,' a book, whatever its faults, which has a real mind behind it. But neither book begins to make the particular artistic or spiritual effort which is at the heart of the English books mentioned above. The Germans of an older generation, like Winckelmann and Schlegel, did pre-eminently make such an effort. The famous Nietzsche, before he gave up Greek and went a-whoring after false philosophies, did some fine work of this character, half-creative and half-critical, but decidedly illuminating. At the present time I can think of only one German who makes this particular effort—Schultz, who writes on '*Ionische Philosophie*' and on '*Gnosis*.' But he cannot control his impulse. It only leaves him hashing his authorities and passionately floundering in his explanations, and German scholars in general treat him severely. Of course I do not say that English scholars in general approve of this quality which I have ascribed to certain English books. They illustrate a tendency, and a tendency which may be dangerous, for the writer to use his whole mind in his work and not to limit and stunt himself. The true specialist ruthlessly cuts away every interest that may interrupt his particular work, and sets his achievement above his personal development.

In Germany there is more devotion and more loss of proportion. More people are willing to spend their lives in narrow and absorbed pursuit of some object which, viewed in cold blood, possesses no very great importance and no particular illumination or beauty. In England there is more humanity, more interest in life, more common sense, and, as an almost inevitable consequence, less one-sided devotion and less industry. Browning's grammarian would be more at home in Germany. He would be decorated and made a '*Geheimrath*.'

GILBERT MURRAY

IV.—MODERN GERMAN HISTORIANS.

THE admirable work * in which Mr Gooch surveys the historiography of the 19th century reminds us not only of the extent to which the thought and knowledge of the world is indebted to the labours of historical students, but also of the catholicity and interconnexion of the historical movement. No country can claim a monopoly. Every country has made contributions corresponding to its wealth of scientific equipment and reflecting the characteristics of its peculiar genius. It cannot even be said that the primacy goes unchallenged; for, if in the fifties and sixties, when Sybel, Mommsen, Haüsser, Droysen, and Giesebrecht were at the height of their powers, the pride of place unquestionably belonged to the Germans, in the last decade of the century the most brilliant galaxy of historical talent was undoubtedly to be found on the banks, not of the Spree but of the Seine. Here the student might listen to Renan on the Hebrew Text of the Old Testament, to Sorel on European diplomacy, to Paul Meyer and Gaston Paris on the medieval literature of the Romance nations, to Viollet on the history of law, and to Aulard on the annals of the French Revolution. Taine was completing his brilliant historical work in the *Origins of Contemporary France*. Vandal, Houssaye, and Masson were illustrating the Napoleonic age in a style which suffered little from the rich abundance of material. Luchaire was already famous as the most finished exponent of French municipal antiquities. Rambaud and Anatole Leroy-Beaulieu were established authorities on Russia. Hanotaux and Lavisse were widely known, the one for an unfinished fragment of high quality on the age of Louis XIV, the other for a series of valuable contributions to Prussian history as well as for his general powers as a teacher. Among the younger generation Langlois and Bémont were attracting notice for the solidity of their medieval studies; and, when a 'Soutenance de thèse' was held at the École des Chartes, the great Léopold Delisle would preside over the jury,

* 'History and Historians in the Nineteenth Century'; Longmans, 1913. Cf. Fueter, 'Geschichte der neuern Historiographie'; Munich, Oldenburg, 1911.

bringing from the Bibliothèque Nationale such a sum of minute and exact medieval scholarship as can seldom have been gathered in a single brain.

There is, however, a sense in which the 19th century may be claimed for the German historians, for not only was the critical treatment of authorities greatly developed in Germany, but in sheer volume of printed matter the Germans easily distance their competitors. It is, however, important to observe that the competence of the Germans in historical study is a fact of comparatively recent date. No English contemporary of Charles James Fox would ever have thought of Germany as a source of historical illumination. No German of that age would have looked to his own countrymen to furnish him with a history in the grand style. 'Read Burke,' wrote Stein to Gneisenau, 'it is the breviary of all wisdom'; and again, 'English literature especially deserves to be known because it furnishes us with the best historians.' Even if we take account of the preliminary work of editing and publishing chronicles and documents, in which the Germans have now acquired so great a mastery, there was in those days nothing anywhere comparable, for the imposing mass of its achievement, with the patient labours of the French Benedictines. 'Your bold progress,' wrote Ranke to Waitz in 1838, 'evokes my greatest sympathy and joy. You are treading the paths of Baluze and Mabillon.' That is a significant compliment.

The true historical awakening of Germany sprang out of the Napoleonic wars; and the movement has never lost all traces of its origin. German historians have been what the political history of their country has made them. They have been opposed to doctrinaire radicalism because it is the creation of the French Revolution. They have been liberal because they hated the French despot and saw in the development of constitutional liberties a guarantee for national power. Fervent advocates of Prussian expansion, they favoured the exclusion of Austria from the German confederation, facing such ridicule as might attach to the label of 'Little Germans,' and losing no opportunity of exposing the waste of national power involved in the political disunion of their country. Since a military monarchy

was a distinguishing mark of Prussia, they combined with their constitutional liberalism a strong faith in the Hohenzollern dynasty, whose services to the German cause they depicted with romantic enthusiasm.

The patriarch of all this historical movement was a Danish administrator, who being called to Berlin a little before the battle of Jena was entrusted with the direction of the Bank of Prussia. Niebuhr was a competent financier, a master of twenty languages, and the most profound and various scholar of his age. It is customary (though not entirely exact) to speak of him as a pioneer in critical method, and as, in a sense, the founder of scientific history as that term is now understood. But the real importance of Niebuhr in the intellectual development of Germany does not consist in his learning or in his critical acumen or in his application of philological tests to decide historical problems; for in the generation of Wolf, Boeck, Savigny and Grimm there was no lack of learned scepticism in Germany, and the Homeric poems had suffered violence before Niebuhr laid sacrilegious hands on Livy. It consists rather in his political spirit. He was the first of the Germans to approach history from the angle of a modern statesman and to discover in the past a discipline for character and a guide for public action. Thus the learning which gave to Niebuhr's Roman history an authoritative place in our English Universities until it was deposed by Mommsen is not really its chief title to be remembered. The learning commended but did not constitute the message. For Niebuhr the true interest of the history of Latium was that, presenting as it did 'a model of national development,' it served as an example to his adopted country of the methods by which a small people may achieve greatness. Even as Rome had gathered all Italy under her sway by a resolute exercise of prudence and courage, so might Prussia, shaking off the foreign tyrant and incarnating all that was valiant and manly in the German spirit, unite the scattered fragments of the German Federation under her rule.

The impetus, once given, continued through the century, gaining volume as it went and bringing to the academic prophets of German unity and Prussian

power an influence over public opinion which no prodigies of cold science could have secured. It was not so much the political doctrine which mattered, as the patriotic feeling and the stimulus to national self-respect. From the historians Germany gained a loving, perhaps exalted, sense of her former greatness. She learned how in the distant past the Germans had broken down the Roman Empire, founded dynasties in France, Italy, England, Africa and Spain, and refashioned the face of Europe. This people, laid helpless at the feet of Napoleon, had once been the great conquering and imperial nation of Europe. A German Emperor had ruled in Arles, and the Netherlands too had been part of his domain. The old epics and songs, the old chronicles and legal customs, were made the framework for an infinite labour of affectionate embroidery. In Giesebrecht's eloquent and learned pages young people could read the romance of the Medieval Empire, of that great and tempestuous effusion of German chivalry which for many centuries filled Europe with its noise, and ultimately suffered the ruinous check which fate administers to those who chase shadows.

All this exuberant stirring of national sentiment, though it often led to the expression of unripe opinion, was quite consistent with scrupulous workmanship. For the greater part of the century Ranke, 'that discreet and disinterested servant of the Prussian monarchy,' provided an admirable exemplar of historical impartiality. His governing idea of the individuality of peoples grew out of a temperamental opposition to the French theory of a Universal Republic or Empire; and it was his main interest in history to define the distinctive character of each national group and then to describe their mutual action and interaction at the moments of universal history. The spirit of those alert and lively Venetian *relazione*, the importance of which he was the first to discover, seems to have entered into this gentle and curious Saxon aristocrat. Wherever he moves—and he moves everywhere—he is always elegant, dexterous, well-mannered. Even the tempest of 1870 did not discompose him; and, while the guns were booming at Gravelotte and Sédan, Ranke was describing the origins of the Seven Years' War with the sobriety of a judge. The

hotter tempers of Germany did not appreciate this Olympian detachment.

Ranke, however, lived to be a miraculous survival of an earlier age. The dynamic forces during the later half of the century were men of a very different type from that band of patriot scholars, of whom Dahlmann may be taken as a conspicuous example, whose life hopes had been crushed by the failure of the constitutional movement of '48. Mommsen, the greatest of all the new professors of 'Real-politik,' had begun life as a journalist, was even concerned in the disorders of the revolutionary period, and never ceased to manifest a fiery interest in the politics of the day. Always a liberal, and even after 1870 a vigorous opponent of Bismarck in the sphere of domestic policy, Mommsen was at the same time a convinced and passionate imperialist. Whereas Niebuhr had regarded the foundation of the Roman Empire as 'one of the most afflicting spectacles in history,' for Mommsen it was the salvation of the world, and its creator was the only man of genius produced by Rome. The 'Römische Geschichte' was first published in 1854, and took the world by storm, not merely for its vigorous eloquence, its hard firm outline and massive knowledge, but also as a brilliant incarnation of the spirit of Prussian imperialism. An apology for Cæsarism so thoroughgoing and confident had never been pronounced by a scholar entitled to a hearing. The old idols of Republicanism were swept down with a contemptuous gesture, Cato as a vain and tragical fool, Cicero as a despicable charlatan of the journalist tribe. The ideals of the aristocratic Republic were treated as beneath observation, for, as M. Guillard aptly remarks, 'le vaincu pour Mommsen a toujours tort.' The great scholar was on safer ground when in later life he evolved the history of the Empire from the inscriptions, for here his survey was unblotted by the clouds of passion. But the earlier and more famous work is another illustration of Lessing's witty saying that nobody ever writes the history of any age but his own.

A younger contemporary of Mommsen brought historical studies into more intimate relations with German politics. Heinrich von Sybel, a Westphalian by birth but a Prussian by adoption, was primarily a

publicist, holding in common with Seeley that history should be practical and the historical workshop a laboratory of political hygiene. His own opinions, which were of the National Liberal type, vehemently Prussian and Protestant, were held and enunciated with great vigour during a long and busy life. As a political pamphleteer he was certainly unequalled in his generation, for he took large views and was the master of a manly and robust style, sometimes touched with irony and always marked by conviction. His best short pieces denounced the Medieval Empire as an extravagant and disastrous folly, and (at some expense of historic justice) depicted Austria as the destroyer and Prussia as the constant champion of German interests. But his fame rested upon two long historical books, each of which in a sense marked an epoch. We do not now read Sybel's 'French Revolution,' which was in truth a political pamphlet designed to unmask the baseness and cruelty of the French, the cowardice and treachery of Austria, and the loyal courses of the Prussian monarchy in a distracted age. We do not read it, partly because its political estimates are biassed, and partly because the book is dull and heavy, wanting alike in psychological insight and graphic power. But nevertheless we have all profited by Von Sybel's admirable researches. He was the first historian to attempt a complete study of the documentary evidence for the Revolution, the first to bring out the importance of the Polish question as a factor determining the course of European affairs, and the first who paid serious attention to the economic side of revolutionary history.

His second long work, on the 'Foundation of the German Empire,' being an unstinted eulogy of Bismarck, earned for him the dislike of the present Emperor, and exclusion from the Archives of Berlin. The brief to which he wrote would have perplexed a moralist, but Sybel was too hardened a Prussian to permit himself the luxury of a fastidious conscience. He defends the second partition of Poland and is at elaborate pains to argue the Prussian case for the annexation of the Danish Duchies. Von Roon, who was a blunt soldier, did not see the need of professorial apologies. 'The question of the Duchies,' he said truly, 'is not a question

of right but a question of force, and we have the force.' To rob first and excuse afterwards was the classical process whereby Prussia had grown, and the successful thief was always more honoured than his apologist. 'Je prends d'abord,' said Frederic II; 'je trouverai toujours des pédants pour prouver mes droits'; and Bismarck had no more difficulty in finding his pedant than the robber of genius who established the greatness of Prussia on the stolen provinces of Silesia and Posen.

The graphic quality, which is so singularly lacking in Sybel, was amply supplied in the work of a deaf and passionate Saxon who has been described by some as the Macaulay and by others as the Carlyle of Germany. Heinrich von Treitschke was a man entirely devoid of some properties commonly held to be essential to the adequate writing of history. He was generally lashed up to a white heat of indignation, and consistently insulting to large and respectable bodies of the genus Man—to the English and French nations, to the Jewish race, and to all who professed socialist or radical opinions. Violent in his capacity for theological execration—for he preached his political doctrines with fanaticism—he created misgivings among many German scholars, including Ranke, who drew a line between the publicist and the historian. But the man was a genius. His history of the German confederation from 1815 to 1848 is one of the most delightful and brilliant achievements of modern prose literature. The little courts and the big courts, the wandering idealising students with their patriotic songs, their duels, their gymnastic clubs and sentimental absurdities, the newspaper men and the junkers, the special characteristics of manner, physique and tradition by which the inhabitants of one part of Germany may be distinguished from another—all this and much more he paints for us with such wealth of illustration, such vitality, and so easy a mastery of men and things, that there is no other historical book upon any period from which Germany and all that Germany means can be so well understood.

So far I have spoken of Treitschke merely as a lively descriptive artist, but Treitschke was a great deal more; he was not even principally an artist, and of course still less a man of science. If we wish to classify this

astonishing master of eloquence, we must think of him as a prophet, delivering, as all true prophets must, one message and one message only to his age, and repeating himself now in one form, now in another, but always on a sustained note of fiery and even reckless intellectual courage. And the message was in essence identical with the creed of Mommsen, Droysen, Sybel—the necessity for a strong Germany, united under the Prussian sceptre and informed by the Prussian spirit.

Of this doctrine Treitschke was certainly the most influential, even if he was not the most learned, exponent. His lectures at Berlin, spiced with malicious sallies at the English, the Jews and the socialists, were one of the established entertainments of the capital and widely celebrated in the student world of at least six nations. Nobody could complain that the Professor's teaching was lacking in the quality of directness. He knew exactly where he stood and whither he intended to lead his flock. A single idea informed his whole teaching. If he praised Hegel as the 'first political head among the German philosophers,' it was because the Hegelian philosophy glorified the State. If Byron was held up as a shining example to cosmopolitan decadents like Heine, it was because 'to the banished aristocrat England still remained the first country in the globe.' The State was the ultimate good, patriotism the supreme virtue; and the main problem for the teacher was to develop the State-sense in a people remarkably deficient in political coherence. What matter if there were some exaggeration? To a nation like the German the call of the State must be bawled through a megaphone.

In the light of this governing principle, common to Aristotle, Machiavelli and Hegel, Treitschke expounded the ethics of German imperialism to a generation steadily becoming more and more conscious of its inner unity, its military strength, and its great future in the world. He did not hesitate to glorify war as a necessary and elevating influence on national progress, and at all times and seasons preached with reverential emotion the gospel of material power. For Prussia his enthusiasm knew no bounds, for he held that she had performed every great achievement in German politics since the Peace of Westphalia. The true test of a man, as of a nation,

was capacity for sacrifice. But if we ask the oracle to what ultimate end, we obtain no very clear or satisfactory response.

That Treitschke has been the principal literary organ of a very brutal type of imperialism should not blind us to the many elements of real moral grandeur contained in the body of his writing. Perverted, overstrained, violently prejudiced, as he undoubtedly was, nobody has paid more unstinted reverence to the proud and heroic forms of human temperament. And the example of Carlyle is sufficient to show that a philosophy of politics fundamentally opposed to the specific Christian virtues may be so held and propagated as to exercise, upon the whole, a fortifying influence on the brain and will by bringing into relief the sterner beauties of human character, by insisting on the seriousness of life, and by exciting a more active sense of its duties and responsibilities. So it was with Treitschke, who, with less of mystic depth, had more of practical sense and elasticity than Carlyle. The generation for which he wrote welcomed and needed the stimulus of his genius; and, though in many ways his influence is greatly to be deplored, in others it was good, not only as giving to the study of politics a large and imaginative outlook, but also because it helped to arouse an intelligent interest in the conduct of public affairs.

The present constitution of the German Empire, with its unequal federalism, its Prussian predominance, its aristocratic social structure, its vast system of militarism combined with universal suffrage, is so anomalous a mixture of medieval and modern principles that, were it not for the fact that Professors in Germany are state servants, we might be surprised at its having received a general measure of academic assent. Treitschke, like Alexander Hamilton, would have preferred a unitary state to a federation and was ill-pleased with the Reichstag. Yet, upon the whole, being at once aristocrat, militarist and monarchist, he was well satisfied with the polity as it finally left the shaping hands of Bismarck. As we learn from Mr Davis' excellent volume,* his early enthusiasm for liberty grew cooler with the passage

* H. W. C. Davis, 'The Political Thought of Treitschke'; Constable, 1914.

of years. Free education, local self-government, a free acceptance of reasonable laws by the citizens of a national state—such was the ultimate residuum of his liberalism. For party strife and parliamentary government he cherished an infinite contempt, and regarded such institutions as entirely unfit for Germany.

Indeed part of his intellectual activity was devoted to combating the notion, which was not uncommon in the middle years of the last century, that the political salvation of Germany was to be found in English Constitutionalism. This or something like it had been the belief of the great Dahlmann, Treitschke's master in history and the creator of the still-born Constitution of 1848. And it was because English liberalism was at once so seductive and yet so incompatible with the Prussian spirit, that all who stood near to the mind of Bismarck determined to discredit it with every weapon at their command. How basely the campaign was conducted by their hero is concealed in many volumes by Sybel but amply revealed by the voluble Busch. Nor can we be surprised if the professor of patriotic history in Berlin did not fall short of his political chieftain in his efforts to weaken that sentimental attraction of the Germans to England which was 'really a deadly sin, nothing less than the sin against the Holy Ghost.' In this congenial operation Treitschke was assisted first by the patent sympathy of the English people for the Danes in the affair of the Duchies and then by the English neutrality during the Franco-Prussian War. That Great Britain should refuse to strike in with Prussia appeared to him a crowning demonstration of baseness. 'The lust for mammon,' he writes, 'has stifled every feeling of honour, every feeling of right and wrong; cowardice and sensuality take shelter behind that wondrous theological rhetoric which to us free German heretics is the most repulsive of all the defects in the English character. We seem to hear that reverend snuffle when we see the English press turn up pious eyes full of indignation against the unchristian and warlike nations of the Continent.'

In so viewing history from the strictly patriotic and nationalist standpoint, without the barest attempt to understand either the general complex of international relations or the great and inspiring features of alien

civilisations, Treitschke was unfaithful to that high tradition of scientific detachment which earned for the leading historians of Germany their wide audience and honourable name in Europe. But, if his object was to stamp a particular set of political views upon the main body of his countrymen, he may be pronounced to have been brilliantly successful. His picture of England was not more malevolent than Michelet's; but, being less fanciful and executed in a series of strong confident strokes, it was far more telling with the public. The selfish island power, impervious to heroic ideals, which had stolen an empire while the world was asleep; the tyrant of the seas, the modern Carthage, the upholder of a barbarous system of international law; the land of hypocrites and shopmen, preaching and canting, yet buying cheap and selling dear and lusting for a 'Cotton millennium'; the secular perturber of European peace, against whose insidious diplomacy the unvarnished simplicity of German nature would be for ever, save for some heroic remedy, exposed in unequal conflict; a nation brutalised by sport, demoralised by the obscuration of its ancient aristocracy, patently loose in patriotic principle and organic cohesion—such was the estimate of our people which he drew for Germany, and which in the lower regions of German opinion found an only too easy acceptance.

It would be unjust not to admit that there are many passages in Treitschke's writings which present a true appreciation of the more sublime qualities of the British genius, as also of some political virtues of the more ordinary stamp. But in general it may be said that his capacity for appreciating Englishmen steadily declined with his own advance in years, and that the England of his admiration was finally interred in 1832. In language both plain and emphatic he indicated his opinion that some time or other Carthage would cross the path of Rome, and that, though the struggle might be long and difficult, self-interest would be vanquished by valour and the purse defeated by the sword.

It would have been surprising and even discreditable if so great an event as the foundation of the German Empire, with its amazing procession of military triumphs and its great exaltation of patriotic feeling, had left no

impression on the historical literature of Germany. And in fact the impression has been profound, the political process directing the pen of the writers, and the writers in turn shaping the public mind to appreciate and extend the process. Indeed it is not too much to say that the historians of the Prussian school have been the principal architects of the political creed of modern Germany. They have exalted material power and belittled the empire of moral sentiments. They have applauded war as an instrument of progress and national hygiene. Holding that aggression is a symptom of vigour, and vigour the sign manual of political virtue, they have championed every violation of right which has subserved the aggrandisement of Prussia. They have scorned small states because they were small and have applauded big states because they were big. And in their violent but not unnatural reaction against the quietism and happy contemplation of that old pleasant Germany for which Mozart wrote music and Goethe verse, and which still holds Europe in its manifold enchantment, they have exaggerated with Teutonic thoroughness the brutal side of politics as a thing much to be respected and a talisman calculated to conduct their too kindly fellow-countrymen into an Elysium of indefinite ease and self-respect.

If we have thus concentrated our attention on the political historians of the Prussian school and on the important share which they have taken in shaping the public mind of their countrymen, it is from no failure to recognise that there is more than one department of historical study in Germany and more than one type of German historian. Even in the narrower sphere of political history the case for South Germany has not gone entirely by default, as Baumgarten's criticisms of Treitschke remind us; and books are still written by professors of modern history under the good old rubric of scientific serenity. Meanwhile outside the regions of modern polemic the indefatigable industry of the German race continues to make valuable contributions to the sum of knowledge. If the exploration of the papyri is for the most part carried on in London and Oxford, the greatest living historian of antiquity is a German. Liebermann, a Jewish scholar it is true, has given us

the best edition of the Anglo-Saxon laws, Krumbacher the only Byzantine bibliography; and, in the sphere of Biblical criticism, German scholarship, though no longer without serious rivalry, is still sufficiently active to provoke a reproof from the Imperial partner in the Divine concern. But, while it is important not to minimise our continuing indebtedness to German historical science, it is equally necessary to avoid overstatement. The Germans have been pioneers in the organisation of learned enterprise, but have nothing better of their kind than the dictionaries associated with the names of Murray, Stephen and Lee. They created the academic study of history, but are now equalled, if not surpassed, by the severe and polished standards of Paris. The countrymen of Savigny can still boast of great legal antiquaries, but of none so brilliant as Maitland and Esmein. Ihering was a genius, one of the rare Germans who have sown original and fruitful ideas; yet it will be generally admitted that in range and illumination and fertility Maine was his superior. Indeed, if we weigh the historical product of the nations not by the brute mass of knowledge which it contains but by the quality of its insight, the true balance of its judgment, the wealth of its original perceptions, the charm and brilliance of its manner, we shall find ourselves asking questions which, in the interests of the international comity of scholars, had better not be asked, and will not confidently be answered. Was Stubbs as learned as Waitz, and yet more actual? Has anybody equalled De Tocqueville in social analysis? What historian is fairer than Lecky, wiser than Gardiner, more imaginative than Carlyle, more full of threads to guide than Guizot, more brilliant in narrative than Macaulay and Vandal? Among the many excellent German historians of Greece is there a political judgment as massive as Grote's? We cannot dogmatise, but this at least we know, that whoever would pass from the ancient to the modern world must tread that great Roman causeway the stones of which were so soundly laid by the genius of an Englishman some hundred and fifty years ago, that neither the traffic of scholars, nor any sudden tempest in the climate of intellect, is likely to leave it cracked and unserviceable.

H. A. L. FISHER.

Art. 2.—'WHITE WOLF' IN KANSU.*

VERY different is the outlook of one who is actually drifting amid tempests, from that of him who sits comfortably at home and reads about them connectedly and in composure. As one wanders on from frightened town to frightened town, encircled by rumours black and terrible from every quarter, life becomes a hand-to-mouth affair, where the threatened evil of to-day is quite sufficient. One's horizon of information is bounded by a radius of fifty miles, and everything beyond is wrapped in a darkness that one has neither power nor leisure to illuminate. One sees history in the making from a small and personal angle; of the great events that go to make it outside, one gleans no hint as they happen, and the small things that help to compose the great become the daily anxieties and pivots of existence. Consequently, from a point so close at hand, details loom larger than the whole landscape viewed from afar; and one's chronicle of experiences, though wholly incomplete in knowledge, wholly local and self-centred, yet has an actuality, a growing force, beyond the reach of luckier people before whom the full tale of events lies fresh and hot-pressed on their breakfast-table every day. These may gather in the columns of the press a convenient bird's eye prospect of mankind from China to Peru; but the connected history they glean, with the daily addition of every rumour and proclamation throughout the Empire, can never have quite the savour of the local rumours and tragedies, on a knowledge of which one's life perpetually depends, till the forgotten outer world of kings and emperors and republics fades utterly away before the imminent problem of the White Wolf's proximity to oneself.

Long ere this, facts and fictions of recent China have been clearly set forth for every English reader; and Chinese news, which has not even faintly penetrated as yet to the Thibetan border, is stale and cold long since at English dinner-tables. Yet, in the vast panorama, many a detail may seem small that on the spot bulks

* This paper was written in Kansu last summer (Editor).

huge; and some very ghastly work has lately been doing in these far corners of Kansu, which probably, compressed into a few small lines at the bottom of a column, has quite eluded popular notice, or may have seemed as remote and meaningless and trifling as would the sack of Magdeburg to the monks of Taprobane. Yet here they have their weight; and the ten thousand rotting dead in the streets of Taotchow lie heavier on the scale than the fate of the Dragon Throne itself.

We slipped out of Sian-fu just in time, scudding westward on the fringe of the advancing storm. The great Imperial city, foul with the dust of death, was all in a tumult of terror, seething in convulsion like a boiling pot. The Wolf was advancing; he was at hand; he was a ruthless bandit; he was a nice gentlemanly person whom Mission ladies expressed a wish to meet. The situation darkened; and the Mission ladies changed their views, when they heard the tales of Lao-ho-kou and Kint-ze-kwan. The troops were disaffected, their arms medieval, their leaders corrupt as they. And still the Wolf drew nearer; the City of the Peaceful West was a place of howling storm. In all probability we were the last Europeans to be allowed by the Yamen to leave the capital in any direction. For, in the increasing danger, all the ruffians of Shensi were agog for some haymaking of their own; and the shadow of grave peril lay even over the highway of the border. Permission to start was hardly wrung from the authorities, responsible as they were for our safety, and commendably anxious to assure it, on risk of their own heads. Wrung it was, however, in the end; and means of conveyance secured by diplomacy, our chartered mules being hidden in our yard till the moment of departure, lest the soldiers should commandeer them to their own use, as they certainly would, had they known the opportunity.

On a sunny afternoon we slipped out of Sian, leaving behind us an imminent sense of danger, and escaping gladly to a freer air, westward, at least, of the Wolf, and where the worst of the threatened perils were vague and shadowy. Our last news, as we left, was local; we learned that the mule-broker responsible for our caravan had been seized by the soldiers on our departure, and

summarily beheaded. And after this tale, we passed out into the dark night of utter newslessness; no sound or syllable ever since has reached us, either of Great China, or of the pale feigned storms of Europe that have so quaint an air of unreality when considered in this land of real life and death where we now circulate. For some weeks, indeed, all news of any kind ceased wholly; even local rumour slept or dozed; and we continued a mild career along roads that, in defiance of all warnings from the Yamen, seemed perfectly peaceful for our passing. Yet, even as we passed, there was a sensation on the road that this sunlit calm was but the lull of a brewing storm. An ominous quiet, indeed, it seemed, along this, the main artery of East and West, that carries all the northern trade between Asia and Europe, China, Russia and Thibet. Less august, though, is the roadway, than its importance; and many a stony upland lane of Westmoreland might sneer at this, one of the great highways of the world. Through flat and fertile lands it winds towards the West, through placid little villages, and walled towns comfortably asleep in snug hollow or open plain. But a sultriness lay over everything as we went; it seemed as if at any moment the crash of thunder might break the perilous calm. Watchers with anxious or evil faces lined the streets at our passing; no word was spoken anywhere of war; but every evening we were glad to have left a day and its cities behind us, to be yet one day nearer the Kansu border, beyond which I was assured that peace had her everlasting and inviolable home. Feng Hsiang was a point to be rapidly passed; here the Elder Brother League is strong, and rascality runs high. A slatternly city, with rows of streets half blind and dead, but thronged with dense mobs of sightseers, in whose eyes a heavy and greedy malignance brooded. And here, indeed, we heard that the ulcer was felt and known to be near breaking-point, and the resident Europeans had been warned to be on the watch for their lives. So we passed through and crossed the border, and came to Tsinchow, here leaving the Nanchow road, and striking away southward towards the arid valleys of the Black Water River.

The air at once was changed. In place of brewing sedition and brigandage the land was full of calm.

Frank Mahomedans and kindly simple Chinese peasants occupied the fields and towns in peace. There was no thought of danger from within or without. The Wolf was very far away now; he would never want or dare to trouble Kansu. And thus, with divers adventures by the way, we saw many men and many cities, and at last, blocking the vault of Heaven, the vast white wall of Thibet. And now, if before we lacked information, we plunged here into the deepest abysses of silence. Our own affairs soon occupied us completely, and not a whisper arrived of even the little places we had left but a few days since. Yet the change from China to Thibet was not one from stress to peace.

My name, in Chinese character, is Law-and-Order-Great-Lord. I and my name alike are complete strangers to this borderland; and Law and Order are unfortunately things with which the inhabitants deserve to be drilled into a salubrious intimacy. All along the dividing line of China and Thibet, there stretches a series of independent or semi-independent principalities. The rulers of these often live far away, and in no case are in a position to exercise any effective authority, oppressed as they are between the claims of China on one hand and those of the monks on the other. The result of this is that the border is a lawless no-man's-land, where the monks have everything their own way, deriding the temporal powers of their lords, and owning but the most shadowy allegiance to the vast and vague pontificate of Lhasa. In many places, accordingly, they are, for the most part, an evil crew, intolerant, autocratic and uncultivated, ruling the peasants with a rod of iron, and with all the harshness of masters elevated from the class they govern, seeing that a son of every family is claimed for monastic orders. At the same time, it is not from missionaries, nor from travellers fed entirely from missionary sources, that a fair appreciation of Lamaism can reasonably be expected. No professor of one faith, however candid in intention, can possibly be really ingenuous and impartial in his criticism of another; a Buddhist evangelist would find unexpected and unpalatable things to say of Roman monasticism or Orthodox Iconodules. In one respect, especially, English condemnation of Lamaism seems unfair. Worshipping as we do, above all, material success

in this world, the capacity for slaughter, and that merciless Moloch, Efficiency, we fall foul of Lamaist monasticism in Mongolia because 'emollit mores, nec sinit esse feros,' reclaiming a wild and bloodthirsty people into a meekness and mildness that we ourselves despise as enthusiastically as our Gospels praise it. And yet, when we meet the same monasticism producing exactly the contrary effects in Thibet, and hardening a hard mountain race into yet further courage, audacity and fire, we have no better word than 'obstinate fanaticism' for our angry verdict on a frame of temper that may not suit our own purposes so well as the contemptible meekness or lethargy of the Mongolian.

For my own part, deploring altogether the wide divergence of Mahayana Buddhism in all its branches from the pure traditions of the South, I could yet wish that Mongolian effects were more evident in Thibetan Lamaism. While China just behind us was in agonies we never guessed, we ourselves found our hands sufficiently full in fending off the unfriendliness of the monks. On our arrival at a border village, subject in name to the far-off Prince of Jo-ni (Choni in the maps) we were confronted with an initial difficulty in obtaining lodgment. The men of the village—tall, handsome, burly figures in Isabella-coloured homespun—met us with hostile looks; and their wives were even more overt in their enmity, preventing their husbands from returning any civil answer, wherever one might seem inclined. Finally, however, we secured a house, and were promptly invaded by a deputation of monks from the abbey on the promontory. They came, headed by the Business Manager or Almoner or Chancellor, filled with curiosity and unfriendly questions. It came out that we had already nearly occasioned a grave scandal in the community. For our road, winding over the shoulder of the hill, had suddenly, just as it came in sight of the village, offered us two alternatives, between a low road, convenient and smooth across the cornfields, straight to the houses, and another steep and stony, toiling upwards, right round the encircling slopes, and so down. I, never noting a barrier of brushwood in my path, was at once for taking the obviously easy road; and an instant eruption of dismal howls from the village taught me nothing, for my innocence took none

of the noise to my own account. However, I was soon called back, and the error rectified. Not only in the sphere of morals is the high and stony way more recommendable than the short and smooth. It appears that, before the harvest, the monks impose all sorts of mystic taboos and magic rites, on pain of the most fearful dangers to the crops and cattle, from murrain and hail. Among other prescriptions for a good yield, certain paths must not be trodden by foot of beast until the corn is in. On such a forbidden track had I begun to set hoof. Our peace was made at last, but with difficulty, the monks exhausting themselves in their inquisitory catechism, and, though slightly conciliated by news of my creed, could not overcome their suspicions as to the causes of our coming. They are convinced that we come only for their gold and silver—a grim but hardly unjust comment on European zeal for the spread of 'civilisation.' They are further convinced that our eyes have a miraculous power of penetrating the bowels of the earth and there discovering the sole objects of our search. This is clearly a glorified misconception of the telescope and field-glass; these being products of the West that even these remote monks were aware of, and eagerly clamoured to possess.

At last the holy assemblage was got rid of, and the night spent, as best might be, in avoiding the lively relics of their visitation. Next day brought fresh illustration of the perils that environ unwary feet on the Thibetan border. For my companion went out for a short stroll, along a path as open as Piccadilly; while I lay quiet, studying unwillingly the ways of the little white Thibetan flea. As I lay, I became aware of cries, increasing steadily in number and volume, till finally they lured me to the threshold of our hayloft, whence, about a quarter of a mile away, I perceived with innocent ethnological curiosity, the male inhabitants of the village all gathered in a disorderly mob, and apparently celebrating the Spring or the crops in some quaint primeval rite that consisted in leapings and gesticulation and a dissonant choir of howls irregularly but constantly emitted. For a few minutes I pleasantly pondered over this picture, and was only waked to the true situation by pale and shaking voices that summoned me below. On descending

I learned that that howling mob had in reality gathered together with swords and guns by the pathside, to murder my companion as he returned. For that one occasion it so happened that he was armed only with a smile; this, however, he brandished with energy and perseverance, advancing resolutely down a lane of crowded figures on the banks above him that gnashed upon him with faces so devilish as he went, that the noise and the sight of them will be long before they leave him. Nevertheless, in precarious safety he came through, further protected, as I like to hope, by the dissuasions of a young monk, who now came hurrying along to claim praise for averting the murder. At the same time, the situation was far from solved; an attack from the peasants might be apprehended at any moment. Guns and revolvers were primed and prepared accordingly, and we held ourselves ready for a decisive stand, when in an instant a crowd of monks flowed vehemently into the room, all talking loudly, and all at once, of their, and our, innocence and goodness, and of the wicked obstinate hearts of the people, who were in no wise to be persuaded that we were as excellent and harmless as the monks for their part well knew us to be. The sum of it all was that we should be best advised to make off as soon as possible, and utterly avoid the mountains and their peoples thenceforward. In plainer words, these holy men desired our absence, indeed, but not quite yet our death. This time they even brought the Lord Abbot to add his word; but he made no impressive figure in the scene, being a small-pocked, shock-headed Peter of a man, young but frowsy, stockish and stupid in the face, squat in figure, and of toad-like conformation generally. There was evidently nothing for it, however, but to take these sufficiently plain hints and go. Go we did, accordingly, at dawn, with no further word or look of ill; and with torn hearts began turning away from the great snowy Alps, across to the cultivated lower country which was once more China, the prudent Empire occupying sedulously all profitable land, and leaving the wild hills to Jo-ni and Thibet.

And here, again, what a change! After this interlude of barbarism back into the company of friendly, cordial, simple people, ready to welcome and help, and laugh

and be pleasant. One old lady, indeed, did swear herself black in the face on seeing some of our rugs laid out on her roof; but by nightfall our grandeur had convinced her of her error, and in full audience of all the village she came upstairs and did lowly penance on her knees, repenting in a loud and lamentable voice with beatings of her forehead on the floor. Still no news, however, of great China behind; but we learned that there was a Chinese village under one of our longed-for mountains, which was the best news the moment could have brought us, especially as it proved that the village was wholly friendly, and contained a little old empty temple ready for our reception. To this, then, we joyously removed, demanding authority and sanction from the Governors of the Subprefectural City some forty miles away across the northward ranges. And in answer came the first hint of coming storm: 'Tufei' (brigands) were in South Kansu—whether Wolves or not still seemed obscure, as did also their direction and whereabouts, so that the Subprefectural City was by no means yet in any alarm, but mildly begged us to retire betimes within its walls. We, however, preferred the security of our remoteness, and continued investigating the botanical wealth of the Alps from day to day, but little disturbed by the traffic of the shrine. For the temple was all collapsing to ruin, the roof unsound, the statues gone to pieces, and the dusty floor bestrewn with long-neglected mumming-masks. In the yard lived only one monk, a simple kindly soul, very old and meek and holy, busied all day with his prayers and beads and scriptures, sitting in his cell or in a sunny angle of the court, with a projecting fringe of red hairs fixed round his forehead to protect his eyes from the glare. He was only a visitor by invitation, full of a quiet and unobtrusive dignity. But more insistent was his vicar, a stout and squinting person in dim purple, whose duty it was to conduct the Office in the Shrine. At dawn and dusk he would come down from his cottage at the other end of the village; his acolyte unbarred the great doors, and the drum boomed forth its summons to worshippers who never came. So in a minute or two the doors were locked again, and the service over, and the minister at leisure—this indeed was his unvarying condition—to come up

and pester the strangers, with pappings and pokings and protestations of inordinate devotion. So the days passed; and each expedition into the hills concluded, according to the season, in torrential rains and hail. Finally, we were just upon removing to camp high up, when at midnight returned a messenger whom we had sent over the hill for mules. Through the pouring dark he returned, alone, over a high and stony pass; to the accompaniment of the splashing rain outside in the yard he crouched in a corner of the room, and, yellow in the vacillating light of the one candle, told his tale in husky whispers.

For those fatal hails had brought upon us again the fury of all the border peoples and their monks. And now, to the number of 3000 strong, this simple and pious peasantry was marching immediately up to our massacre, conceiving that the late devastation of their crops was due to nothing else but the annoyance of the mountain Gods at our unauthorised intrusion on their fastnesses. In this belief they were fortified by the clergy, anxious for their monopoly of gold and silver, and utterly deriding the notion that anybody could be so obstinate as we in penetrating the Alps, for any reason short of precious metal, much less for any motive so incredibly silly, so patently a pretence, as the mere discovery of plants and weeds of no value. Once more, then, we were to be harrowed up, and sent packing; for, though the attack came to nothing for the moment, it was obvious that further stay was impossible, if the border peoples had no scruple about invading Chinese territory. So we must fly. But whither?

Now came one of the times when local news and politics become of a vital importance inconceivable in England, where the utmost crisis merely begets an indecision as to whether one may dare dine with one's oldest and dearest friends; such indecision hinging on the uncertainty of human tempers, but not on any uncertain integrity of one's own throat. And a possible scant line at the bottom of an English newspaper column swelled to vast proportions as we were led on to learn that the problem of our flight was further complicated by the fact that terror now reigned throughout South Kansu, that the Wolf was sweeping through, that all the little

towns through which we had so lately passed had been put to sack within a few days of our own departure, and that the Subprefectural City itself was either in convulsions of panic fear, with its mandarin fled, or else actually already in the hands of the Wolf. The marvellous luck of our escape hitherto, the uncanny good-fortune of thus having everywhere *just* flown through in safety ahead of the advancing storm, now paled its lustre before the difficulties of the immediate situation. To the west of us lay the Tepo Tribes, Thibetans wilder and wickeder than most; to the south impassable Alps; to the east the valley was blocked by the Crusading Army athirst for our blood; and on the north lay the chance of running straight into the Wolf's arms, or of meeting his bands upon the road. In either case, with all our boxes and all our bullion, there could not be any great hope for our lives. However, the urgency of the problem demanded prompt decision. To stay was death, sooner or later; to go was only the risk of it. We finally decided to stake our all on the notorious uncertainty of rumour, and the fair chance that the Subprefectural City might prove in less desperate case than was represented. The comparatively small question of ways and means could not delay us long. No mules were to be got in the poor little place, and our big black boxes were of daunting weight. Nevertheless we chartered all the able-bodied villagers as bearers; and the endless stream went filing out at last over the mountains (looking like a string of square black beetles), dismissed with gentle blessings and farewells by the old monk, and with excessive protestations of love and innocence from Squint-eyes, whose disclaimers of all complicity in the Crusade were further discounted by the fact that we had hardly left the village when numbers of unsuspected monks emerged from his quarters and scattered in all directions to their monasteries with the news of our departure.

Through the golden day we travelled in anxiety, seeing no evil thing, but hearing tidings more and more terrible at each successive village that brought us nearer to the Subprefectural City—the Black Water bridge was gone, the city sacked, and the mandarin dead or bolted, or both. Finally, when we reached the river, the bridge

was there; and, as we advanced up the long dry valley towards our goal, firmer assurances met us, that the Subprefectural City stood intact where it did, and that in his accustomed seat the mandarin still sat undisturbed. Never was a place so defensible, indeed, as this. The way winds in and out by the river-bed, commanded by watch-houses and eminences, so that no enemy could get within three miles if these had each a good rifle or two. The city, snuggling into fat folds of hills beneath a huge limestone mountain, and girdled with golden fields of corn in a sunny bay beside the Black Water, with tangles of sweet roses embowering it all around, possesses from the rampart of its walls complete command for several miles of every line of approach, and could easily be kept clear of all attack by a mere armful of good guns. No such defences, however, had the mandarin to inspire him; twenty odd tatterdemalions in blouses, armed with primeval muskets never cleaned and rarely fired except at imminent risk to their user, do not make for confidence against such an army as the Wolf's. Accordingly the Lord Jang had displayed, instead, the wisdom of the serpent, for his valley leads onward nowhere but only into Thibet some six miles west, and his city is poor as a bone. So with good heart he sent down men in disguise to where the valley merges into that of the main road going north to Minchow and Taohow. Along this in time came the ravening Wolves, and, seeing these apparent peasants, asked how far it was to the Subprefectural City. They answered, 60 li, instead of 30; the Wolves disdained to diverge so far for a place so poor, and swept onwards to their appalling sack of Taohow and Minchow. Thus it was that again we just eluded the Wolf, against every reasonable expectation, now following after in his track, and slipping aside into the only city of South Kansu which escaped his clutch.

Hardly any place resisted him successfully; few places, defenceless and unarmed, could hope to do so; and none but two or three attempted it. The Subprefectural City must inevitably have gone with the rest, had it not been for that timely stratagem. As it was, we found it, when at last we wound our way through the gates and along the densely crowded streets, in a state of hysterical excitement. Our arrival marked the climax of emotion;

from afar tumultuous hordes came flocking to escort us in. Our coming created first of all a frantic terror, and then bewildered amazement—terror, lest we should prove robbers, and then amazement that we had not been robbed. The mandarins fell upon our necks, exulting in the prestige of our presence, no less than in the relief of having our precious persons comparatively safe under their own eye within the walls. Nor would they let us go again; we were carried off to stately quarters in the Military Governor's Yamen, and there preserved as a palladium of the City. Excitement began to subside, and the sight of a real rifle rekindled public confidence. But peace was not yet; and now we had a lively sample of what life must have been in the border-towns of England during the sixteenth century, for hardly had the alarm of the Wolves died down, than the Thibetans were known to be advancing on a raid from the west, according to their usual habit in early summer, when they replenish their exhausted stores by crossing the vague border and laying waste the villages, sometimes advancing against the Subprefectural City itself. So it now was; instantly the place went once more frantic. It is hardly possible to conceive the conditions from afar, unless the mind can fairly figure its circumstances of life and peril—that quiet little population of some two thousand peaceful, decent people, only asking (like all decent Chinese) to be let alone to drive their little trades and work their little cultures, not too much squeezed or worried by officials, but living orderly under perhaps the finest system of public justice and carefully graduated responsibility that the world has ever known—if only its performance could be kept at the level of its conception. This population still lives contentedly in the Middle Ages; and the fall of the Manchus makes as little difference to it, and is as little realised by it, as that of the Mings. Their coinage is as primeval as their notions; their defenders' few weapons are as old as either, and only fitted for a museum. But they are encircled by a noble battlemented wall of five-and-twenty feet or so, with a broad level ramp on which two motors could go abreast. This, indeed, is its only defence: for the garrison is a slouching Ragged Brigade, as disinclined to fight as it is incapable, believing that, if you hold a gun and let it off,

you need not aim it, as the inherent Spirit of the gun does all the rest.

Over this little town are set two Governors, the Civil and the Military, of whom the Civil—in this case a kind, jovial old fellow, all for softness and general good-will at any cost—has precedence. What else can one expect in this acutely anti-military Empire, which will not even take the trouble to keep a quiet frontier, though, in places such as these, it could be done with the utmost ease at very slight expense, by a permanent garrison in each place of even thirty modern soldiers, uniformed, well drilled, well paid, and armed with efficient magazine rifles? Indeed, when one contemplates this huge and harmless land, asking nothing but peace and getting little but war, the mind even of one who has a firm sympathy with the wise, enduring East, as against the hurrying and 'successful' West, is apt to feel a pang of irritation at such persistent neglect of elementary and obvious precautions. For want of these, especially of late, thousands of kindly inoffensive people have been plunged into bitterest penury and mourning; and yet one well-posted regiment or so, in the passes of the South, would have completely barred the advance of the Wolf into Kansu. Contemplate the position of the Military Governor of the Subprefectural City. Unlike his Civil colleague, he is a man who has travelled far and wide in all the provinces of China; he has studied Europe in Shanghai, and stood face to face with the Supreme Pontiff in Lhasa, and the great Grand-Dowager in Sian. Here he ends, in the Subprefectural City, ruined, embittered, broken up by the hopeless helplessness of his position, alone among sullen rebels fixed in the unmoved methods of the Ming Dynasty, among whom he stands as grotesque as a motor-bicycle in Stonehenge, powerless to stir, educate, discipline or reform. Four years he has ruled; but his soldiers go on strike whenever the fancy takes them, leaving gates and wall unguarded, and Jo Dâ-ren alone in the innermost yard of his wide but ruinous Yamen, all of which, with himself, family, guests, court, attendants and garrison he has to maintain in the due dignity of the most tremendous Empire in the world on an official salary of ten shillings a year.

Thus, under the rumour of the Thibetan approach, the

town went justly crazy with the instinct of self-preservation. The whole male population turned out upon the wall; stones were piled all along the battlements for throwing; and in disorder ran up and down the tattered garrison, making a vain show of refurbishing their ridiculous muskets and the pair of mud-embedded mortars that might have saluted with their latest sigh the accession of Queen Elizabeth. The citizens meanwhile sent their notabilities in solemn deputation to the foreign Lords, to entreat their help; and in a short time came up their Highnesses Jang and Jo, upon the same errand. We gladly assented; and rifles, cartridges, revolvers and tents were sent up on to the wall at the threatened Western Gate, and there publicly displayed, to the great encouragement of the defence. Meanwhile a procession was formed from the Yamen, and up to our posts we ourselves were convoyed in state by both the mandarins, between a ragged avenue of Yamen attendants in the unaltered scarlet and yellow blouses of Imperial days, armed with every sort of fantastic and theatrical-looking halberd, hung about with crimson tassels to keep away the ubiquitous devils of Chinese life. On the wall we pitched our tents amid enthusiastic crowds. Night came; the scene might have been laid in Troy, but for the lack of Helen. Under the serene night of stars fires shone and flickered all round the line of battlements. Jo Dâ-ren, in contempt of this nonsensical medievalism beyond his power to help or heal, went home indeed to bed; but Jang continually went the rounds, attended by his underlings, addressing fatherly words of encouragement to his little flock from point to point. Gongs clanged incessantly, trumpets wailed across the booming of drums, and clackers pitilessly clacked all through the darkness and far on into the dawn. And in the end, though the foe advanced to a high ridge above the town and peered over, they were discouraged by the sight of such unexpected preparations and puissance, and retired accordingly in discomfiture, empty-handed.

A few days later, however, more excitement supervened. Suddenly, at two hours' notice, three hundred Szechuanese soldiers marched into the city. The population was nearly wild with wonder and dread at sight of these monsters, uniformed in khaki, walking with a

well-drilled swing, and armed with modern rifles clearly capable of going off. What would these anachronisms do? What were they come for? Would they save the town, or turn to plunder it? Everybody was confounded at the sight of them and of the coinage they offered—unheard-of silver disks called dollars, and rectangular pieces of paper which they mendaciously made out were money, and produced for payment in place of the immemorial perforated pence which are the town's one currency, and of such a value that ten shillings' worth would be more than a man could carry. Pavid as the town lay under fear of the military, it could not but make a stand against such incomprehensible frauds; and for a time more difficulties were added to a difficult situation, which was already causing poor stout old Lord Jang to fall visibly away with anxiety, as he paddled to and fro endeavouring to solve the problem of peaceably providing for three hundred men (with the threat of more), in a place so poor that the two foreign Lords alone had driven it nearly bankrupt in flour and eggs and hens. The Szechuanese meanwhile proved perfectly decent and orderly, though how long they would remain so, if angered, defrauded or starved, was a problem which kept my Lord Jang awake at night.

They had come, it turned out, with orders to restore peace on the frontier, teach the Thibetans a good lesson, and then go northward against the Wolf. This news upset the city yet more. It had no malice against the marauding Thibetans; the custom of ages prescribed a situation of mutual and quite amiable brigandage, each party robbing the other in turn, and nobody conceiving bad blood against anybody else. But now, if these troops were to go out and kill Thibetans, what reprisals would not that vengeful and longanimous people take when once the troops were removed? A state of embittered blood-feud would succeed the pleasant state of things that had gone before. Lord Jang felt this, and quaked as he sat; the troops would some day go, and he would be left to bear the brunt. The news spread far and wide; the monks of the border took to quaking too. The foreign Lords had evidently sent to Yuan Shi Kai, and the late insult to them was to be wiped out in blood. At last a monk came slinking in to learn the truth of all

this. Fortunately he happened on the honey-dealer, who was friendly to the foreign Lords for buying all his honey. Besides, he was a Mahomedan and therefore delighted at the chance of vexing a monk. 'For a week,' he said, 'you need not so greatly fear: but after that—Heaven help you!' Whereupon the monk, with no more words, gathered up his purple skirts and fled precipitately homeward over the hills.

The expedition into Thibet was reported a success. Back came the troops in triumph, making the most strangely anachronistic effect as they marched through the streets. Minor alarms and excursions now succeeded; some went, more came. Nobody knew what was to happen next, and the Military Mandarin was as much in the dark as his meanest coolie, according to that immemorial separatist spirit of Chinese officialism, which preserves the most absolute secrecy between different departments, though matters of state debated in the open Yamen became property of the listening street immediately. So came and went the forces, but no news either went or came. For two months the city sat in utter isolation, as if in the most rigid siege. Not a soul dared venture out upon the roads, and not a soul came in from outside to tell of what was going on in Kansu. The silence, at last, grew terribly ominous; not even the oil-men came down from Minchow with their wattled jars, and not a postman for many a week had been heard upon his tinkling journey over the desolate and empty highways. There was a stillness of death abroad; the Subprefectural City seemed alone to live, a strange suspended life in the void of a dead world. All attempts at re-establishing communications failed; emissaries from either Yamen, despatched to Minchow under pain of heavy beating, either flatly refused to stir, whether beaten or no, or else trotted forth with obedient alacrity, only to spend a few days resting in some village just beyond the walls, and then return with a story of impassable roads.

So weeks went by, and, at last, news began to come. A stray mail, long belated, fluttered in from England, hinting at strange doings, pale and remote, yet, like all mails, telling nothing, and leaving the reader more in the dark than ever. It had gone circling the round of the

sacked cities, and so in the end came safe to hand, according to the unalterable fidelity of the Chinese Post Office. But, even more important, soon came letters from the north, and at last we learned of the Hell that had raged through Kansu in May and June, while we and the Subprefectural City alone lay safe and whole, beyond even the remotest sound of the storm. We learned the looting of Minchow; and hardly had we read of it, than the bloody tale turned white in comparison with the ghastly fate of Taochow. Yet now the coast was clear; the Wolves were gone in disorder; the Thibetans were in a state of comparative calm. Accordingly, not without a sadness in leaving the quiet little town that had been to us so kindly and opportune a harbour through a time of storm and peril unrealised, we obeyed at last the insistent call of the great northern mountains which so long had kept us fluttering on the chain, ungratefully chafing against the tediousness of our enforced sojourn in the Subprefectural City. But the channels were reopening, the air clearing; it was time to be gone, if we wanted to catch the skirts of early summer on the high Alps, whither she had long retreated. So with affectionate farewells to my Lords Jang and Jo, we set forth at last on our way, making northward in the blasted trail of the Wolves. No sure news of the outer world was yet to hand, but there were at least rumours of international troops now coming to take charge of China—dead gossip long ere this at home; lying gossip too, very likely. And then last of all, perhaps as true, perhaps as false, or only premature, the night before we left, Jo Dâ-ren came privately to our room and told us in whispers of an official letter just received from Lanchow, and it was couched in the style and formula of the Emperors of China! Under that silent night in the Yamen yard, the vast and awful shadow of the Dragon Throne seemed to take shape once more and fill the world. Not long had its majesty lingered in the lumber-room of history.

REGINALD FARRER.

Art. 3.—THE ECONOMIC CONDITION OF ENEMY COUNTRIES.

IN surveying the financial and economic position of enemy countries, the wish is apt to become father to the thought. In spite of every desire to be judicial and to avoid the pitfalls of patriotic partiality, it is difficult to escape completely from the temptations of national bias. As 'all is yellow to the jaundiced eye,' so are the figures of German or Austrian or Turkish trade and finance liable to be distorted by their enemies into evidences of imminent disaster. This one-sided view and its attendant exaggeration are much to be deprecated. Nothing is gained by painting the devil blacker than he really is. It is much more serviceable in the long run to look at an opponent's position with an eye to his strength as well as to his weakness. We can adopt this binocular method with the less reluctance because even the fair and moderate view need not cause us the least misgiving.

But while deprecating *trop de zèle* on our side, we are bound to add that it needs discountenancing far more in Germany. Germany is remarkably anxious to make it known that there's nothing rotten in the State. But the official attempts to 'make the worse appear the better cause' are almost childishly transparent. It is difficult to decide whether the Imperial Chancellor, the 'Cologne Gazette,' and the Vice-president of the Reichsbank, all of whom have insisted so loudly on the strength of Germany's economic position, are engaged in a pre-arranged game of bluff, or are the victims of a portentous self-delusion. A really impartial view of the situation is entirely at variance with German official optimism, whether real or assumed. It would almost seem as if deceptive boasts, similar to those which have characterised the Berlin Press bureau, were being used in the home campaign in order to hearten the German taxpayer for the heavy pecuniary sacrifices that lie before him. The only alternative theory is, that those who ought to know the real position are in such a state of ignorance that they cannot distinguish favourable from unfavourable factors, and so read into a superficial prosperity the signs of unassailable stability.

On no other assumptions can the boastings of the

'Cologne Gazette' be explained. In one number it published fabulous statistics of German national wealth and a panegyric of Germany's fiscal policy. In another number it reported at great length a lecture purporting to show that Germany is much more prosperous than England. In a third number a long semi-official telegram from Berlin insisted upon the wonderful harmony between Germany and Austria, the success of the Austrian loan, the confidence expressed by German personages of all sorts, and the fact that there was a temporary improvement in the statistics of unemployment. At a meeting of the central committee of the Imperial Bank not long ago, the vice-president asserted that not only the German money market but the general economic situation in Germany had shown thoroughly satisfactory development. It is noteworthy, too, that the speakers at several company meetings claimed that the mining industry, as a whole, is producing to the extent of about 50 or 60 per cent. of the normal output.

It may be admitted that Germany escaped the full force of the great financial crisis which broke upon England when war was declared; but one not very creditable reason for this comparative immunity was that she owed us many millions sterling on trade account which she has omitted to pay, and which form part of that 'prosperity' of which she has lately been boasting. It is easy to make a pretence of solvency when you are jingling other people's money in your pockets. The quasi-panic in London was largely the product of German financial intrigue. The dumping of securities on our Stock Exchange, the discounting of German bills at the London banks, and the secret removals of gold before the declaration of war, were all part of the elaborate mechanism by which Germany hoped to smash our credit. She avoided for the moment some of the emergency expedients that had to be adopted here. The German Government, for instance, was not forced to guarantee the payment of foreign acceptances, for the simple reason that the balance of indebtedness was very largely and of malice aforethought on Germany's side. Nor was a moratorium resorted to; and much has been made of the fact. But at the beginning of the war the restrictions covering the issue of notes by the Reichsbank

were suspended—a measure which had much the same effect as the suspension of the Bank Charter Act would have had in England. All banks were relieved of the necessity to pay in gold. Although gold imports were made impossible by the closing of the seas to German shipping, yet for a couple of years previously active preparations had been going on with a view to husbanding and increasing the stock of gold in the country.

It is not, however, by the immediate consequences of a war crisis, but by its effects in the long run, that the strain of endurance must be tested. It is too early yet to look for the more serious results of economic pressure in Germany. The great cities, if far from normal, are at any rate not suffering from any close menace of privation. Six or eight months are, of course, no adequate test of the endurance of a rich and determined nation; and it would be foolish to deny to Germany either of these qualities. To a considerable extent, in Germany as in England, the lack of work caused by the war in many branches of trade has been balanced by increased activity in others, bringing down the percentage of unemployment. The manufacture of guns, ammunition, military equipment, airships, and war vessels is going on at the highest possible speed. Although many of the working classes are protected against the pinch of unemployment and even able to earn good wages, this abnormal production does not dispose of the growing feeling of anxiety with regard to trades which are not benefited by the war. The food question depends very much upon the extent of the supplies obtained from or through neutral countries. Germany, at the beginning of the war, had large stores of foodstuffs; and, although there is evident fear of a shortage of wheat, as shown by the official decree for the Government control of the corn supplies and for the strict regulation of the sale of bread, commodities generally are not yet so much above the ordinary level of prices as to suggest the immediate approach of famine. Every day, however, makes the position worse. The food supplies, with a few exceptions, are not being replenished as fast as they are being used. In another six or eight months the outlook will have become graver, and the problem of feeding the people much more difficult.

The economic position depends to some extent upon the military and much more upon the naval position. If Germany were making any appreciable headway in the field, if she were diminishing the superiority of our Fleet over her own, then the economic factors that are beginning to threaten her would at once become of relatively minor importance. A great naval victory would mean for Germany the liberation of her external trade, and would revolutionise as if by a stroke of magic the economic conditions. To recognise a possibility so influential is not, however, to admit its probability. At all events, until it really happens, we need not allow our point of view to be changed, or our measure of the situation to be revised. It would be just as futile to base one's estimate of Germany's economic position upon the most wildly fanciful postulate as to base it on a grotesque minimising of actualities.

It will be useful to take a closer look at the financial position first. Nothing has, perhaps, surprised people in England more than the large and persistent increase in the German Imperial Bank's stock of bullion during the last two years, and especially since the outbreak of the war. From about 70,000,000*l.* in July 1914, the nominal gold-store has risen to nearly 142,000,000*l.* It is, however, by no means certain that this figure represents gold absolutely. We have heard of laths painted to look like iron, and it is not scientifically impossible to paint paper to make it resemble gold. It was stated not long ago that in certain cases the deposit of war stock at the Reichsbank would be regarded on the same footing as gold; and the execution of such a brilliant piece of hypothetics might explain a good deal in the nature of reassuring totals. On this point we have the independent views of such an eminent authority as the Swiss Bankverein, a banking concern in Switzerland with many branches. The Bankverein remarks in a recently published memorandum:

'The issues of the Imperial Government having evidently absorbed all the means which the public has had available or is able to mobilise by pledging securities, the Prussian Government is now said to have issued 75,000,000*l.* sterling,

which loan will be handed over *in toto* to the Reichsbank; the Bank can place the issue to the War Loan Society and will receive thereagainst *notes issued by this Society which the Reichsbank is authorised to regard as gold cover for the issue of an equal amount of its own banknotes.* This procedure amounts in reality to an issue of Reichsbank notes against the Prussian loan, and seems to be adopted with the object of disguising the enormous growth in the fiduciary note issue of the Reichsbank.' (The italics are ours.)

If we assume that the whole of the alleged gold is real tangible gold, how has the increase of 42,000,000*l.* since July been brought about? In the first place, the War Chest, amounting to 12,000,000*l.* in gold, has been transferred from the Spandau fortress to the vaults of the Imperial Bank. Then, doubtless, some part of the stock consists of the proceeds of the new tax collection on fortunes, of which about one-half, or 30,000,000*l.*, should have been paid in just before the war broke out. Much of the gold that was in circulation has been gathered in by the Bank, and extraordinary pressure is still being exercised in all directions to gather in the rest.

If we look at the total gold stock in the abstract, without reference to its relation to the general currency question, the financial position of Germany would appear to be strong. To a certain extent, indeed, it *is* strong. There is all this gold to draw upon for war expenditure. So long as the stock goes on increasing, or even remains undiminished, the apparent stability of German finance will be satisfactory—to Germany. The real function of a gold store is to guarantee issues of paper money; and, so long as the paper money does not exceed the gold store, except within defined limits and with State security, it is performing this function on sound principles and to the advantage of the community. But Germany's note issue immensely exceeds its stock of gold, always supposing that it *is* gold. The note issue on Dec. 31, 1913, amounted to 253,000,000*l.* (not counting Treasury notes), as compared with gold in the Reichsbank amounting to about 105,000,000*l.* This means that 148,000,000*l.* of paper had no chance whatever of being redeemed in gold; in other words, Germany is keeping

up the pretence of solvency by means of an inflated paper currency. In the year 1914, during which the Reichsbank's gold stock rose by 44,387,000*l.*, the note circulation increased by 119,463,000*l.*, and the loans and discounts by a sum of 132,590,000*l.*; so that the addition to liabilities proceeded on a much greater scale than that to the gold stock. Sooner or later, the way of inflation is disastrous. No country has ever entered upon that perilous path without being reduced to desperate shifts to put things right. So long as a bank-note will purchase exactly the same as its equivalent in gold, all is well; but so soon as it fails to do so, a premium on gold is virtually established, and the paper currency is proportionately depreciated. In this connexion the Swiss Bankverein drew attention last November to 'the notable depreciation (almost 10 per cent.) in the German exchange,' and remarked that it 'seemed to justify the growing misgivings which are gaining ground in respect of Germany's financial position.' In dealing with the same question, Messrs Samuel Montagu & Co., the great bullion merchants, made the following significant remarks in a recent trade circular:

'The large increase of the gold holding of the German Reichsbank during the past two years acquires grave significance now that its gold reserves may be destined to become the sinews of war. A considerable portion of the gold added to the Reichsbank gold reserves since the commencement of war consisted of the contents of the Spandau War Chest. This accumulation of gold is not being released for ordinary foreign banking purposes, but is being held presumably for war finance alone. As a consequence, Holland for many weeks past has refused to accept German currency except at a discount of between 7 and 8 per cent.'

These rates of exchange show that German paper money is already looked at askance in neutral countries; and before the war is over it will probably be discredited altogether. Nothing short of sweeping and intolerable taxation can save the financial situation and insure Germany's solvency. The Imperial Bank's statement looks very rosy, and no doubt imposes upon the mass of Germans who are unversed in the expedients of

'haute finance'; but American bankers do not appear to think much of it, for they have so far shown a marked reluctance to lend money to Germany in spite of very alluring terms. The 'soundness' is of a more or less superficial character. When the day of reckoning comes, it will be a stormy one. The whole fabric of economic policy is based upon the view held by the high officials, from the Kaiser downwards, that Germany would enjoy a speedy triumph and exact an enormous indemnity. She is, therefore, in the position of a man who has borrowed heavily in all directions on the expectation of a highly problematical windfall. In a word, she has gambled on the chance of victory, and her stakes are become forfeit.

It should be an obvious conclusion from these comments that it is quite possible to attach excessive importance to German estimates of Germany's gold reserve. The real point of interest is the German exchange, in which is found emphatic evidence that the self-gratulations of the 'Cologne Gazette' are not echoed by neutral observers outside Germany.

Meanwhile, the force of economic pressure is steadily going on, implacable, irresistible, and fatal. With her main fleet bottled up in harbour, and most of her marauding cruisers at the bottom of the sea, Germany's foreign commerce—that commerce which she has been so laboriously building up during the last twenty-five years—has almost ceased to exist. Several of her colonies, on the development of which she has spent, first and last, some 50,000,000*l.* sterling, have been taken from her. Whether she will ever recover them depends on the course of events in Europe. For the present, however, we may regard the loss of Togoland, German Samoa, German New Guinea, Kiaochau, and some of the Melanesian Islands as definitive, in which case the trade prospects which were to compensate her for such a huge investment are extinguished for ever. Count Bernstoff's bombastic threat that, if one inch of Germany's possessions, in Europe or elsewhere, be taken from her, she will at once begin another era of bloated armaments, need not trouble us very much. Bloated armaments cost money; and Germany will have quite

enough to do in other directions, without expending her crippled resources on a remote project of revenge. Besides, it is a game two can play at. Anyhow, the threat comes too late to save Germany's possessions, for several 'inches' of territory, formerly German, in the Pacific and Africa have already changed hands.

And these losses will rankle. A craving for colonies is at the root of her frantic policy of expansion. It was her misfortune that these Imperial ambitions were a little belated. She arrived at the hotel after all the best rooms had been taken. Her remedy for this is to try to blow up the hotel, but it seems probable that she will succeed only in blowing up herself. The following comparison is interesting. The British self-governing Dominions with the Crown Colonies and Protectorates have an area of 11,224,000 square miles and a population of 434,000,000; the German Colonies and Protectorates (including, for this purpose, Togoland, German Samoa, and the others which have been seized) have an area of about 1,027,820 square miles and a population of some 14,500,000. In both cases the native races largely predominate, but much more so in the German colonies than in the British. The contrast is greater when we compare the character, progress and intelligence of Germany's largest possessions (those in Africa) with our own overseas Dominions of Canada, Australasia and South Africa. So far, Germany's ambition for a place in the sun has yielded miserably poor results, partly because the Germans are bad colonisers, and partly because there is no land available for them unless they take it by sheer force from someone else.

Not all of Germany's quondam possessions were self-supporting. In German South-West Africa, which includes Damaraland and Namaqualand, the receipts for 1912 were 860,500*l.* and the expenditure 2,250,000*l.*; in the Cameroons the receipts were 316,500*l.* and the expenditure 882,500*l.* The receipts for German East Africa were 624,000*l.* (151,135*l.* of which was State aid) and the expenditure 1,828,250*l.* The disproportion comes out more clearly in the budgetary statements for the current financial year :

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ESTIMATED REVENUES FOR 1913-14 (IN MARKS).

	East Africa.	Cameroons.	Togoland.	German South-west Africa.
Revenue	16,901,628	10,540,928	4,057,136	18,164,832
Government subvention	3,603,687	2,803,696	—	14,626,840
Loan to meet extraordinary expenditure	34,250,000	2,000,000	—	21,350,000
Total	54,755,315	15,344,624	4,057,136	54,141,672

	New Guinea.	Samoa.	Kiaochau.
Revenue	1,994,966	1,132,804	7,234,841
Government subvention	1,419,031	—	9,507,780
Total	3,413,997	1,132,804	16,742,621

The above figures show that an aggregate revenue of over 60,000,000 marks, or roughly about 3,000,000*l.*, is supplemented with Imperial subventions and loans amounting altogether to nearly 90,000,000 marks, say 4,500,000*l.*

In dealing with the exports and imports of the different possessions, we have to rely for the most part on the returns for 1912, those for 1913 not being available.

	Imports.	Exports.
	£	£
German East Africa	2,394,716	1,495,515
Cameroons	1,629,895	1,102,803
Togoland	561,400	498,000
German South-West Africa	1,624,944	1,952,667
German New Guinea		
Bismarck Archipelago	293,600	258,200
Caroline Islands		
Marshall Islands		
Samoa	251,263	252,224
Kiaochau	5,746,900	4,014,750

The imports into Germany from German Colonies amounted in 1912 to 2,645,000*l.*, and the exports from Germany to her Colonies to 2,865,000*l.* The recent fall of Tsingtao (the German headquarters in Kiaochau) will be a heavy loss to Germany. This ambitious enterprise

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cost an enormous sum. The following table shows revenue and expenditure for the last 12 years :

	Ordinary revenue.	Imperial subsidy.	Total expenditure.
	Marks.	Marks.	Marks.
1901-2	300,000	10,750,000	11,050,000
1902-3	360,000	12,044,000	12,404,000
1903-4	455,000	12,353,142	12,808,142
1904-5	505,300	12,583,000	13,088,300
1905-6	636,000	14,660,000	15,296,000
1906-7	1,048,000	13,150,000	14,198,000
1907-8	1,542,700	11,735,500	13,278,200
1908-9	1,725,800	9,739,953	11,465,753
1909-10	3,620,597	8,545,005	12,165,602
1910-11	4,565,206	8,131,016	12,715,884
1911-12	5,124,640	7,703,240	13,538,614
1912-13	6,242,693	8,297,565	14,639,725
1913-14	7,227,625	9,560,000	16,787,625

The two most salient features of these figures are: (a) the remarkable growth of the ordinary revenue, which has multiplied more than 24 times in the period covered; and (b) the heavy contributions made by the Imperial Government. If the subventions made before 1901-2 are included, we arrive at a total of more than ten millions sterling which Germany has invested, over and above the revenue receipts, in this China venture, all of which she stands to lose. Part of the expenditure is classified below, so as to show the cost of civil administration, military administration, and extraordinary expenses respectively, though it must be added that there are other items of expenditure common to both civil and military which help to swell the total.

	Civil expenditure.	Military expenditure.	Extraordinary expenses on works, etc.
	Marks.	Marks.	Marks.
1902-3	799,547	2,368,539	7,375,000
1903-4	907,164	2,434,542	7,470,000
1904-5	984,514	2,403,356	7,697,000
1905-6	1,106,690	2,771,897	9,257,000
1906-7	1,181,628	3,206,925	7,375,000
1907-8	1,246,872	3,339,241	6,230,000
1908-9	1,370,265	3,411,176	4,037,500
1909-10	1,301,105	3,558,449	2,661,300
1910-11	1,775,066	6,157,740	1,775,165
1911-12*	1,262,795	4,010,323	2,075,500
1912-13*	1,308,788	4,040,615	2,032,500

* For these two years we find an expenditure of 2,854,497 marks and 2,934,844 marks respectively under the new head of 'Fiscal Exploitation.'

The loss of her Colonies has had not only direct but also indirect consequences. What threatens to aggravate the monetary position in Germany and the slump in her overseas trade is her inability to sell her own securities anywhere, since neutral markets will regard them with misgiving and her bourses remain closed. London, once the dumping-ground of Europe, occupies that position of maid-of-all-work no longer. In view of the regulations in force to prevent German, Austrian or Turkish selling, even of international securities, on the London Stock Exchange, those countries will have to find some other and more accommodating market, or, as is not improbable, will have to do without any market at all.

If this restriction be taken in conjunction with the severe limitations of German trade, the conclusion presents itself that Germany has virtually to depend, until the end of the war, almost entirely upon her internal resources. Her export trade is killed by the compulsory inactivity of her mercantile fleet; her manufactures are seriously prejudiced by the limitation of imported raw materials; her food supply will probably, by and by, be insufficient for the wants of her population. In a word, the economic pressure will, from now onward, become more and more relentless and effective.

In order to see clearly what commercial consequences are looming ahead, and the extent to which Germany is likely to be affected, it is necessary to consider the trade figures that are available. Germany's budget for 1914 provided for an expenditure, ordinary and extraordinary, of close upon 175,000,000*l.* This was the sum, therefore, that had to be provided in time of peace; and this Imperial revenue had to be raised from posts, telegraphs, customs and excise duties, taxes, the Imperial railways in Alsace-Lorraine, and the matricular contributions of the several component States. The revenue for the previous year was about 184,800,000*l.*, a good deal of which was due to non-recurring expenditure in connexion with the Army changes of 1912. Yet, in spite of her rapidly-increasing national indebtedness, and the steady growth of her annual expenditure, Germany was, up to the outbreak of war, a prosperous nation; and her prosperity would have continued to grow if she had

but been content to live at peace with her neighbours and had not cherished a monomania to control the whole world. But her attitude has always been one of aggression and suspicion. As the thief sees in every bush an officer, so Germany suspected in every precautionary move against her own threatening policy an insidious attempt to take her by surprise. The 'Wehrbeitrag,' or levy on property enacted to obtain the money for hurrying up the new Army law, was nominally a defensive but actually an offensive measure. This graduated tax, both on property and income, falls heavily on the owners of big fortunes and on the richer limited liability companies. It was passed some little time before the war, but, burdensome though it is, it will go but a little way towards meeting the tremendous expenditure necessary in financing the war. For there is the interest on the new War Loans to be provided. The German Imperial debt, funded and unfunded, amounted to 269,844,390*l.* two years ago; and since then a loan of 250,000,000*l.* has been issued and a further loan of unlimited amount authorised. The new debt, if it amounts to 500,000,000*l.*, will mean an extra charge, in interest alone, of 25,000,000*l.* a year—a serious item considering the falling incomes of many of the big trading concerns and the blow already inflicted on the revenues.*

With the collapse of foreign trade comes the necessity for heavier taxation. While the manufacturer is earning very much less, he is called upon to pay very much more; and, while scarcity of employment in many trades is making cheap food a necessity, interference with the importation of food-stuffs is making it an impossibility. Great as are the agricultural resources of Germany—from eight to ten millions of her people are in normal times engaged in agriculture—they cannot be available to anything like their full strength now that so many of the peasant class have been called to the colours. Work on the land is done to a considerable extent by German women; but no amount of female labour can

* The Imperial Budget for the coming year places the ordinary revenue and expenditure at 166,154,076*l.* The revenue in the extraordinary budget is estimated at 4,024,965*l.* and the expenditure at 502,112,100*l.*, of which 498,092,139*l.* will be covered by loan,

compensate for the loss of strong and lusty men in agricultural work. This interest will therefore suffer, though not, at the outset, so much as the manufacturing interest. Both will be called upon to make good by taxes the deficiency in customs dues and in profits on exported goods, and the increase of interest on the rapidly-swelling national debt. To a smaller extent we at home are affected in a similar way. We have to raise new taxes at a time when trade, except in war requirements, is sluggish and in some cases stagnant. But there is this vital difference—our mercantile marine is pursuing its normal course, and will continue to do so in spite of submarines or other menaces. A few ships have been captured or sunk, and a few cargoes confiscated; but, with these trivial exceptions, our import and export trade with all countries, save those directly affected by the war, is going on just the same as usual. We have lost our trade with Germany, Austria and Turkey, and to a great extent that with France, Belgium, Russia, Italy and Switzerland has been crippled, but Germany's disaster is world-wide.

Although it is probable that a good deal of merchandise, food-stuffs particularly, are finding their way into Germany through neutral countries, it is certain that this can only be done by a relaxation of the customs dues, so that whether the import trade is wholly or partially suspended owing to the war, the loss to the revenue is pretty nearly the same. The value of the imports for 1913 was 534,750,000*l.*, the customs duties on which amounted probably to between thirty and forty millions. It may be safely assumed that not more than a third of this sum will be collected during the twelve months beginning Aug. 1, 1914. The case with regard to the exports is infinitely worse. Practically no merchandise is going out of Germany by way of the sea. Her mercantile shipping, which in point of tonnage is the second in the world, is lying idle in port; her great passenger liners are equally inactive; and the exports, which in 1913 amounted to a value of 495,630,000*l.*, are reduced to practically nil. Before the war, these consisted of iron and iron goods, groceries and food products, drugs and chemicals, wool and woollen goods, cotton and cotton goods, anthracite coal and coke,

instruments, clocks, machines and vehicles, earths, ores, hardware, art objects, fancy goods, clothing and silk goods. The loss of nearly 500,000,000*l.* sterling in export trade is one that must very seriously affect industrial interests and restrict employment. Germany's trade with the United Kingdom has, of course, come to an end altogether. This amounted in 1913 to 130,000,000*l.*, of which 80,500,000*l.* were exports, consisting principally of sugar, cotton, iron and steel, woollen and silk goods and grain. The chief commodities imported from the United Kingdom were cotton yarn, coal and coke, worsted yarn, machinery, etc., most of which may be looked upon in the light of raw material, and the lack of which will as seriously interfere with German manufacturers as with British exporters. The exceptional activity of the trades concerned in the manufacture of war munitions and military equipment will doubtless alleviate the industrial paralysis in Germany as well as here; but there is all the difference in the world between doing a trade with your own countrymen and doing a trade with the foreigner. The money that Germany is spending in this way is going out at a rapid pace, and there is next to nothing coming in. She is paying huge sums in unproductive work, whereas her productive enterprise is arrested; and big markets, which she has taken so much pains to acquire, are temporarily closed to her.

It is interesting to recall what was said by Herr Possehl a year or two ago (as reported in the 'Daily Express') in an address to the Deutscher Werkverein, wherein he frankly predicted the economic effects of a war and a blockade of German ports. In dealing with the iron and steel industry, he pointed out that it employs 400,000 men, not counting the 700,000 miners. To carry on this trade, more than 12,000,000 tons of ore have to be imported from Sweden, Spain, France and the Mediterranean, as well as from Russia. As Germany could not possibly supply the deficiency caused by the stoppage of these external supplies, the blast furnaces would have to close down, and trade in the interior of the country would be suspended.

'The situation,' continued Herr Possehl, 'applies equally to the great hardware industries of Rhenish Westphalia and of

Silesia; the raw materials will fail, and the works will have to shut down. The cutting-off of our exports of manufactured goods, of which Rhenish Westphalia produces half, operates in the same way in the event of a blockade. Then comes the great textile industry, with 16,000 mills employing 900,000 men and women, which imports enormous quantities of cotton, wool, raw silk, and so on from overseas, and exports them as finished goods. The total imports and exports reach about 150,000,000% a year. Here no new source of raw materials is possible. The machinery trade, which employs 900,000 workers in 20,000 shops, accounts for exports worth 25,000,000%. The chemical industry, the iron-working trade, the supply of foods and drinks, the rubber industry, hides, paper, wood-working and other trades employ hundreds of thousands of workers and contribute enormously to the wealth of the German people.

'I am persuaded,' he declared, 'that a long war, with a blockade of the coast, would mean that one-third of our industrial workers would be without bread; even if agriculture could temporarily employ a great number of the town workers and various branches of industry were busier than they normally are on war materials, still there would remain about a million workers without a stroke of work to do.'

'Germany's maritime trade and shipping are dead in the event of war,' he concluded. Of Germany's exports and imports to the total value of 900,000,000%, more than two-thirds, he points out, come and go by sea, and 'are consequently at the mercy of the sea power of England.' All the prophecies put forth with such striking candour in this speech have not yet been fulfilled, but they are probably on the way to fulfilment. Economic pressure is not a thing of a day or a week or a month; it takes time to act, and the longer it takes the more deadly is its action.

The question of foodstuffs, already briefly referred to, is one which has already caused anxiety to the Imperial Government. In order to put the matter without any bias, we will simply quote a few figures from an authoritative German source. Wheat consumption in Germany amounted in 1910-11 to 29,000,000 tons, not counting seed-corn. Of this total, 6,000,000 tons, or nearly 16 per cent., was imported. Population and consumption of

wheat per head have increased without any proportionate increase of agricultural produce. In order to feed the cattle raised in Germany, the import of enormous quantities of fodder has been necessary; and the supply of home-bred meat has only been possible by reason of this unobstructed importation. Even of potatoes there was a shortage in 1911, owing to persistent rain. The net result is that 100,000,000*l.* worth of foods and drinks, including fruit, dried fruits, wines and tobacco, were imported annually. The stoppage of the greater part of this must have a sinister bearing upon the problem of feeding the German nation. The longer the war continues the more serious will become the position. What is but a gentle increase of pressure to-day may become an intolerable burden in a few months' time. That the situation with regard to food supplies is becoming critical may be judged from the fact that a State-supervised company, 'War Cereals, Limited,' was recently formed in Berlin with power to seize private stores of grain. The 'Lokalanzeiger' said recently of this Company:

'Its object is to acquire as much grain as possible, even if necessary by the seizing of private property, and retain it for the last months preceding the new crop. The company works co-operatively; dividends are limited to five per cent.; and on dissolution shareholders only receive par value for their holdings, any surplus going to the State for national purposes. We may therefore rest assured that the feeding of the population has been secured till the next crop, but only on the presupposition that the necessity of exercising the most rigid economy will be recognised by the whole German nation, and that the use of bread will be limited to immediate requirements.'

Since this was written, the Government has stepped in with its control of the wheat supplies and bread allowances of so much per head. Nor is that the only sign of uneasiness. Early in January a semi-official notice was published which indicated that there was considerable apprehension about the future. It recommended the public to lay in supplies of ham, bacon and pickled pork, because, owing to the scarcity of fodder, it was necessary to sell as soon as possible pigs which were ready for killing. In these circumstances it was said to be the duty of everybody who could afford it

and who had, or could rent, storage room, to provide himself with as large supplies as possible of smoked or pickled provisions. Not only should families make this provision, but co-operative societies, hospitals and all large institutions should take advantage of the opportunity. The towns were advised to lay in large stores of frozen meat, in order to assure the supply of the population during the spring and the summer. In this way the surplus stock of pigs which could not be fed any longer would be made to serve the requirements of a time '*when perhaps other provisions will be scarce.*'

Perhaps more important even than a threatened food-scarcity is the actual scarcity of copper. Always a metal of many and various uses, it has been thrust by the war, on account of its indispensability in the manufacture of ammunition, into a new and startling prominence. There has thus been created in Germany a demand which far exceeds that of ordinary times and has led to a corresponding rise in the price that German importers are willing to pay. This rise has tempted merchants in neutral countries to import copper from other neutral countries and to run the risk of shipping it to Germany. The Germans are, nevertheless, still hard put to it to get enough copper for their ceaseless output of war material. Very little is produced in their own country or in Austria. For 1913 the total amount raised in Germany and Austria combined was less than 30,000 tons. Before there was any general apprehension of war, Germany's importation of crude copper had been going on at the rate of 230,000 tons per annum. A good deal of the yearly consumption, which amounted to about 250,000 tons, was undoubtedly applied in the manufacture of shells and cartridges; but, now that these are being used up with such reckless profusion, a huge amount of copper must be required for fresh supplies.

This stimulation of demand coincides with a serious check administered by the British to open trading. Copper, being declared contraband of war, is liable to seizure if intended for an enemy's use—a state of things which makes its direct shipment to Germany almost impossible, or, at all events, is attended with commercial risks that no prudent firm would care to undertake.

The blockade of German ports which has been virtually established prevents the import of copper in the ordinary way and leads to such surreptitious devices as can be utilised with any prospect of advantage. Copper in Germany, notwithstanding these methods, is almost as scarce as gold currency. All sorts of expedients have been resorted to for economising its use and turning it from domestic to military purposes. Some months ago the coinage of copper was stopped; and, although the proportion of this to nickel in the small monies was insignificant, it was made even less. Copper kitchen utensils and all kinds of scrapped copper were diligently collected, and orders were issued that the fragments of shells and spent cartridge-cases found on the battlefields were to be gathered up for the sake of the copper they contained. Neither these economies nor the imports through neutral countries, however, bulked sufficiently large to arrest the rise in the price of copper. At the beginning of the war refined copper could be bought in Germany at the rate of a little over 60*l.* a ton; to-day it is eagerly bought at 170*l.* a ton, and it has been stated that in exceptional cases as much as 200*l.* a ton has been paid. In England, the current price is now about 64*l.*, and the difference between this and the German price is a measure of the relative urgency of demand in the two countries.

The world's total supply of refined copper for 1913 was a little under a million tons; and Germany's consumption amounted to 250,000 tons, just one-fourth. The United States production was about 55 per cent. of the whole; and, as Germany obtained the largest part of its supply—197,353 tons—from the United States, it follows that something like two-fifths of the American output was going to Germany before the war. Some of this was, of course, used in manufactures. Electrical plant must have accounted for a good deal. Copper is a big factor in telegraph and telephone wires and in dynamos. In the form of a sulphate it plays an indispensable part in the dressing of vines to prevent the havoc of the phylloxera. A great many culinary vessels for German use were formerly made of copper. Although the vessels may be dispensed with, and the vines may be neglected, there must be field telegraphs and field telephones, to say nothing of the millions of copper cartridge

cases and the hundreds of thousands of copper-banded steel shells needed for the prosecution of the war. It is not extravagant to believe that, if Germany were prevented from getting any more copper through neutral countries, her powers of resistance would be broken in a few months by shortness of ammunition.

Sir Edward Grey's figures justify the inference that the new supplies obtained through these channels have been considerable. From the beginning of the war down to the third week in September, Italy imported from the United States 36,285,000 lbs., as compared with 15,202,000 lbs. for the corresponding period of 1913. During the same time the combined imports of Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Switzerland, Spain and the Balkan States amounted to 35,347,000 lbs. as compared with 7,271,000 lbs. for the corresponding period of 1913. It would be folly to believe that these startling increases are due to any marked growth of industrial activity in the neutral countries themselves. Trade does not jump about in that way. Even if we may suppose that the preoccupation of the belligerents has stimulated the industries of neutrals, it cannot possibly have stimulated it to anything like the extent reflected in the above figures. The sane conclusion is that a good deal of the increased importation has been passed on to Austria and Germany, thus enabling them to prolong the war. But the price is, after all, the best possible indication that the supplies are still insufficient. Germany would not pay 170*l.* a ton and upwards for copper if there were anything like an adequate supply in view. If the scarcity is such as to compel an increase in price of 166 per cent. as compared with the market price elsewhere, what will it be when the neutral countries have put into full operation the more stringent examination which they realise to be obligatory?

Nearly everything that has been said about Germany applies, *mutatis mutandis*, to Austria-Hungary. The principal industry of the latter is agriculture, and it would no doubt be sufficient for the food requirements of the people if the labour conditions were normal. The drafting of so many thousands of men into the armies must have interfered seriously with cultivation; and the outcry already heard about the prices of provisions will

surely become much louder when the fields are left unsown. A nation which by reason of military strain can neither grow nor import food is not far removed from a state of threatened famine. And the pressure of war on Austria-Hungary will not be lessened by the fact that she is certainly not as rich as Germany, while her trade is smaller, and the people of the Dual Monarchy are by no means united.

Austria's estimated revenue for 1913 was 130,728,397*l.*; Hungary's was 86,367,043*l.*, which included the sum set aside annually as a contribution to the service of the General Debt of Austria. Austria-Hungary's foreign trade for 1913 was 141,433,000*l.* in imports and 115,129,000*l.* in exports; and the customs duties played an important part in the revenue figures. Her National Debt of about 304,000,000*l.* will be largely increased by the War Loan recently 'placed' and by further vast expenditure to come. But the most hurtful financial factor, as in Germany, is the embargo put upon her export trade. Her chief exports before the war were beet sugar, grain, cattle, horses, eggs, timber, woollen and leather goods, glass and glassware, and fancy goods. Nearly all these are suspended. The value of Austria-Hungary's exports to the United Kingdom alone amounted in 1913 to 7,706,000*l.*, by far the larger part of which was in sugar. No doubt a certain amount of commercial interchange will still go on between Austria-Hungary and Germany, between Austria-Hungary and Turkey, and between the German powers and neighbouring neutrals; but this will not save them from an enormous falling-off. Germany has in the past invested big sums in Austrian commercial and manufacturing enterprises; and it is estimated that at the present time she has between 100,000,000*l.* and 200,000,000*l.* in these ventures. Those which are devoted to the manufacture of things required for the war will be profitable, but it is not at all likely that much more than a tithe of the total is in this relatively fortunate position.

It is difficult to refrain from smiling when one comes to discuss the financial position of Turkey. In one sense, Turkey has no financial position. She certainly has no financial credit, and, before the present war started, she

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was in the direst financial straits. Her participation in the struggle, at the prompting of the fatuous Young Turk party, will only make the financial confusion worse confounded. To what extent Germany is prepared to give monetary aid to her obedient cat's-paw, no one can tell; certain it is that with a bankrupt Treasury the prospects of the army are very chilly. Not very long ago, France was confiding enough to advance a loan of about 20,000,000*l.* in exchange for certain concessions; and the Powers at the same time agreed to a 4 per cent. increase in the Customs duties and the institution of several Government monopolies. The state of war precipitated by the Sultan has not only made any further financial assistance from the Western Powers impossible, but has seriously affected the interests of the Turkish bondholders, interest on the debt being, of course, suspended, except in the case of the loans secured on the Egyptian tribute. It is believed that French investors hold about 55 per cent. of the total debt, Germans 25 per cent., and English investors barely 20 per cent. The outstanding debt on March 1, 1914, was as under:

LOANS SPECIALLY SECURED ON THE EGYPTIAN TRIBUTE.

	£T
1855 (joint English and French guarantees)	4,196,720
1891 Defence Loan	5,915,712
1894 Egyptian Tribute Loan . .	7,868,674
	<hr/> £T17,981,106

SECURED ON REVENUES ASSIGNED TO DEBT ADMINISTRATION.

Unified converted debt	37,065,930
Lottery bonds	10,870,791
	<hr/> £T47,936,721
Other loans	63,738,180
	<hr/>
Total	£T129,656,007

In addition, at the end of 1914 there were Treasury bills outstanding for over 20,000,000*l.*, and there have been temporary loans since. Some of these may have been paid off out of the proceeds of the loan provided by France, but in any case the total debt of Turkey to-day is hardly less than 160,000,000*l.*

The T17,981,106*l.* secured on the Egyptian Tribute may be eliminated from calculations as to the ability

of Turkey to meet the service of her debt, because, unless Egypt ceases to be a British Protectorate, as much of the tribute as is necessary is certain to be remitted regularly direct to London. Until the war is over the interest on the rest of the Ottoman debt will remain unpaid, so far as English and French bondholders are concerned. What the German bondholders get will depend very much upon the state of the revenue and the demands of extraordinary expenditure. The revenue for 1914-15 was estimated at T31,921,163*l.*, and the expenditure at T34,007,619*l.* Both will be influenced by the war; the revenue will be much less and the expenditure much greater. The imports for 1911 amounted to 37,774,913*l.*; and the 11 per cent. *ad valorem* duties on the same basis in normal times (excluding tobacco and salt) would be between 3,000,000*l.* and 4,000,000*l.* The exports for the same year were 22,474,818*l.*; and in 1913 Turkey exported to the United Kingdom alone goods of the value of 5,416,659*l.* Her foreign trade is now in the same position as that of the other enemy countries; she can neither import nor export, so that she loses the customs dues on the one hand and the growers' profit on the other. Figs, raisins, barley, fruits, tobacco, wool, mohair and opium are amongst her chief exports, which have hitherto been all to the benefit of agriculture and flock ownership. It does not seem to matter much, in the circumstances, which revenues are assigned to debt administration, because in a state of war it is improbable that any effective means of enforcing payment exist. One of the loans (the 4 per cent. of 1909) is secured on the revenues formerly applied to the war indemnity of T350,000*l.* annually payable to Russia from May 1882. This was paid regularly down to Dec. 31, 1908, when a new convention was signed by Russia and Turkey allowing of the free disposal of the annual instalments for forty years. Where the customs receipts form the security, the Council of Administration of the Ottoman Public Debt has, speaking generally, the collection and application of the dues. During war time, however, the remittances to England and France may be looked upon as having no actual existence.

Turkey's desperate need of money is shown by the arbitrary action of the Government in connexion with

the Imperial Ottoman Bank. The Government, it appears, brought pressure to bear upon the local bank authorities with the object of getting them to sanction an issue of 2,000,000*l.* of bank notes. The Directorial Committees having their seats in Paris and London refused their approval, without which the issue would presumably be invalid. The Turkish Government then adopted the high-handed policy of appointing provisionally for the duration of the war an executive committee with its seat in Constantinople, in order 'to make provision for indispensable financial measures.' The negotiations referring thereto are reported to have progressed so far that a definitive result is expected, if it has not already been reached. The Director-General of the Ottoman Bank in Constantinople and the Assistant Director-General declined the Government's proposals, which would have allowed them to remain at their posts under certain conditions.

The Bank in Turkey is therefore in the hands of the tools of the Government; and, although it was originally established by an imperial firman and its head office is situated in Constantinople, most of the capital is French and English, and the shareholders cannot regard without misgiving the appointment of an executive committee obliged to carry out the behests of the war party and its German task-masters. If the position demands these drastic illegalities at a comparatively early stage of Turkey's participation, what may not be expected when a few more crushing defeats, followed by public disillusionment, have made the position of the Government critical and the financial conditions disastrous?

H. J. JENNINGS.

Art. 4.—MUSIC AND THE WAR.

THE unmistakable influence which national convulsions and international wars have had at all times in awakening the highest forces of musical art is one of the most interesting problems of the historian and the psychologist. The evidence is convincing and cumulative. At no time has a great country failed to produce great composers when its resources have been put to the supreme test of war, provided (and the exception is one of the highest importance from the point of view of human nature) that the ideals of the nation are high, that its principles of action are just, and that it possesses a sound incentive to call forth a genuinely patriotic effort. Hence it is as common to find a great artistic movement rising at moments of gravest peril, and even of disaster, as at a period of triumphant success. The individual expressions of the greatest composers, when called upon to celebrate the concrete successes of their countries, have generally been on a level of excellence inferior, often far inferior, to that of their best work. Where Beethoven failed, others of less calibre and inventive force could scarcely hope to succeed. When their thoughts turned upon the realisation of a general conception of greatness, or of the agony of reverses, their highest powers did not fail them. The masterful personality of Napoleon, and his influence for good or evil upon Europe, found a musical expression in the 'Eroica' Symphony, superior in its intensity of emotion and its grasp of the big things in life to any literary biography, however accurate or eloquent. The gathering of Emperors and Kings at Vienna in 1814 only resulted in two compositions by that greatest composer of his age—the 'Battle of Vittoria' and the 'Glorreiche Augenblick'—neither of which can be classed higher than *pièces d'occasion*. The genius, which flashes out almost in spite of itself in everything Beethoven touched, scarcely showed itself for more than an 'Augenblick' in either of them. But the Spirit which moved upon the face of the waters inspired in full measure the pages of the Mass in D. In the last movement of that mighty work, the 'Agnus Dei,' the whole tragedy of war finds

its most sublime expression called forth by the prayer for peace.

It is interesting to note the coincidence of the appearance of greatest composers of various countries with the time of great national danger. The conquest of the Netherlands by Spain and the worst days of the Inquisition in that country, far from stifling music, gave it a strong impetus; it is only necessary to name three composers of renown, Josquin des Prés, Willaert and Roland de Lattre (Orlando di Lasso), out of a bevy of glittering talent. The same period of stress saw the rise of Palestrina and Gabrieli in Italy, and of Goudimel in France. The Spanish wars and the Armada peril resulted in an equally strong outburst of artistic life in England. Tallis, Byrd, Morley, Orlando Gibbons and the Elizabethan madrigalists gave England the right to its title of a 'Nest of singing birds'; just as in the older and less chronicled days of Henry V, the name of Dunstable, the father of modern choral music, still shines through the fog of obscure records, and a setting of the 'Song of Agincourt' still lives in its original manuscript to prove its title to fame. The Civil War and the period ending in the Revolution of 1688 saw the zenith of the career of Henry Purcell. The sufferings and interminable struggles of Germany during the reign of Louis Quatorze in France and of Frederic the Great were coincident with the appearance of Sebastian Bach in Thuringia and of Handel in Saxony. The international turmoil which extended over Central Europe with little cessation down to 1815 saw a succession of musical giants, Couperin andameau in France, Gluck in Vienna, Haydn in Croatia, Mozart in Tirol, Beethoven (a Netherlander) in the Rhineland, Schubert in Vienna, Weber in Dresden, Cherubini (a Florentine) in Paris, Rossini in Italy. In later times the Revolutions of 1848 and the fermentations which surrounded them found their musical expression in Wagner and Brahms to the east of the Rhine, and in Berlioz and Bizet to the west; and Chopin appeared at the moment of Poland's greatest trials. The struggle for Italian unity is even symbolised in the very name of Verdi. The renaissance of Russia and its manifold successes and reverses are marked by the name of Glinka, and an ever-increasing roll of

remarkable creators of a national school, Tschaikowsky, Rimsky-Korsakoff, Moussorgsky, Glazounow, and many more of consistently high aim and sparkling vitality.

Psychologists will, however, not fail to note that the greatest men arose precisely in those countries which had the highest ideals and which fought to maintain them. Invention was not stimulated by aggression or by greed, while it reached its highest level where the incentive for action was founded upon justice, patriotism, and the maintenance of freedom. As soon as Beethoven saw that Napoleon's aims were guided by personal ambition, he tore the dedication off the score of the 'Eroica,' and trampled on it. With tragic satire he changed the superscription to the words 'per festeggiare il sovvenire d'un gran uomo.' The 'gran uomo' was very much alive (1804); and the memory Beethoven celebrated was that of the greatness which was shattered, for the composer, by Napoleon's assumption of the Imperial title. France had no equivalent to show. Aggression did not stimulate the artistic brain. The only composer of great merit whom she possessed was not of her nation; Cherubini was an Italian to his finger-tips. The stimulus of the Revolution had produced one immortal melody, the Marseillaise; its excesses temporarily throttled the music of the nation. As it recovered from them, the national inventiveness began to reassert itself. The stars of Berlioz, Bizet, and Auber arose, to be followed in recent years, as the influence of old aggressiveness faded away and the higher principle of the defence of freedom and of country became irresistibly stronger, by a remarkable outburst of artistic life; not so powerful, perhaps, as the similar manifestation in Russia, but arising from the same incentive.

The appearance of a school of American music dates, as might be expected, from the Civil War of the Sixties. The North fought for a great cause, and from the North that movement has come. In poetry a new note was sounded by Walt Whitman in the West, answering the trumpet call of Tolstoi in the East. In music the beginning was made, although a nation of such recent growth, and consisting of so many still unamalgamated elements, could not be expected to strike out a new and individual path. Nations have to grow old with a folk-music of

centuries behind them before they express themselves in unmistakable terms of their own nationality. The ingredients have to be mixed and boiled before the dish is served. Upon this point von Bülow and Dvořák were equally positive; both agreed in the prophecy that with patience the day of American music would come.

The remarkable rehabilitation of Britain as a music-producing country dates from the same period. Our insular position has to some extent militated against foreign recognition of the enormous stride which this country has made in the last thirty-five years; but the chief stumbling-block in the way of appreciation has been the attitude of Germany. Europe has long looked up to Germany as the best judge as well as the best producer of music, whereas she has for the last two decades been living solely on the reputation of her past; and her stubborn denial of value to any British productions has hypnotised the rest of Europe. The facts, however, are alike distinctive of the value of her judgment, and proof positive of the cause which underlies it. 'There are none so blind as those who will not see'; and Germany has refused to see. The tendency, growing year by year since 1870, and with amazing acceleration since 1896, to admit no rivalry, however friendly, to build up frontiers against art, even to use her all-powerful Press Bureau to stamp out any sign of appreciation of good foreign work, has been patent to all who have come into close contact with them. Treated with respect, courtesy, and admiration when they come to this country as our guests, the Germans persistently made it clear that in none of these qualities will they show the least approach to reciprocity.

The reason is not far to seek. The ideals which alone can nourish art have faded away, and aggression pure and simple has taken their place. The creators of great musical work have vanished from their midst, and they are critical and clever enough to know it. Hence the decision, 'If we cannot do these things ourselves, we shall take good care not to admit that other nations can, and more especially that Great Britain can.' So they bang and bolt their own door, while expecting that the doors of other nations will stand wide for them. The better judgment and broader views of a

section of Germans, and that no small one, are hectored into quiescence by an all-powerful clique. The German masses never protest, and take everything, as the saying is, 'lying down.' Not the least suggestive sign of the general submissiveness is the absence of printed correspondence in their multitudinous daily papers. So long ago as 1887, Hans von Bülow lamented the attitude of the 'compositeurs indigènes, lesquels profitent de la très regrettable tendance actuelle du chauvinisme pour protester contre mes principes cosmopolitiques en matière d'art.' What was but a 'tendency' then, has crystallised in recent times into a creed. When the German Press brings its ammunition to bear upon foreign music—even such as is accepted and acclaimed by its public—it rarely fails to interlard its columns with political innuendoes, even to the point of rebuking for unpatriotic temerity, such promoters of performances as are broad-minded enough to look beyond their own frontier. Against this brick wall of insulated prejudice Art runs its head in vain.

The modern developments of German music since the death of Wagner and of Brahms throw a light, if a lurid one, upon the trend of German character. The anti-militarist and peace-loving nations outside, more especially in England, have, with the exception of a few men of deeper insight and more intimate knowledge, treated these specimens of art-production as if they were hardy and mature growths from a sound parent stem. They have failed to see that they are but suckers, taking on the appearance of the old tree, but sapping its life-blood at the root. The essence of German militarism has been reliance upon numbers, rapidity of concentration, perfection of machinery, repression of individual initiative, and in action the attack in close formation of which this repression is the necessary corollary. In their recent music, all these elements can be clearly traced. Richard Strauss is the counterpart of Bernhardi and the General Staff. He relies increasingly upon the numbers of his executants, upon the technical facility of his players, upon the additions and improvements to musical instruments, upon the subordination of invention to effect, upon the massing of sounds and the superabundance

of colour to conceal inherent poverty. A review of his career is convincing of these facts. Strauss began work as a writer of chamber-music, which to any eye of average critical ability is but 'Capellmeister-musik' of a fairly distinguished order. He found this would not do, and that pale quasi-Brahms was not a passport to notoriety. So he threw Brahms, for whom he had apparently all the admiration of a would-be follower, overboard; even characterising in a never-to-be-forgotten gibe a work of his own, which bore that mark, as 'nearly as bad as Brahms.' He began to sit at the feet of Wagner and still more of Liszt, the greatest of executants and most fascinating of men, but none the less the emptiest and most pretentiously bombastic of composers, whose undisputed pianistic supremacy hid from his hearers the barrenness of his invention. Wagner was drawn upon for his orchestration, Liszt for his efforts to apply the stage to the concert-platform in the shape of programme-music.

Thus equipped, Strauss set out to conquer the world by force and surprise, when he knew that he was powerless to do so by charm or beauty. He established a new order of Capellmeister-musik, so rich in colour and in machine-made effects that only the acute observer could see the old Capellmeister-musik still lurking there, disguised in glittering garments and so loud and flamboyant as to conceal its real vacuity. But the older influences for good could not be obliterated at a blow. In his earlier incursions into programme-music-land they survived enough to give artistic interest. 'Tod und Verklärung' ('the hospital-ward affair,' as one of his own most celebrated compatriots described it) has elements of beauty in it, though its close, which is its best moment, owes everything to Brahms' Requiem. 'Don Juan' contains a theme which is beautiful *per se*, and reaches a level which its composer never again approached. It is also full of a certain dash and youthful exuberance which carries the hearer along with it without giving him time to analyse the component parts.

From that day, Strauss' record is one of steady decadence. The means are multiplied as the invention wanes. He glorifies Nietzsche in 'Zarathustra,' in strains under which that philosopher would have writhed. He

sets Bernhardi to music in 'Heldenleben,' not indeed taking him or even a Napoleon for his hero, but with sublime egotism glorifying himself. To succeed in this he uses old themes of his own, obviously because, as the context shows, he was unable to hit upon any so good. He makes his climaxes out of the well-known sounds and combinations familiar to any musician who knows his 'Nibelungen' or his 'Tristan,' and adopts them with such a bold face that criticism, which would expose the imitation if it appeared under any other name but that of Strauss, is reduced to silence, and even forgets the origin of his effects. He cannot even leave the domestic hearth and the innocence of childhood alone, but blares at infancy with tubas and trombones. In his view Blake should have been a Boanerges in the nursery, howling Treitschke instead of baby rhymes; and the bath should have been sown with floating mines. In his stage work the decadence is even worse. Beginning with a pale reflex of Wagner in 'Guntram,' it would seem as if the later morals of Berlin promised quicker returns. He treads on risky ground in 'Feuersnoth,' presses Oscar Wilde into his service in 'Salome,' outrages all the ideal spirit of Greek drama and violates its first principles of keeping horrors from the public gaze in 'Electra,' and finally lets himself and such art as he has left roll in the gutter and bespatter himself and his hearers with the mud of 'the Legend of Joseph.' For this supreme anti-climax of a career for which many had such hopes, he, because his name was Richard Strauss, was honoured by the Alma Mater of Cranmer, of Laud, of Gladstone and of Newman. He has not, like his compatriots, repudiated the Oxford degree.

For such a *débâcle* there can be no feeling but one of the deepest regret, which is not softened by the consideration that the approach of inevitable disaster was but gradual. There will be no rejoicing over such a catastrophe in any land where music is loved. The causes are not so much the fault of the individual as of the system which has undermined his judgment and his better self. In the world of Pan-Germanism, Strauss is but an unconsidered cypher, apart from his celebrity in art. The canker of militarism has eaten into his system as it has into that of the most peaceful of his

compatriots. It has throttled his invention, and compelled his colossal technique to serve its own purposes. A glance at the volumes of marching songs, which he arranged (by Imperial order) for the soldiers, affords the most vivid proof of this slavery to Junkerdom. Where simplicity, cleanness, and clearness of treatment are imperative, there is a seeking after crudity and a crookedness of expression, which in a less-known man would be set down to inexperienced and ignorant technique. To get even the obedient Teutonic rank and file to sing them at all would certainly require the menace of the officers' revolvers.

It is somewhat curious, and it is also a sign of the times, not only that a strain of the old musical sanity still lingers in Germany, but that its isolated exponent is almost snowed under. His works may be few, but their value is a more than equivalent counterpoise to their paucity. Two diamonds are a greater possession than a cartload of stones. Humperdinck provides the only oasis in a desert of cacophony. The 42 cm. shells of his brethren create such a din and stupefy so many with their fumes, that he is, for the moment only, a solitary and almost unnoticed figure. But he loves children, and the purity which appeals to them; and he stands alone, a living protest against the cruelty and barbarity of his country. He may sign as many professorial protests against other nations as he likes; his work belies the tenets to which his signature is set, suggests the pressure applied to secure the support of those of his kidney, and is far less indicative of self-advertisement than the abstention of his noisier colleague. He is a disciple of Wagner, it is true, but of the best in Wagner; the Wagner that knew and appreciated Palestrina, that laid his foundation upon folk-song, the Wagner of the 'Siegfried Idyll,' of the 'Meistersinger' and of 'Parsifal,' not the Wagner of unbridled excitement and sensuality. He writes music and does not confound it with chemistry. It is clean; and that quality, unfortunately, is not the fashion in his country now, any more than it was in the France of 1870. In that, as in many other particulars, the rôle of the two nations has been entirely reversed in the short space of forty years. It is the old story of the demoralisation of the *nouveau riche*. It explains

how it came about that the possession of a great literature of noble folk-song, which in the Napoleonic troubles and the heroism they compelled found fruit of indigenous and characteristic growth and savour in Körner and in Weber, and in 1870 in Karl Wilhelm and the 'Wacht am Rhein,' has to turn to England for the melody of 'Heil dir im Siegeskranz' and to Croatia for that of 'Deutschland über Alles.'

The war of 1914 has brought about a convulsion in the world of music. The results which will ensue are almost as hard to forecast as those of the Conference which will delimitate the frontiers of Europe. The music-centre of the European nations will, as a dominant factor, cease to count. Financial considerations alone must so cripple Germany that it will for decades to come be unable to preserve its Opera-houses and its Concert Institutions at a sufficient height of efficiency to attract the hosts of students and of music-lovers which congregated there. The loss is prodigious, and it must be supplied. The love of the art and the creative incentive of the composer will not cease with the explosion of the last shell. Public taste and public spirit will demand the revival and continuance of the arts of peace. A substitute must be found for the country which has for so long, though of recent years to a smaller extent, been the Mecca of musicians, old and young. It will be a distinct gain in many ways if the land which has been overmanured should be allowed to lie fallow for a time. Better crops may be raised on more virgin soil. We have our own to our hand. England at last has the chance of her life; but, if she is to take it, she must break away for good and all from the influences which have for so long strangled her efforts.

Those influences are, first, the inveterate preference shown by the higher ranks of Society for the foreigner, and, next, the equally inveterate and unfounded disbelief in, and consequent discouragement of, its compatriots. Such encouragement as these have got in the past has been, by the irony of fate, not a little owing to the active assistance of the immigrant foreigner. The first champion of recent British music was August Manns, a Prussian bandmaster. The second was Carl Rosa, a

Hamburg violinist. The former did yeoman service for the orchestral composer, the latter for the operatic. Neither got much encouragement from any above the ranks of the middle classes, but they did not take their hands from the plough. Manns made his large public listen to new native works by combining them with attractive and well-known masterpieces, following the policy by which Jullien popularised Beethoven in earlier days. Rosa risked more, for an English opera had to stand by itself; but he believed in the power of this country to produce and to perform, and was rewarded by the success of his ventures as long as he lived to control their destinies. His enthusiasm infected Augustus Harris, who at the time of his early death at the age of forty-four was working hard in the direction of National Opera.

Meanwhile all the pro-foreign influences were as hard at work as they had been in the days of Handel, that gigantic trampler upon national aspirations. As George III supported the great Saxon who had overwhelming genius to back him, so successive generations of the leaders of Society carried on the tradition, extending their patronage even down to the preference for foreign musicians for dances and entertainments. The last connexion of the English executant with the State, the King's Band, which was a permanent institution dating back to the reign of Edward IV, was abolished only within the last few years. Its place was taken by Germans, Austrians, and Hungarians; not on account of their superior ability, for the English players were in every respect their masters. When this example was set, smaller fry profited by it, and most London functions followed suit. Even the theatres and music-halls copied the policy of their patrons; and only a few good men and true, such as Irving, stuck by their country. The musical strength of Germany is well known and proved to have been fostered and solidified by the unfailing encouragement and support given without stint by the numerous heads of small states, such as Weimar, Schwerin, Meiningen, as well as by the larger Courts of Prussia, Saxony and Bavaria. In time their example stimulated great, and even small, municipalities to follow on the same lines. Dresden at one time favoured the Italian

to the exclusion of its own compatriots; national feeling was too strong for it, and Weber slew the invader. From that day, though Italian and French work was performed, it had to be performed in the German language. France, Italy, Russia adopted a similar policy, and became formidable competitors, the last an overwhelming one.

In England we had no such influences as the lesser courts of Germany provided, to direct taste into patriotic channels. We continued to feed British ears with every sound and language save our own. Not, be it clearly understood, from lack of talent. While the North can breed the finest choral singers in the world, there can be no lack of voices. When every foreign conductor knows and even allows himself to admit, that British orchestras are unsurpassable for tone, temperament and executive skill, there is no excuse for underrating them. When the 'Nibelungen' can be sung (not shouted) on the stage by British singers in a way to compel the unstinted praises of its first Baireuth conductor, there can be no famine of artists for far less exacting operas. No one who has had personal or intimate knowledge of German opera-houses and German singers and orchestras can deny that, apart from the long experience born of unbroken routine, Great Britain is their superior in freshness, in beauty of tone and in elasticity of interpretation. Wagner, when he visited London in 1877, openly expressed his preference for the use of the English language in the English presentation of his operas. He knew, as we should know, if we were not such inveterate depreciators of our own possessions, that the language which was good enough for the Bible, Shakespeare and Milton, is good enough for the operatic stage, provided that it is written in a style worthy of the literature of the country. Wagner's wishes were carried out by Mr Frederick Jameson, in translations of the 'Ring' and of the 'Meistersinger' which will stand comparison with any German translations of foreign works. What Mr Jameson began we have plenty of literary men to complete, as soon as their services are required.

Even in the difficult and subtle task of translating German lyrics, we have abundant proof of the ability of English poets to grapple with it, in the masterly translation of Tieck's 'Magelone-Lieder' by Andrew Lang,

a rendering no whit inferior to the original, even though hampered by the necessities of fitting the syllables to Brahms' voice-part. Ignorance of the English language has too often induced foreign publishers to print ridiculous and childish translations to their vocal productions, and has led unthinking and prejudiced persons in this country to enlarge upon the so-called unsuitability of our language for music. They forget the beauty with which it clothes the 'Messiah'—its sonorousness when well chosen, its extraordinary wealth in subdivisions of vowel sound—and they class all poetry for music in the same category as that of the Poet Bunn. There have been as yet only spasmodic efforts to produce works which require carefully thought-out English to illuminate them. The earliest attempt of recent days, that of Carl Rosa, was directed by himself; and, being a German, he could not be expected to apply severe literary criticism to what he saw. Nowadays we can do not only better, but superlatively well. In scenery and scenic effects we not only hold our own with other countries but even surpass them; and there is no reason why, in a country fresh to the business, we should not strike out as individual a note of our own as the Russian artists do.

All this has been accomplished not only without help from the influential and monied classes in this country, but in spite of their apathy. It has been work all along against the collar. That it has been persisted in without faltering is the greatest proof of the healthy vitality of the artistic heart of the country. The time has now come when England can show whether she is going to be true to herself, or to be content to let others reap the harvest which is ready to her hand. The magnet is removed from central Europe; is England, 'whence' (as Brahms said in 1896) 'you will see great things come,' going any longer to prefer the foreign voice to her own? Will she only accept a compatriot if he changes his name by the addition of a '*vitch*' or a '*ski*,' whitens his hands, and lets his back-hair grow well over his collar? Or is she going to see where the real stuff is, and to give her own sons and daughters at least an equal chance in the race for success? If the lead is given, she will go ahead. If it is not, no amount of musical taste in the masses (and there is no lack of it) will be able to rescue her.

This popular good taste, which is more deep and far-reaching than the inhabitants of Mayfair and Belgravia imagine in their wildest dreams, and of which one visit to an East End Sunday Chamber Concert would convince them for good (if they have forgotten or ever knew the orchestra seats at the Monday Popular Concerts), is ready to support and carry to victory any honest effort if the rich and well-to-do determine to turn over a new leaf and to do their duty by their own race. It is not by any means necessary that the leaders should be endowed with musical taste, or should even know one note from another. They must look at the art as an essential part of national evolution and refinement, as they look at the National Gallery and the British Museum. No man need be a literary critic or even a great writer to grasp the importance to the nation of the possession of a sound and wide literature, nor need he be a painter or a judge of pictures to gauge the value of the masterpieces of great artists. If they grasp the importance of all arts as a national asset, that conviction will be enough to induce them to extend their assistance to all arts alike, irrespective of personal predilection for any one of them. Hitherto all arts in this country have profited by this spirit except one—music. It is not too late to include in its proper place that art which ancient Greece, at the climax of her intellectual supremacy, valued as high as, if not higher than, any other.

Much has been said and written, unfortunately not without dire cause, about the disastrous effects of the war upon the arts and their exponents. None of them has escaped, but music has suffered the most heavily of all. This, in view of the conditions in the past, is only natural. It has earned far less than its colleagues, and has therefore less savings from better days to rely upon. Society, however, has not scrupled to call upon half-ruined singers and players to give their services to help to swell subscriptions for charitable purposes. They have come forward without grudging, and have themselves furnished many to fill the ranks of the Army on active and auxiliary service. After the stress is over, there will be a debt to pay, not for services given in war-time, but for service available in peace-time.

When that day comes, will Society turn its back on artists who were good enough for the purpose when the gentlemen with foreign prefixes and surnames were not procurable? There is but one answer; it cannot, if it is loyal; it must not, if it is honest. If it goes one step further than obligation, and substitutes cordial support for cold acknowledgment, the day of British music will be dawning, and the sky will clear.

Another serious problem confronts the musical world, which, although not patent on the surface at the moment, is bound to call for solution in no long time. Germany has been the centre not only of production but also of publication. The commercial ramifications, which it has so sedulously fostered for so long, include one which is as far-reaching as any other. It has supplied the world with printed editions of the works of the great masters, and of many modern composers. These outworks will also be destroyed, together, very probably, with the stability of the firms from which they are issued. The supply of English music of what may be called the serious type—chamber-music, orchestral works and the like (and quantities of it are in existence)—are mostly in manuscript upon their composers' shelves. If the writers had been 'made in Germany,' most of their works would have been procurable by the public long ago. Being writers in a country where publishers follow the trend of Society, and disbelieve, or at any rate argue that the public disbelieve, in British work, they cannot find their way into print, still less obtain the smallest value for it. The consequence is obvious in every music-seller's window—a row of royalty ballads. The exceptions are sufficiently few to prove the rule. When a German composer, even a beginner and little known, produces a work in his own country, the publishers congregate to hear it, and to form their judgment upon its suitability for print. If an English work is produced, the English publisher is at his own fireside; he knows nothing of its fate and cares less. Even the favourable comments of the press will fail to move him to consider at second-hand the claims of any work which does not fall into the category of large profits and quick returns. A string-quartet, an orchestral symphony or concerto, would

be looked upon as matters far too ephemeral to be considered in the same breath as a three-verse song with organ obligato. Their author will be pitied for wasting his valuable time on visionary ideals.

This antiquated Philistinism must be superseded if British music—that is to say, the music which counts—is to have its chance. Performance from manuscript is equivalent to isolated performance. Repetition alone will make a fine work tell. Repetition will not tell unless it spreads outside the bounds of the original producer. It cannot spread without the intervention of print. The more serious type of music is not appreciably more lucrative abroad than it is here. Its profits are nearer 5 per cent. on the capital that is invested in it than the 100 per cent. which an English publisher fixes as the minimum of a successful venture. But canny Germany was content all the same to receive the smaller dividend on sounder bonds, while not abstaining from more lucrative ventures to supplement them. It saw that the ephemeral, without the lasting work at its back, would not enhance the credit of the country or the fame of its publishing houses, and became thereby the home of the celebrated editions of Sebastian Bach, Handel, Beethoven, Schubert *et hoc genus omne*, while throwing a willing ægis over contemporary work. But these monumental editions are gone, and can now only be saved for posterity by photography, the metal upon which they are engraved having been absorbed by Krupp; their place must be taken somewhere and by somebody enterprising enough to secure them. Why not by England, equally with Germany the admirer and devotee of those great masters?

A leading publisher in America—which is to all intents and purposes a new field for music, and a land where commercial interests are paramount—lately said that he made it a rule to include a solid percentage of high-class music in his catalogues, even if they spelt a deficit in themselves, for the credit of his house and of his country. The sooner it is brought home to the English music-publisher that the credit of a nation's output depends in the main upon music of the highest class, not upon choral works which are only for English consumption and require translation to reach foreign nations, or upon

works written for the English Church which are unsuitable for any other, or upon ephemeral pianoforte music, or, least of all, upon worthless ballads and part-songs, the better will be the outlook of this nation in the world of art. It is not the time for ploughing lonely furrows, still less for attacking foreign firms merely because they are foreign, whose record for the production of good music is far healthier than the bulk of our own. We must do better than they, and gain thereby the respect and confidence of the musical world. The day when the chief Berlin publisher of his time was able to state without fear of possible contradiction that a 'good composition published in England was a lost composition, killed by its rubbishy surroundings,' must, if only for our national credit, go, and go for good. 'By their works ye shall know them' is as great a truism as it was 2000 years ago; but the works must be procurable.

War has its blessings as well as its curses. One of the greatest of its blessings is the awakening of patriotism. Much has been written about patriotism in business, and its utilisation to give stimulus to the nation's inventions and manufactures. Little has been said about its influence in the arts, and especially in music, the wholesomest aid to patriotism in the field and outside it. To stimulate artistic patriotism is the need of the moment; we must cultivate a trust in British ideals and British effort at least as great as other nations have long shown in their own. If this patriotism has been long dormant, it is not too late to wake it. If it is restricted in amount, it can be extended. But the need of the moment is a lead, and a strong lead, not in the direction of exclusion of the best from without, but of the encouragement of all that is good within; and, given conditions of equal ability, a preference to the men and the productions of our own country.

CHARLES V. STANFORD.

Art. 5.—THE ABANDONMENT OF THE GOLD STANDARD.

THE Great War will be long remembered for other things besides the destruction of life and the reconstruction of the map of Europe. On the financial side the most notable event was the universal abandonment, for the time being, of the gold standard. The abandonment, varied in extent, was effected by different devices in different countries, and was described in the kind of language that is familiar from the bulletins of defeated armies; it was not in reality an abandonment at all, but only a temporary retirement under the guidance of the higher financial command.

The two principal forms assumed by the abandonment were the Moratorium and Inconvertibility. The two forms are in essence the same. Inconvertibility is generally applied to bank notes; it means that the bankers are authorised to refuse to meet their promises to pay in gold on demand. There is, however, besides this open inconvertibility *de jure*, a disguised inconvertibility *de facto*, which may be the more dangerous because hidden. A moratorium means that all debtors (not specially excluded) are authorised to postpone the fulfilment of their monetary obligations. Germany adopted at once the method of inconvertibility, and prided itself on not being obliged to adopt the moratorium; but inconvertible notes were issued on such terms and to such an extent that a moratorium was not needed. France adopted both methods. The United Kingdom adopted openly the method of moratorium, and in a disguised manner the method of inconvertibility. English people will long remember the beginnings of the Great War, when some of the London banks refused to give gold for Bank of England notes and people were forced (or delighted) to receive postal orders as legal tender. They will long remember also the advent of the new sin of hoarding gold and the new virtue of turning it out of their pockets into the banks. With the war the whole duty of the private man as regards gold was declared to be total abstinence; the proper place for gold (so it was preached) was a bank; and the proper business of the bank was to hoard it.

410 ABANDONMENT OF THE GOLD STANDARD

For a time the banks were commanded by the Treasury not to pay out gold. The order of the day was disguised inconvertibility.

The abandonment of the gold standard by the respective nations, each within its own borders, was still more marked as regards foreign payments. England was a large creditor; and, failing other modes of remittance, large sums of gold were due in London on the outbreak of the war. But the foreign debtors with one consent hoarded their gold. The essential idea of a banking reserve was lost sight of. A reserve is intended to meet an exceptional strain. In ordinary times it is useless; it is never drawn upon to any marked extent; there is always an apparent over-abundance. But on the outbreak of the war the great banks refused to part with gold, especially for foreign payments. Six months after the outbreak of the war the banks of France, Germany and Russia had actually increased* their enormous stocks of gold. Such a general abandonment of the gold standard could not have taken place unless the monetary evolution had long since been tending in that direction. A short historical survey seems the best way to explain both the nature and the extent of this abandonment and the promptitude with which it was effected.

Down to the conclusion of the Franco-German war of 1870-71, gold and silver were, generally speaking, on an equal footing as standard money. In India and the Far East silver was the sole standard and the principal metallic money. In some of the most important Western countries (e.g. France and the countries forming the Latin Union and the United States) the double standard prevailed; gold and silver were legal tender to any extent at a ratio fixed by law, and the mints were equally open to both metals. In the United Kingdom gold was the standard, and silver was only used for token coins.

* At the end of January 1915 the holdings of gold, compared with January 1914, showed for the Bank of France an increase of 28,034,000*l.*; for the Imperial Bank of Germany 44,879,900*l.*; and for the Bank of Russia 4,002,000*l.* But, *per contra*, the note circulation of France had increased by 183,184,000*l.*; that of Germany by 130,290,000*l.*; and that of Russia by 136,995,000*l.* All these notes are legally inconvertible.

So long as this state of things lasted, although there were no formal international agreements, practically a certain amount of silver all the world over would always command a certain amount of gold (within very narrow limits), so that for ordinary purposes and for banking and international trade the two metals were interchangeable to any extent.

This system, which *de facto* had great stability* and great advantages, was upset by the action of Germany on the conclusion of the Franco-German war. This action of Germany was due, like all the main lines of her recent economic policy, to the imitation of Britain. Germany thought that British commercial supremacy and the predominant position of the London money market were largely due to the gold standard. Therefore Germany determined to have a gold standard, and set about what was called the demonetisation of silver. This action of Germany upset the balance of the two metals, and they were no longer interchangeable in the same way. A given amount of silver would not obtain the usual amount of gold but a less amount. Silver was depreciated, and the depreciation increased. The consequence was that other nations found it necessary or desirable to make gold the only standard. In order to do this they put the silver (which they held in large quantities as standard money) in some kind of dependent relation to gold, the nature of the relation varying in the different countries.

This process of readjustment took a very long time; and during that time there was a continuous fall in prices and a great depression of trade, the fall in prices reaching its lowest depth in 1896. The difficulties in the general adoption of the single gold standard were greatly increased by the falling-off in the supply of gold. In course of time, however, practically all the nations of the world put themselves on the gold basis; and all the great financial and commercial transactions of the world came to be conducted on this standard. The actual monetary contracts were no doubt expressed in terms of

* The normal ratio of silver to gold ($15\frac{1}{2}$ to 1) was practically unaffected by the great wars of the century and the great changes in the relative production of gold and silver.

the various national currencies, but all of these were ostensibly linked up with the gold standard. As it happened, since 1896 this universal adoption of the gold standard was greatly facilitated by the largely increased production from the mines. Before the outbreak of the present war it seemed as if the new gold was sufficient not only to provide for this universal adoption of the gold standard, but also to cause a general rise in prices. Certainly the common opinion in financial circles is that, just as the fall in prices before 1896 was due to a decrease in the gold supplies, so after that date the rise in prices has been due to their increase.

Unfortunately, however, during the process of getting rid of silver as an alternative standard and making gold the sole standard, there grew up very hazy ideas on the nature and the uses of a monetary standard. These hazy ideas were made the basis of important changes in financial practice. The ultimate effect was that, even before the outbreak of the war, gold had in reality become less effective as a monetary standard than it was in the days when its dominion was supposed to be shared equally with silver. The reason is that in various forms and to various degrees the pernicious principle has been adopted of deferred or suspended or delocalised or denationalised convertibility. Ostensibly, with the adoption of the gold standard all monetary obligations were to be met in gold; but practically all sorts of expedients have been invented to 'economise' (as it is euphemistically called) the use of gold. This 'economy' has now reached its limit with the introduction of legal inconvertibility in three of the great nations concerned; in the fourth the inconvertibility is disguised.

The degree of the change in opinion and practice may be realised by reference to the bimetallic controversy. Then the great argument of the gold standard purists was that in the natural course of things silver would depreciate. Therefore it was said that, if debtors (governmental or private) could discharge their debts in silver, they would do so, and the British gold creditors would suffer. Bankers in particular were horrified at the idea that promises to pay in gold could be made good by payments in silver, or in currency or credit based on silver. The stability of the London money

market, and with it the stability of British trade, were supposed to be dependent on the maintenance of the gold standard in the strictest and most absolute form. The adoption of the gold standard by Germany confirmed this view. Now the banker who made a wry mouth at a silver spoon will eat paper like an ostrich.

This strict maintenance, before the present war, of the gold standard in the United Kingdom, where it had been effectively established since the conclusion of the Napoleonic wars, was an easy matter; it was only necessary to observe the old maxim—'*quieta non movere*.' But in other countries, where silver had been standard money, the real establishment of gold as the sole standard was a matter of great difficulty. In France, for example, silver was still full legal tender, though the mintage was restricted; and in that country the double standard had given way to what was known as the limping standard (*étalon boiteux*). In India, although the dominant metallic money is still silver, silver is not the standard; nor on the other hand has the gold standard been effectively adopted, but only that modification of it which in these latter days has come to be called the gold-exchange standard. Its opponents call it the gold standard without gold. The essence of this standard is that, by the limitation of the coinage of rupees and by other devices, fifteen silver rupees in India are interchangeable with a gold sovereign in London (within narrow limits). This is no doubt, in normal times, a convenient arrangement for the Governments of India and of England, though whether it is advantageous to the people of India is another question. The present point is that, although India is supposed to have a gold standard, its principal metallic money is only imperfectly convertible into gold. It is a case of suspended convertibility.*

The plan adopted by India in 1893 with the closure of the mints to silver was not new. The Report of the Committee on which action was taken, after a comprehensive survey of monetary systems, concludes :

* The great rise in prices in India since 1900 is never officially ascribed to the enormous issues of token rupees, and the difficulty in the management of the exchange since August is set down to the war 'simpliciter.'

'It would thus appear that it has been found possible to introduce a gold standard without a gold circulation, without a large stock of gold currency, even without legal convertibility of an existing silver currency into gold.'

This method of imperfect convertibility * had also been adopted long before the war in different forms by the principal countries of Europe. There was an appearance of monetary strength in the masses of gold held in the central banks, but any exceptional demand for this gold, especially for foreign remittance, was met by making a special charge, or in some cases by actual limitation. The gold was in effect hoarded by the central banks; and provision for foreign remittances was met by foreign credits in various forms.

In normal times this imperfect convertibility of credit into gold was not even noticed, and certainly caused no apparent difficulties. In normal times most monetary transactions are concluded without the actual passing of gold. But the real meaning of effective absolute immediate convertibility (no single word can convey the full meaning of the old system) was not simply that people could always get as much gold as they found convenient (e.g. for making ornaments or for payments abroad), but that very real effective limitations were imposed on the undue expansion of credit.

The simplest credit substitute for gold is a bank note, which in essence is a promise to pay on demand the metallic money that it is supposed to represent. Notes based on gold are strictly convertible only so long as the demand for conversion can be met under any conditions within the range of practical possibility, as shown by the financial experience of nations over long periods. The demand for conversion into gold in ordinary times is one thing; it is a demand that is only exercised within very narrow and customary limits. But the demand for conversion in extraordinary times is quite another thing; and it is only in extraordinary times that the real stability of a monetary system is tested.

It was the necessity for being ready for exceptional

* Cf. 'Money and Monetary Problems' (Essay on the Indian Currency Experiment), by the present writer; and 'Indian Currency and Finance' by J. M. Keynes, ch. ii.

strain that induced nations to adopt very stringent measures as regards the issues of bank notes. The issues have been limited in all sorts of ways; and special provisions have been made for securing an adequate reserve against any emergency. Curiously enough, the legal restrictions on the issues of notes by the Bank of England are more severe than those of any other great Bank. After a certain amount has been issued (now 18,450,000*l.*), for every other note an equal amount of gold must be kept in the issue department. The consequence was that, in the week before the outbreak of war, against an issue of notes of 55,121,405*l.* the Bank held gold coin and bullion to the extent of 36,671,405*l.* After six months of war the Bank of England held in the last week of January gold coin and bullion in the Issue Department 68,352,305*l.* against an issue of notes 86,802,605*l.* There was also a sum of 813,512*l.* of gold and silver coin in the Banking Department. It would seem from the figures of the Issue Department that the Bank of England notes were secured to a ridiculous point of safety, namely, with about 80 per cent. of gold.

But it is most important to observe that all the other forms of credit, just like bank notes, are ostensibly convertible into gold on demand. Even if the date of payment is deferred, as in bills of exchange, by the method of discounting, the present value is convertible into gold on demand. For the week quoted above the account of the Banking Department of the Bank of England shows a reserve against liabilities of 32 per cent. as against a proportion of 51 per cent. a year before.* As shown by Sir H. Inglis Palgrave, in his standard work on the Bank Rate and the Money Market, it is not the absolute amount of the reserve but the proportion that counts. The great argument of Bagehot's 'Lombard Street' is that the Bank of England ought to keep a far larger proportional reserve than other banks, mainly owing to the uncertainty as regards the magnitude and the times of

* It is true that on Feb. 10, 1915, the Bank of England held 24,049,183*l.* in coin and bullion more than on Feb. 11, 1914; but the proportion was 31½ compared with 53½. The Imperial Bank of Germany for the corresponding weeks showed an increase of 44,286,000*l.*—yet the German currency was depreciated.

foreign demands. This argument has been strengthened by the course of events since that work was published.

Before the outbreak of the war London was more than ever the centre of the financial world. The fact has been repeatedly forced on public notice since the war began, but it is doubtful if its importance has been adequately realised by the public. So long as every promise to pay means in the last resort a power given to the holder of the promise to get gold from his bank, his bank is obliged to have the command of gold. If his bank finds it convenient, instead of keeping gold, to have a credit with the Bank of England, then the Bank of England, 'the bankers' bank,' must keep a stock of gold equal to any probable demands not only of this particular banker but of all the holders of similar promises to pay gold. In this way the reserve of the Bank of England imposes, or ought to impose, stringent limits on the expansion of credit. The essence of the system by which London became the central money market of the world was the immediate convertibility of all credits into gold. In other countries, especially after the depreciation of silver, this convertibility of credit into gold became imperfect, which is only another way of saying that credit was unduly expanded.

The effects of this laxity in the interpretation of convertibility into gold were shown in the great crisis in the United States in the autumn of 1907. There had been an undue inflation of credit and prices—over-banking and over-trading. When the demand for real convertibility set in, it could not be met. For a time the United States had really an inconvertible currency, consisting mainly of cheques that could not be cashed. The effects of this crisis were world-wide. Everywhere there was a great contraction of credit for the time being, and a great fall in the prices of securities. It might have been expected that the crisis of 1907 would have given the banking world a lesson, but the only immediate effect in the country of origin seems to have been the evolution of a new scheme for emergency currency in case of another crisis. To save trouble the emergency notes were at once printed and stored ready for use. Such was the foresight of the United States; and it is now made a matter of complaint that this

country was not equally provident. 'Stuff a fever' instead of 'starve a fever' has now become the maxim of the financial medicine-man. In spite of our unpreparedness we have certainly stuffed our fever pretty well. But this is anticipating the course of events.

The general position of the commercial and financial world before the outbreak of the war may be expressed in two propositions. Firstly, gold had been nominally adopted as the universal standard of value. In the countries in which silver coins were still unlimited legal tender (e.g. France, India, etc.), they were supposed to be in the position of bank notes convertible into gold—they were 'bank notes printed on silver.' Secondly, this nominal adoption of the gold standard had only been imperfectly realised in practice, because the different kinds of representative money—not only the silver and the bank notes, but all the various forms of bankers' credits—were only imperfectly convertible into gold. In normal times, within customary narrow limits, they *were* convertible into gold; but on the slightest strain some kind of difficulty was put in the way of getting the gold immediately. The only exception was London. London was acknowledged to be the only free market for gold—the only market that was likely to be open in times of stress. It is no doubt quite true that in the other great banking centres the greatest respect was shown to gold. The other central banks piled up far larger reserves than the Bank of England. But, for all the good it did, the greater part of this gold might as well have been molten into great golden calves, to be worshipped by the customers of the banks. Of course, the gold might be useful as an emergency war-fund (e.g. in bribing Turkey), but that is another question.

The principal effect of this system of imperfect convertibility was that credit was unduly extended, and that the limit on its expansion, properly imposed by effective convertibility into gold in even exceptional circumstances, was broken down by the use of all kinds of 'soft' substitutes—the time and place of the actual convertibility being apparently a matter of no moment so long as the promise to pay was not definitely repudiated.

This economy in the use of gold in practice was

supported by a corresponding development of theory. As generally happens in economics, the theory was invented to explain and justify the practice. We were told that paper was much more convenient than gold for internal currency, and that the actual circulation of gold was wasteful. It would be quite sufficient to keep a reserve in bullion; and the bullion itself would only be required for an occasional balance in international payments. If a country held enough gold for this occasional emergency, then the rest of its gold could be left to fructify in Egypt or South America, instead of being subjected to useless wear and tear in the pockets of the people. Even as regards these fitful international payments, every effort was made to minimise the useless transmission of gold. 'Bullion, as it circulates among different commercial countries, in the same manner as the national coin circulates in every country, may be considered as the money of the great mercantile republic.' So wrote Adam Smith; and he also observed that 'naturally' a merchant exerts his invention to find out a way of paying his foreign debts rather than by sending gold and silver. Too much invention and economy in the great mercantile republic as in others leads to inconvertibility in times of stress.

The natural consequence of this economy of gold was that the outbreak of the greatest war in history found the financial world with inflated credit and inflated prices, and with an ordinary commercial crisis like that of 1907 looming in the near future. The only difference was that in some cases the emergency currency was ready; and, if in other cases the emergency measures to be taken had not been regularised by far-seeing legislation, the minds of all men were fully prepared for the suspension of any inconvenient laws and the substitution of practical measures (and paper) worthy of the occasion.

The consequence of this development of easy finance and the substitution of a system of great elasticity for the old cast-iron system was, as shown by the most extraordinary results, almost too good to be true. All over the world under the old system of credit the Bank of England rate had been regarded as the best measure of the stability of the world's credit system. In the great crises of the 19th century the bank rate rose to

10 per cent., and in one year (1866) remained at 10 per cent. for 96 days and over 7 per cent. for other 96 days. This great crisis arose simply out of the failure of one great firm. But within a week of the declaration of war by England last August the bank rate was reduced to 5 per cent.; and at 5 per cent. it has remained down to the time of writing, although a kind of arithmetical deference was shown to old tradition by the adoption of a 10 per cent. rate during a five days' Bank Holiday. It is remarkable that a year before, in the midst of profound peace, the bank rate had also been 5 per cent.; so that it looked as if the Great War had had no real effect on the world's financial system. The newspapers were full of congratulations on the ease and the speed with which the crisis had been suppressed. The Chancellor of the Exchequer became the most popular man in the City. At the Lord Mayor's banquet it was announced that a peerage was to be conferred on the Governor of the Bank of England. All seemed going well.

It is true that, even when we look only at the surface of things, the situation does not seem quite so cheerful as is suggested by the glut of money in the London money market. The Stock Exchange was closed to the end of the year; and the premier security, the old Consols, which used to be considered as good as gold and as the barometer of public credit, was unsaleable at an official minimum price too high to attract buyers, and higher (value for value) than the price of issue of the new War Loan. One of the most amazing things about the present war is the effect it has had on people's memories. They have quite forgotten all they said about Consols and public credit. When, with the new year, the Stock Exchange was opened, it was under severe restrictions both as regards dealings in old securities and the creation of new. It was remarked by the chairman at the annual meeting of one of the great Joint Stock banks that the primary object of a gold reserve was to inspire confidence, and that it must above all things be visible. But the Bank of England has put itself in line with the new theories on the gold standard by keeping an unknown part of its gold reserve in Canada, South Africa, or Australia, and ear-marking other parts. It is true that the Bank Act of 1844 has not been

suspended, but the enormous issues of Treasury notes, against every principle of that Act, render this technical abstention insignificant.

It may be admitted, however, that the aggregate effect of the various measures taken by the Government in a sudden and unexampled emergency has been for the time very pleasing; but, in judging of the full effects of any economic disturbance, we must always distinguish between what economists call the 'short period' and the 'long period.' With regard to the 'short period,' on the outbreak of war every one expected a series of earthquakes accompanied by the fall of financial houses great and small. It appears, however, from a calculation in the 'Times' that the insolvencies in England from August to December were less in number and in magnitude than in the corresponding period for the year before; they were, indeed, below the average, and there was no failure of any particular importance. In the same way people expected a great increase in unemployment; instead there has been a decrease, just as in insolvency; and except in Lancashire, no great industry seems to have been much afflicted, whilst many have attained unusual prosperity. It is true that exports have fallen off; but imports have almost reached the normal, and the ports are congested with undistributed cargoes. After six months of war there is apparently no real economic pressure so far as we are concerned, whilst we have the gratification of observing all the symptoms of increasing pressure in Germany. If these marvellous results and this astonishing contrast are to be ascribed to the financial measures adopted in England and Germany respectively, then the clamour of self-congratulation is at least pardonable if excessive. But are they to be so ascribed? Is there not something of the simplicity of the *post hoc ergo propter hoc* in the conclusion? And are the 'long period' effects likely to be equally satisfactory?

First of all, attention may be directed to the effects of the emergency measures on the foreign trade of the country. Unfortunately an adequate appreciation of this side of the question depends on understanding the working of the foreign exchanges; and this is a matter to which in this country very few people, even bankers,

pay any regard in the ordinary course of their business. The ordinary man does not know even the meaning of the foreign exchanges. When he was told that the foreign exchanges were dislocated, he probably thought that it was part of the business of the navy to put them right. He was not far wrong, but it takes longer to clear the seas than to sign documents, and London could not wait. The bill on London had come to be recognised as the world's international currency. The bill on London was made good by a plentiful use of public credit. How much eventually will be added to the national debt in consequence is looked on as negligible in the midst of the flood of the other governmental expenditure necessary for the war.

In judging of this restoration of the foreign exchanges, two points ought to be borne in mind—one retrospective, the other prospective. The dislocation of the foreign exchanges was not due to any probability of a run on the Bank of England in what is called a foreign drain of gold. On the contrary, the real difficulty was that other countries owed to London so much gold that they were unable, or thought they were unable, to pay. They thought they were unable to pay because they were afraid of the effect of appearing to lessen their gold reserves. They were afraid of an internal commercial crisis. They were all dominated by the golden-calf theory of banking reserves. The principal offender (be it said with all respect) was the United States of America. As the event showed, only time was necessary for the exchanges to be restored in the usual way; but, as time was of importance, the action of the Government was enthusiastically approved.

The prospective point is now of more practical interest. Is the restoration likely to be enduring, or are the measures adopted in an emergency liable to have a set-back later on? To answer this question, we must consider the measures taken, apparently not in the interests of foreign trade but of home trade and industry.

Here it is difficult to understand on what principles, if any, the country was flooded by emergency currency. Notes for one pound and for ten shillings were issued as fast as possible, and at first were supposed to be intended to support the banks. The banks were to be

allowed to borrow these notes from the Bank of England up to 20 per cent. of their liabilities. If the banks had acted on this privilege they could have borrowed and issued over two hundred millions of these notes, which, having regard to the banking system of this country, was an absurdly extravagant amount. Fortunately the banks scarcely made any use of the privilege. But long after the banking system of the country had settled down—and it was never much upset for internal purposes—the Government continued to issue millions of these notes. By the end of the year the amount had exceeded thirty-eight millions; down to last January every week had seen an increase. After some contraction in January the weekly increases began again in February. Besides this, postal orders were made legal tender and were issued free of charge; that is to say, they were exactly like bank notes of small denomination, that could be issued by any private person who chose to give coin for them, and in general the coin was silver. They were convertible into any legal coin at the Bank of England. They ceased to be current and legal tender by the Proclamation of Feb. 4. The Treasury notes proper were convertible into gold, but the provision for convertibility was practically non-effective.* The notes were by the Act to be convertible at the Bank of England, but, in order to assist the Government and the Bank of England, the country banks were encouraged to use the notes as much as possible and to send any surplus gold to the Bank. An ominous foresight was shown even in the superscription of the Treasury notes; they bore no promise to pay in gold. In case of complete inconvertibility being adopted subsequently, they would be all ready and would not need to be reprinted. Even this flood of postal orders and

* On Feb. 10 the currency note redemption account showed gold coin and bullion amounting to 24,500,000*l.*, 'ear-marked' against a note issue outstanding of 36,102,858*l.* This is so far satisfactory, but the 'ear-marking' would not mean much if the gold were needed for other purposes. In the debate in the House of Commons on Feb. 23 Mr Chamberlain said: 'I do not care about seeing a great deal of gold in the pockets of the people; I care about a large reserve of gold for an emergency. You get your gold together to use it when the emergency arises.' Mr Lloyd George expressed his entire agreement. What then becomes of the special redemption of the Treasury notes?

Treasury notes does not complete the sum of the Governmental assistance to the country in the way of providing 'money,' since in other ways there has been a great extension of bankers' credit, the chief form of modern money. Even the war loan was made the basis of the most easy borrowing from the Bank of England—ultra-Teutonic in its easiness.

That such and so great an inflation of currency and credit should raise prices, including the prices of food and other necessities, seems never to have entered into the minds of any one in authority, The Cabinet Committee appointed to enquire into the rise of prices issued a statement in which eleven points were put down for investigation, but the inflation of the currency was not even mentioned. The check to the issues of the notes in January was the only sign that this old way of paying new debts is not to be indefinitely continued. The worst of it is, as all experience shows, that a rise in prices due to currency causes is never detected until it is so marked and general that the ordinary abuse of the speculator and the shippers and the railways and all the other brigands seems unequal to the situation.

There is, however, one way in which an inflation of prices is forced on the attention of the great financial authorities. Our imports for January 1915 were in aggregate value practically the same as for January 1914, whilst the exports declined 40 per cent. If the rise in prices encourages imports and checks exports, then there will in time be a difficulty in meeting the foreign payments, and the foreign exchanges will again be dislocated in a way that the Government will find not so easy to correct. Early in the war Germany began to feel this difficulty in meeting foreign payments, which is of course so far a comfort to us, but it recalls the old proverb about the house of one's neighbour being on fire: 'proximus ardet Ucalegon.'

J. S. NICHOLSON.

Art. 6.—THE BALKAN STATES AND THE WAR.

THE European conflict began in the Balkans; it will probably end in the Balkans, for the closing period of this gigantic struggle will inevitably be protracted by fresh war in those regions, unless the present artificial and unnatural distribution of territories in the Peninsula can be replaced by a more reasonable and equitable arrangement in conformity with the principle of nationalities. Continued misery and unrest in the Balkans, the direct result of alien and unsympathetic rule, after threatening the peace of Europe for more than a generation has at last brought about the great conflagration. To those who repeatedly pointed out the danger and denounced the uselessness of ineffective remedial measures the dire catastrophe brings a melancholy justification. Like Cassandra, they have witnessed the fulfilment of their prophecies. And it may be predicted with equal certainty that, should the European conflict be followed by new arrangements ignoring the rights of nationalities in the Balkans, another struggle in those regions will inevitably ensue.

The ultimate cause of all the trouble, the 'fons et origo mali,' will be found in the Treaty of Berlin, the proximate cause in the Treaty of Bucarest. At the close of the war of 1877-1878 Turkish authority in Europe had been practically extinguished. An effort to effect its partial restoration was made by Lord Beaconsfield, aided by Count Andrassy, who had already secured Bosnia and Herzegovina as Austria's share in the Sick Man's inheritance, and by Prince Bismarck, who declared that the Balkan Christians were not worth the bones of a single Pomeranian grenadier. The denial of Crete to Greece was a crime which entailed a heavy retribution. The appropriation of Bosnia and Herzegovina by Austria was a gross wrong to Serbia, which had twice taken up arms on Russia's side. But the treatment accorded to newly-born Bulgaria was the greatest crime of all. Scarcely two million Bulgarians received political independence under Turkish suzerainty; some 800,000 were given autonomy under a Turkish governor; while more than a million unhappy beings were handed back to

Turkish tyranny with nothing to console them but the promise of reforms. The 'big Bulgaria' of the Treaty of San Stefano had been correctly delimited—except in some small particulars—on ethnographic lines and represented a united nation; the little Bulgaria which issued from the dissecting room at Berlin was a maimed and mutilated remnant. The darkness of night fell once more over Macedonia, which for a few brief months had witnessed the dawn of liberty.

The seeds of future trouble were thus sown, and the doleful harvest was reaped during the next three decades. For several years the Macedonian Bulgars patiently awaited the promised reforms; it was not till 1893 that, despairing of aid from the Powers, they began to form revolutionary associations. For ten years the struggle against Turkish oppression went on; in 1903 it culminated in a general insurrection of the Bulgarian population in the Monastir Vilayet. A merciless repression followed; the Powers were at last compelled to intervene; and Austria-Hungary and Russia, the 'two most interested Powers,' were allowed by Europe to try their hand at reforms. The 'Mürzsteg programme' which they elaborated proved, as might have been expected, a total failure. The two Powers were mainly concerned in prosecuting their rival interests; in January 1908 they finally fell out with each other, and their place was taken by Great Britain and Russia. The Anglo-Russian scheme, the 'Reval programme,' drawn up a few months later, seemed at last to ensure effective European control in unfortunate Macedonia. But this was precisely what the more patriotic, or rather chauvinistic, element among the Turks was determined to prevent. The Reval project had scarcely been announced when the Young Turk revolution broke out in the Monastir region under Enver Bey and Niazi Bey; the 'Constitution,' promulgated in 1876 with the object of thwarting foreign interference, was proclaimed once more for the same purpose—together with the 'perfect equality of races and creeds,' a venerable phrase embodied in the Hatt-i-Sherif of 1839 and since then repeated *ad nauseam* on innumerable occasions. The Powers, believing or affecting to believe that all would now go well with Turkey and her Christian subjects, committed the unpardonable

error of withdrawing their officials from Macedonia, thus sacrificing at a stroke the whole position acquired at the cost of a naval demonstration and five years of laborious diplomacy.

The consequences of this blunder were soon evident. Allowed a free hand in Macedonia, the Young Turks, who had been fêted in London and Paris as the harbingers of civilisation, proceeded to stretch the races of that country on a Procrustean bed. Bulgarians, Greeks, Vlachs, Serbs, Albanians—all alike were expected to renounce their nationality and to become 'good Ottomans.' In order to facilitate their conversion a general disarmament was decreed, and was carried out with the utmost barbarity. A conspiracy of silence was maintained in the European press; and the world knew little of the horrors of 1910 and 1911. But a community of misfortune drew the Christian races together; the formation of a Balkan alliance, hitherto a dream, became a reality; and the battle of Lule Burgas sounded the knell of Turkish domination in Europe.

Had the statesmanship of the victorious Balkan nations proved equal to the task of providing a reasonable division of the liberated regions on the basis of nationalities, the great European conflict might have been averted or at least postponed for several years. The secular feud between Teuton and Slav, the resolve of Germany to challenge the maritime and commercial supremacy of Great Britain, the yearning of France for her lost provinces, the centrifugal forces at work in the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, and the intolerable burden of increased armaments, might have continued to threaten without disturbing the peace of the world for another decade or even another generation. The partition of Africa, an immense achievement, had been effected without a European war. The separation of Norway from Sweden had been accomplished without the shedding of blood. If time could be gained, it was at least conceivable that the advance of democracy and the growth of a universal conscience might have finally triumphed over old-world militarism. However this may be, the golden opportunity for effecting a settlement of the Balkan Question was lost when the conference of the delegates from the various states which assembled

in London in December 1912 broke up without arriving at an agreement.

The inner history of what then took place has yet to be written. Between Servia and Bulgaria there was practically nothing to discuss, inasmuch as the territorial question between the two countries had been settled in the minutest detail by the 'secret annex' to the treaty of Feb. 29, 1912. Between Bulgaria and Greece no arrangement existed; and it was of vital importance to the future of the two countries, to that of the Balkan Alliance as a whole, and, indeed, to the peace of Europe, that a settlement should be arrived at without delay. Unfortunately the very moderate proposals put forward by M. Venizelos were rejected by his Bulgarian colleague, whether *proprio motu* or by order from Sofia it is hard to say; the real question at issue was the possession of Salonika, for which the Greek delegate was ready to make large concessions. At the same time the Bulgarian representative met the claims of Rumania to 'compensation' for her neutrality during the war with proposals which can only be described as derisory. It might, of course, be argued that Rumania, which looked on unmoved while the sister states staked their existence in the cause of humanity and freedom, was entitled to no compensation whatever; but considerations of this kind find no place in practical politics. The virtual rejection of the Rumanian claims derived some palliation from the unwise employment of menaces by Rumania, but it was a blunder. The question was afterwards settled, as it seemed, by an award of the ambassadors at Petrograd, accepted by both sides, but subsequently denounced by Rumania.

Had time been allowed for the protracted bargaining so congenial to the Oriental disposition, it is by no means improbable that an arrangement might have been arrived at between Bulgaria and Greece, and that the second Balkan war, with all its lamentable consequences, would have been averted. The real cause of the second war—the repudiation by Servia of her treaty with Bulgaria—would in that case never have taken place. But the work of the Conference was cut short by Enver Bey's *coup d'état* at Constantinople; and the Balkan States unanimously resolved to continue the

war with Turkey. The brunt of the struggle once more fell upon Bulgaria; and, while she was fighting in Thrace, her allies found time to conspire against her and to encroach on the territories she had occupied during the first period of the war. It is strange how the smallest circumstances sometimes determine the course of great events. Had M. Gueshoff, the Bulgarian prime minister, a man of conspicuously moderate and pacific character, been allowed to come to London, there can be little doubt that he and M. Venizelos would have settled the questions between Bulgaria and Greece. M. Venizelos had not intended to act as delegate, but he agreed to do so on the understanding that M. Gueshoff would be his colleague. At the last moment, however, M. Gueshoff's departure from Sofia was countermanded.

After the break-up of the London Conference matters went from bad to worse among the allies. The mysterious assassination of King George of Greece at Salonika removed a moderating influence of priceless value, which was replaced by military chauvinism. At Belgrade M. Hartwig, the Russian representative, the virtual author of the second war, encouraged the Servian Government to tear up its treaty with Bulgaria. An anti-Bulgarian compact was concluded between Servia and Greece; and, when the Balkan delegates assembled again in London to make peace with Turkey, the Servian and Greek delegates, with the object of exhausting Bulgaria by continuing the war, combined to delay the signature of the treaty until Sir Edward Grey politely hinted that their presence in London was no longer necessary. Then followed the dreary wrangle over the question of Russian arbitration, prolonged by the vacillation of the Russian cabinet, which repeatedly changed its standpoint, sometimes veering to the Servian, sometimes to the Bulgarian point of view. The delay gave Austria-Hungary time to prosecute her intrigues at Sofia; while at Belgrade M. Hartwig, who pursued a policy of his own, encouraged the Servians to put forward impossible demands. The tension became intolerable; and at last, under Austrian inspiration, the war party at Sofia broke away. On June 29, 1913, an order was issued to attack the Servian and Greek armies. The question of the responsibility for this insensate act is

now *sub judice* at Sofia. The order was recalled two days later and the troops withdrawn, with fatal results to the campaign which followed. But the position of Bulgaria was in any case hopeless. Rumania, setting aside the compact of Petrograd, and Turkey, tearing up the Treaty of London, fell upon her from the north and east.

A nation must bear the consequences of the blunders of its rulers. But whether it should be condemned to permanent dismemberment as the penalty of a rash act is a question which may at least be argued. That question in the present case possesses more than an academic interest, inasmuch as the sentence passed upon Bulgaria by her enemies at the Conference of Bucarest will come up for revision before the reconstituted European Areopagus at the close of the great war. Two wrongs do not make a right; and it remains to be seen whether Europe will decide that Bulgaria's misdemeanour must be purged by a sentence violating the principle of nationalities and handing over whole populations to the domination of their secular foes. Public opinion in Britain and France rightly condemned the Bulgarian escapade, but it is only fair to remember that practically all its information came from sources hostile to Bulgaria. An unscrupulous but successful newspaper campaign was organised with lavish patriotism by the wealthy Greek colonies all over Europe and in America, while Servians, Rumanians and Turks took their share in the chorus of denunciation. The virulence of the subsidised French journals, which knew no bounds, is unhappily remembered to-day in Bulgaria; and the natural sympathies of her democratic people with the great western Republic have been chilled. French policy at this time aimed at setting up Greece as a rival to Italy in the Levant; and, apparently inspired by this idea, M. Delcassé even proposed the partition of Bulgaria during the sittings of the Bucarest Conference. The Bulgarians bowed their heads before the journalistic storm; a rustic, self-centred and unimpressible race, they underestimate the force of foreign opinion, while the urban, alert and cosmopolitan Greeks are only too much alive to its importance. Many of the calumnies then circulated were exposed by the Carnegie Commission, but its valuable report was belated; it failed to

appear till shortly before the outbreak of the great war, and consequently attracted little attention.

The worst of culprits should not be judged unheard. Even the most heinous crimes are viewed by modern jurisprudence in the light of the provocation and of the circumstances in which they were committed. At the end of the present war—before long, let us hope—Bulgaria will appeal to Europe for a mitigation of her sentence. It is commonly said that the Bulgarians committed revolting atrocities, that they began the war against their allies, and that they got what they deserved. As regards the beginning of the war, the accusation is, of course, true. But, in order to arrive at a just judgment, the circumstances of the case must be considered.

The common belief that the Bulgarians lost their heads in consequence of their victories is altogether erroneous, except as regards a limited number of courtiers, politicians and *militaires*. Never did a nation display greater sobriety and restraint in the hour of victory. Even the tidings of Lule Burgas, conveyed in brief and modestly worded telegrams to Sofia, produced no paroxysms of excitement, no elation, no *fanfaronnades*. But the repudiation of the treaty of alliance by Servia, and still more the arguments by which it was maintained, aroused a keen feeling of indignation. A still greater provocation lay in the maltreatment of the Bulgarian populations of Macedonia and Thrace by the Servians and Greeks, which began from the first days of their military occupation of those regions. An interesting account of this persecution will be found in the Carnegie report. Bishops, priests and schoolmasters were evicted from their dioceses, churches and schools, and were banished from the country; the peasants were compelled to sign documents declaring themselves to be Serbs or Greeks; those who refused were beaten or imprisoned; and all the usual machinery of forcible assimilation was set in motion.

This state of things had continued for eight months—unhappily it continues still—in territories which at that time had not yet been assigned to the Servians or Greeks, and were *ex hypothesi* in the possession of the three allies. The Macedonian emigrants, always a powerful

factor in Bulgaria and now augmented by some 18,000 volunteers as well as by refugees from the districts in Servian and Greek occupation, became restive; they mistrusted Russia owing to her frequent changes of attitude, and feared that, if her arbitration were accepted, a portion of Macedonia would be lost to Bulgaria. They therefore resorted to threats in order to prevent the departure of Dr Daneff for Petrograd, where a Conference of Balkan delegates was about to meet. They little knew that Russia was at that time prepared to award almost the whole of Macedonia to Bulgaria. But the main cause of the Bulgarian *coup* was the condition of the army. The peasant soldiers, who had been under arms for nine months, wanted to return to their fields for the harvest. They were willing, they said, to fight at once if fighting there must be, but otherwise they would go home. Had they done so, Bulgaria would have been compelled to surrender Macedonia to her enemies without striking a blow. The situation became desperate, and the war party had its way.

The rupture between the Allies was a success for Austrian policy, which had steadily laboured for this end. On the day of the Bulgarian attack the members of the Austrian legation at Sofia could scarcely conceal their delight. 'From the beginning,' wrote the inspired 'Reichspost' some months later, 'we knew of the formation of the Balkan Alliance and we set ourselves to break it up.' In truth Austria knew only of M. Hartwig's plan, but the confession of the 'Reichspost' is nevertheless instructive. Ever since the Berlin Treaty it has been the settled policy of Austria to promote discord in the Balkans. Of this, abundant proof could be given if space permitted; it is enough to recall King Milan's unprovoked attack on Bulgaria, carried out under her auspices in the sacred name of 'equilibrium' in 1885, and the Greco-Rumanian alliance against Bulgaria, arranged by Baron von Burian, the new Austro-Hungarian Foreign Minister, in 1901. The Treaty of Bucarest, which perpetuated the causes of discord and indeed increased them, was another triumph for Austria; it violated the principle of nationalities, to which for domestic reasons she was always opposed, and facilitated the preparation of her approaching *coup* in the Balkans.

The creation of a big Serbia, extending down the valley of the Vardar, would form an obstacle, of course, to her long-projected advance to the Ægean. But it had at least the advantage of perpetuating Bulgarian exasperation; and the effort to govern a hostile population would be a cause of weakness to Serbia. But Austria had already decided to settle accounts with that Power. The treaty, of course, could not stand; but it served Austria's purpose for the present, so she confined herself to reserving her claim to its revision in the future while the Kaiser enthusiastically proclaimed its finality.

Had the Western Powers and Russia intervened at this time on behalf of a more equitable arrangement, they would in all probability have succeeded. Austria, notwithstanding her desire for war, could not have opposed the transference of the greater part of Macedonia to its rightful owner. She had already begun to pay court to friendless Bulgaria. Germany was not ready for war; she had only recently begun the great augmentation of her forces which she deemed necessary in consequence of the formation of the Balkan Alliance and the consequent fall of Turkey. Italy, as we now know, would not have moved. The conduct of the Western Powers was excused on the ground of their anxiety for peace. The world has seen how peace has been preserved. The maxim 'Be just and fear not' is something more than a high moral precept; it is commonly a safe rule to follow in private and political life. The opportunity for arriving at a just and reasonable settlement, which the Balkan States and the Powers alike threw away at the time of the London Conference, once more presented itself at Bucarest. Such a settlement could now only be imposed from above. This might have been done with comparative ease in London; the task was now more difficult, but far from impossible, notwithstanding the greedy appetites which had been whetted during the period of controversy and the savage passions kindled by the war.

The main problem which the Balkan delegates both in London and Bucarest had to face was how to come to any kind of an arrangement that would satisfy the swash-bucklers and demagogues at home; most of them, moreover, were party leaders themselves and had their own

political future to consider, which might be fatally compromised if they surrendered any portion of the national claims. At Bucarest, for instance, M. Venizelos received orders from King Constantine to demand so much of the *Ægean* coast that only a few kilometres near Dedeagatch would have been left to Bulgaria. He refused and tendered his resignation, but eventually had his own way. Similarly Dr Daneff had demanded his recall before the premature break-up of the London Conference. Strange as it may seem, if the Powers of the Entente, either during the London Conference or before the signature of the Treaty of Bucarest, had interposed with an equitable solution, the Balkan delegates would have welcomed an intervention which would have enabled them to plead *force majeure*, and the various governments would have done likewise. Resistance would never have been attempted without armed support from the Central Powers, and of this there was no prospect whatever.

On the day before the signature of the Treaty of Bucarest the writer sailed up the Danube and passed beneath the two gigantic pontoon bridges over which the Rumanian troops marched into Bulgaria. The sight suggested the question, which of the two States had meditated aggression in the past? These immense structures had been prepared for years; Bulgaria possessed nothing similar; her thoughts were with her enslaved kinsmen in Macedonia. Under the guidance of King Carol, Rumania had concluded a military convention with Austria; she had been offered a large slice of her neighbour's territory, and the means had been duly provided for her entry into the Promised Land. The finger of Austria seemed to stretch over the long line of pontoons; Rumania had already taken her morsel—not so large indeed as the stipulated portion; what would Austria do next?

On the same day Austria, already aware of the terms of the treaty, enquired, as we know from Signor Giolitti's disclosures, whether Italy would agree that a *casus fœderis* had arisen for a joint attack on Servia; he was met by a refusal. What passed between Austria and Germany at this time is unknown, but there is nothing to show that Germany backed the Austrian request on

this occasion. On the other hand, it seems improbable that Austria would have taken this step without consulting her principal ally. The Italian reply seems to have given Austria pause; and, if William II donned his 'shining armour' at this moment, he soon replaced it in the cupboard. That Austria meditated an attack on Serbia so early as the preceding June, when the war between the Balkan Allies, which she had deliberately fomented, broke out, seems proved by the recent revelations of M. Pichon and the historian Guglielmo Ferrero; while M. Take Jonescu, the Rumanian statesman, relates that at that time the Austrian minister at Bucarest declared to him that Austria would come to the aid of Bulgaria 'with arms in her hands.' 'Nous avons fait bonne affaire,' said a high Austrian official gleefully to a friend of the writer at the moment of the Bulgarian attack in Macedonia. But the Treaty of Bucarest caused Austria to make up her mind. The murder of the Archduke Francis Ferdinand, which took place ten months later, furnished a convenient pretext for putting her design into execution; Germany was now ready; the shining armour at Berlin was displayed to all the world, and the great catastrophe followed.

The Treaty of Bucarest is founded on the ruins of violated contracts; it stands on the flimsy substructure of torn-up 'scraps of paper.' It has not been recognised by any of the Powers, and therefore cannot be regarded as a legitimate substitute for previous arrangements which they have drawn up or sanctioned. It presents a series of grotesque frontiers, traced on vindictive lines in violation of the principle of nationalities and in defiance of economic laws. It has condemned more than a million unhappy beings to conditions of existence which cause them to regret the rule of the Turks. It was completed during a period of eight days—a short time for the discussion of the most complicated question of modern times—and was imposed on the Bulgarian delegates almost literally at the point of the bayonet. Before the end of the negotiations M. Maiorescu, the Rumanian prime minister, intimated to M. Toncheff that, if he failed to sign the document, within 48 hours Rumanian troops would occupy Sofia.

Bulgaria now demands the revision of the treaty,

so far, at least, as regards a portion of her lost kindred in Macedonia. On the reply to this request depends her attitude towards the present war, and, strangely enough, that of Rumania also; for Rumania, rightly desirous of union with the cognate race in Transylvania, is ready to throw in her lot with the Entente Powers if Bulgaria will do likewise. The question is thus of the utmost importance, for, apart from the considerable aid which the two States can render to the Allied cause, their military action would almost certainly be followed by that of Italy, and the war would be shortened by many months. Rumania, which hopes to annex a region with 4,000,000 inhabitants, has now abandoned the doctrine of Balkan 'equilibrium' propounded with so much unction by the victors in 1913; she is now willing to consent to concessions to Bulgaria in Macedonia, and even to restore to her a portion of the territory of which she deprived her in that year. (That an injustice has been done to Bulgaria has been publicly admitted by M. Take Jonescu, the most brilliant of contemporary Rumanian statesmen, who recognises that she has been wronged in Macedonia.

Bulgaria is willing to leave the whole question between herself and her former allies to the eventual decision of the Powers, and to maintain a strict neutrality. In return for her neutrality she has been promised by the Entente Powers the whole of Eastern Thrace as far as the Enos-Midia line laid down by the Treaty of London, together with considerable concessions in Macedonia. This promise, it is understood, will be fulfilled at the end of the war. For her active and timely aid she has been promised larger concessions in Macedonia. But in return for this she desires the present cession of at least a portion of the district, now in Servian occupation, lying south of the line laid down by the Serbo-Bulgarian Treaty of 1912. Beyond this line Servia pledged herself 'not to ask for anything'; and the region in question is, or rather was, inhabited by a compact Bulgarian population.

In short, Bulgaria asks for something in hand as the price of her military co-operation. She defends her position on two main grounds. In the first place she can no longer place any confidence in international

contracts. Without questioning for a moment the sincerity of the three Powers, she cannot feel sure that their promises will be realised even in case of their success. She has seen three solemn compacts torn up to her disadvantage—the Serbo-Bulgarian Treaty, signed by the sovereigns of the two countries and approved by Russia; the protocol of Petrograd, prepared by the ambassadors of the Powers; and the Treaty of London, drawn up by Sir Edward Grey and sanctioned by Europe. She has seen, she might add, the reoccupation of Southern Albania by Greece in violation of the convention of Corfu, and the German onslaught on unhappy Belgium. How can she trust any more to ‘scraps of paper’?

Secondly, the continued persecution of her kinsfolk across the frontier involves her in serious internal trouble and exposes her to dangers which can only be removed by their liberation. If, to quote the words of the Carnegie report, the methods of assimilation and extermination applied by the Greeks display ‘*encore plus de rigueur systématique et encore moins d’humanité*’ than those adopted by the Servians, the condition of the Bulgars in Servian Macedonia has, in consequence of the war, become apparently worse than that of their brothers in misfortune under Greek rule. All the men of military age have been taken for the army—to fight for their enemies; the cattle, the furniture, the clothing of the family are sold for the payment of increased taxes; and in many cases soldiers, gendarmes and even brigands are installed in the defenceless households. Only those who have witnessed the misery of the ill-clad and often starving refugees, who, at the risk of being shot down by the frontier guards, daily make their way in hundreds across the snow-clad mountains into Bulgaria, can realise the horror of the situation or fully grasp the truth of the principle that one Balkan race must not be allowed to rule over another. Unless life had been made intolerable to these people, they would not have left their homes. Many of the fugitives, especially the children, succumb to cold and privation during this terrible pilgrimage. The survivors must be maintained by the Government; they swell the great host of Macedonian exiles, whose exasperation increases daily. This sentiment is sedulously played upon by

German and Austrian emissaries, who swarm at Sofia and preach an anti-Servian crusade in subsidised journals in the hope of compromising Bulgaria with the Entente Powers.

By the irony of fate Bulgaria, humiliated and despoiled, is now in a position to control the action of her neighbours; and the Entente Powers, anxious to secure her co-operation and that of Rumania, have undertaken to urge the desired concessions on Servia. M. Pashitch, if he were a free agent, would doubtless comply; it is obviously in Servia's own interest to help her allies to shorten the war; and the concessions will in any case have to be made at its conclusion. But the military coterie which surrounds the Prince Regent will not hear of them. It was the officers who insisted on the repudiation of the treaty of 1912; among them are some of the conspirators who placed the present dynasty on the throne. Their calculation is that the Entente will win in the end and that no concessions will then be necessary; but they leave out of account the sacrifices which their policy will impose on their allies and on Servia herself owing to the protraction of the war. The Prince, accordingly, has countered the proposals of the Powers with a proclamation promising constitutional rights to the Macedonian Bulgars—he describes them as sons of the Servian conqueror Dushan—thus indicating the resolve of Servia to retain them under her rule. Everyone must admire the heroism with which the Servians have defended their country against enormous odds, but, in this instance at least, they cannot be congratulated on political wisdom. The true expansion of Servia lies in the direction of Bosnia, Northern Herzegovina, and Southern Dalmatia, with the ports of Metkovich, Spalato and Sebenico. When she obtains these regions she will more than double her territory. Whether Catholic Croatia will join her is a question which might be left to its inhabitants. The extreme south of Dalmatia, with Gravosa and Cattaro, should go to Montenegro.

In urging both Servia and Rumania to refuse all concessions to Bulgaria, Greece has acted against the interests of the Entente. Her policy is due in part to hostility to Bulgaria—the hatred of the Greek for the

Bulgar is something phenomenal, surpassing in bitterness all other race-hatreds of the world; in part to the military considerations which dominate the court of Athens—Bulgaria, it is urged, must not receive any accession of territory, for her military strength would thereby be increased; in part to the fear that a precedent may be created for concessions on the part of Greece. Such concessions, however, will be inevitable if at the end of the war the Entente Powers carry out their declared intention to vindicate the principle of nationalities; the regions of Kastoria, Florina, Yenidjé-Vardar, Voden, Kukush, and Drama should go to their rightful owners. Kavala, hitherto mainly a Turkish town, should also be handed over to Bulgaria; it is inconceivable that this promising seaport should be cut off from its hinterland. Greece should seek her legitimate expansion in the twelve islands now occupied by Italy (that Power obtaining compensation in the Trentino) and on the western coast of Asia Minor, where the Hellenic element is strong. Greece should withdraw from Southern Albania in accordance with the Corfu Convention; and the Albanian State should be restored under a new ruler, receiving Ipek and Dibra in the north.

The Emperor William, who telegraphed to his Rumanian cousin that the Treaty of Bucarest was 'definitive' and who 'fought like a lion' to obtain Kavala for his Greek brother-in-law, will find that his family policy, more suited to the Middle Ages than to modern times, was a blunder. Nothing but an arrangement based on the sound principle of nationalities will ever bring peace to the Balkan Peninsula. A durable peace in South-Eastern Europe, followed by a revival of the Balkan Alliance, will, it is to be hoped, be among the beneficent results of the present calamitous war.

Art. 7.—THE ATTITUDE OF ROUMANIA.

ROUMANIA is neutral. She declared her neutrality during the life-time of King Charles at a 'Crown-Council'—a political court improvised for the occasion. Subsequently she explained that this neutrality did not involve any departure from the line of policy she had hitherto pursued, which was recognised as the one best suited to her situation. Though discussions went on well into the autumn of 1914, and were characterised by a good deal of excitement on the part of that section of the public which delights in rowdy demonstrations, and by the urging of violent measures by individual groups such as the 'Universitaires' of Bucarest, they bore only on the question, under what circumstances military intervention might be either permissible or advantageous. The result was that Roumania, well aware of what she has owed of recent years to German 'Kultur,' with no illusions as to her own strength, and uninfluenced by sentimentalism, romance, or sympathy with the Latin race—that race to which she herself belongs—made up her mind that she would not go to war to swell the triumph of Austria-Hungary. That this decision should have been approved by almost the entire nation, points to the fact that it was based on weighty considerations. We propose to lay these considerations before the British people, which has shown hitherto but a half-hearted interest in the affairs of Roumania; for it is important that the attitude of a country which remains neutral should be thoroughly understood.

In no country did the ultimatum, with its amazing terms, which the Austro-Hungarian monarchy thought fit to address to Servia, bidding that country to identify herself with the perpetrators of an abominable crime, and to proclaim the fact not only before her own army but before the whole of Europe, provoke graver apprehensions or a franker expression of disapproval than in Roumania. In the first place, there was no doubt that the ultimatum emanated from Budapest. For, though it was felt that Germany had a strong motive for provoking a European war at this particular moment, instead of waiting till her enemies had time for preparation, the haughty feudal spirit, the lordly contempt, and

the peremptory tone were unmistakably those of the group which, in the name of 'Magyarism,' directs the policy of Hungary. These modern representatives of a bygone suzerainty, mindful of the time when the kings of Hungary could add to their title that of Kings of Rascia, Cumania and Bulgaria, aspired to play the part of rulers of the Balkan Peninsula, of which in time they hoped to gain entire possession.

It is true that, after protracted struggles, in which she displayed great heroism, Hungary had (in 1867) at last escaped from the tyrannical and 'Germanising' yoke of the Court of Vienna. But, from the very day of her liberation, her dream was to regain by fresh struggles and renewed efforts—in which she looked for the support of that party in the Dual Monarchy which still remained Austrian—the position of political importance which she had enjoyed under the Arpadians, under Louis the Great, and under Mathias Corvinus. Magyar Imperialism differed from that of Vienna as embodied in the autocratic policy of a Prince Eugene of Savoy only in so far as it aimed, not only at political, but also at racial supremacy. Since the time of Széchenyi, in the early part of the 19th century, the Magyars believed themselves capable of denationalising the lesser peoples in their immediate neighbourhood, so that they might have the honour of sharing in the triumph of Magyarism. It was only, as they conceived, at this cost that their existence as a new nation could be justified. But, in cherishing this ideal, they entirely left out all consideration of the historical past of Hungary, which had left its mark in a medievalism entirely alien to the great national conflicts characteristic of the present day.

Now Roumania, a state founded, at the cost of great sacrifice, in the territory of Cumania, which the Arpadians of Hungary in the 11th century claimed as one of their provinces, was, along with Servia—the latest embodiment of a polity which originated in the contemporary Rascia—included in the Imperialistic programme of modern Hungary. It was therefore felt strongly at Bucarest that the efforts of the Dual Monarchy, to conquer and administer the Balkan Peninsula—where she has no rights to maintain, where her trade has been for some time on the decline, and where her mission of civilisation has

never been recognised or desired—were traceable simply to the aggressive spirit of Magyarism. Such indeed is the ideal of the Magyar aristocracy, which aims at the subjugation of the entire Serbian race (from whom they have wrested Bosnia and Herzegovina), and the expansion of their territory, by way of a conquered Albania, to the Adriatic, and, by way of Salonica, to the *Ægean*.

On more than one occasion, in the parliament of Budapest, attention has been drawn to the fact that there are in Western Moldavia some thousands of Hungarians of the old stock who, having clung to Catholicism and thus avoided denationalisation, still inhabit a certain number of villages between the Carpathians and the river Sereth. Of recent years these Hungarians, who have almost completely forgotten their nationality, have been subjected to a continuous propaganda; and every effort has been made to give a touch of Magyarism to the Catholic Church recently established in the Kingdom of Roumania, the Church of which these people are adherents. Even in publications of recent date one meets with the contention that the two principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia, which together make modern Roumania, were originally provinces of the Kingdom of Hungary. The chiefs of these provinces, it is argued, were the humble tributaries of Hungary, forced to pay punctual tribute, and liable at the hands of their all-powerful masters to rewards and punishments according to their behaviour.

Roumanians are well aware that the theories propounded in books and newspapers, and preached in University courses and lectures, are not due merely to a wish for notoriety or originality on the part of some isolated scholar, but rather to a determination to further by every possible means the aims of modern Hungary in the direction of conquest and supremacy. Efforts are being made, moreover, even at this moment, to remove natural apprehensions on this score, by means of newspapers published openly under the auspices of Count Czernin, representative of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy at Bucarest, which draw a terrifying picture of the effects of Slav despotism. This expedient has been tried before. It was made use of more than a century ago, as much by way of suggesting to Roumania a policy

of friendliness towards Vienna, as of gaining for themselves the sincere and enthusiastic adherence of those Roumanians inhabiting Austria-Hungary whose influence on the attitude of Roumania in the present European crisis we are about to sketch.

Differing in race from the various Slav peoples who are subject to the Hapsburgs, from the Yougo-Slavs of the Balkans, and from the millions of Slavs united under the sceptre of the Tsar, Magyars and Roumanians (we are told), while maintaining their own existence, share a common task—that of defending Western civilisation, with which they are identified, against the encroachments of a spurious civilisation based on Asiatic serfdom, of which Russia is the armed representative. Such is their theory. At one time it was the Germanic race marching in unison from the west towards the conquest of the east—the ‘*Drang nach Osten*’—which was viewed with apprehension among the Magyars. But things have changed; and Hungary, anxious to gild the fetters with which she binds Roumania to herself, looks to this very Germanism for support in preventing Europe from becoming, according to the well-worn phrase, ‘Cossack.’

In denouncing the designs of Russia, Hungary knows well that she is not preaching to deaf ears. The young principality of Roumania took an important part in the war waged by Russia in 1877 for the emancipation of the Christian peoples of the Balkans, which ended in the Treaty of San Stefano, a treaty subsequently revised at Berlin, to the detriment of Russia. But, by a gross error on the part of Gortschakow, who was anxious to wipe out all traces of the Treaty of Paris (1856), Roumania lost the three districts of southern Bessarabia bordering on the Lower Danube and its Kilia mouth, these being ceded to her allies. For many years the relations between the great empire and her neighbour Roumania remained profoundly influenced by these painful recollections.

Among the principal politicians of Roumania there were many who felt that Peter the Great's Will, which urged the policy of pushing towards Constantinople, was a greater danger than the German ‘*Drang nach Osten*.’

Roumania was developing agriculturally; and every year showed an increase in the agricultural produce shipped to the Bosphorus by the Danube (by way of Galatz and Braila) or by the Black Sea (by way of Constantza), in comparison with that which was exported by land. The freedom of the Dardanelles was thus becoming one of the first economic necessities of a country which had no direct access to the open sea. And, as Russia's designs on the Straits were well known, nothing was more dreaded than a policy on her part aiming by every means in her power at getting possession of the 'keys of her house'—the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles.

The result of these apprehensions was an 'entente' with the Triple Alliance, which had just been formed (1882). It appears that there was a formal Act to this effect, signed by the Sovereign with the consent of a very limited number of the leading political men of the country. It was even said that this Act was laid before the recent Crown Council (see p. 439). However that may be, there has been no open departure from the foreign policy which the country then adopted, and which is styled the 'traditional policy' of Roumania, as if it were at least a century old. For some time past it has not been etiquette to discuss questions of foreign policy in Parliament, though such discussions were allowed by way of a harmless pastime for dissatisfied members of the Opposition, or for the 'irresponsibles,' i.e. those independent of 'Government parties' (Conservative or Liberal, and since 1909 Conservative-democratic)—a sort of opportunism which is also evident in regard to domestic politics. The mildest form of liberty of speech was sternly rebuked; and members were told that they need not concern themselves with the future or the progress of Roumania. This, they were assured, was quite safe, for the Powers of Central Europe had taken charge of it.

We have briefly recalled these facts and conditions, in order to explain the difficulties with which the Government of Roumania, even if it had made up its mind to depart from the beaten track, and to strike out a new line of policy involving considerable risks, will have to contend. These risks include not only the danger of Panslavism—still a reality much to be dreaded,

according to certain people*—but also those which may arise from the fact that, owing to her constant attitude of suspicion towards Russia, Roumania had dropped all intercourse with the powerful Empire beyond the Pruth. Any knowledge the Roumanians had of Russian literature they had acquired through French translations; Russian society was as little understood as that of Japan; no one crossed the accursed frontier to penetrate into the country of 'barbarians'; the archives of Russia, rich in the past history of the country, aroused no curiosity; even sympathy with their kinsfolk of Bessarabia cooled when it was remembered that they were the subjects of a State which it was a duty completely to ignore.

This state of mind still exists. We need not enquire into the causes of the enthusiasm aroused by the visit of Nicholas II to Constantza last June. Gossip asserted that it pointed to the marriage of Prince Charles, son of the heir to the throne, with one of the daughters of the Tsar, who was to bring with her, as a dowry, the whole of Bessarabia, or at least the districts which had been 'retroceded' in 1878. On the very day after his visit to Constantza, however, the Tsar alluded, at Kicheniev, the capital of Bessarabia, to the inseparable ties which bound that province to the Empire. This was quite enough to cool the enthusiasm that had been roused in the public mind, flattered by the visit and by the marked interest shown in their army, their organisation and their national life, by a powerful sovereign who had hitherto been an entire stranger. Such is ever the fate of a policy based on sentiment—to dazzle at a distance, but to lead to no practical issue and serve no useful purpose. Nevertheless, there was no return to the 'traditional' attitude of docility towards the blandishments of Vienna and the friendly, if sometimes unpleasing, counsels of Berlin.

Other causes also had helped to bring about this

* M. D. A. Stourdza, only recently dead, republished some months ago a statistical pamphlet of a somewhat controversial nature, by which he tried to prove, if not the authenticity of Peter the Great's Will, at all events that perfect community of aims and interests existed among the Slavs, and that the manifest intention of the Russian Government was to create a Slav confederacy even at the cost of pushing back the Germans and annihilating the Magyars and Roumanians.

negative attitude of revolt against the 'traditional' policy, which however has not, even yet, resulted in a clear and courageous declaration for the future. In the month of June 1913 Roumania had the satisfaction of a great diplomatic success (a little over-emphasised by a press prone to take impressionist and optimistic views), brought about entirely by the rapid and striking display of military force, amounting to half a million well-trained troops, on the other side of the Danube. The Balkan world, entirely disorganised by the war of 1877-8, was, with the exception of a few scattered dreamers, wholly unconscious of the need that had existed from that date onward, of forming a united defensive Balkan confederation. Such a confederation was required, on the one hand to prevent the outrages of a corrupt Turkey against those Christians who still remained under their rule (Slavs, Greeks, Albanians, and the Aroumanians of Macedonia), and on the other, to put a stop to the daily encroachments of Russia and Austria, continually vying with each other in their efforts to recreate the Eastern Empire of Rome to their own advantage. Bulgaria, under Stambulov, had had the courage to shake off the absorbing influence of Russia, only to return in a short time to the feet of her mighty elder sister. From this position, it is true, she soon seceded again, in accordance with a policy of opportunism adopted with the object of regaining, sooner or later, the frontier marked out for her by the Treaty of San Stefano. The policy of Servia, under her astute King Milan, destined to fall a victim to his own vices, was Austrian; she pursued the same policy under Milan's unfortunate son Alexander, who was assassinated, not without suspicion of alien instigation. The accession of King Peter, a member of the rival family of Karageorgévitsch—a family attached to Russia by a long-standing friendship—brought about an abrupt change of front, followed almost immediately by differences with Austria. These differences were accentuated by the formal annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1908. Montenegro meanwhile vegetated in the pay of Petrograd, which lavished money on the army and the Court. Greece, intoxicated with vain hopes, was sunk in unparalleled inactivity, dreaming that the realisation of her 'great idea' would be brought

about by the spread of philhellenism and the reign of justice in Europe.

Roumania had therefore a great part to play—namely, to arouse on all sides the resolution to act independently of foreign support. To a combination of forces in the Balkans such action was decidedly possible at that time; but, in order to create the resolution in others, it was necessary that Roumania should be fully conscious of it herself. Her advice would then be listened to, her directions followed; and with her greater wealth, her older organisation, her incomparably superior civilisation, both material and spiritual, and the prestige of her sovereign, her supremacy would be assured. This important and difficult task, however, had not even been attempted, when, in the autumn of 1912, the political leaders at Bucarest were suddenly confronted by the uprising of the Balkan League. In the face of this emergency, they had no clear idea what attitude to adopt. Regret was expressed in certain quarters that Roumania had not accepted the better strategic frontier offered her by Russia in 1878 for the new province of Dobrudscha, which would have extended as far as the line Rustschuk—Chumla—Varna. The word ‘quadrilateral,’ which had a purely military signification, was flung out; and an excited public was quick to catch it up. Diplomatic mediation was attempted, but proved almost fruitless, resulting, after the decisions of the European Conference at Petrograd, in little else but the acquisition of the town of Silistria with a circumference of three kilometres. Then, in July 1913, on the advice of France and Russia, as well as of Austria-Hungary, anxious to use Roumania in order to strike a blow at the too-successful Balkan League, recourse was had to military intervention, which led to the extension of the Roumanian frontier as far as Varna, and the incorporation of Turco-Bulgarian territory within that line.

The Treaty of Bucarest (1913) was concluded in haste. Cholera was raging; Austrian intrigue was rife; it was necessary to come to a decision as speedily as possible. Had the various Balkan problems been thoroughly studied at Bucarest, had there even been greater liberty of discussion, the work of readjustment, in which Roumania took the lead, might have been fertile of

good results. But, carried away by rejoicings over peace restored, over the recognition of Roumanian prestige, over the assured future of the Aroumanians,* and lastly over the acquisition of a strategic frontier, people in Roumania took too optimistic a view of what was to follow. Instead of quiet and determined efforts, directed towards the rebuilding of the ruins and the quelling of animosity, the Balkan peoples were confronted by disturbances in Albania, discontent in Macedonia, and cabals and attacks on the part of a press for ever egging them on to cut each other's throats.

Greece, which had managed to acquire the larger share of the booty taken from her two successive enemies, was in alliance with Servia, the second of the two 'beati possidentes.' Is there a similar treaty between Servia and Roumania? It is certainly believed to exist. But, on the other hand, the military convention with Austria-Hungary is said to have been renewed by M. Maiorescu. It was in this condition of things that the heir to the Austrian throne was assassinated at Serajevo last June by a Serb; and Austria-Hungary took up arms to crush the 'horde of assassins' at Belgrade.

In this crisis was Roumania to uphold Servia? Public opinion was unanimous in desiring it. But the attack on this valiant little people coincided with the outbreak of European war. Roumania had announced at Sofia that she was determined to 'uphold the Peace of Bucarest'; she had also declared that she would resist any attempt on the part of Bulgaria against Serbian Macedonia; and it is impossible to say whether this declaration may not have influenced the attitude of Bulgaria, though that country may well have had other reasons for remaining neutral. Overtures on the part of the Young Turks, who were completely subservient to German policy, met with no success. On the contrary, they even called forth a general outcry against the promoter of them, Talaat Effendi, himself.

At such a time as this, when the most imposing political structures seemed to tremble under the blows

* They are still without the bishops promised in the terms of the Treaty; and most of the Roumanian schools in Macedonia still remain closed.

of Fate, no war-like measures could have been ventured upon without some external support. Roumania wishes to come to an understanding with her older Latin sister, Italy, whose situation offers certain analogies with her own. But between the positions of the two states there are also essential differences. Austria is in a position to offer her partner, who has found in the Triple Alliance no reason for joining the Germanic Powers in the war, compensations on the Balkan shores of the Adriatic, without reducing herself to political bankruptcy—a painful expedient even for those who find themselves *in extremis*. That is not, however, as we shall see, the position of Roumania. Bulgaria has every reason for opposing any policy on the part of Servia which aims at the dismemberment of the Dual Monarchy; and Greece has nothing to gain by a disastrous development of the Austro-Hungarian crisis. As for Turkey, she is already doing her best to assist her Germanic allies by all means in her power.

The support of a united Balkan Peninsula, which Roumania might at one time have hoped for, is in these circumstances out of the question. She must either fall back upon her old policy, the disastrous consequences of which she knows only too well, or embark on a new course whose risks she cannot foresee and dares not encounter. It is, nevertheless, incumbent on her to decide; and only one course is open to her.

There are in Russian Bessarabia some 2,000,000 Roumanians who have been deprived little by little of their rights—of archbishop, bishops and priests of their own nationality, of schools and church services in their own tongue, and of any literary or cultural activities of their own. The Roumanian population in Austrian Bukovina, torn without a blow from Moldavia in 1775, is swamped by Jewish innkeepers, who rule the towns, and by peasants of Ruthenian and Little-Russian stock, who, favoured by the administration, have now attained a numerical majority, especially in the north. In Transylvania and the neighbouring districts as far as the Theiss, there are 3,500,000 Roumanians, while in the independent Kingdom of Roumania there are only about twice that number.

Has there ever been, is there anywhere at the present

day, a nation that would tolerate such a situation? To understand it one would have to imagine some fifteen millions of Frenchmen or ten millions of Italians, living under a foreign yoke and yet in close proximity to the State to which they naturally belong, a State founded on the basis of nationality by their independent compatriots. The whole policy of such a State must be primarily influenced by anxiety as to the fate of these brothers and by the duty of emancipating them.

The Roumanians of Hungary, it should be added, form the sanest element in the race, consisting as they do of peasants, hardy, thrifty and industrious, and closely attached to their priests and bishops, whom they look upon as their political leaders. The Roumania of to-day feels the need of this new, healthy blood to reinforce her after the reaction which necessarily followed on the great expenditure of force during the period of her heroic effort. Moreover, the support and example of these peasants, who have enjoyed a prolonged period of economic and social (though not political) liberty, is necessary for the salvation of those thousands who have only recently escaped from a state of wretchedness, the result of years of oppression and destitution. It is because they have enjoyed this partial liberty that our compatriots long for complete national emancipation. All their efforts have been directed towards this end. They sought it long ago through their bishops, who were buffeted and imprisoned by the Calvinistic Magyar aristocracy; through the 'union' of their priests with the Roman Catholic Church of the Emperor, when he became ruler of the country in 1692; later, by discussions in the provincial diets, by peasant risings (as under Horea in 1784), by petitions to the sovereign (e.g. the 'Supplex libellus' of 1791), by organisation of the self-governing churches among the 'united,' and especially among the 'orthodox,' combined with the participation of the laity in its administration (1850-60); by violent altercations in the Parliament of Budapest after the annexation of Transylvania to the Kingdom of Hungary and the establishment of the Dual Monarchy (1867); by energetic campaigns in the press; by appeals to the public opinion of Europe, to the interests of the Triple Alliance itself, and to their compatriots in independent Roumania.

Every effort has been made, but in vain. The result is that some four million human beings are looked upon as a people of the lowest status, their nation a mere ethnological feature of the unitary state of the Magyars, their individual members as worthless creatures, useful only to appease the savagery of a brutal police.

And now their devotion and their heroism are asked of them, to aid in swelling the triumph of a system which aims at their national annihilation. Only the other day Count Tisza, when, assuming the airs of a benevolent despot, he announced certain 'concessions,' so tactless that they were more like affronts, took the opportunity of affirming the absolute necessity of the 'unitary Magyar state.' Now it is this very attitude which is at the bottom of all the mischief. So long as this unjust and absurd idea prevails, all 'concessions' they may deign to grant to the Roumanians are nothing but narcotics, intended to deaden the pain of approaching death.

To this demand the Magyar race, by the voice of Count Tisza, master of the destinies of the Dual Monarchy, replies with a hard and brutal *non possumus*; and that at a moment when the plains of Galicia are stained with the blood of thousands of Roumanian soldiers, placed, not by accident, in the most exposed positions. A *non possumus* equally emphatic is the reply of the Roumanians themselves. They bide their time. This is clearly recognised in Roumania; and, whatever action she takes, it will be understood in this, the only possible sense. To live or die a united nation is no watchword of mere sentiment, but the outcome of a carefully thought-out policy, which is bound to have its results. If we are to believe those who neither understand her situation nor recognise her difficulties, Roumania waits too long. Well, let it be known that if she waits, it is not from hesitation as to her duty, but simply in order that she may discharge it more completely.

N. JORGA.

Art. 8.—THE PRO-GERMAN PROPAGANDA IN THE UNITED STATES.

THE war has now been going on for eight months ; and the ordinary reader of any of the American daily newspapers of the first class is as well informed of the diplomacy that immediately preceded the war, and of all that Germany has done in Belgium, in France, in Poland, and in England, as the ordinary reader of a London newspaper. A well-organised and widely-extended propaganda on behalf of Germany—a propaganda in which the German and German-American leaders and their numerous lieutenants in the press and on the platform are persistent, resourceful, and often unscrupulous—has been conducted during all this time. The propaganda is still going on. Neither the division of it that is worked through the post office and managed from Berlin, nor the division that is conducted from New York and Washington, shows as yet any signs of flagging. It is impossible for Americans who read newspapers or receive letters and printed matter by post to escape the pro-German propaganda. But in spite of this tremendous and continuous effort on behalf of the Kaiser and his mission, it can be affirmed that 95 per cent. of the American people of English or Scottish origin are with Great Britain and her Allies ; and that the only sympathisers with Germany and Austria are Americans of German origin, Irish-Americans belonging to the Ancient Order of Hibernians and kindred Irish associations, and Americans of Anglo-Saxon lineage who have at German universities or elsewhere come under the influence of German 'Kultur.'

Americans who are with the Allies are not demonstrative in their sympathies. Most of the manifestations of sympathy are in the daily press ; for ninety-five out of a hundred of the newspapers printed in English have from the first been outspoken in their condemnation of Germany's action in bringing on the war, and still more outspoken and severe in condemning the invasion of Belgium and the shelling of Hartlepool and other towns on the east coast of England. No great public meetings are held to express sympathy with the Allies as was the

case in England in 1861-1865, when the Federal armies were suppressing the rebellion in the southern states. With the exception of Ex-President Roosevelt, no man of prominence in national politics has attempted to assume the rôle that Bright played in England during the civil war of half a century ago. The churches, with only here and there an exception, have been loyal to President Wilson's plea for neutrality. There is, moreover, no widespread perception of the fact that the Allies are fighting for the political civilisation of the United States—defending the principles on which the republic has been based since 1783, just as much as for the political and social civilisations of Great Britain and France. But there was gloom all over the United States when in the early days of the war it seemed probable that the German army might reach Paris; and, apart from the Teutophil elements mentioned above, joy will be almost universal in the United States when the Allies reach Berlin.

It is easy to understand the disappointment at Berlin over this state of things. There are grounds for the conviction, widely held among Americans, that the pro-German propaganda carried on since August 1914 had been prepared some years in advance; and also for the conviction that Germany intended to secure, no matter at what cost, that American sympathy should be with her when the time arrived when she deemed herself ready to plunge Europe into war. The system of 'exchange professors' is now regarded as part of the pro-German propaganda—as one of the schemes for influencing public opinion in the United States. This system had been in operation for eight or nine years before the war; and it is now obvious that its aim was to use, in the interest of Germany, American professors who were sent to German universities, and also German professors who were sent to the United States. The Kaiser was more than courteous to American professors who went to Berlin under this system. Two of these professors, by their part in the pro-German propaganda of the last eight months, must have fully repaid the Kaiser. But Americans in general now realise that the ostentatious courtesies of Berlin, duly recorded by newspaper correspondents, were not accorded merely because the

American professors were looked upon as representing what is best and highest in American university life; and to-day nobody persuades himself that the sole mission of the German professors who visited the United States was to enable students at the older American universities to come into contact with the flower of German scholarship.

The alliance between the German social organisations in the larger American cities and the local branches of the Ancient Order of Hibernians, which has come to light during the war, is not so old as the system of exchange professors. It was, however, in existence some years ago; and, although Germans and Irishmen in the United States almost monopolise the liquor trade, community of interest in this trade alone would not have brought about the present alliance. In recent years, whenever a new steamer of the Hamburg-America line or the North-German Lloyds reached New York on her maiden trip, her arrival was made a public occasion; and at the invitation of the Company thousands of visitors went over her during her stay in port. Americans, who in these days several times a week find their letter-boxes loaded with pamphlets and reprints of newspaper and magazine articles of the pro-German type, now perceive that these show-days for new German trans-Atlantic steamers were not intended solely to advertise the steamship lines; for the arrival of propagandist literature can often be explained only by the fact that the recipient had signed the visitors' book on a German steamer on view in New York. Americans are seldom disposed to look a gift-horse in the mouth. But people to-day are wondering whether the gifts of the Kaiser to American universities were due only to his admiration of these institutions and his love of American learning.

When the history of the international aspects of the war—particularly of those aspects that concern the neutral countries—comes to be written, no chapter will be of more interest to the people of England, or contain more surprises for them, than the account of the wooing of the United States by Germany in the decade that preceded the invasion of Belgium, and in the months immediately following the declaration of

war. The trail of the preliminary propaganda—the years of ground-baiting—will be found to strike through some honoured institutions and to touch some unexpected places; and the second half of the history—the propaganda in war time—will disclose the most remarkable example known to history of mission-work carried on in a neutral country on behalf of a belligerent.

No country but Germany could have carried on a propaganda in the United States so extensive, vigorous, and persistent as that of the last eight months. The only possible comparison would be with the propaganda in the United States in favour of Home Rule for Ireland, which went on from about 1880 to 1912. This was a remarkable campaign. From first to last it resulted in millions of dollars being sent from the United States for the use of the Irish Nationalists; and, next to the Roman Catholic Church, it was the most potent influence for the cohesion in the United States of men and women of the Irish race. But, united as are the Irish, they are not nearly as cohesive as German-Americans, or Germans resident in the United States who have not become American citizens.

There are two and a half million people in the United States who were born in Germany, to say nothing of German-Americans born in the country who have never lived in Germany. People of German birth, at the census of 1910, constituted 18 per cent. of the foreign-born population. The total percentage of British-born, including those born in Canada and Newfoundland as well as in Great Britain and Ireland, was 28 per cent. Of these the Irish formed 10 per cent.; and the remaining 18 per cent. was about equally divided between persons born in British North America and those born in England, Scotland and Wales. Except among the Irish, and to a small extent among the Scots, there is no cohesion among British-born citizens or residents of the United States. Englishmen and women are as completely lost in the general population as men and women from France; for, like Frenchmen, Englishmen are seldom actively interested in state or federal politics. They never form subdivisions of either the Republican or the Democratic party, as Germans have done for nearly half a century, and as Swedes, Italians and Jews have done

during the last fifteen or twenty years; nor in any part of the United States are there newspapers which cater for the English-born, or claim a constituency of immigrants from England. There are daily newspapers in all the larger cities which frame their editorial and news policies to secure support from Irish-Americans, and weekly newspapers existing exclusively on this support. Jews, Swedes and Italians have their own newspapers. Americans of all these races are clannish; but no race which in the last hundred years has helped to people the United States has shown such cohesion as the Germans, who, unlike the Irish, are settled in the rural areas, particularly in the Middle West, as well as in the cities from New York to San Francisco.

The Germans have been widely distributed in the United States for a longer time than the Irish; and, family for family, they are more prosperous and better educated than the Irish. Religion and political traditions are the cement of the Irish, but Irishmen are not held together by language as the Germans are. New-comers from Germany must have a newspaper printed in German. No other paper fills their need; and hundreds of thousands of Germans, long in the country, and using the English language in business or the workshop and even at times in the home, continue loyal to the German newspaper. German-American newspapers discuss American political questions from a German point of view. They usually have special correspondence by mail from Berlin and other large cities in Germany; and editorially as well as in the news columns more attention is given to Germany than in the ordinary American daily newspaper. These German newspapers, moreover, give constant attention to the doings of the German community; and especially to the musical, literary, athletic and trade societies and organisations which are so marked a feature of German-American communities, urban and rural. There are more German communities dotted all over the United States than of any other race, excepting, of course, the Anglo-Saxon. Clannishness and love of the language and the fatherland are the characteristics of these aggregations; and they are served by more than 800 newspapers, all printed in German. In cities like New York, Philadelphia, Cincinnati and

St Louis, there are three or four daily German newspapers; and there is scarcely a city with a population over a hundred thousand that has not at least one weekly newspaper in the German language.

It is not pretended that these German-American organisations—newspapers, churches, clubs, 'sängerbunds,' 'turnvereins,' and other social institutions—were called into existence to aid the pro-German propaganda. Associations of this character are nearly as old as the advent of the German immigrant in the United States. Thousands of them, like many of the German-American daily and weekly newspapers, date back to the fifties and sixties of last century. But all this machinery was to hand and in good running order when war was declared. Some of it, there is reason to believe, had been overhauled and oiled in recent years in view of the war which Germans had so long regarded as inevitable. It was all available when Dr Dernburg went over in the early days of the war to direct the pro-German propaganda, to hold German-Americans together for 'Kultur,' and to persuade Americans that they had reached wrong and biased conclusions as to the war because they did not know the facts, and because the British had cut the German-American cable, so that only the case of the Allies had reached the American press.

Had the war been confined to the German States and Russia—had Belgium with Great Britain and France not been involved—it is possible that by March 1915 Dr Dernburg might have reported a large measure of success in stimulating American sympathy for Germany. But Belgium confronted Dr Dernburg when he began his tremendous and thankless undertaking in the United States; and he, with Professors Münsterberg, Von Mach and Burgess, Mr Hermann Ridder of the New York 'Staats-Zeitung,' and other colleagues of Dr Dernburg in the press and on the platform, soon found that Belgium would not down. In the early days of the frantic campaign for American sympathy, the case put forward was that Russia had wantonly made an aggressive war on Germany, and that Germany was doing no harm when Russia, out of pan-Slavonic fury, assailed her; while, as regards Belgium and the violation of

neutrality treaties, it was asserted in the literature and by the speakers of the propaganda that Great Britain did not heed treaties when it suited her interest to disregard them. The South African war and an alleged violation of Portuguese East Africa were cited as proof of this, even after it was shown that there was no mention of Portuguese East Africa in the history of the war of 1899-1902 prepared by the historical section of the Great General Staff at Berlin. Some of Dr Dernburg's understudies became so confused over Great Britain's wrong-doing and her disregard of neutrality treaties that one of them told an audience at Carnegie Hall, New York, that during the Boer war Great Britain had invaded Portugal.

Germany's dread of Russia, as a reason for the war, made very unsatisfactory material for the platform division of the propaganda; for the agents of this division, once on a platform, could not escape embarrassing questions from the audience. 'If Germany was afraid of Russia,' it was asked at these meetings, 'why did she invade Belgium?' The road to Russia, it was suggested, did not lie through Belgium; and the German apologists were knocked over the ropes. At other meetings where Belgium would persist in obtruding itself, the champions of German 'Kultur' sought to persuade their audiences that Belgium had really no grievance against Germany, because Germany had offered to make good any material damage resulting from the temporary use of Belgium by the German armies, and had, moreover, given an undertaking that her active interest in Belgium would cease at the end of the war.

Dr Dernburg himself, who between September and the end of January covered more ground in the United States, addressed more meetings, and gave out more newspaper interviews than any lecturer or literary celebrity who ever did one-night stands in the United States under the auspices of Barnum or Pond, had a disconcerting experience at Amherst College, in connexion with this offer and pledge to Belgium. He was asked how Belgium was to know that Germany would keep her word. He had no answer to this question; and, when further pressed, he conceded that if he had been a Belgian he would have been in arms against

Germany. Dr Dernburg, in arranging for platform engagements, usually restricted the range of the questions to be asked of him; and, with the extreme courtesy towards the platform—to chairmen as well as speakers—that characterises American public discussions, the restrictions were generally observed. But American college students, accustomed to ‘quizzing’ professors, are not so easily kept in hand as audiences at century and ‘get-together’ clubs or political and social academies. At Princeton University Dr Dernburg evaded questions that might have been embarrassing by intimating that he was not on tour to be catechised by undergraduates. At Amherst, he was apparently caught off his guard, and was obliged to abandon the claim that Belgium ought to have trusted the Kaiser.

Nevertheless the ground which Dr Dernburg so assiduously cultivated was not altogether unprepared. To begin with, there are Americans, even of Anglo-Saxon stock, who have long been jealous of England’s control of the seas. Ever since the war began, expressions of this jealousy have occasionally occurred, in the papers. For instance, an editorial article in the Washington ‘Post’ of Jan. 13 remarks:

‘At this time, when Great Britain appeals to the sympathy of the American people in her fight against Germany, while calmly attempting to destroy American commerce, it behoves Americans to look the facts squarely in the face, and not to be misled by sentiment that is ~~not~~ based on truth. . . . What England desires is to destroy the German fleet. That is her real objective. With Germany crippled on the sea, England does not care how strong Germany may be on land. . . . Individual Americans place their sympathies where they please; and many of them freely express their abhorrence of the acts which have laid Belgium waste and caused France to mourn. They may be violent in their denunciation of German militarism. But they are not thereby blinded to the aims and purposes of Great Britain. They see clearly the development of Britain’s plans; and they are determined that the United States shall not be made a cat’s paw of the island kingdom.’

This passage bears traces of the influence still exercised by the text-books of American history used in the high schools and colleges until some twenty years ago.

It is clear that there is some survival of the old-time dislike of Great Britain, due to their treatment of the Revolutionary War, the war of 1812, and the attitude of Great Britain during the Civil War of 1861-1865. This feeling has found expression at times in American newspapers which dare not risk their reading constituencies by openly espousing the cause of Germany. But the old dislike and hatred of England had almost disappeared before the beginning of the present war; and there was consequently little ground ready to receive the seeds of Anglophobia which the pro-German apologists were eager enough to sow. There was no need to sow them among the Irish of the A.O.H., or the German-Americans ready to endorse all that Germany has done since the ultimatum to Serbia was sent from Vienna—a city sometimes described by New Yorkers as the 'up-town office' of Berlin.

Even before Germany openly turned her propaganda to the gospel of hatred for England, there were indications that the pro-German campaign in the United States was nearing the end of its usefulness. Belgium had made it hopeless from the outset. No direct preaching of hatred of England marked the first six months of the propaganda; but, from the first, pro-German platforms rang with charges of British perfidy as regards treaties, together with claims that Germany was as much entitled to a place in the sun as Great Britain, and with charges that England's participation in the war was due to her jealousy of the industrial and commercial expansion of Germany. When they were quibbling over the neutrality treaties of 1839 and 1870, or seeking to convince their audiences that the German Empire could not be bound by treaties made by Prussia, pro-German speakers could expect no success; for the American conviction since the war began is that, treaty or no treaty, the invasion of Belgium is the most appalling outrage recorded in modern history. But in pushing other pleas they had more chance, for American audiences, when they listened to the demand put forward on behalf of Germany for a 'place in the sun,' seldom asked where this place was to be—in Canada, Australia, Texas, or South America. They seemed to have a hazy idea that there are still unpeopled areas where it is

possible to settle people of a white race in large numbers. Even men who have been through high school and college have asked in open meeting, 'If England can have colonies, why not Germany?'; and the discussion of colonies for Germany has brought out the fact that many Americans are quite unaware that the last vestiges of Great Britain's old colonial system disappeared when England adopted free trade in 1846.

Comparatively few Americans realise that Canada enjoys complete fiscal freedom; that she can pass and has passed protective tariffs without the slightest regard to the commercial and manufacturing interests of Great Britain; and that the British oversea dominions have now the right to negotiate their own commercial treaties. It is news to seven out of ten educated Americans that no British colony, whether a dominion or a crown colony, contributes a cent towards the cost of the British Government or even the maintenance of the Colonial Office in London. It is a surprise to these Americans when they are told that in the last fiscal year the share of the United States in the total imports of Canada was over \$410,000,000, and that of the United Kingdom only \$132,000,000. They are even more surprised to learn that the same tariff duties are paid at ports in British India on cotton goods from New England or the southern states and goods from the mills of Lancashire; and that Germany exported goods to the United Kingdom in the year 1913-14 to the value of 80,400,000*l.*, on which not a cent of protective duty was levied. It is a result of this ignorance that speakers harping on Germany's need of a place in the sun and on England's jealousy of Germany's expansion have had a more patient hearing than when expatiating on Belgium's rebuff to the Kaiser's tenders; but, on the whole, the campaign to influence American public opinion has been a failure. There are many German-Americans, sympathising with the Allies, who insist that not more than half of even the German-American population has been won over by the pro-German propaganda. Only a poll could determine whether this claim would hold, but it may be taken as certain that, excluding the Irish-Americans, whose sympathies would have been with any nation at war with England, all that Dr Dernburg and Mr Hermann Ridder

have accomplished is to hold the bulk of the German-Americans firm for the Kaiser.

More than this was impossible, for reasons that are quite on the surface. No answer was conceivable to the case of Belgium. The propaganda offered half-a-dozen answers—that payment was offered for the right of way; that to go through Belgium was a matter of life and death to Germany; that Germany offered peace to Belgium after the fall of Liège; that the German Empire could not be called upon to observe treaties made by Prussia; that Belgium had forfeited all claim to German observance of neutrality by military conventions with Great Britain in 1906 and 1912; and that France had no intention of observing the neutrality of Belgium or had even violated it. Not one of these answers could be defended long enough to allow the speaker who made it to get off the platform. The propaganda had also to carry the burden of Von Halle and his book* (maintaining that Germany must seize Holland and all the Dutch colonies) as well as the staggering load of Bernhardi. It tried desperately to unload Bernhardi—to persuade American audiences that this 'old man of the sea' was of no account, military or social, in Germany; and that no more weight could be attached to his 'prophecy and programme' than to any book that might be written by a retired officer of the United States army. It was all in vain. Bernhardi was persistent and all-pervading, especially at the meetings addressed by Dr Dernburg's zealous understudies, where the audiences had a chance to heckle.

A third reason for the failure of the propaganda in its first six months was the method of approach. During the first few weeks, when Count Bernstorff was in charge, and was spending most of his time in New York, and later after the German Ambassador to Washington had been succeeded by Dr Dernburg as director of the propaganda, it was assumed that Americans knew nothing about Germany, nothing about the war and Germany's aims

* Dr Ernst von Halle, 'Volks-und Seewirtschaft,' 2 vols, 1902: vol. i, 'Die Deutsche Volkswirtschaft an d. Jahrhundertwende'; vol. ii, 'Weltwirtschaftliche Aufgaben und weltpolitische Ziele.' Berlin: Mittler und Sohn, publishers to the German General Staff and the German naval authorities.

and the 'Kultur' that is made in Germany, and that their minds were a blank as regards the war, its causes, and its developments. The propaganda was a failure for the same reason as German diplomacy—that the Kaiser failed to realise what the wanton invasion of Belgium was to mean for Germany. Dr Dernburg and his associates were without imagination. They could not see that there could be any view-point but that of Germany; and they proceeded with their campaign on the assumption that they could secure American sympathy for the Kaiser, if they only told the story of the war and its causes as it was told to people in Germany, who since the war began have not been permitted to see any foreign documents or uncensored newspapers.

The people of the United States pride themselves on being greater readers of daily and weekly newspapers and of magazines than any other nation. This claim, so much a matter of pride, was brusquely ignored by the Dernburg propagandists, thereby offering an affront to the intelligence of Americans. The propagandist appeal was, moreover, repulsive and abhorrent to Americans who were not blinded by race sympathy, by anti-English antagonism, or by worship of 'Kultur.' Another reason for the failure of the propaganda was the want of a direct cable between New York and Berlin. A cable controlled at both ends by the German Government was necessary to the leaders and organisers of the propaganda. Such a cable was lacking, with the result that, while the propagandists in the United States were saying one thing, prominent Germans in the land of Kultur were making directly opposite statements; and the statements made in Germany had the effect of knocking out the underpinning of the propaganda in the United States.

The campaign will go on apparently as long as the war lasts, unless Americans grow too weary of it. At the end of March there were signs of this weariness. But persistence, thoroughness, and resourcefulness are as characteristic of the campaign in the United States as they were of Germany's forty years' preparations for war. American impatience may result in a slackening of the efforts to win sympathy for Germany; but the machinery will be kept in order, with a view to a new campaign just as soon as it is realised in Berlin that

no sacrifice can avert defeat. Then the aim will be to secure the intervention of the United States in order to break the fall for Germany. England must be prepared for a move of the pro-German forces in the United States to this end. In the meantime there should be no advocacy in English journals or on English platforms of any intervention by the United States when the plenipotentiaries who are to settle the terms of peace are being chosen and are about to assemble. There should be no nonsense about 'America's first full open entrance into European politics in the capacity of peace-maker' being 'the assumption of a great historic rôle as glorious for the people of America as it would be beneficial for the peoples of Europe'—a rôle that 'would have the further virtue that it would make a profound appeal to the emotions and imaginations of the people of the United States.' To American sympathisers with the Allies, who after Scarborough and Yarmouth were becoming increasingly impatient with the failure of the Washington Government to protest against the invasion of Belgium, the placing of mines by Germany where they endangered neutral shipping, and the shelling of unfortified towns, such sentiments as those quoted—sentiments expressed on the editorial page of a London Liberal weekly journal so recently as December 12—excite only ridicule and irritation. Only pro-Germans among Americans ever hint that, in view of the course of events from August to the end of March, the United States can either expect or claim to have any part in the settlement at the end of this appalling war.

EDWARD PORRITT.

Art. 9.—THE GOLDEN BOUGH.

The Golden Bough. By J. G. Frazer. First edition, three vols, 1890; third edition, twelve vols. London: Macmillan, 1907-1914.

THE completion a short while ago of the twelve volumes of 'The Golden Bough,' with its modest sub-title of 'A Study in Magic and Religion,' is an epoch-making event, we must believe, in the life of the author and certainly in the history of anthropological science. If the dignity of knighthood is the fitting reward for achievement in scientific literature, Sir James Frazer has been rightly selected for that honour. For, besides the work with which this review is concerned and by which mainly this writer will in all probability be remembered and judged, he can reckon to the account of his life's larger output such products as his 'Commentary on Pausanias' and his four volumes on 'Totemism and Exogamy,' and to each of these one might apply Pliny's phrase, '*præclarum opus, etiam si totius vitæ fuisset.*' Meantime our author has inaugurated another *magnum opus* by publishing the first volume of a treatise on 'The Belief in Immortality.'

The colossal work which is now before us for appreciation has grown into its third edition from a much scantier but still ample treatise published in 1890, which had for its aim the solution of the mystery attaching to the priest of Aricia, 'the priest who slew the slayer and shall himself be slain.' But in these twenty-four years the researches of the writer have travelled very far afield from the grove of Nemi. And his excursions have brought back such a booty that it may have become a question of indifference for him and his readers whether he has solved the original riddle that started him on the quest. The titles of these volumes, one on 'The Magic Art and the Evolution of Kings,' one on 'Taboo and the Perils of the Soul,' one on 'The Dying God,' and two on the cognate theme of Adonis, Attis, and Osiris, two on 'The Spirits of the Corn and of the Wild,' one on 'The Scapegoat,' two closing volumes on 'Balder the Beautiful: The Fire-Festivals of Europe and the Doctrine of the External Soul,' present the outlines of a world-wide research, and yet are inadequate as a summary of the

varied wealth of material that is in them. For the titles of each book and of some of the chapters fail to indicate the often bewildering variety of the content; in fact, in regard to the two volumes on 'Balder the Beautiful,' a captious reader and one specially interested in Balder might often be tempted to cry *οὐδέν πρὸς Διόνυσον*. But, indeed, the whole series is a vast encyclopædia of primitive and advanced anthropology; and it is hard to mention many problems proper to this field which one does not find discussed or which one could not gather material to elucidate in this labyrinthine treatise. And besides the enormous compilation of primitive facts and the many theories, advanced usually without dogmatism and as if only for the sake of stringing those facts together, there are many oases to allure the reader who girds himself to traverse these thousands of pages; for the writer is skilled in linking up many a savage ritual, many a savage myth and thought, with the achievements of our highest civilisation, our ideal philosophy, science and religion. Hence the sudden digressions on the Greek philosophers, modern science, Kant and Hegel, in which the well-known literary skill of the writer is approved, but which come upon us so unexpectedly that the harsh critic may call them purple patches. Yet the purple is good and true colour, and has a meaning of its own in the landscape.

To have said as much as this is to say that no critical and adequate review of these volumes will ever be written, for such a review would itself be a volume. The ordinary reviewer may be content to express his reverent admiration for the amazing industry, the devotion to research, the moral energy that could alone inspire and achieve such an intellectual output. But the conscientious critic, having carefully read and pondered on the whole, must try to formulate his impression of the primitive life which the writer reveals, and must candidly give his judgment concerning the value of the methods pursued, the accuracy of the research, and the validity of the inductions drawn.

This picture of the world of thought and belief through which the higher races are assumed to have passed and in which the lower races, even perhaps some of the modern European peasants, are still abiding, may be found by the imaginative reader gloomy, dreadful,

and repulsive. The phrase that seems to have been invented as if for Oxford 'Greats' papers by an early amateur in these matters, Walter Bagehot—'the mind of the savage is tattooed all over with monstrous images'—will perpetually recur to him. The primitive man of the past and the present is depicted in the pages of Sir James Frazer as a being devoted to cruel, hideous and licentious rites, as ridden with the terrors of demons, ghosts and witches, and tortured with the fears of malignant unseen powers when he rises in the morning and lays him down at night, when he goes out and comes in, when he puts his spade into the soil, when he culls the first-fruits or gathers in the last sheaf of his harvest, when he marries a wife, when his daughter reaches puberty, when he goes on the warpath and no less when he returns triumphant or defeated; and he defends himself against these evils real or imaginary by magic rites that are always futile and wasteful and often very unclean. Our writer is himself well aware of the appalling impression that he gives us of our early ancestors; and, while he usually makes use of his faculty of gentle banter and irony to save himself and his readers from the depressing influence of his facts, yet at times he gives way to his own lurid imagination and intensifies the blackness of his colouring. His chapter on the 'Omnipresence of Demons' (Part VI, p. 73) is a typical example of his power; in his hypothetical reconstruction of the Jewish Passover, starting with the assumption that the primitive Hebrew did actually sacrifice his firstborn, he conjures up the phantom-forms of midnight executioners (Part III, p. 178), and veritably makes our flesh creep—a pastime not wholly scientific. It is in keeping with this that he is inclined to the more pessimistic type of hypotheses, even in respect of ritual where all trace of cruelty has vanished; behind many an innocent masquerade of an All Fools' day, he detects the tragic ritual murder of the aging King; and with the over-eagerness of the earliest pioneers in anthropology, he scents human sacrifice in places where later students would refuse to acknowledge any trace of it, as, for instance, in the quite harmless ritual and ritual-legend of Sosipolis of Elis (VI, p. 353). Moreover, he even ventures on the dismal vaticination that civilisation

and humanity may one day abandon the higher religions and revert to the 'Walpurgisnacht' of the past (v, 2, p. 335; cf. vi, p. 89). The reader who appreciates our author's facts in their true grimness will tremble at the prospect.

We are not here concerned with his views concerning the future of mankind, but with the picture that he presents of modern savagery which may reflect our own past. The reader who accepts the facts here gathered together as true, and also as the whole truth, may wonder how our race has escaped extinction through the devastating effects of a suicidal race-madness, still more how it has succeeded in winning through into a civilised sanity and a reasonable psychic state. Certainly we may draw one induction from this survey of the anthropological phenomena, namely, that the human animal, just because he combines a rudimentary thought with intensity of emotion and feeling, is liable to morbid and often self-destructive exaggeration of sentiment and to perilous disturbances of the mental equilibrium; hence the ghastly self-mutilations of savages, their exhausting asceticisms, their occasional deaths from the terrors of taboo and the spirit-world or from the auto-suggestion of sorcerers. His magic is, indeed, to some extent protective; and, as Sir James Frazer has observed, the higher religion of the good deity may sometimes deliver from the menace of evil spirits. But magic may kill as many as it saves; and high religion has at times diffused as dark and deadly a terror as the lower polydaimonism. It is fortunate that primitive as well as civilised man has been helped by other influences, by the faculty of contradicting himself, by the refusal to carry through a fatal logic of life or death, by the power of *insouciance* whereby he can escape from his morbid states into a saving and restful lightheartedness.

Sir James' picture is the more lurid because he does not sufficiently emphasise the other side. At times he shows himself aware of it, as when, in dealing with the omnipresence of demons, he says (Part VI, p. 78), 'The savage and indeed the civilised man is incapable, at least in his normal state, of such excessive preoccupation with a single idea, which, if prolonged, could hardly fail to end in insanity'; and in a note there he quotes some

'judicious observations' of Mr Dudley Kidd on the merry disposition of the Kafirs, in spite of the swarms of devils that the anthropological report finds in their region. But the reader, relieved for a moment, is soon plunged into terror and pity again as he follows our author round the world, especially when he gets to Corea and Ceylon. And he may feel the contradiction in the statement quoted with apparent approval from Dr Wallis Budge (VI, p. 103)—'though naturally of a gay and lighthearted disposition, the Egyptian must have lived in a perpetual state of fear of spirits of all kinds.' There is often a lurking fallacy in a 'must,' and things that 'must be' often are not so. Hence it is that observant sojourners in savage lands often find the actual savage very different in psychic temperament from what, according to the decision of the anthropologic *littérateur*, he 'must be.' We ourselves are often very different on Monday from what we were on Sunday; hence, it may happen, we are able to continue living. Doubtless our writer's statistics concerning the 'omnipresence of demons' are of great value as raw material for our history of the human mind. But we have to do our own estimating and sifting; and, as he throws statistics of all races, primitive and cultured, into the same pigeon-hole of demonology, his chapters do not help us to distinguish the various peoples according to their less or greater burden of this dangerous yet fruitful superstition. Yet this distinction, which marks off, for instance, the Hellenes in their prime from the Babylonians and Egyptians, is vital for the history of progress.

Another general reflection is suggested by this vast exposition of human facts. We seem to want a new formula, a phrase for describing the process of our life from primitive to modern times. The 'stratification' theory, demarcating the stages of our history as clearly as the strata of the earth, seems to be quite inadequate to the facts; and Sir James himself writes a good note of warning against its fallacy (Part v, 2, pp. 36-37). His readers certainly need the warning, and perhaps he himself might bear it more steadily in mind; for he is apt to speak of 'an age of magic' followed by 'an age of religion,' or of anthropomorphism as superimposed upon a previous theriomorphism or theriolatry. Yet

his own evidence helps us to discern the past differently, so far as knowledge or conjecture can penetrate back. We do not see separate strata clear-cut from one another; rather we see a great variety of contradictory forms, the contradiction not being felt, existing in germ altogether; magic mixed up with religion, the lowest magic with a possible god in the background, vague anthropomorphism with a vague theriomorphism, ideas cruder than animism combined with animism, the terror of spirits touched at times with some instinct of love; the existence of individual thought in a circle of collective consciousness. There may have been an age of pure magic, a godless age, a preanimistic age, an age purely theriomorphic, purely matrilineal; but no conscientious anthropologist dares yet say that he has found it.

More helpful is the evolution-formula, derived as it is from the physical study of the organic world; and it is this which governs our writer's exposition in his fascinating short study called 'Psyche's Task.' But in his last chapter of Part II on 'Our Debt to the Savage,' he is less satisfying, less in accord with the reasonable verdict on his own facts. These ought to intensify our sense of the mental value of civilisation, of which in this chapter he tends to speak disparagingly, taking the easy and fatal 'pragmatic' view of truth; at the same time he over-estimates the mental life of the savage, at least as he has exposed it; for he speaks here of savage society as a faultless model constructed with rigorous accuracy upon the lines laid down by a barbarous philosophy. But in very much that he has presented to us we cannot see, nor does he try to show us, this 'rigorous accuracy'; we see rather in many directions a violent exaggeration, morbidity and unexplained caprice. And from his evidence we may gather the impression that civilisation cannot be regarded wholly as the result of a gradual progress in a straight line, as the slow evolution of a savage germ, or as the gradual transmutation of savage life, though these descriptions may apply to some parts of the whole complex change; we must regard it also as partly due to a higher lift, achieved by rejection and negation of much perilous and poisonous matter, and we must believe that the sceptical steady brain has been one of the lifting powers. The term

'evolution' then does not seem altogether appropriate and contains its own 'fallacy of metaphor.'

Our author's own attitude towards the savagery that he so copiously chronicles is difficult to fix. Generally he compels the reader to abhor it by his power of lurid painting; at times he records its futilities in the tone of Voltaire or Gibbon; but on the whole it fascinates him and he makes out a brilliant case for it. As regards his method of investigation, it is that which he has always employed, and which we may call the universal comparative method. Its procedure rests on a general survey of all mankind without regard to locality, race, or stage of culture, and on the view that a fact of anthropological interest and difficulty presented by one locality may be elucidated by comparison with other facts more or less similar reported from any other part of the world. This method in the hands of the master can lead and has led to great achievements; but there are certain pitfalls to which the worker on this and only this method is specially exposed. In the exigency imposed by his world-wide quest he may have neither time nor inclination for intensive study, that is, for the study of a fact in relation to its immediate and adjacent ethnic and social surroundings, in short for what is now being called 'adjacent anthropology.' Lacking this, he is always liable to misinterpret a fact, to attribute to it a certain significance, to place it in a certain setting, that does not accord with the probabilities suggested by its environment. And, partly as a consequence of this, he is liable to bring under one category doubtfully similar facts, which by reason of some unnoticed but essential incongruity are really incommensurate. In fact, the employment of the method of universal comparison alone is not likely to engender in the anthropologist the spirit of criticism; and I have tried to indicate elsewhere the advantages of combining it with the method of adjacent anthropology or with intensive study.

Great master as he is in his own method, which is no longer the most modern, Sir James cannot be said to have escaped wholly the pitfalls alluded to. This is most manifest when he comes to deal with areas of ancient culture, in which the facts are most complex and multifarious, and which specialists have devoted long

years to elucidate—such areas as Palestine, Babylon, Crete, Greece, Rome. A special student of Babylonian religion, for instance, will be startled by the thesis (Part III, p. 4), 'the High Gods of Babylon periodically died.' This is given on the authority of a discarded and unauthoritative little treatise by Mr King, who, like other good Assyriologists, is now aware that that statement only holds good of Tammuz. More especially in his long and frequent discussions of matters concerning Greek and Roman religion, he fails to impress the specialist or to display the true perception that comes from patient, sympathetic and critical study. Wissowa's work on Roman religion reaches solid results, but is dry and narrow, and often ineffectual, partly through want of geniality, partly through disdain of comparative anthropology. Our author is his antithesis; having failed to 'Romanise' himself, being content with the universal comparative method only, he achieves no convincing truth, but is content to propagate many quaint and interesting theories, the children of cloudland, emanations from the realm of the barely possible. It is only the purely 'comparative' student, unversed in the lore and unfamiliar with the atmosphere of a special area that asks such questions as on p. 245, Part I, Vol. 2—'if the Peruvian Vestals were the brides of the Sun, may not the Roman Vestals have been the brides of the Fire?' Sir James Frazer would have theorised better on Roman religion, if he had allowed himself to be influenced by Mr Fowler, our greatest authority on the subject, who combines the advantages of the two methods. He might, then, have been corrigible on the question of the marriages of Roman deities, of Jupiter and Juno, for instance; he might have been critically careful of the distinction between what is late and Grecised and what is early Roman or Latin; and he would not have accepted the story of the Martyrdom of St Dasius as evidence for the primitive religion of Latium (VI, p. 308).

The universal world-survey is apt to engender hurry; and we sometimes find mistakes in our author's statement of facts which suggest the hurry that prevents one looking carefully at a context or weighing the value of a literary passage. We are told (v, 2, p. 240, n. 1), 'The Hebrews sacrificed and burned incense to their nets,'

on the authority of Habakkuk i, 16; but if we turn to the prophet's page we find that he quite clearly refers not to the Hebrews but to the Chaldeans. A childish bird-story in Antoninus Liberalis is quoted as evidence that the ancient Attic kings were identified with Zeus (I, 2, p. 127); one might as well conclude from the love-story of Cupid and Psyche that all beautiful women in ancient Greece were identified with Aphrodite. He marks a statement of the Scholiast on Aristophanes that the Greek sacrifice to the dead took place at noon-tide; and as an explanation he tentatively suggests that the custom may have arisen from the belief that spirits cast no shadow (II, p. 88). No explanation would have been needed if he had remarked that another Scholiast (on Apollonius Rhodius, I, 587) and Diogenes Laertius merely contradict the 'fact.' Again, he has no time for the weighing of authorities, or he would not have allowed himself such an *obiter dictum* as 'according to one account, Apollo himself was buried at Delphi' (Part III, p. 4); he would have realised how fatuous that late 'account' is. The same appearance of hurry is visible in his study of the Greek Saturnalia, which is the weakest and least critical portion of his work, forming the concluding chapter of 'The Scapegoat' (Part VI). Upon this very frail foundation is based the important induction that there existed in prehistoric times a uniform society ranging from South Italy to India. Occasionally, under the exigencies of a popular style, he ventures too sweeping generalisations on a quite insufficient basis: 'in classical antiquity there was a popular notion that every human being had his own star in the sky' (III, 66). He merely quotes Pliny (2, 28), who only attests the belief of his own time. But might not the intelligent reader conclude from these words that the Greek and Roman peoples throughout the periods of their respective histories were as liable to this unfortunate superstition as our Middle Ages or the age of the Renaissance? Our author must be aware how seriously important for the history of European civilisation are the exact facts concerning the prevalence of astrology, and that before the time of their decadence the Greeks were innocent of the disastrous illusion.

Again, one cannot resist the uneasy impression, while

one admires the vastness of his range, that in dealing with the leading problems of classical religion, such as the Anthesteria and Thargelia festivals, our writer's work is secondhand and uncritical. These are subjects that have been worked over most minutely by modern specialists; and our author's references suggest a sufficient familiarity with the modern literature of this department. Yet its influence upon him, whether positive or negative, seems usually slight; and he does not allow himself the time or concentrate himself for the effort to follow out a problem to its legitimate end. His restless mind is constantly flickering away down side paths, and he has to apologise to the reader—not without cause—for this weakness for casual roaming (v, 2, p. 96). The reader will easily forgive him, for we owe to it some fascinating anthropologic excursions; but our desire to see an argument driven home by continuous hard-headed reasoning, to follow down one track till something definite is found, is continually baffled. We are often bewildered with a mirage of half-realised innumerable possibilities.

There is another danger that naturally besets the rapid and omnivorous investigator and co-ordinator. All is fish that comes to his net; and at one cast he is apt to bring in many fish that are very unlike. Sir James Frazer casts his nets wide, and often the facts that are brought together are by no means co-ordinate. Careful investigation will reveal this in his development of one of his favourite themes, the killing of kings (III, 34–58). The ceremonious slaying of the king as a god-man to save him from the weakness of old age; the gallant end of a king on the battlefield, as of Saul; the casual and utilitarian execution of a king, as of Charles I—all these different types of cases are brought together as if they explained each other. Or again, in his discussion of the many interesting problems connected with the sacred women of Anatolia and Mesopotamia, he blurs the distinctions between many different types which modern criticism has laboured to keep distinct. The perfected scientific spirit needs in equal degree the faculty of seeing resemblances and the faculty of seeing differences. Our writer has the former in a striking degree; he is defective in the latter.

Some of these drawbacks may be inherent in his
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method; and one may ask if he himself is aware of its limitations. At times he cautions the reader well and warily against too much dogmatism; he speaks of the 'slipperiness and uncertainty of the ground' (III, p. 112), but this does not deter him from very bold skating. 'Even the lamp of comparative mythology (he says) cannot always illumine ancient mythology' (ib.). This is certainly true; all the lamps that can be applied illuminate only a very small part; but his words imply that this is the true and only lamp. A test-case might be the argument that meanders through two volumes on 'Balder the Beautiful' to prove or to make probable that Balder was the oak that was burnt on the Midsummer Fires. All the comparisons and analogies strung together in these volumes do not and cannot bring us any conviction that Balder was an oak; and, if they were increased indefinitely, they would be valueless by comparison with a single direct Scandinavian record associating him with this tree. Even his statement, given on slight authority, that these fires are or were called 'Balder's Bale-fires' in modern Sweden outweighs as evidence the rest of the two volumes; but Scandinavian scholars do not regard that term as possessing any value for the original Balder-myth.

So far it is the method and the workmanship that have been discussed. But even the most general survey of this great work must take note of some of the writer's special theories. Criticism is checked at the outset by the candid openmindedness, even the indifference, of the writer in regard to them. He is always ready to abandon them if better can be shown him. This is scientifically praiseworthy. In the preface to the second edition, which he reprints at the beginning of the third, he pronounces his interest as more in the facts themselves than in the hypotheses which colligate and illumine them. But it is not to be expected that his reader will share his indifference. In the first place these eleven volumes are as full of theories as an egg is full of meat; and without them the whole work would lose the slight degree of unity which at present it possesses. It is just his particular theory about Balder that allows him to fill the last two volumes—dedicated to that god—with

bewilderingly various matter; while in an Appendix he at last inclines to a totally different theory about him which at once renders nearly all these two volumes irrelevant. Elsewhere (VII, 2, p. 218) he embodies in the text 'a suggested theory of Totemism' in which he no longer fully believes, 'because it serves as a convenient peg on which to hang a collection of facts which are much more valuable than any theory of mine.' This is not quite worthy of the dignity of a *magnum opus*; and he does himself an injustice. Yet his words recognise the necessity of some theory, without which our perception, memory and sense of values would be drowned and lost beneath the flood of accumulated facts. A fact by itself is not yet of any value. The past and present history of mankind contains potentially billions of 'facts,' most of which are useless, and none of which are useful until interpreted and illumined by some theory or hypothesis. Even 'The Golden Bough,' by far the richest storehouse of anthropological facts that has ever been accumulated, is only a selection; and every selection implies a theory.

We cannot, then, be indifferent to theories; but at the same time it is well to realise their inadequacy. Sir James Frazer is modest enough about his own; but it is not clear that he recognises with sufficient acuteness how inadequate are his own theories, as well as others that have been put forward, to explain nine-tenths of the facts in certain domains of anthropology, especially mythology and ritual. Let us accept and apply to the phenomena of ritual and myth all the most prevalent hypotheses, theories of sun-worship, weather-magic, fear of ghosts and witchcraft, ideas of purification and taboo, totemism and the worship of animals; then we are pulled up short by a question of detail—'Why do savages knock out their two front teeth?' or, 'Why must the priestess of Athena at Athens abstain from native cheese?' or by any other of the thousands as embarrassing as these in Dr Frazer's collection; and all our theories fall helpless. Anthropology can show the leading ideas in such a priestly code as Leviticus, but no theory can rationalise more than a fraction of the amazing details. Nothing is more eccentric and baffling than the ceremony of a savage funeral. Nothing in

our writer's discussion on the worship and reverence paid to animals explains why men should hunt the wren with such curious rites (v, 2, p. 317). Mythology is, even more than ritual, elusive of the net of the theorist, especially if he is narrow-minded enough to work on the sole theory that all myth comes from ritual. Dr Frazer is too much of a veteran to cherish that illusion; but it may be that inadvertently he encourages it in the tyro.* He puts forth, for instance, a theory of Balder and thinks that, if accepted, it explains the myth. We feel that at best it only explains a fraction of it; the myth of Balder is too rich and original to be explained as the 'text-book' of any conceivable 'sacred drama.' It is the fault of much modern research into the origins of Greek mythology, that, when it has discovered and proclaimed the origin of a particular myth, it leaves all that is really interesting in the myth unexplained and more mysterious than before. A capricious fancy, at once exuberant and meticulous, appears to have prevailed in primitive ritual and myth-making. It is our duty to endeavour to systematise their products by reference to general principles that regulate them; but it is also our present duty to confess how slight our success has been and how evasive the detail is.

Our author's theories are mainly concerned with magic, religion and sociology in the broadest sense of these terms. Now, it is a vice of much modern anthropology that it blurs the distinction between magic and religion and fails to arrive at any precise definition of them. This cannot be said of our writer, who gives a clear and workable account of the difference between the two spheres (Part I, 1, p. 222). By religion he understands 'a propitiation or conciliation of powers superior to man which are believed to direct and control the course of nature and of human life.' Magic is not defined with such precision in this treatise; but he uses the term to denote a mode of control or compulsion exercised upon the outer world (including men and gods) according to a law of sympathy between phenomena; which sympathy he analyses into the ideas of homœopathy and contiguity. His analysis is a reasonable

* Cf. vii, 2, p. 88, where he gives a too narrow definition of 'myth.'

interpretation of the facts from the point of view of the modern observer; but it may be thought to fail as a vivid representation of what is going on in the mind of the savage magician. His theory might have been more complete and more real, if he had engrafted upon it Dr Marett's exposition of magic in his 'Threshold of Religion' as an ebullition of will-power or 'mana,' using such means as mesmeric words, gestures, and actions. Such a view will protect us against the temptation which is strong in Sir James Frazer to affiliate the modern man of science to the primitive magician, as if the point of view of both in respect of the outer world were the same, each assuming the invariability of nature and its obedience to certain fixed laws, while the votary of religion regards it as variable and depending on the capricious or incalculable will of a personal power. It might be truer to say that the magician is distinguished from both the other characters by his egoism, his self-confident assertion of force; and that both he and the typical religious person are distinct from the man of science in that they consider the world of nature as an elastic and sensitive medium, indefinitely responsive at any point to an immediate discharge of will-power.

As regards the relations between magic and religion in the history of man, our writer is well aware of their deep interfusion; but he maintains the thesis, which is scarcely susceptible of historic proof, that in our human history an age of magic preceded an age of religion. At the same time he strongly and clearly refuses to regard religion as in any sense evolved from magic; for the rise of religion involved a self-abnegation, a breach with the past, a new point of view which was adopted by the higher minds as they discovered the futility of the old. That the human race has passed through a wholly non-religious era is a quite defensible hypothesis; but our author's proofs of it in the fourth chapter of Part I (Vol. 1) will hardly be considered adequate. For instance, such a statement as that on p. 233—'obviously the conception of personal agents is more complex than a simple recognition of the similarity and contiguity of ideas'—is hardly obvious or convincing as phrased.

As regards his general theories on religion and its progress through the various stages of lower and higher

life, there is some characteristic vagueness arising from lack of clear definition. He has no perception or imagination of a possible preanimistic mode of religious feeling; he is vague concerning the meaning of fetichism, confusing it with pure animism. For instance, he defines the former as 'the view that the fruits of the earth and things in general are divine or animated by powerful spirits' (IV, 2, p. 24); and he is occasionally loose in his application of the term 'god.' When he deals with the interesting question concerning the genesis of the idea of 'gods,' he tries to preserve an open mind; and in an excellent preface to his treatise on 'Spirits of the Corn and of the Wild' (Part v), he warns his readers against attributing too much weight to the quantity of the evidence that he there accumulates, and against the narrow view that each and every deity was in germ and origin a vegetation-spirit. He rightly proclaims his belief in many different origins of deities. Yet here and there, we may think, his early and life-long devotion to the theory of Mannhardt, the discoverer and the champion of the Corn-dæmon, still leads him astray; for instance, it misleads him into a jejune and narrow-viewed account of Demeter and Persephone (v, 1), who in origin and throughout their career are vaster potencies than the Corn-Mother or the Corn-Maiden, and whose careers cannot be wholly explained, as he would explain them, by reference to that trifling peasant-fetich.

Though he strives to be open-minded, studies so wide and copious as Sir James Frazer's naturally entitle him to a predilection for certain views. There are two concerning the genesis of gods that are salient in these volumes. The first, to which, I think, he has only been inclined in recent years, we may call the Euhemeristic. At the end of the two volumes, somewhat daringly entitled 'Balder the Beautiful,' he adds an Appendix on 'African Balders,' in which he finally gives his adhesion to the opinion that Balder was a real man. Again, in Part IV, after sketching the religion of Osiris, he comes to favour the suggestion that Osiris also was once a real personage, in fact to be identified with Khent, an Egyptian king of the first dynasty, who was buried at Abydos. Now, the Greek who gave his name to this theory of the human and historical genesis of gods may have been

a very foolish theorist; his followers in antiquity were undoubtedly among the most fatuous of the later writers. But this ought not to prejudice us against the tenability of the theory as an abstract proposition. Like other theories, it has its turn to be true; in fact, within historic times, as Sir Alfred Lyall in his 'Asiatic Studies' has shown in respect of India and China, and recent anthropologists have proved in respect of certain African communities, it gives us an undoubted *vera causa* of the growth of gods. Therefore we have the right to posit it as an operative cause in the prehistoric period.

It is only a slight personal misfortune for our author that, if his final theory about Balder is right, the title he gives to the two volumes of Part VII becomes even more irrelevant than before. But what alone concerns us here is to ask whether he gives us any criteria, or whether any such can be found, for determining, in any particular case, whether a god was once a real man. I believe such criteria exist and can be stated. But criticism and sharp definition of criteria are not our writer's strong points; the vaguely synthetic and lax habit of the roving comparative method has led him to discover Balders in Africa, who are not Balders except at one point, and who do not help our question at all; when he ought to have spent more intensive study on Scandinavian religion and the Balder-myth. The reader will find the theory of a real man-Balder more critically set forth and the evidence for it seriously considered in Golther's 'Handbuch der Germanischen Mythologie,' published in 1895.

A further reflection bearing on religion may occur to the reader of these volumes on Balder; and it is strange that it did not occur to the writer. Whether a god was once man or not man, in popular mythology many human traits and attributes are sure to be attached to him, which are the same as those that belong in the real world to men and heroes, for instance, a coat of mail, a spear, a wife, a horse, a ship. It was an actual custom for a great Norse hero to drink beer, and on his death to be burnt on his viking-ship. Therefore Odin's gods drink beer, and Balder is burnt on his ship. It is the real heroic life of the period that suggested this trait, not the peasants' midsummer fires, with which Balder is not known to have had any concern. Sir James Frazer's

Euhemerism might have saved him from infecting heroic saga with too much ritualistic interpretation.

A second predilection of the author in his speculations on the evolution of deities is towards the theory that the anthropomorphic god was 'evolved' from a previously divine animal or divine plant. From his occasional statements the hasty reader, as was hinted above, might imagine that our race in its religious development has passed through the distinct stages of 'phytomorphism,' 'theriomorphism' (the direct worship of plants and animals), and finally—if it is final—'anthropomorphism,' the worship of humanly conceived and human-shaped divinities; in fact, we might as well coin another ugly word, 'lithomorphism,' for the direct worship of stones and rocks, and call this another 'stage' in religion. This 'stratification' theory has led many rash students astray. No age purely theriomorphic, no all-prevalent worship of mere animals without the human conception present at the same time, has as yet been shown to exist. As has already been said, our author has warned us against this pseudo-scientific theory of our religious development. The following passage in Part v (Vol. 1, p. 22)—'the advance of thought tends to strip the old animal and plant gods of their bestial and vegetable husk and to leave their human attributes (which are always the kernel of the conception) as the final and sole residuum'—well expresses a true induction from our evidence. The theriomorphic does not necessarily precede the anthropomorphic conception; both may be working simultaneously. In fact, at times, the former may be subsequent to the latter; a real man has been worshipped after his death as incarnate in the crocodile, and Zeus the Aryan sky-god might be imagined vaguely in his earliest period as a superman in the sky, and much later, for casual and temporary reasons, might become incarnate in a bull. Yet, after the excellent sentence just quoted, Sir James can speak of 'the animals and plants which at first were the deities themselves'—a less careful and vaguer phrase, sure to provoke the same misunderstanding. And he cherishes the desire, often quite illusory, to discover the previous animal from which the high humanly-conceived deity was 'evolved.' His conjecture (iv, 1, p. 88, note) that 'the Furies themselves may, like Æsculapius, have been

developed out of the reptiles,' is unlucky and suggests no careful study of either the Erinyes or Asclepios; why not as well conjecture that the latter was a real man-doctor like the Egyptian physician-god, and that his snake was merely the usual incarnation of the dead spirit?

In another place (Part v, 1, p. 23) he gives us a criterion for discovering the animal which produced the anthropomorphic deity; 'wherever a deity is described as the eater of a particular animal, the animal in question was originally nothing but the deity himself.' This is only put forward as a conjecture; it rests on the assumption of Robertson Smith that all sacrifice was once a sacrament, the eating of a deity, which no one now believes. An anthropomorphic deity is naturally supposed to eat what men eat. Our author would not have commended this conjecture as giving us a general criterion, had he studied more deeply the ritual and religion of the Mediterranean. Wherever in these volumes he speaks of the 'worship'—a word often uncritically used—of animals, and of their relations to higher deities, we find no recognition or consciousness of the truth, which is so important for the right understanding of Mediterranean religion, that the sanctity of an animal may be only temporary, not possessed by it in its own right, but coming to it solely through contact with an altar impregnated with the spirit of a humanly-conceived god.

Finally, in this connexion, the reader should carefully note the evidence collected in Part v, 2, pp. 169-293, on the veneration and propitiation of animals. The account is interesting and valuable; but none of the numerous examples show us the evolution of any high god from the animal; in many cases the high gods are seen in the background as altogether distinct from the animals; even the revered tiger of the Battas of Sumatra is not grouped with the gods.

His sociological theories concerning the origin of certain social and religious institutions remain to be briefly considered. In this last edition he does not put forward any new theory of importance, but restates what his earlier editions had made familiar to us, adding some new evidence and considering some objections that his critics had raised. The real value of his work in this direction lies in his untiring exposition and colligation

of the facts reported from existing primitive societies; and, if we take him at his word that he cares little for theories, he will be content with our gratitude to him for this excellent service. But he is prone to indulge himself in fanciful reconstructions of the great societies that at last emerged into the culture of the historic period; and here we cannot help feeling too often that his historic imagination is whimsical, his critical sense deficient, his judgment of the archæological and anthropological evidence undisciplined. We know that mythology reflects prevailing social institutions of the present or past; and therefore an ancient mythology may give us valuable anthropological testimony of ancient social customs. But it requires tact and caution for its interpretation, since it often reflects the abnormal and eccentric, certain startling breaches of the social custom. We rub our eyes, then, when we read our author's serious conjecture that the story of Œdipus, Laios and Jocasta reflects the social custom of the son murdering his father and marrying his mother (III, p. 193, n.). It will be time to consider such a conjecture when we find such a marriage-custom prevalent in any actual or recorded society. Meantime, we may feel that we have as much right to conjecture that the story of Hamlet reflects a Danish custom of all nephews killing their uncles.

A striking feature of many societies, usually in the primitive stage, is 'mother-kin' or the rule that kinship is counted through the female. Since McLennan's works on primitive marriage, the subject has been a leading topic of modern anthropology, and in unscientific hands has been debased by being perverted to the party purposes of the Women's Suffrage cause. Our author is happily free from any such vice; and he is well aware that mother-kin very rarely carries with it 'matriarchy' or the power of the female. But he devotes himself with zest to the discovery of the mother-kin system in ancient societies where it had not been recorded or hitherto suspected, for instance, in Greece and Rome and other Aryan communities. His evidence is partly the interpretation of myths, and his manner of interpretation is again unconvincing; for instance, he interprets the many Greek myths of the wandering hero-adventurer winning a kingdom by marrying the native king's

daughter as evidence of mother-kin in the royal line the crown descending through the female (I, 2, pp. 278-280). Such stories may rather be thought to reflect the migrations and conquests of tribes; to conciliate the conquered people the successful invader unites himself with the old dynasty by a marriage. Such is the story of Hengist; such is the record concerning Canute; such was the claim of William the Conqueror. We know that myths can be valuable evidence of ancient society; but they never ought to be interpreted in direct contradiction with a definite historic record. Our author regards certain Lydian myths about Omphale as indication of mother-kin in the royal family and the inheritance of royalty through the female. This is in flat contradiction to the absolute statement in Herodotus that for twenty-two generations from Herakles down to Kandaules the kingship in Lydia descended in a direct line from father to son, all the Herakleidai being lineally descended from Herakles and a slave-girl (1, 7). Our author, therefore, 'conjectures' that Herodotus is wrong (Part I, 2, p. 282); but such a conjecture impairs his own reputation as a judge of evidence.

The whole question of Mediterranean mother-kin still needs to be reconsidered by a thoroughly trained and unbiassed scholar. It becomes even a religious question; for many writers, even many scholars, still believe that it is connected with and explains the predominance of the goddess. Our author holds this opinion himself without much consideration of the adverse arguments that have been urged; he is only able to adduce one positive and clear example, namely, from Assam (IV, 2, p. 202). But suppose we accept his anthropological formula (one not wholly true), which is worded thus—'the divine society portrayed in myths reflects the society of the worshippers'; suppose it is the case, as he maintains and as the evidence proclaims, that in the societies based on mother-kin the power is still in the hands of the king or the chief or at least the men; we must then conclude that a society based on mother-kin will usually reflect itself on the heavens in the form of the predominance of the god. The prominence of the goddess then, as in prehistoric Crete, must be due to some other cause. And other causes have been suggested.

The sociological theory that is most prominent in the whole treatise is his view of the origin of the monarchy and of the social religious rite of the slaying of the divine king. With his usual initial reasonableness he admits that kingship may have had many origins. But his thesis that the king was often 'evolved' from the magician and in early days was a divine weather-charmer or vegetation-priest, whose periodic slaying was a necessary refresher of the earth, is very dear to his heart, and with all his industry and ingenuity he labours to discover traces of it all over the world. He has not convinced us that such was its origin in the higher societies of history, in Greece, Rome, Palestine or the Teutonic North. His arguments are too often frail and forced, his evidence, as that, for instance, drawn from the consecration of sacred women to the Anatolian Goddess, too often irrelevant. It is more serious that he should condemn and pervert the evidence where it is wholly against him, as he does with the Biblical testimony concerning the origin and character of the monarchy in Israel (iv, 1, pp. 18-25).

But those who steadily and critically read these volumes to the end will not close the page with a feeling of disapprobation. They may miss in Sir James Frazer the severity of trenchant logic, the self-restraint that rejects the irrelevant, the *finesse* of the critical sense. But these faults are the defects of his other qualities, which themselves are near to greatness. Even if the colossal work had no other value save as an unique collection of the raw material of primitive life, the value will endure and will shed lustre on the writer, who deserves the congratulation of friends and critics upon the accomplishment of such a task.

LEWIS R. FARNELL.

Art. 10.—STRIKES, FROM THE WORKMAN'S POINT OF VIEW.

WHY do strikes occur, are they justifiable, and if so can no better means be found of attaining the same ends ?

Were the question asked abruptly, 'Why do men go on strike?' the average employer would probably reply, 'Because they are discontented,' while the typical working-man might answer, 'To get fair play.' Each of these answers seems to bear a little hardly upon that section of the community to which the speaker does not belong. It is the point of view which counts. The following remarks, made from the working-man's point of view, are the result of observation and (may one say?) *internal* conversations among working men throughout a period of nearly ten years. An opportunity like the present is seldom given the working man, for two reasons; he is but half articulate, and his point of view is the wrong one—wrong because it does not appeal to the educated, who very naturally do not appreciate the mass of detail which renders the lot of the working man so much less happy than it might be.

This reasonable ignorance is unfortunate for the working classes in many ways, and is not to be dispelled by the ordinary methods of the journalist or philanthropist, for any attempt to 'acquire information' soon betrays itself and creates an unnatural atmosphere. In practice the working man or his wife being interviewed—however informally—will always paint working-class conditions very much better or very much worse than they really are. There appears to be no middle course in this connexion; and grave misapprehensions arise, damaging the cause of the wage-earners.

All working-class grievances (hence practically all the economic unrest through which we are passing) are due mainly to the fact that working men consider there is a want of logic in the attitude of society towards its hewers of wood and drawers of water. There is still a reluctance on the employer's part to realise that his 'hands' can reason and are quick to trace to its source any specific grievance which, in their opinion, would not exist were a clear statement of the facts made public. This alleged want of logic produces two main results

from which all legitimate working-class grievances spring. First, the hours of the wage-earner are too long, and second, his pay is inadequate.

Consider the so-called eight-hour day. This would be more accurately described as the nine-hour day, because, for five days a week the working hours are usually eight and two-thirds in number. If the expression eight-hour day be insisted upon, then, as a matter of simple arithmetic, there would be no Saturday half-holiday in the forty-eight hour week; and the forty-eight hour week is the shortest within the general knowledge of the working classes. 'Terminological exactitude' is of something more than academic importance here, because working men may, with some show of reason, point to its absence as an indication of the spirit in which matters concerning them are discussed. It has been contended that,*

'In many fields of intellectual work men frequently take no account of time, but go on as long as may be necessary to complete some task, and much longer than any workman is ever called upon to exert himself. Some intellectual workers habitually do it—there are numerous classical examples—and even in ordinary professional life it is not uncommon. The head of a business often works longer than anyone in his employ.'

This is only incontrovertible if we assume that the bootmending, plot-cultivation and so forth, which actual necessity imposes on the worker, are not work. Employers seem unable to realise that the vast majority of their more poorly paid hands have to toil for very many hours, week in week out, to bring the works or *official* pay up to a living wage. Further, the working man does for himself and his family very many of those things which members of the more fortunate classes pay domestic servants or others to do.

Again, it is generally accepted as a fact beyond dispute that mental work is more fatiguing than mere bodily labour. Yet the working man in Government employ knows that he will be compulsorily retired at the age of sixty-five,† while he is also aware that Judges, Cabinet

* The 'Times,' Aug. 19, 1910: 'Mental and Manual Work.'

† Ordnance Factory rule 70, 'In any circumstances workmen, whether entitled to superannuation or not, are compulsorily retired on attaining

Ministers, High Commissioners and others whose work is on the highest mental level may, and very frequently do, continue their labours to a much greater age. May not the labourer, worn out at sixty-five, contend that his toil must have been harder than that of the Judge still working at seventy-five, eighty or ninety? One who had earned his pay at both brain work and labour said not long ago, 'The truth is that, whereas mental work fatigues the brain only, manual labour fatigues the body and the brain too.*' It is matter of everyday experience that the man with a tired body can do no useful work, mental or manual—cannot even derive profit from reading—though the mentally tired man may do good bodily work and find therein recreation.

Up to this point our comparison of working hours has been confined almost exclusively to the notion of hours *per diem*, but it must not be forgotten that the working man will probably never have one entire week for his own until he is deemed past work, unless, in the wearisome years between schooldays and his premature old age, sickness or other misfortune befall him. Is he so much to be blamed if he sometimes compare his statutory holidays with the wider and more frequent breathing-spaces allowed to others? and is it not clear that his hours of work, reckoned throughout the year, are very much longer than those of his superiors? Monotony and constant subordination too bring in their train an awful cramping of spirit quite unknown to the brain-worker.

Recent railway disasters have brought out in a painful manner the fact that monotony of work tends to subconscious performance, and we know that any action performed subconsciously is liable to be forgotten on occasion. Major Pringle, enquiring into the disaster which occurred at Waterloo Junction on Oct. 25, 1913, asked a witness whether men did not take things too much for granted sometimes.†

'When a man,' was the reply, 'is kept a long time in the box he gets so used to the work that it comes to him quite

the age of sixty-five.' The rule also states that a workman may be retired on the ground of age at sixty.

* The 'Times,' March 31, 1911: 'Labour and Brain Work.'

† The 'Daily Mail,' Nov. 6, 1913. The witness was himself a signalman.

naturally.' 'What would you suggest as an alternative—move a man?' 'It would do him a bit of good sometimes.' 'You think that being in one box for a long time a man becomes less careful?' 'Not less careful, but they do the work and a minute or two afterwards do not think what they have done. They do not think enough about it.'

But the soul-destroying monotony with its attendant catastrophes is for our purpose a side issue. The important points are three: the manual worker is worn out at an earlier age than is the brain-worker, and the man on the lower rate of pay will be compelled to put in very many hours per week at some form of drudgery which it is not usual to consider when reckoning his hours of toil, while of holidays throughout adult life he has practically none. By what standard then do we measure if his hours are not too long?

Secondly, the manual worker's pay is inadequate. It might be argued that our Alms-houses, Hospitals and Workhouses, together with the Old Age Pension Act, are all standing monuments to the inadequacy of the working-man's pay. Though such a contention is by no means the exaggeration it may seem to many, it is certainly sweeping, and we willingly abandon it with the remark that, if there were no charity in the world save charity in thought, our civilisation would be upon a higher plane.

There are certain things which the working man can never do because his pay is insufficient. He can seldom or never afford to occupy a house in which there is a bathroom. The story of the bath used as a receptacle for coal is familiar, and no doubt true, but it scarcely furnishes good proof that working men would not appreciate fitted baths. On the other hand, it brings out the fact that even the more provident of our poor are compelled to purchase coal extravagantly—by the cwt. or half hundredweight—because their homes have not the storage accommodation for larger and more economic purchases. The working man who is determined to be clean must either spend a great deal of his spare time (when he is not working), carrying pails of water about,* or he must pay at the public 'Wash

* The so-called 'Saturday afternoon strike' in Sept. 1913 was largely due to the bath difficulty.

houses' for the risk of innumerable chills. Further, though the working man may lay no exclusive claim to inability to afford illness, yet illness bears much more hardly upon him and his than upon his social superiors; and he may contend with absolute truth that the few days' rest which might stave off a severe illness is a luxury beyond his means—he must go on, taking the risk. It seems at best a paradox that the less a man is paid the greater is the physical endurance demanded of him; in other words, the man worst fed, housed and clothed is called upon to run the greatest risk of physical injury. That the working man cannot afford holidays is made clear by the practice of the punishment known as suspension. Could he afford it, it would be no punishment at all, but the mere granting of an unexpected holiday, for nearly all working-class holidays are days upon which there is neither work nor pay. Superior persons who work fewer hours and for higher pay suffer no deduction in respect of statutory holidays.

The average working man holds very decided opinions concerning his own and other people's holidays: 'How is it,' he asks, 'that the more important a gentleman's work is in the place, so much the longer is the period for which he can be spared from it each year, and things—including his pay—go on just as though he were there? How is it that, though I may be entitled by rule to a few days' leave each year, of course without pay, yet, when I have a single one of those days, there is generally a fuss? And why, if my time is of so little value, must it be checked to the half minute, while the man whose time is paid on a very much higher scale may wander in half or three quarters of an hour late daily? It is a crime for me to lose half a minute (valued at a fraction of a farthing) once a year, while the other man may lose his shillings' worth every day. I pay heavily for the small loss, he pays nothing for the greater.'

Fortunately it is within the power of anyone interested to draw up an imaginary balance sheet of working household expenditure if he will but take the trouble to enquire into the question of rent (as a rule the working man earning twenty-five shillings a week pays no less than six shillings in rent), and will also bear

in mind that all too often clothing *must* be paid for on some iniquitous instalment plan, while gas, coal, sugar—practically every necessary—is dearer to the working classes than to persons able to pay for larger quantities. Tobacco and tea too are taxed irrespective of quality; and so the wearisome tale of something which is surely less than justice might be prolonged.

It is particularly difficult, if not impossible, to compare the work of the educated with that of the uneducated when relative rates of pay are under consideration, yet it is not difficult to find instances where startling incongruities prevail. For example, educated persons frequently occupy positions wherein there is not much work while there is grave responsibility; such posts are highly paid. The wage-earner, on the other hand, is often called upon to undertake both work and responsibility. For the responsibility he is not paid, but has instead to work under the knowledge that any neglect of responsibility on his part may mean imprisonment or other serious punishment which the educated responsible man has little need to contemplate.

But perhaps the situation as regards working-class pay may best be summed up in this manner: the working man who is in full work—earning his weekly wage fifty-two times a year, but for statutory holidays—is in much the same financial position as a trader unable to make net profit would be; all the gross profit is absorbed in working expenses. In either case the cost of necessary food, clothes and housing should surely not be reckoned as a charge upon net profit; it is an essential working expense. Were this fact recognised by accountants it would be found that, while the wage-payer's net earnings would show but slight diminution, the wage-earner's would become evanescent. Here we are brought face to face with the fact that there is no living pension for the man who cannot save during working years.

Have wage-earners a moral right to strike?

This question has been discussed again and again, and the discussion has frequently led to no more definite conclusion than may be conveyed in the one word 'sometimes.' From so brief an answer the seeker after truth can deduce but three things: instances have arisen when

the wage-earners' strikes have been justified by unfair treatment; there have been other occasions when the treatment meted out to the workers has been equitable, so that their action in striking cannot be justified; and there may have been other cases where the generosity of employers has made the mere thought of striking a gross ingratitude. But what is fair, what equitable, and what generous? Again we are made conscious of the diametrically opposite points of view. Should a poacher be tried by Justices who preserve game? Should questions concerning fair treatment of the uneducated be settled entirely by the educated? Should the purchaser of labour fix the price? Of these three questions the second offers peculiar difficulties, which can only be indicated here by some such further question as, How many barristers have had the education (technical, domestic and social) of the average blacksmith? But, supposing it to be agreed that in a particular trade the pay is not adequate, is a strike then justifiable? Extremists can be found who will say, 'No. Men must not quarrel with their bread and butter, bring their wives and children to starvation, and then appeal to the public for help.' Yet an ideal public would be upset by the mere knowledge that a section of its servants was being hardly dealt with, and no strike would be necessary. Even a public not quite ideal is often stirred to its depth when it gets to know. Ignorance may be bliss, yet justice sometimes demands knowledge. The Press does not help in these matters as it might. This much at least seems certain: there have been, and no doubt there will be again, times when it is a mere matter of prudence to withhold a portion of corn that it may serve as seed, even though the daily ration be thereby diminished. Further, it is probable that had there never been a strike or anything akin to a strike, the earth's population might be broadly divided into two classes—slave-owners and slaves. The Press Gang suggests an argument in this connexion which is not easily refuted.

If a strike is to reach any importance, it must have for its object an honest desire to better the lot of the working classes. That section of the Press which is loudest in its outcry against the foolish masses who are

swayed and led by paid agitators is no less noisy concerning splits in the ranks of labour and the discrediting of labour leaders by their former supporters. 'Labour,' they say in effect, 'is always foolish, foolish to support a voluble self-seeker, and foolish, having found him out, to withdraw their support.' It is the same spirit which all too often creates confusion between the precipitating cause and the real reason of a strike. No strike which involved the idleness of even one hundred men has ever been brought about solely by the dismissal of one man. Ethically, for the sake of the community at large, this may be a pity, but practical conditions in the work-a-day world of labour render such a happening impossible. The true explanation of very many of the so-called 'One-man strikes' is not far to seek. Given a body of men who feel, rightly or wrongly, that they are not getting fair play, let these men read one-sided accounts of their own and their fellows' doings, accounts in which the masters' case is not infrequently set forth as though it were the men's, then a quite trivial incident may be sufficient to bring about a strike. Vast masses of rock are not blasted that another fuse may be made. While the object of every reasonable strike is to improve the lot of the wage-earners in this and succeeding generations, there is always present too the hope that 'The public may get to know.' This last—no mere childish outcry for sympathy, but rather hope of means to an end—is a point upon which the Daily Press generally is reticent. When we read that a striker has assured a journalist that he does not know why he is on strike, we may be sure either that the striker was a foolish specimen of his class or that the journalist was, for a journalist, singularly obtuse.

The public has often believed all to be right with an industry until a strike has been in progress for some time. In this connexion, as in many others, the dock strike of 1889 is worthy of special attention, not because it was the first of the great dock strikes (we must revert to 1872 for that), but because the dock workers may justly claim to have been the pioneers of useful strikes and strike methods, since it was they who, by enlisting the sympathy of one or two public-spirited persons of

education, showed how it was possible, as the result of strife and suffering, to overcome the culpable negligence of the Press and to gain public sympathy in spite of that negligence. Moreover, the strike of 1889 showed clearly one new feature—public sympathy—a feature not generally recognised yet, to which reference will be made later; and it has required dock strikes to accentuate the influence, the enormous influence, which Roman Catholic priests exercise in labour struggles.

The dock strike of 1872 left us the nucleus of the Labour Protection League, which flourishes to-day, doing good work and more than justifying its existence, even if it be credited with nothing but its readiness to champion the widow and fatherless; our civilisation boasted a Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals before the inception of the Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children.

The dock strike of 1889 left us a public beginning ever so dimly to realise that there might be hardships in the lives of the working classes concerning which newspapers failed to speak. Certainly the first scene of the struggle was played to an unsympathetic public. The 'man in the street' had his existence in those days, but he knew neither his name, his responsibility nor his power. The one thing of which he felt sure was this: a mob of ignorant, drunken ruffians, who were jolly well off because they had no appearances to keep up, were quarrelling with their bread and butter—the key, by the way, to most of our labour troubles might be found in an honest interpretation of that cant phrase 'no appearances to keep up!' At the commencement of this strike, then, the public, *qua* public, was unsympathetic, if not actually hostile. Fortunately, however, there were one or two individuals, members of the public, yet head and shoulders above it in this connexion simply because they had seen for themselves. Mrs Annie Besant, Mr Sydney Buxton and others knew, for example, that hundreds of literally starving men presented themselves daily at the dock gates and, after a more or less protracted wait, were permitted to take part in a scramble for perhaps thirty brass discs which were flung among the crowd. These observers knew further that the few who emerged from the awful

mêlée in possession of the coveted checks were engaged. This being engaged or 'taken on' meant that the fortunate men were permitted to work strenuously for threepence halfpenny or, more frequently, fourpence an hour; and, though the job might last for but one hour, crimps and other types of hanger on were present to claim a percentage of each man's earnings.

Later, as the result of a charge of theft (a loaf of bread figuring as the Police Court exhibit in the case, if memory serve), Cardinal Manning made public some details of starvation. Meanwhile the processions of 'drunken ruffians' which paraded the streets were frequently headed by Mr John Burns—a life-long abstainer. And Australia knew enough of the trouble to subscribe and forward the Strike Committee 37,000*l.* In consequence of the knowledge thus forced upon the public the dock workers' pay was increased variously, by ten per cent. in some cases and as much as forty per cent. in others, while no engagement was to be paid as a period of less than four hours. From this it followed that a man being taken on could not earn less than two shillings on that day. Thus it was the dockers who led the way in the attainment of a minimum wage.

After this some twenty-two years elapsed before the occurrence of another notable dock strike, that of 1911. The cost of living had risen more than fifteen per cent. in the interval, while wages had remained stationary. It was the dock workers who first brought about the establishment of the minimum wage; and, as a natural consequence, it was they who first realised that Capital in its dealings with Labour is apt to regard minimum as the synonym of maximum when wages are concerned. The twenty-two year old conditions were no longer good enough. This plain issue was, however, complicated in a most unfortunate manner; and there was complete misunderstanding on certain points. An idea got abroad and was largely adopted by the men, to the effect that the Masters of the Port of London were making conciliation an excuse for the complete breaking-up of the men's Trade Unions. As a result there was great delay in the resumption of work, the men refusing to go back until the demands of every section had been

satisfied. Ultimately, the hours of the lightermen having been reduced and a 'Penny and Penny' increment having been granted, work was resumed; but the feeling against free labourers was greatly acerbated. The so-called 'penny and penny' increment (*anglicè*, sixpence per hour to be in future sevenpence, and the previous sevenpenny rate to become eightpence) was practically equivalent to the fifteen per cent. rise in the cost of living since the last adjustment of wages.

The dock strike of 1912 is now generally regarded by the strikers themselves as having been a foolish performance. Ostensibly it began over the employment of one non-union man; and considerable effort was made to secure complete recognition of the Transport Workers' Federation. So far as the majority of the men were concerned, this strike constituted a breach of agreement; and for a time it appeared that the entire system of collective bargaining had broken down. An effort was made to call out the workers at all the ports about our coast; this, however, met with something very much less than half-hearted response. Yet it must not be supposed that there was no shadow of excuse for the men's action. The previous attitude of certain Port of London Masters, together with the employment of free labour in specific instances, had set up an honest belief among the men that once more a determined effort was being made to smash the unions. Hence, breaches of agreement, weeks of semi-starvation, and crowds marching to the work-houses. And the net result? The strikers returned to work unconditionally, having lost the right of choosing where the 'taking on' should be done, while the Lightermen's charter was gone, and there was a marked increase of bitterness against the free labourers.

In taking away the Lightermen's charter the Port of London Authority struck the final blow at a system of apprenticeship which was perhaps the finest London ever knew. The apprentice was, as a rule, bound to his father or some immediate relative—it is wonderful to note how certain family names have survived in the industry. Further, the Watermen's and Lightermen's Company not only forbade the apprentice to enter a public-house or music-hall, but (and this even in comparatively recent times) if he did so they fetched him out! This system

has been finally shattered that a working man's monopoly might be destroyed.

Is it unreasonable to contend that strikes are a natural consequence of educating the masses and at the same time a means of furthering that end? The old argument that a hand into which a book has been placed is spoiled for the plough appears to be a curious half-truth. Are we not hearing of University Graduates in business, of highly educated women farmers, bee-keepers and so on? May we not look forward to the day when the time of men and women shall be reasonably divided between mental and manual labour? Is it not terrible that one of our great dailies should feel called upon to apologise for 'the subjugation of London by the Tango,' saying that it and such vagaries 'form a slight relief to the monotony of amusements which is far more deadly to the mind and spirit than the monotony of work'?*

Can the wage-earners find no better means of attaining their ends than the strike?

Working men generally may be regarded as a class of trader coming into the market to sell their time, their strength and a certain amount of skill. They offer perishable commodities. By no possibility can the time, energy or manual dexterity unsold to-day realise a price to-morrow. They are not even as the apple-growers who, having found the makers of cyder obdurate, discover that their produce can be turned to profitable account as food for cows. What the labourer has to sell to-day must be sold to-day or lost for ever—to him and to the community. It is this unfortunate fact which renders sweating a possibility; could our working classes afford a few real pauses for breath in their adult lives we should see great changes. The working man comes into the market, then, to sell the most perishable of all commodities—labour. If the would-be purchaser fixes the price at a figure which experience has taught the would-be vendor to consider too low, then the labour, not of one man only, but of an entire section, is apt to be withheld—for, as a general rule, numbers rather than individuals are concerned in these bargains—and a strike

* The 'Daily Mail,' Nov. 11, 1913.

is declared. While the strike is in progress it is the working classes who are much the greater sufferers; they have deprived themselves of very many actual necessities and have so depleted their funds that on resuming work they may have to put up with a great deal before they dare embark upon another strike. The employers have lost no more than the profit they might have made on the men's labour (save in certain peculiar cases, as, for example, in mines, where damage is caused by flooding during periods of inactivity),* and the public has been inconvenienced. Fortunately the British striker seldom or never indulges in sabotage, our sensational Press notwithstanding. Here let but just one instance be noted with a view to substantiating inevitable statements concerning our daily Press. During the railway strike of some four years ago a paragraph went the round of the morning and evening papers accusing the strikers of having cut certain signal wires. To the average reader this would naturally appear a dastardly outrage; but every railway worker knows that should a signal wire break or be cut the arm would at once fly to danger, the shorter portion of the arm being weighted for that purpose. The statement concerning the cut wires seems to have been widely circulated, but this explanation appears to have been published nowhere. Clearly then the immediate consequence was apt to be more grave to the strikers than to anyone else concerned. Nor must it be forgotten that there is yet another and very terrible risk which all strikers run—that of permanent loss of employment through the bringing in of free or blackleg labour.

Has the striker any sort of justification for interference with the free labourer?

It is only for so long as we regard manual labour as a walk in life apart from all others, that this interference seems unique and without warrant. Recollecting that the labourer too is human, that his actions are dictated by motives which operate in higher circles, it

* In the Yorkshire coal strike of April last the men whose duty it was to keep the pits in condition remained at work with the full knowledge and consent of their mates.

may be found that he is blamed not so much for what he does as for the all too blatant manner of the doing. If similar motives are at work in other circles, how do they operate? to what extent can we find parallels? Recently a barrister speaking in public informed his audience that he did not go on strike, because he was a member of the finest Trade Union in the world. In other words, free labourers would not presume to interfere; should they make any such attempt, drastic action would no doubt be taken; yet the crude methods of dock labourers and others could be avoided among members of the Bar. Again, if shopkeepers complain to a manufacturer that one of their number is cutting the price of a certain article, it is usual for the manufacturer to refuse further supplies to the retailer complained of. Such methods are understood, society endorses them; but, insisting that the manual worker is of a race apart, that the worst is always good enough for him, no such help or moral support is given in his case. He must, therefore, take the law into his own hands or let himself be undersold. And the awful pathos of this underselling! Half a loaf may be better than no bread, but it does not follow that it will be sufficient. Drowning men clutch at straws, only to find the support inadequate. It is very terrible to work and to starve simultaneously.

The common assertion that union men endeavour to drive non-union workers out is very far from the truth. A cordial invitation is constantly being extended to the free labourers to join the societies or unions. It is only the man who cannot furnish simple proof of competency who is kept out. Further, after every big strike there is usually a considerable influx of new members. The engineers' eight-hour strike of some thirteen years back, which failed, was remarkable in this respect. If masters have a right to say to men, 'Work in the manner we appoint and for the pay we choose to give, or starve,' then there is not one single word which can with honesty be said in support of trade unions. If, on the other hand, masters have no such right, then the manual labourer is justified in refusing to work with any man whose action or want of action would have a tendency to enforce the aforesaid conditions upon him by appearing to confirm the master in such right. The term

'Free Labourer' is of course a misnomer, coined probably by the Capitalist Press. These men are free only to undersell their fellows for just so long as their fellows cannot prevent the underselling.

The law allows 'peaceful picketing'; and to the superficial observer this would seem a great concession. Men are allowed to surround their 'shop' and may endeavour to dissuade others from doing the work which they themselves have abandoned. But may a man dig up the seed potatoes which another has planted and devour them on the ground that the other is not eating them? Would not the planter be very apt to think he had a right to adopt some course more drastic than mere verbal remonstrance? Here the analogy may seem overstrained, yet the case for the striker has not been fully stated. His policy is anything but that of the dog in the manger. How many of the reading public understand that, when a strike is in progress and free labour appears on the scene, it is a quite usual custom for the Union to offer these men the same strike pay, as the Union men are receiving, on the simple condition that they leave the job alone? Thus we have the planters saying in effect to the free men:—'If you will but leave our seed in the ground we will share with you from out what we have put by, though we are ourselves on short commons and though too you have refused in the past to put by for yourselves. Help us to this extent for the sake of our future, your future and all our children's future.' When such an appeal fails is it wonderful if an occasional blow be struck?

Public inconvenience, employers' losses and strikers' privations all combine to exhibit the strike as at once a clumsy and a deadly weapon. Yet strikes have in many cases served a useful purpose. In 1889 the public had little or no sympathy for dock labourers. The labourers struck; the facts concerning their conditions of employ filtered through as the strike progressed; and public sympathy was with the strikers. Again, when one hears of a large body of strikers putting in the forefront a demand for a code of working rules,* one cannot doubt that the treatment meted out to these men must

* Painters and Decorators, Aug. 1913.

at times have been strange. Yet again,* when employers (on the introduction of the Insurance Act) levied a charge for material on their workers, so that in effect the workers should pay the entire cost of insurance stamps, can we wonder that no time is lost in discussion, that the strike, armed from head to heel with something more than 'peaceful' picketing, springs into being?

Yet the strike is undoubtedly a clumsy method of procedure. Of other means at present we seem only to recognise the interview between masters and men, the conference between employers and trade union officials, and the Conciliation Board, or Enquiry, presided over by some neutral arbitrator—who may or may not be a Government official—and *ad hoc* legislation. In years gone by one heard of the 'Round Robin,' an institution which probably met its death at the hands of the new-born 'Dignity of Labour,' though the reason for its existence survives. An interview between masters and men means in practice that one or two workmen speak on behalf of their fellows. Throughout that interview the men are heavily handicapped (if not actually obsessed) by the knowledge that they must pick and choose their words. The master labours under no such difficulty. And ever after the spokesmen are marked individuals. This of course is the reason for the men's desire that their case may be stated by Union officials.

Any comment upon recent happenings in this connexion would be a labouring of the obvious. Here then we have the position that an interview where the men must state their case is not satisfactory to them, while one at which Union officials make the representations is not favoured by the masters; and the Board of Enquiry presents its own peculiar difficulties. The type of man who can approach these questions with an open mind is not born many times in a generation; and when the case for labour is stated the judge is in effect a defendant, for he belongs to the employer class.† Nor must we forget that the plaint of labour is all too often

* Somerset Collar and Shirt Makers, July 1912.

† The Report of the Federation of Trade Unions, 1913, contains a suggestion to the effect that 'Judges who try cases in which the interests of capital and labour clash should be selected from a different class from the one which now provides them.'

put forward by yet another of the defendant class. But supposing all such difficulties to have been overcome, and that there is an adequate supply of suitable chairmen for our Boards, how are their decisions to be made binding upon both parties? This latter question seems to bring us at once to the method in general use to-day, *ad hoc* legislation. Nor are objections wanting here; such legislation is apt to be hurried, the 'hard cases' which lawyers tell us make bad law are apt to receive undue prominence, and a lack of special internal knowledge of detail sometimes leads to the making of strange errors.

What then is to be done? Are the occasionally working rich and the ever-toiling poor to remain so very far apart? The following suggestions, put forward in all humility and as a mere tentative outline of possibilities which would at least go far to satisfy working men may be of some service. This is an age of specialisation; why not a new type of specialist, an Average Adjuster in matters of labour? Such an expert would need to have received an education on quite definite lines with a view to the office he is to fill. This education would require to be of a peculiarly high order, but its catholicism must not depend on a knowledge of the classics. Firmness, tact and dignity would of course be essentials. Ability to sift evidence from the standpoint of common sense rather than a comprehensive legal training would also be indispensable.

But above all he must have an intimate knowledge of working-class conditions. To obtain this he must actually become a workman for a time—a period of certainly not less than three years. This will be the most difficult part of the training, for it must be thorough if it is to serve any useful purpose; he must live on his pay, not embarking on this period with a well-stocked wardrobe nor receiving allowance or presents from his friends; indeed his communication with them ought, if the thing is to be thorough, to be rigidly restricted. Moreover, he must understand at the outset that 'not feeling quite the thing' is to entail no stoppage of work—a fact he would soon learn for himself, but it should in common fairness be impressed upon him at first. Then,

and only then, it seems we shall get a sufficiently large class of men capable of presiding at labour enquiries, men who will know both sides of the question. Having held such an enquiry, it might be best for the 'Adjuster' to submit his conclusions to a small committee of his colleagues, and their pronouncement might become automatically an *ad hoc* statute. It may be objected that Sir G. Askwith is here already to do this sort of work. From the working man's point of view Sir George has done splendidly; but my middle-class friends tell me that it is easy to settle strikes by giving in to the striker. Are there many men who will act upon sympathy for the under dog in the teeth of their own friends' opposition, unless beside sympathy they have also exact first-hand knowledge upon which to base action which is not conventional? Sympathy plus experience gives a greater fund of moral courage than is usually derived from sympathy alone.

If this outline of a tentative scheme be considered worthy of discussion, the matter of labour training will probably receive criticism. The suggestion that men should be taken from refined homes and compelled to associate with working men, living and working as such men live and work, may seem absurd if only because the educated man would naturally feel his changed surroundings much less congenial to him than would be the case had he been born in such a condition of life, and may thus be led to take an exaggerated view of the hardships. This is true, but may it not be urged, as tending to counteract such depression, that our student will have definite hope, and will know that for him the period is but a period? It may also be argued that even at the end of his three years he would not be able to take his place in any skilled trade. Let him then either undergo a longer period of labour training or be content to work throughout the shorter course as a labourer. Probably this latter suggestion would be found best in practice, if only on account of the saving in time. The labourer is always cognisant of the way of life of his 'mate' the mechanic.

Industrial peace will never rule the earth; but a band of arbitrators knowing both sides of the question would go far to remove friction, while the mere fact that such

a body, however small, was making the sacrifice, undergoing the necessary training, would do much for labour.

Since the foregoing remarks were written, war, international war, has come upon us, bringing in its train an immediate cessation of industrial hostilities, to be followed after a period of some seven months by a most unfortunate recrudescence of labour troubles in those industries upon which our own and our Allies' existence as free peoples are most vitally dependent. If we try to explain the working man's attitude throughout these happenings as briefly as possible, the fact is that he never has believed, probably never will believe, that there is danger for England. Overwhelming proof of this statement can be adduced by anyone who has worked with him on terms of anything like intimacy. When a fleet of Zeppelins was believed to be approaching the Royal Woolwich Arsenal, the men could not be got to take the situation seriously. It was a stupendous joke.

Why, then, did the declaration of war produce immediate economic peace? Because the violation of Belgian neutrality aroused all that was best in our working classes. Naturally there follows the question: why did this state of things not continue? Here a complete answer cannot be given in few words. Strikes are seldom, if ever, attributable to one single cause. The final or precipitating event is generally to be regarded as no more than the makeweight which turns the scale. Further, though we may accept it as an axiom that there should be no strikes in war time, it hardly follows that, if strikes occur, the blame is entirely with the workers.

The most important and consequently the most regrettable strikes of which we have been hearing in the immediate past are to be attributed broadly to natural weariness and equally natural resentment of injustice. The strain of the war has fallen very heavily upon the workers. Overtime is by no means the unmixed blessing which certain persons would have the general public believe. A dock labourer, writing to the editor of one of our daily papers, says: 'It is possible for a man to work three days and three nights in one week.' To the additional hours of work the delays due to the crowded state of trains and trams about industrial centres should

be added when one is considering the fatigue of overtime. Frequently it seems as though many persons, whose hours are probably under their own control, elected to travel for amusement at just those times when working men consider they have a right to easy homeward transit; while it is certainly the fact that the London County Council Tramways Committee has not risen to the demands of the period, the early morning service being quite inadequate. Loss of one minute by the working man may mean the loss of hours in his pay.

With regard to the injustice. Here again we find the Daily Press, with but few exceptions, arrayed against the working man. That large section of the Press whose ubiquitous representatives can learn all about anything in less than half an hour and whose columns admit no contradiction, has been guilty of criminal folly again and again throughout the past six months. The headline provocative, most dangerous of implements since it stirs up the ignorant who read little beyond placards and head-lines, has been all too much in evidence, while sensational stories have been told of drunken dock labourers arrested with anything from twenty to sixty pounds in their trouser pockets, and quite interesting little fables have been related in cold print concerning the working man's preference for notes because a paper hoard can be moved without noise. The mischief done by these exaggerated statements and insinuations concerning working-class earnings is incalculable. Dealing with one aspect only, do such statements not furnish semblance of excuse for the artificial inflation of prices? Since contradiction or correction from those who know is seldom or never admitted, great bitterness is engendered. The dock labourer previously quoted, who succeeded in getting a letter published, wrote: 'I have been a dock labourer for thirty-five years and the last three weeks have been my best weeks for years, my wages averaging 2*l.* 5*s.* . . . so where does the four or five pounds per week come in?'

Before leaving our consideration of the Press attitude towards increased earnings there are yet two points to which attention should be directed. It has already been said that very few working men live on their normal weekly wage. From this it follows that overtime

pay is by no means all gross profit, for garden-plots are perforce neglected and boot repairing must be put out and paid for. Suppose his subsidiary industry be worth five shillings per week to the man—and this is a low estimate—he has to put in five shillingworth of overtime each week on this count alone that his budget may be normal. Next, if we consider that the increased cost of food and fuel be no more than fifteen per cent., and if, still keeping our estimate very low, of his normal wage sixty per cent. is absorbed by these two items, then nine per cent. must be added to that normal wage to make up for this increased cost of living. Now what is the position of the man whose normal rate is twenty-five shillings? He requires an additional five shillings plus nine per cent. on twenty-five shillings—in all an increase of seven shillings and threepence each week. How much overtime does this mean? If he is in Government employ and puts in three hours extra a day for each of four days, he earns eight shillings and fourpence as overtime pay—thus making one and a penny gross profit by overtime. And even the anti-labour Press admits that labourers on twenty-five shillings a week are able to make very little extra. Supposing he works but two and a half hours extra on four nights, his weekly earnings will be sixpence less than in times of peace. On the other hand, should he work all day on Sunday, he will earn nine shillings at one fell swoop, for he receives double pay for that day—a surplus of one shilling and ninepence for the loss of his day of rest.

It is the knowledge of these facts which enables one to say that the workers generally are feeling the strain of additional work and are labouring under a sense of increased injustice. Of the 10,000 strikers on the Clyde the great majority have had no increase of pay for seventeen years, the increment then having been one halfpenny per hour; and, in simple justice to them, some stress should be laid on the fact that their demand for the additional twopence was formulated and presented before there was any prospect of war. Their subsequent refusal to work overtime pending a settlement is hardly to be wondered at when one reflects that, whereas an employer would deem it disgraceful to delay his reply to a business enquiry addressed to him from without his

own works for longer than a week, such an enquiry coming from within his establishment may be indefinitely shelved. Yet a strike in war time and against the advice of Union officials clearly has its bad points.

Of the 8000 Liverpool carters who handed in strike notices recently not much need be said, for they have displayed both courage and patience by returning to work in so short a time. Of the London Shipowners who declined to meet Dockers' representatives nothing need be said.

Concerning the Committee appointed to report upon production in engineering and shipbuilding establishments, there has been much public talk anent the absence of Union officials from such a body; and it is not without interest to note that a very great deal is being said privately, and quite unofficially, with reference to the fact that there are no 'Men without handles to their names on the job.'

As regards the immediate present, the question of strikes may perhaps be summed up in this way. The workers have absolutely no idea of endangering the Empire or of exposing our troops to added risks. Their attention is concentrated on the notion that a state of war is being made the excuse for further exploiting them. Requests made before the war are still undealt with, while the cost of living has been much increased. Protest has been unavailing, hence the strikes—unfortunately in war time. The suggestion that our Government should adopt yet another German method and mobilise strikers overlooks the fact that a large majority of our strikers have already volunteered for active service and been told that they would be of more use to their country by remaining at work. A proposal which seems far more sound is that due to the Hon. William Pember Reeves, who suggests that we should adopt the Australian system of arbitration, at least for the period of the war. If this be done the prospects of successful working will certainly not be made more remote by the inclusion on the arbitration boards of men who understand both the work and the workmen.

A SKILLED LABOURER.

Art. 11.—INDIAN ART.

1. *Indian Sculpture and Painting.* By E. B. Havell. London : Murray, 1908.
2. *The Ideals of Indian Art.* By E. B. Havell. London : Murray, 1914.
3. *A History of Fine Art in India and Ceylon.* By Vincent A. Smith. Oxford : Clarendon Press, 1911.
4. *Selected Examples of Indian Art.* By A. K. Coomaraswamy. London : Quaritch, 1910.
5. *Indian Drawings.* Two Parts. By A. K. Coomaraswamy. London : India Society, 1910 and 1912.
6. *The Arts and Crafts of India and Ceylon.* By Ananda K. Coomaraswamy. London : Foulis, 1913.
7. *Eleven Plates of Indian Sculpture, chiefly in English Collections.* Edited by E. B. Havell. London : Probsthain, 1914.

WITH the opening of the 20th century the art of Europe finds itself in strange condition. It is full of self-questioning, full of perplexity. It feels the desire to go forward, but is not sure of its direction. The underlying causes of this condition are not difficult to trace. It has been for centuries an accepted theory that art consists of an imitation of nature. It is true that the great artists have always understood that their fundamental business was design; but the belief that the representative side of art is its essential function has influenced the practice of all artists; and the signal success of science has also, consciously or unconsciously, coloured the minds of all of us, so that the zest of discovery and exploration has been for art too a commanding inspiration. Like men of science, artists have put their life's effort into the wrestle with nature. A perpetual reference to nature, a close touch with the inexhaustible variety of natural form, colour, and movement, makes for health and vigour in art; but with the true artist the problems of representing these are subordinated to the fundamental problem of design. And design need not be concerned, though in ripe and great art it always is concerned, with nature. After long labour and struggle, aided by scientific study of anatomy, perspective, and

atmospheric effect, culminating, with the last impressionists, in an almost feverish effort to transfer to canvas the vibration and splendour of sunlight, there has been a sudden recoil. How can we go forward on these lines? There seems nothing left to be done. Various attempts are being made under sounding or mysterious names to organise a forward movement. But like those advertised medicines for a score of diseases at once which are found, when analysed, to contain nothing but some well-tried ordinary drug, these movements only disguise something very simple—a return to design. A sure instinct is driving us back from a conception of art as specialised not merely in painting but in a special kind of painting, to a conception which relates together everything designed by human workmanship. At the moment this instinct forces up, with the elements of self-questioning discontent and rebellion, a desire to get back to the beginning. A kind of disgust with the drawing-room atmosphere of complacency which has long reigned in art leads to a weariness of the authority of accepted classics. And so, turning away from Europe, eyes are turned to the art of other and strange lands.

When we turn from the art of Europe, it is of course with the art of Asia that we are first confronted. It is truly amazing, considering our relations with the East, that the art of Asia has for so long a time remained unknown in Europe. The products of the bazaars have been known; the so-called industrial arts of the East have been long appreciated. But the greater arts of the continent, those in which its ideals have been enshrined and expressed, have been till quite recent years wholly neglected. And it must seem a singular thing that, while India was the first of the great Oriental lands to come into close contact with Europe, its art is the last to have been recognised. Japan was an unknown country till after the middle of the last century; yet it was Japanese art which first received the serious recognition of European connoisseurs. Even in the case of Japan, the grandeur of its early sculpture and the beauty of its classic painting remained for years unsuspected. When this rich world opened out, it was seen at once how much it derived from the genius and inspiring example of China; and we realised that, while for so long we had been

collecting Chinese porcelains, we had totally ignored the art of which the porcelains were merely a reflection, the splendid painting and sculpture of the classic epochs. But China again is not to be understood without reference to India, and to the Buddhist religion by which Chinese art was so powerfully affected; and, if we are to study the art of China, we must also study the art of India.

The actual study of Asiatic art, however, has not been pursued on these general lines, since it has necessarily been undertaken chiefly by specialists, who have approached the study each from his own point of view; and, while the initiation of the public has followed the sequence just indicated, the discovery and the championship of the art of India have been due to scholars steeped in Indian lore and Indian atmosphere.

Before Mr Havell wrote, it was the fashion to deny that India had produced any 'fine' art at all. That fashion is now exploded. Mr Havell has done a real service by his championship of Indian sculpture, painting, and architecture. He has shown that India possesses a creative art animated by its own ideals, and he has interpreted those ideals with sympathy and eloquence. He has made the English public, so ignorant of the real India and its achievements, and so little enlightened by the returning Anglo-Indians, acquainted with an art of which it had no conjecture. The impetuosity of his attack on ignorance and prejudice, and the very excesses of his zeal, have probably been more effective than a more critical and judicious treatment of his subject. For it must be confessed that Mr Havell's enthusiasm often outruns his judgment. Former writers had been prone to attribute anything they found of merit in Indian art to some foreign influence; especially to that of Greece. Greek influences exist in Indian art; they are notably strong in the Buddhist sculpture of Gandhara, just as Persian influence is strong in the Mogul school of painting. But these 'influences' are always being exaggerated by archæologists and historians of art. Every great art absorbs elements from without, and the most original artists are generally those who have borrowed most. The sole question to be considered is what use has been made of the borrowed material. Has it been truly absorbed into the creative energies of the

artist or of the race, or does it remain foreign and external? If the borrowed element be not congenial, it will be wasted. But art works from within, with a fusing and perpetually transforming power. Every one sees that the important and essential thing in Shakespeare's plays is Shakespeare, and not the histories, legends or Italian novels which he took for his plots, although whole passages of his actual dialogue are to be found in the sources he drew from. But in pictorial art people are far too prone to represent similarly borrowed material as the dominant and even the essential factor. What is interesting in Indian art is that which is Indian in it. Gandhara took a method of representation, choice of type, forms of drapery, from a Hellenistic school of sculpture; but the Buddhist inspiration soon transformed these from within, so that in the resulting tradition of Buddhist art which passed across Asia to China the Greek element is a dwindling and almost insignificant factor. So too the Persian influence on Indian painting in the 16th and 17th centuries never penetrated deeply; the quite different spirit of the Indian artists made of it something new, not a mere imitation.

Mr Havell quite rightly defends Indian art from this perversity of criticism. But, not content with defending, he carries the war into the enemy's camp, and tends to find Indian influence everywhere, in Persia, in China, even in medieval Europe. And we are obliged to answer Mr Havell in turn, as he answers his opponents, and to say that what interests us in Persian art is the Persian genius, what interests us in Chinese art is the Chinese genius, what interests us in Gothic architecture is the Gothic genius. Whatever influences of whatever kind may have gone to the forming of these great schools, it is undeniable that each is a separate and unique creation of the human spirit; and it is what each in its ripeness has become, the inner life which has controlled its growth, which concerns and attracts us. Mr Havell may rejoin that we ignore an essential distinction. What India has borrowed has been methods, motives, forms, conventions, things belonging to the means of representation. What India has given out has been a kindling of the mind, an ideal, something belonging to the inner spirit. The actual influence of Indian ideals

outside India seems to us to be overestimated by Mr Havell; but, even were it as potent and wide-pervading as he would have us believe, we have still not got to the root of the matter. For in art a race expresses something more profound and secret than any formulated ideal, something deeper than words, something underlying even thought; it is for a race what attitude and gesture are to a man seized by emotion, a silent index of his innermost nature. An artist cannot disguise himself in his art; what he really *is* appears inevitably in it, however strenuously he may aspire to be something different. And so it is with a race. If we seek for that which is quintessential and incommunicable in a nation's art, we must seek it not so much in ideals which can be translated into language as in its distinctive design. By design we mean that ordering of the relations between the parts, by which a work of art acquires organic unity; it is something belonging to the mystery of life itself, and it is this which justifies our calling art creative. Forms, conventions, decorative motives, can be absorbed by this subtle fluid of vitality; but so also can ideals, thoughts, and emotions. The influence of Christianity on the art of Europe has been immense. It provided fuel for the creative fire in those races which imbibed the faith; it gave impetus and direction to the art thus called into being. But of itself it did not create art. So it was with Buddhism, and Indian thought generally, in the world of Asian art. Let us recognise, with Mr Havell, that Indian art is something sprung from the soil, something personal to the race; what it has absorbed from outside is of little significance. But let us also recognise that the same is true of the arts of the other great races of Asia, and of mankind.

If we emphasise this point, it is because we think Mr Havell's main defect is that he does not seem to realise the fundamental importance of design in art. He opposes Indian idealism to European naturalism, and exalts the spiritual character of Indian art as a supreme quality. But a work which has an ideal subject can be just as bad art as a still-life painting, and, because of the greater difficulty, is usually worse. And if European art has often been swamped by its materials, its best inspiration lies in the faith that nothing in the visible world is too

mean or common for the uses of the spirit. It is the miracle of art, of the designing faculty, that it can everywhere transform fact into idea and from the merest hint in nature can create something that appeals to the most profound elements in man. Indian art has never fallen into the slavish pursuits of naturalism, though on the other hand it has often been too contemptuous of nature; but its capital weakness lies in something that comes from neither of these tendencies, it comes from a comparative lack of energy in the designing instinct, by which an art grows and is renewed.

Though it would be a mistake not to recognise the weak side of the Indian genius, it is more important at the moment to rejoice in the many beautiful creations which have lately been disclosed to the European public; and let us be grateful to Mr Havell for a pioneer work which will never be forgotten. With Mr Havell must be associated Dr Ananda Coomaraswamy, who has done so much by publishing fine sets of reproductions to spread the knowledge of Indian art, and who has studied its history with critical thoroughness as well as with sympathetic insight. Of another school is Mr Vincent Smith, long known as a learned archæologist, who has been led to modify considerably his views on the æsthetic merits of Indian art—not uninfluenced by its recent champions—and whose 'History of Fine Art in India and Ceylon' is the fullest and completest historical account that has yet been published.

An Englishman who wishes to find some actual work from which to start on a study of Indian art cannot do better than visit the Indian Section of the Victoria and Albert Museum. There, among a mass of miscellaneous objects and poor modern work, he will find a certain torso of dark red sandstone. We often find that a single work (whether of art or literature) belonging to a school which we have regarded with indifference, or even aversion, converts us to a new view of that school. It delights us and surprises us; and then we begin to wonder if there are not other works of the same school which may delight us also. A fresh angle of vision is gained, and with it the eye of sympathy. The torso in question is of singular beauty. Its beauty is different from the beauty of a Greek marble; though merely a

torso, it has a kind of aroma of spiritual rather than bodily charm. It reminds us at once of Greek and of medieval sculpture; but such reminders only serve to emphasise its uniqueness. It is akin to the art of Ajanta in its inspiration; vigorous but gentle, it seems to express the grace and poise of a spirit neither withdrawn from the delights of the world and disgusted with the mortality of man, nor on the other hand immersed in the life of the senses. The restricted but rich ornament shows the germ of Indian tendency in decoration, afterwards to become extravagant and heavy.

There is very little of Indian sculpture in the same collection to attract or compel admiration from the lover of art. One cannot but deplore that in this country, the one above all others which ought to have intelligently studied and collected what is best in Indian art, so little has been done. Even with the meagre and ill-assorted material available at South Kensington, a generous treatment by high administrative authority might enable those directly in charge of the collections, who are at present cramped and disabled by want of accommodation, to dispose them to far greater advantage and focus attention on the finest things. The torso which we have described, for instance, deserves a place to itself, with good lighting and space about it. If it were placed in a gallery with nothing else but Lady Herringham's copies from the Ajanta Frescoes on the walls, how immensely different would be the effect on the visitor! He would then have some definite conception of the early art of India, and would have some means of realising what this art stands for in the art of the world. Lady Herringham's beautiful copies, lent by the India Society, are on the walls of one of the upper galleries; but the view of them is so interrupted by the floor-cases that it is impossible to contemplate them at one's ease. Yet for one who wishes to gain an acquaintance with Indian art these copies are of paramount importance. The frescoes show the Indian genius at its finest; but very few travellers undertake the difficult pilgrimage to that remote glen in the mountains of Haiderabad where in a great curve of cliff above a stream are hollowed out the Caves of Ajanta. 'Caves' is a convenient but misleading word, for the frescoes are painted on what are really great halls

hewn out of the rock in imitation of actual structures, with architectural and sculptured ornament. A remarkable series of photographs has been made by M. Victor Goloubew, and is to be published by him in the admirable 'Ars Asiatica.' Meanwhile the forthcoming annotated publication by the India Society of Lady Herringham's copies will be a most valuable acquisition for the student. But the copies themselves bring us nearer to the originals, for scale is important.

Two former sets of copies have been made from the frescoes, the first by Major Gill, the second by Mr Griffiths; but both of these were more or less destroyed in two separate fires, though a damaged remnant of the second set may still be seen in the Indian section. Hitherto the paintings have been best known through the coloured lithographs and the collotypes in Mr Griffiths' two folio volumes published in 1896. It is curious to note the difference of selection in that publication and in Lady Herringham's series. The two sets make a quite different impression; and it must be said that the paintings chosen by Lady Herringham are at once much more attractive and give a far finer notion of the art of Ajanta. And it must be remembered that these frescoes represent not one single school or period, but a succession of schools working from the first or second centuries A.D. to the seventh, the latest being the best.

These paintings are all Buddhist in subject. We are apt to associate Buddhist art with a hieratic character, with the mystical figures of the Bodhisattvas, apparitions from the supernatural world; with an art that has no concern with the actual and the visible. But the most characteristic of the Ajanta frescoes have for subject the stories told of the lives of the Buddha in his previous incarnations on earth. And so we find portrayed before our eyes the actual life of India of that time. Here in a palace-interior, where pillars of deep red are crowned by capitals of pale blue marble, a prince is seated, receiving offerings from young girls. How full of natural grace and courtesy are their attitudes and movements! We have no need to make excuses for a primitive stage of art. All is largely designed, with an easy mastery over the means of representation. Others again are outdoor scenes. Here is the story which afterwards wandered to

Europe and became the well-known legend of St Hubert, the huntsman who chased a stag which turned to show him a crucifix planted between its antlers. In the Indian story it is a certain king, fanatically enamoured of the chase, who pursues a deer headlong, leaving his courtiers behind him, till he falls into a pit full of water which he had not noticed in his haste. The deer takes pity on him and pulls him out, and so transforms his nature. The freshness and animation of this scene, with its thickets of green so admirably suggested, and the many moving figures, remind one of Pisanello. But the all-embracing tenderness of Buddhism, its recognition of the dignity and patience and beauty of the life outside humanity, gives to these scenes an atmosphere very different from that of any mere hunting-scene. The deer itself is the being who was afterwards to be born as the Buddha.

Another story is of the great white elephant, also an incarnation of the Buddha. Owing to a spite conceived in a former existence, a young queen determined to rob this king of elephants of his tusks, and sent a hunter to procure them. The hunter after surmounting incredible obstacles found his victim, but was unable to saw off the tusks himself. The elephant then took the saw in his trunk and cut them off himself, knowing why and for whom the thing was done. The prize was brought home to the queen; but she, at last perceiving her own littleness of soul and the Buddha's magnanimity, turned away from the sacrifice and allowed herself to die. The group of the dying queen surrounded by her attendants is one of the most beautifully conceived in this whole series of frescoes, or indeed in the whole of Indian art. And the drawing of the elephants in the scenes of this story is masterly.

The characteristic spirit of compassion flowing out for all living creatures, which gives a singular gentleness to all these scenes, a gentleness felt even in the drawing of the figures—this spirit finds its culmination in a super-human figure which is the supreme expression of the art of Ajanta. No one certainly knows whom this figure is intended to represent; whether Gautama renouncing the world, or (more likely perhaps) the great Bodhisattva, the genius of compassion, Avalokitesvara, who is said to refuse salvation till the salvation of the whole world be

accomplished. Of superhuman size, among a confused multitude of smaller shapes, and with a background of rocky ledge and tree, this great form stands out detached as a spirit looking down in pity on the world. If little known as yet, this figure will assuredly become famous among the great creations of art.

In these Ajanta frescoes we find an abounding and inexhaustible delight in life; in the beauty of form and movement in men and women and animals, in the freshness of leaves, in the earth and the sunshine. And yet in the midst of this joyous exuberance, the natural vigour and hope of youth, there is the capacity for profound sorrow and an exalted compassion. The secret of this art is a deep recognition of the spiritual element in man, conceived not as an essence apart, to be cloistered and protected from the material world, but as something pervading and refining all the actions and events in which men and women take part, and colouring with its own tinge even the unconscious life of nature.

These frescoes have the same kind of significance and promise for the art of Asia that the early Italian frescoes have for the art of Europe. If inferior in some aspects, especially in design, they are superior in one aspect; they are not so exclusively occupied with human figures, they admit refreshingly the world of animals and vegetation. Animals and birds are painted with more mastery because with more sympathy and insight. From a morning of such magnificent promise what might we not expect? But, alas! the story of Indian painting, so nobly begun, drops into centuries of total darkness. No doubt the practice of painting continued—it reappears again in the 16th and 17th centuries—no doubt there has been immense destruction; but for close on a thousand years, so far as anything is known at present, we have an astounding gap and silence.

We will return to the later phases of Indian painting. Meanwhile let us consider for a moment the sculpture, which is of immense variety and extent. The torso at South Kensington was found at Sanchi, the site of a famous *stupa*, and is said to have crowned one of the pillars erected by Asoka in the 3rd century B.C. Mr Vincent Smith is of opinion that it is correctly ascribed

to the age of that Emperor; but Mr Havell is strong against so early a date, and would put it down to the 4th or 5th century A.D. However this may be, we do not often find in Indian sculpture forms of such purity and distinction.

The early Buddhist sculptures and reliefs of Sanchi and Bharhut, which are later by a century than the time of the Emperor Asoka, show already in a pronounced degree the Indian characteristics; the teeming multiplicity, as of luxuriant vegetation, the fullness and softness of the forms, the animation in detail, and the absence of relieving spaces. There is inventive floral ornament, and the animals are admirably treated. The technique is really that of the woodcarver, surviving into a time when wood had been supplanted by stone; but even to this day the practice of making statues in perishable materials—wood, clay, or mud—continues.

The same style, with its ornateness and love of filling every available space, is developed further in the sculptures of Amaravati in the south, which date from the 2nd or 3rd century A.D. This monument, like others in India, has suffered greatly from the demolitions of local builders in want of stone. The remnants which have been saved are preserved in the Madras Museum and in the British Museum, where they are seen by every visitor who mounts the main staircase. According to Dr Coomaraswamy, these stone reliefs were originally covered with painted plaster. In any case, we cannot well judge of the effect intended without the architectural setting and the congenial glow of Indian sun. In their own type of richly crowded design these reliefs show extraordinary invention. Fergusson thought them the crowning achievement of Indian sculpture; but few would now agree with this judgment. Much has been discovered since Fergusson wrote; and it is noteworthy that, while he remarked on the 'almost total absence of sculpture in Ceylon,' the efforts of the Archæological Survey have quite disproved this statement, and some of the finest classic sculpture is to be found in the island. Among these is one of the grandest of the great seated statues of Buddha, and the magnificent figure of Kapila, carved in the rock. The Kapila especially has a latent energy and a contained simplicity

of contour which give it a place apart. It is thought to be contemporary with the latest and finest of the Ajanta frescoes, about the 7th century A.D. Of a like monumental quality, though very different in style, are the colossal statues at Konarak in Orissa, of horses and warriors, and of elephants. In these, however, which belong to the 13th century, a certain barbaric exuberance and tendency to break the outline are to be noticed; the design and the sense of style are comparatively on an inferior plane, though their grandiose force gives them a place among the memorable sculptures of the world.

A properly equipped and adequately housed museum of Indian art would find room for casts of the most representative of such statues, and would give the student an opportunity of realising the achievements of Indian sculpture, in comparison with the sculpture of Egypt, Assyria, Greece, and the medieval art of Europe. Such a museum would also have casts of a selection of the reliefs at Borobodur in Java, where Indian Buddhist artists have lavished a wealth of skill in endless narrative sculptures of the Buddha legends, complementing the so different Buddhist sculpture of China and Japan. At present England offers little for study besides the fragments from Amaravati, except the collections of Gandhara sculpture, chiefly in the British Museum. And the Gandhara sculptures are not purely Indian. They represent the efforts of a provincial Hellenistic school in Bactria to express the ideals and portray the legends of Buddhism, and inevitably reflect the character of a hybrid art. They have been rather absurdly overpraised by writers of an archaeological bent, prone to see wonders in anything connected with Greece. They are now vilified as extravagantly, in revenge, by Mr Havell and Dr Coomaraswamy. The latter dismisses them as 'purely commercial art, of the same order with, but scarcely equal to, those of modern Catholic plaster saints.' This is certainly to say too much; for many of the reliefs and statues are of considerable charm, and we see no reason why they should all be dubbed 'purely commercial.' The makers of these images may have been full of genuine fervour, though hampered by an inherited convention which was not very appropriate to their themes.

From the broad human point of view, the art of Gandhara, the meeting-place of Greece and India, is of singular interest. At the same time we must beware of regarding the sculpture as of any real importance in the history of Indian art.

Purely Indian sculpture provides a vast mass of material which has yet to be systematically and critically studied in detail. Mr Havell has written much about the spirit inspiring the artists; but for a connected historical survey the student must turn to Mr Vincent Smith's well illustrated volume, or to the lucidly condensed account given in Dr Coomaraswamy's 'Arts and Crafts of India and Ceylon.' Undoubtedly from all this mass of work a very impressive selection could be made. But, taken in the mass, Indian sculpture is apt to leave a sense of dissatisfaction, fatigue, and sometimes repulsion. We are struck by the beauty of individual figures, by a charm of attitude, gesture, mood; but the relation between the figures is rarely felicitous. Again and again the relation seems accidental; the main forms follow haphazard lines in a variety of directions, creating a feeling of unease and incoherence. The interesting sculptures from Deogarh temple, Plates 34 and 35 in Mr Vincent Smith's 'History,' serve as an example. There is immense skill, there is inexhaustible invention; it is the instinct for organic design which is wanting.

Mr Havell and Dr Coomaraswamy insist greatly on the surpassing spiritual qualities of Indian sculpture. But, though we can admit the pervading concern with the things of the spirit and the desire to express them, the impression on the mind of the spectator is the essential test. We may discover the ideas inspiring the artists and then read these into their works, but it is the mood created by the sculptured images which should transport our spirits into the ideal world; and confused, distracted design will not so transport us, it leaves us rather in agitation. The general impression left by the mass of Indian sculpture is of a tremendous, almost tormented desire to create something transcending human possibilities and inevitably failing in the attempt. The marvels that design can do by contrasts, by spacing, by great reserves, by isolation—these are left unstudied by an art which seems to find no effort

worthy but that which exhausts itself in pouring out all in a flood at once. The Indian mind seems unable to avoid this tendency; it seeks to impress by fabulous dimensions and impossible feats; it has not learnt the power of understatement. It multiplies the limbs of divinities, to ensure that they shall not seem as feeble men; but the images of these divinities, however beautifully treated, create a sense rather of impaired than of superhuman power. The Indian artists are not content that the beauty of men and women should be merely human beauty; it is part of their traditional canon that the shoulders should have the form of an elephant's head, the waist should be like a lion's, the thigh like the trunk of a plantain tree, the eyes like a fish in shape, and so on for all the parts and features of the body. An artist will be quick to note the similarities of form in all the world of life; but, after all, the ideal of any form of living thing is something that belongs to its own nature, and the beauty of man is intimately his own.

These tendencies manifest the ingrained idealism, the preference for type over individual variety, which is characteristic of Indian art. Along with this we find at times a curious naturalism. This is notable especially in the sculpture of animals, above all of the elephant. There is a relief of swarming human figures at Mamallapuram, with two colossal elephants beneath, which, in a photograph, give almost the illusion of actual living animals moving across the base of the relief. The magnificent bull at the same place is of a nobler naturalism. In some of the great contemplative Buddha statues, again, we find the flaccid tissue of disused limbs portrayed with a literalism which obtrudes itself incongruously where a deeper sense of style would have compelled us to forget the disablements of the flesh, and created a convention adequate to the conception of a spirit absorbed in thought and still as a windless flame.

Indian sculpture, like Indian art in general, is anonymous. If there were great masters, we do not know their names. We have not, as we have in Greece, and in Europe since the Renaissance, the landmarks provided by the grouped works of a single genius, radiating the energy

of a personal force. Rather we have an art comparable to the medieval sculpture of Europe. It is an art of the people, with an immense power of tradition supporting it; the art of a race rather than of individuals. It knows no sterilising divorce between art and craft; and even to-day, in architecture, this power of tradition is a living force in India; it can still create. To us, who have utterly lost this continuity in art, there is something both interesting and attractive in such conditions. Unfortunately, as Dr Coomaraswamy says, 'there is one fatal weakness of the later phases of a traditional art; it has no power to resist the corruption from without. It is beautiful by habit rather than intention.' And a traditional art has other sources of weakness too, which Indian sculpture seems to betray even in early times. The craftsman tends to usurp the function of the designer. We seem to miss the influence of controlling master-minds, jealous of the unity of their creations.

Till lately it was a generally accepted notion that the Indian painting of modern times, from the 16th century onwards, was a mere continuation of the Persian style introduced with the Mogul conquerors. The miniature painters of Persia, whose masterpieces are all in the manuscripts they illustrated, created an art which is unique in the world. Their themes were steeped in the spirit of romance. It was an art of sensuous beauty, informed by the genius for decoration and the love of colour which belong to the Persian race. A passionate delight in the beauty of things, the delicacy of single flowers, the grace of animals, the glory of the sunlight, the charm of youth, the fine texture of woven stuffs and their gorgeous dyes, the luxury of gardens with their tanks of cool water and their whispering trees—all this inspires pages of a dream-like intoxication. Nowhere, moreover, have artists revelled more in the possibilities of the materials they employed—the ivory-like paper, the choice, pure richness of the pigments, the sensitive outlines of the brush. The sumptuous pages of Bihzad and Mirak, so immensely prized now by European collectors, were the classics of art for the painters of the Court of Akbar and his successors. But the golden period of the late 15th and early 16th centuries

had passed away; and by the opening of the 17th century a rapid decay seems to have set in.

In India the Mogul conquerors found a native art flourishing. Abul Fazl, the minister and biographer of the great Akbar, has a passage of great interest on the painters of his day, which has been often quoted. The Emperor, he tells us, had from his youth taken great interest in art, and was wont to reprove bigoted followers of the letter of the Mohammedan law. 'It appears to me,' he is quoted as saying, 'as if a painter had quite peculiar means of recognising God, for a painter in sketching anything that has life, and in devising the limbs one after another, must come to feel that he cannot bestow personality upon his work, and is thus forced to thank God, the giver of life, and will thus increase his knowledge.' Abul Fazl goes on to describe the encouragement given to artists by Akbar and the flourishing state of art which this encouragement produced; and he asserts that the painters of his time produced masterpieces 'worthy of a Bihzad,' which 'may be placed at the side of the wonderful works of the European painters who have attained world-wide fame.' Then comes a sentence about the Hindu painters which has been seized on as a significant admission. 'Their pictures,' he says, 'surpass our conception of things. Few indeed in the whole world are found equal to them.'

Now it is notoriously unsafe to build on literary references to art, unless we can control these by actual examples. Abul Fazl's account points to the existence of an eclectic school, hampered probably by court patronage as much as it was encouraged by it. The evidence of surviving work does not at all countenance a rivalry with the masterpieces of Bihzad and his contemporaries, so far as the Persians are concerned.

But what of the Hindus? 'Their pictures surpass our conception of things.' In that phrase Abul Fazl expressed more than perhaps he understood himself. It was not in technical qualities, as such, that the Hindus surpassed the Persians. But Persian art, with all its enchantment for the eye, lacked a soul. It was not nourished by ideas; and it is by the pressure of ideas, of spiritual emotion and imaginative thought, on the instinct for design in form and colour, that art grows and keeps

alive. Lacking this pressure, this craving for expression and expansion, Persian art, having reached a climax of superb decoration, suddenly fails and ebbs away into lifeless repetition. The Indians, whatever their defects, belonged to a world of which the very life-current was religious and philosophic thought and emotion. And one cannot but think that it was this superior depth and intensity of mind which impressed the minister of Akbar, this superior 'conception of things.' Certainly the work of the Indian painters of the Mogul Court, while far inferior in richness of pattern and splendour of colour to the classic painting of Persia, shows always the trace of an underlying spirituality. It is by no means an enfeebled and imitative continuation of the Persian style. At the same time we must not fall into the error of considering the Mogul school as typically Indian. The painters of the Court of Delhi were greatly influenced by Persian models; and they worked to please an emperor who had ideas of his own and to whose wishes they conformed. The remarks quoted by Abul Fazl indicate Akbar's attitude to art. A scrupulous fidelity in drawing God's creatures was the quality most to be prized. And portraiture, in a wide sense, is the main field and the main excellence of the Mogul school. Hardly any period of the world's history is richer in portraiture of individuals than the period of Akbar and his successors on the throne of Delhi. These portraits were endlessly copied, and it is important for the true appreciation of the school that they should be seen in fine and original examples. The British Museum Library possesses (among others) a precious album, once seen by Sir Joshua Reynolds, whose special admiration of certain examples has been recorded; and we may recall the similar admiration of a still greater master, Rembrandt, attested not by words but by the actual copies from Mogul drawings which he made in some numbers. Another fine album made for the ill-fated prince Dara Shikoh has recently been acquired by the Library of the India Office.

But, though of fascinating interest from the human and historical point of view, these Mogul paintings represent, after all, a hybrid art. Exquisite in delicate truth of feature and detail, they are small in style and lacking in vitality of design. The painters confine

themselves to a narrow range of repeated poses'; and the relation of the figure to the framing space is little considered. Their studies from nature, animals, flowers, and birds, admirable as they often are, are inferior to Persian work of the best period. We feel that the true Indian spirit is not deeply engaged, or employed with real congeniality. The difference is at once felt when, deserting courtly subjects, the painters take a theme from native life. Mr Havell reproduces in 'Indian Sculpture and Painting' (pl. lxiii) a 'Scene in a Courtyard,' from the Calcutta Gallery, where bricklayers are busy at work, and an old man prostrates himself before another, begging for mercy or for pardon. Here the Indian feeling finds beautiful expression even in a scene of daily life; still more is it apparent in the drawings where groups of holy men are seen in meditation, or scholars listen to a mullah's reading, while the placid work of the Indian fields goes on about them. We have only to place one of these paintings beside a classic Persian page, steeped in the joy of the senses, to realise at once the immense difference of spirit and atmosphere.

But the difference is still more apparent and arresting when we contrast the Persian work, not with the drawings of the Mogul school, but with the pure pictorial art of India. For, apart from the Mogul school, there exists a whole body of Indian painting which is entirely independent of Persian influence. This is an incontestable fact, though till recently it was not suspected, and is even now little realised. Even Mr Havell, when he wrote in 1908, did not clearly bring out the distinction. Depreciating the classic Persian art, as that of a degenerate school, governed by 'conventionalism' and 'mechanical formality,' he is unable to find any merit in it till 'the true spirit of Indian art began to assert itself in the Muhammadan world.' 'The art of the Moguls . . . quickly grafted itself on to the older Buddhist and Hindu schools, and thus became truly Indian.' Such a view, with its attempt to represent Persian art as insignificant and merely preparatory to Mogul art, leads to confusion. Only when we appreciate the native excellence and unique quality of genuinely Persian painting, do we appreciate the contrasted excellence of the genuinely Indian style which existed side by side with

the hybrid Mogul school and was practically unaffected by its influence.

For a fuller acquaintance with the native art we must turn to the publications of Dr Coomaraswamy. This author's account of 'Rajput' painting is now pretty generally accepted, as the production 'of Hindu painters, from the 15th to the 19th centuries, in Rajputana and the Panjab Himalayas.' There is still no quite satisfactory explanation of the complete gap between the Ajanta frescoes of the 7th century and Rajput paintings on paper of the 15th. We can only surmise that the medieval wall-paintings have all been destroyed, and that the Indians were slow to adopt the practice of painting on paper. It is important, however, to note that the Rajput paintings are not, like the Persian, illustrations to MSS, and have not the character of miniatures. Technically, they derive from the ancient methods of Asiatic fresco, and in their inspiration they hark back to the traditions of Ajanta. Their subject-matter is profoundly Indian, not the life of courts and palaces, but the life of the people with its old, popular tales and romances, and its pervading delight in the legend of Krishna, the divine cowherd.

Take, for example, the painting which Dr Coomaraswamy reproduced in colours in the 'Burlington Magazine' for March 1912. Its theme is Krishna's Quelling of the Serpent. The serpent, a semi-human Naga king, dwelt in a whirlpool of the Jumna. Krishna leapt in to fight with him, while his companions on the bank cried and wailed in fear. Krishna overpowers the serpent, and the serpent's wives, mermaid figures with human bodies and fishy tails, come round him in the water, supplicating for the life of their lord. This is the moment represented. Although to eyes trained on European art the similarity of general conventions in Oriental painting may at first deceive, even a brief study of such an example as this will convince any one that it is in essentials a whole world apart from any Persian painting; it is quite different in character from even any Mogul work. It is extremely animated; it lacks the repose of the finest Persian design; and, though the colour has passages of great beauty, it has not the Persian gem-like harmonies of richness. But the main thing to note is the entire

absorption of the artist in his theme, and in making each figure expressive of the emotions within. We are reminded at once of the Ajanta frescoes; for here, on a small scale and with more delicacy of outline, we find the same genius for seizing the expressive movements and gestures of the body, the same thoroughly Indian types and attitudes, the same suppleness, gentleness and animation. Of especial charm are the sinuous supplicating forms of the Serpent-king's wives, floating and bending forward with outstretched hands in absolute abandonment to their emotion. Here is a beauty not of the senses, but of the spirit; or rather of the spirit through the senses.

The productions of the Rajput schools are as yet little known in Europe, and are still often confused with Mogul paintings. Dr Coomaraswamy has proposed a classification of them according to their *provenance*; placing in one group the paintings from Rajputana, the chief centre of which was the city of Jaipur, and in another group, which he would call the Pahari or Hill-Country school, those produced in the Himalayan valleys of the Panjab. While the colouring of these paintings is often of great charm, sometimes schemed in pale and tender tones, and sometimes of a vigorous depth and lustre, we find numbers that have been left in outline only. In these outline drawings the peculiar quality of the art is even more delightfully disengaged.

Dr Coomaraswamy has reproduced a series of these Pahari drawings, which make us hope that more will be brought to light. They are characterised by a fluent and continuous rhythm of line, such as we never find in drawings of the Mogul school. The sweetness of the gestures of the supple forms lends itself to this love of sinuous containing lines, and prevents it from becoming too obvious a mannerism. If the new Calcutta school, which now seeks to turn its back on the imported academics of Europe, and to revive native traditions, can learn to recapture the secret of this happy and spontaneous art, then indeed it will have done a great thing.

LAURENCE BINYON.

Art. 12.—THE SULTANATE OF EGYPT.

ON July 4, 1261, Beybars, Sultan of Egypt, rode forth from Cairo in great state, attended by all the Court, to a marquee which had been set up in a spacious garden without the walls. Here had been brought the insignia by which the Caliph signified his confirmation of the royal title. Arrayed in these—a turban of black and gold, a long purple tunic, and a collar and chain of gold—the Sultan displayed himself to the people. The investiture was complete. There remained only the reading of the diploma. Ibn Lokman, the chancellor or chief archivist, ascended a lectern and recited the formal document which he had composed to the admiration of all future exponents of oriental diplomatic.

After praise to God and the Prophet, the orator came quickly to the point—an unstinted panegyric of the virtues and exploits of the new Sultan, among which he signalised the restoration of the Abbasid Caliphate, lately overthrown by the Mongols. His concluding paragraphs, shorn of much rhetorical ornament, may be paraphrased as follows :

O Prince, the Commander of the Faithful testifies his gratitude by making you Sovran of Egypt, Syria, the Hijaz, the Yemen, and the banks of the Euphrates, and all lands, plains or mountains, which you may henceforth subdue, not excepting a single town or fortress or anything great or small. Watch therefore over the welfare of the people. Shun ambition and the lure of worldly goods, which are but fleeting shadows. Do justice and mercy, for happy is the man who ensues justice; his days will be brighter than festivals and shine like the star on a charger's brow, more sparkling than jewels on the neck of beauty. Keep a watch over your men in authority, for whose acts you will be accountable at the last day. Choose good officers, who will dispense the law with mildness and moderation, and will use impartiality and treat all men as brothers; for to a Muslim, be he ever so much a Sultan, all other Muslims are brethren. Reform the late abuses and exactions. Wealth unjustly gained is but a load on the prince's back, for which he must one day account; and a treasury thus filled, even to bursting, is really destitute. Let his Highness elevate himself by lightening the burdens of his subjects. Let him fight in God's

way, and above all let him guard the frontiers of Egypt. God has granted you all the success you could desire, and endowed you with the gift of foresight. By you he has restored vanished hopes and dispersed gloom from all hearts. He has led you in the path of justice, and has set your duty before you. He will not cease to bless you with his protection and fill you with gratitude for his grace: for gratitude is the corollary of grace.

After hearing this pronouncement, signally memorable at the present moment, the Sultan mounted a white horse, caparisoned in Abbasid black, and with standards waving over his head and the diploma of investiture borne before him by the Master of the Household, rode under the old Bab en-Nasr into Cairo. The city was *en fête*, the streets festooned, the Sultan's path strewn with costly carpets. Amid the acclamations of the crowd Beybars traversed the city to the Bab Zuweyla, and so regained his palace in the Citadel.

Thus was a Sultan of Egypt invested with his dignity six and a half centuries ago, two generations before Orkhan, the son of Black Othman, planted the Ottoman flag on Brusa in 1326, and assumed the same title. Beybars, however, was not the first Sultan of Egypt. Originally the title, which is merely the Arabic for 'might,' and hence 'authority' (and, it may be added, is feminine as well as masculine—there is no such word as 'Sultana' in the East), did not imply any of the majesty which accrued to it in later times, but, as Burton said, could be applied indifferently to a village sheykh or the ruler of an empire. Some early historians give the Caliphs of Baghdad the title of Sultan; and it has been argued that it was applied also to the Captain of the Caliphs' Turkish bodyguard so early as the 9th century. It was a favourite style with the Turks, in preference to the respectable old title of Melik, and was not adopted by the numerous Persian dynasts who sprang up on the weakening of the Caliphs' temporal power. The Turk Mahmud of Ghazna, the first of Muhammadan rulers who invaded Hindustan, is generally credited with being also the first to style himself Sultan; but he did not use the title on the most authoritative of all official documents, his coins. His later successors, however, did

so use it, probably in emulation of the Turkman Seljuks, who made the name of Sultan respected from the borders of Afghanistan to the Mediterranean coast, and familiar to Roman writers. By the influence of the imperial Seljuks in the 11th and 12th centuries the title attained its full significance, and rose to the level of Cæsar.

Saladin, one of the few oriental rulers whose name, Salah-ed-din, has been familiarised in a European spelling, was undoubtedly the first to be styled Sultan in Egypt. Though not a Turk himself, he had been brought up under the Seljuk system and adopted their military and civil organisation. That he should also adopt their title, after he had acquired independent sovereignty in Egypt and Syria, was natural. His contemporary biographers, who were in his personal service, refer to him throughout as 'the Sultan'; and as such he was well known all over Europe. In the 'Romance of Richard Cœur de Lion' he is called 'the cheff Sawdon of Hethenysse'; and we are told 'How Kyng Richard, the noble man, encounteryd with the Sawdan.' It is clear that he was *the* Sultan of the third Crusade. The curious thing is that he did not himself use the title on his coinage. The three points to which a Muhammadan ruler attached the greatest importance in the Middle Ages were, first, the formal diploma of investiture sent by the Caliph of Baghdad by a special ambassador; secondly, the insertion of his own name and style, after the Caliph's, in the *khutba* or bidding prayer which formed an impressive feature in the Friday office in the mosques of his dominion; and thirdly, the right of *sikka*, or issuing a coinage impressed with his name and title. The Abbasid Caliph certainly sent Saladin the insignia of investiture, whether as Sultan or Melik; but the testimony of the coins, that he styled himself Melik and not Sultan, is conclusive.* Probably his unassuming character made him indifferent to mere titles. His sons and collaterals who succeeded him in Egypt followed his example. All

* The only exception is a copper coin struck at Damascus in 1191 (A.H. 587), when Saladin was absent from Damascus, busily engaged in repelling Richard I in Palestine; and it names him Sultan el-Muslimin, 'Sultan of the Muslims,' not as his chief title (which is still el-Melik en-Nasir on this coin) but as an appendage to the others, obviously with a topical reference to the Jihad or Holy War, then in an acute stage.

eight of them were styled simply Melik on their coins; but they not only were known as Sultans but called themselves so in the inscriptions which they put on their buildings. Thus we have on the one hand the restriction to the old title of Melik on the most formal of all documents, and on the other the general use of Sultan by contemporary writers and on public monuments.

It was not, in fact, till the Ayyubids were succeeded in 1250 by the Mamluks and till Beybars by a masterly stroke of policy restored at Cairo the Abbasid Caliphate overturned by Hulagu at Baghdad, that the title of Sultan appears on the coinage. The representatives of the Abbassids thus elevated may not have enjoyed an indefeasible title, and undoubtedly were held in no great esteem even in Cairo. They were kept almost as prisoners in the Citadel and only produced when a new Sultan required his often ill-gotten and always precarious title to be legitimised by a diploma. One 'Commander of the Faithful' was even publicly flouted as 'Commander of Wind'; others were deposed and imprisoned, or forced to unfrock themselves. But they answered their purpose in maintaining the formality of the appointment of princes by the spiritual head of orthodox Islam. One indeed consented to become Sultan himself, but only on condition that he should be allowed to resume his caliphship when he chose; which he did in a few months' time, only to lose both titles. How little Beybars himself thought of them, apart from the formality of investiture, is shown by the way in which he sent the unfortunate Caliph, who had just invested him, on a mad expedition to recover Baghdad, taking care to furnish him with a miserably inadequate force, so that he was routed by the Mongols and died. Beybars was not the man to encourage a too powerful Caliph in the old seat of their renown; but the convenient presence of a titular spiritual head, under strict control, at Cairo, made Egypt the centre of the Muhammadan world, and enabled the Sultans to assume the imposing names of 'Partner of the Commander of the Faithful' and 'Sultan of Islam and of the Muslims.'

Moreover, the possession of the Hijaz implied the charge of the Holy Cities of Mekka and Medina. The actual government of these sacred places was in the hands of special emirs or sherifs, with whose authority

it was not safe to meddle; but the Emir of Mekka was obliged to get his diploma of investiture from the Egyptian Sultan, and there were various means of exerting a discreet influence at the shrines of pilgrimage. The covering for the Kaaba, still manufactured in Cairo and sent with much pomp to Mekka every year with the Egyptian pilgrims, commemorates the fact that the Sultans of Egypt were lords of the Hijaz and the Holy Cities, where their names were prayed for in the mosques, and their authority was vindicated by a military force.

The Sultanate of Egypt, established in fact by Saladin in 1175, and officially regularised in the person of Beybars in 1261, lasted for 341 years, until the conquest of Egypt by Selim I of Turkey in January 1517. In little less than three centuries and a half there were fifty-eight Sultans.

'A distinguished member of the family of Mehemet Ali,' to quote the words of Lord Cromer in his discriminating study of the late Khedive * . . . 'whom I believe to possess all the qualifications necessary to fill the high office to which he has been called with advantage to the people over whom he will rule, has [now] been named Sultan of Egypt.' His Highness Hussein is the 59th holder of the title.

There is a marked distinction to be drawn between the first dynasty, that of the Ayyubids, which was hereditary in the family of Saladin, and the subsequent line of Mamluk Sultans, which only intermittently recognised hereditary title; and a further distinction is to be noticed in the fact that Saladin and some of his successors were more closely associated with resistance to the crusades in Palestine and Syria than with sovereignty in Egypt. Saladin himself never saw Egypt after his departure for the Holy War in May 1182; but his short residence there had converted Cairo from a mere fortified palace of heretical caliphs into one of the capitals of Islam. He laid out the walls of what was to be a great city instead of a royal enclosure, and began the building of the Citadel. To restore the inculcation of the orthodox faith, which had been interrupted during the domination, for two centuries, of what he considered a virulent variety of the Shi'a heresy, he introduced a

* 'Abbas II.,' p. xvii. By the Earl of Cromer. Macmillan, 1915.

new form of religious building, the *medresa*, or theological college, which became the characteristic type in Cairo of what we call a 'mosque,' and which differs in plan and in purpose from the congregational mosque which preceded it.

Since the foundation of Saladin's colleges, Egypt has remained predominantly orthodox; and his influence on its future was even greater in the direction of religion than in the defence of the capital. His wise brother El-'Adil and even wiser nephew El-Kamil continued his policy. Public works, defensive and religious, were multiplied; the power of Egypt still formed the rock against which the crusading wave broke in vain; the invasion of Jean de Brienne was repulsed, and Frederick II was easily conciliated and induced to enter into an alliance with El-Kamil which exasperated alike the Pope and the rigid Muslim. The Republics of Venice and Pisa were encouraged to establish marts and send consuls to Egypt; and trade and industries increased under the rule of these enlightened and benevolent Sultans.

Saladin's dynasty, already broken up by the contests and jealousies of kinsmen, came to an end in the turmoil of Louis IX's invasion of Egypt. It is a curious circumstance that the link which connects the House of Saladin with the Mamluk Sultans and also with the Caliphs of Baghdad is a Muslima Queen. The first of the Mamluk Sultans (though styling herself *Melika*) was once a slave of that Abbasid Caliph whom Hulagu the Mongol put to death at Baghdad. She was purchased by Es-Salih Ayyub, Saladin's grandnephew, who made her his wife and was so fascinated by her that he would not let her out of his sight. Unfortunately he died at the critical moment when Louis had just started from Damietta on his march towards the capital. The heir to the throne was far away in Mesopotamia. An interregnum, in face of the enemy, meant anarchy and destruction. Shejer-ed-durr, or 'Pearl-Spray,' was equal to the emergency. She called to her council two trusted leaders and confided to them her plan. The Sultan's death was concealed; it was announced that he was ill. Meals were sent in at regular hours to the presumed invalid, and general orders were issued in his name, with forged signatures. For three months, during the winter of the

French advance, the heroic woman carried on this brave deception, controlled the administration from behind her purdah, and allayed the jealousies of the rival factions in the army; until Beybars and his Mamluks had cut down the chivalry of France in the great charge at the battle of Mansura and turned an apparent victory into a fatal defeat of the Most Christian King. It was the Queen—for she had been unanimously elected to the Sultanate on the murder of her husband's heir—who received the royal ransom which Louis' Queen had partly scraped together at Damietta; it was she who loyally held to the terms of the treaty, when others wished her to break them, and to her Louis owed his safe escape from Egypt. There are few Queens in Muhammadan history, and Shejer-ed-durr is the more illustrious.

There was afterwards a great crime and a tragic end, such as befall great queens in a cruel age. The chiefs of the army were proud to be subject to such a woman; but the whole force of ecclesiasticism—if such a word may be permitted in regard to a religion which has no priests—was against her. Had not the blessed Prophet laid it down that 'the people who elect a woman to be their ruler are past saving'? The Caliph was seriously annoyed, and wrote significantly to the Egyptian emirs that if they could not find a *man* amongst them, he would send one. That the Queen had once been in his own harim was doubtless in his eyes an aggravation of her effrontery. Shejer-ed-durr offered no resistance to the decree of her spiritual and formerly temporal master. She married a leading emir of the Mamluk army which she had so wisely ruled, and allowed him to enjoy the title whilst she retained the power. The arrangement did not work well; there were domestic complications; Aybek paid for his disloyalty with his life; and 'Pearl Spray,' having first pounded up her jewels in a mortar that they might adorn no other woman, expiated the jealous crime in her own barbarous death at the hands of a rival's slaves. Her end was like Jezebel's, yet she was a great Queen; she had saved Egypt from the Frank and founded the long line of the Mamluk Sultans.

Saladin, the creator of the Egyptian Sultanate, was also responsible for the introduction of the Mamluks. He brought them to Egypt as part and parcel of his

stock of political and military ideas. Mamluks, or white slaves, generally of the virile Turkish or Turkman race, had for three centuries formed the bodyguard of the Caliphs of Baghdad; and the decay of the Caliphate and the influx of Turks into Persia had led to the growth of dynasties of the same race, of which the Seljuks were the most powerful and lasted the longest. The Seljuks ruled through an army and an administration conducted by trusted slaves. Nur-ed-din, the grandson of a Seljuk slave, extended and strengthened the system in Syria. Saladin, brought up under the Seljuks and Nur-ed-din, carried it to Egypt. Repugnant as a polity based upon slavery is to western ideas, there is something to be said in its favour. It consecrated the principle that advancement should depend solely upon merit. The Mamluk who attained to power was, as a rule, unquestionably the man who had earned it, by valour, physical training, administrative ability, address, or manners. It was no light work to rise to authority in the Mamluk service; but every man, though he might begin as a common trooper, bought for 20*l.*, or as a clever page boy, carried, like Napoleon's sergeants, a Marshal's baton in his pocket. There was no bar to promotion; equal opportunities lay before each—and equal risks. It is difficult for us to realise that, far from being a slur, the status of slave has always ranked higher than that of servant in a Muhammadan society. The slave was a member of his master's family, almost his son; the servant was 'an hireling' with all the hireling's irresponsibility and untrustworthiness. Indeed, in the days of the Mamluks, the only road to power lay through slavery; and it is related that a free merchant, who afterwards became a great emir and built a famous mosque at Cairo, actually sold himself as a slave to the Sultan as the only means of setting his foot on the ladder of advancement. The ladder led by various degrees, military and civil, in the barrack and at the court, through the many lucrative appointments of the Mamluk organisation, till possibly the slave, long since given his freedom, grew powerful enough to surround himself with a trained guard of slaves like himself and even to aspire to the throne, by the help, if necessary, of assassination. Such a crime, however, to be successful must be backed by sufficient

force. The Mamluks were rigorous in punishing other people's crimes; and the assassin who was not powerful enough to vindicate his act by his own triumph was likely to suffer the penalty which was exacted from one of the murderers of Sultan Khalil—he was slain by his victim's bodyguard, who proceeded, in accordance with ancient precedent, to feast upon his liver.

The series of the Mamluk Sultans is merely the succession of fortunate emirs, who were strong enough to oust the previous Sultan and to dominate the other members of what was always in principle a military oligarchy. In the earlier of the two dynasties, into which the Mamluks are divided, the choice of a Sultan was more exclusive than in the later. It was in practice restricted to the famous brigade of the Bahri Mamluks, a *corps d'élite* formed by Es-Salih, Pearl-Spray's first husband, and deriving its name from 'the river' (bahr), because its barracks were on an island in the Nile close to Cairo. The Bahrīs supplied the royal line, as a matter of unwritten privilege, though there were other 'crack' brigades in the Mamluk army, such as the Burgis of the Citadel. It was as though, after the Commonwealth, it had been agreed that the Kings of England should be chosen from the Coldstreams, as heirs of Cromwell's famous 'New Model.' The privilege had no foundation in law, but the power of the Bahrīs enabled them to exercise it unchallenged, until they found it more convenient to accept an hereditary line.

There was, therefore, some recognition of the hereditary principle. At first it was a failure; the sons of Aybek and Beybars, when raised to the succession, proved incapable; but in the family of Kala'un—originally a slave of Beybars and an expensive one, for he cost 1000 dinars—an hereditary prestige was created which kept fourteen of his descendants on the throne to the fifth generation. Of all the fourteen, however, only two can be said to have ruled; and the reign of Kala'un's son En-Nasir Muhammad was as long as the combined 'reigns' of all his twelve descendants, and covered forty-two years of the most brilliant period in medieval Egypt. The hereditary idea served its purpose even in his ephemeral successors; the *magni nominis umbra* impressed the crowd, at a time when the great lords

were too numerous and each too powerful for any one of them to assert his sovereignty over the rest. They found a *roi fainéant* of En-Nasir's blood a convenient figure-head, whilst they distributed the high offices of state and shared all the real power amongst themselves. In the later Circassian dynasty of Mamluk Sultans, no such illustrious family was discovered, and the hereditary principle dropped out. Several of these Sultans, indeed, had a son proclaimed as heir designate, and even abdicated in his favour to ensure the succession, but the device never answered. It was judged that an experienced and mature leader, although without claim to royal descent, generally proved a better ruler than a princely fledgeling who knew nothing of the management of men and gave way to youthful dissipation.

The Mamluk Sultan, apart from hereditary prestige, was but the head-mamluk, *primus inter pares*; and he was often constrained to understand his true position. When Lajin was elected Sultan, the other Mamluks made him swear twice over to remain as one of themselves, consult them in everything, and show no favouritism. He broke his oath, set up a worthless favourite above the rest, and was duly assassinated, like many before and after him. If it was no light task to work up to the dignity of an 'emir of a thousand,' and to become cup-bearer, taster, chamberlain, commander-in-chief, and viceroy of the realm, it was an even harder business to be Sultan over such a body of turbulent emirs, each with his miniature court, his trained lifeguards armed *cap-à-pie*, his host of retainers and confederates, and his enormous wealth. Ever since Beybars organised this wonderful machine of government, the Mamluk chiefs had been granted more and larger fiefs in the spoliated land of Egypt, and also drew great revenues from the exorbitant transit duties on the European trade with India, which necessarily passed through Alexandria. We need not believe the fabulous stories which Egyptian chroniclers tell of the riches of these emirs—how one gave his daughter a dowry of 160,000 dinars (half-guineas); another, the Court polo-master, spent 85,000 on his pilgrimage to Mekka; a third never drank twice out of the same cup (such a beautiful work of chased and inlaid silver as we may still see in our museums),

and 'prided himself on being perpetually 15,000% in debt.' We have but to look at the mosques, colleges, hospitals, schools, and fountains, with which they beautified Cairo and Damascus and other cities of their realm, or to study the beautiful vessels of their domestic luxury preserved in museums—the perfume burners, tables, ewers, basins, lamps—to realise that the pretorian lords of the palmy days of Mamluk civilisation in the 14th and 15th centuries were enormously rich, and lived in most elaborate and sumptuous profusion.

The more money they had, the more slaves they bought; and the more slaves they possessed—and not merely possessed, but trained with the utmost care in every manly exercise, sport, and discipline—the greater became their menace to the Sultan. It took no little diplomatic ability to play off one faction against another. On the first sign of failure, the reigning Mamluk was imprisoned, exiled, or murdered; occasionally he might be allowed to retire into private life and even become a privileged guest at his supplanter's table. Meanwhile the rival factions, led by various claimants to the throne, fought in the streets, or bombarded each other from the Citadel and the opposite roof of Sultan Hasan's great mosque; and the great wooden gates that guarded the separate quarters of Cairo would be shut for days or weeks, till some emir managed to get the upper hand and force his way to the Citadel and the throne. Those were exciting times for the inhabitants. No one could feel dull when the Mamluk squadrons were on the war path; and the life of medieval Cairo had all the interest of variety and colour.

The remarkable thing is that this slave organisation, fully elaborated by Beybars in the latter part of the 13th century, endured, practically unimpaired, till the beginning of the 16th. A parallel may perhaps be found in the wonderful machinery of the Ottoman Empire in the great days of Suleyman, on which Professor Lybyer has recently published an illuminating study largely based upon contemporary Italian evidence.*

* 'The Government of the Ottoman Empire in the Time of Suleiman the Magnificent,' by A. H. Lybyer, Ph.D., Professor of European History, Oberlin College, Ohio (Harvard University Press).

That also was a slave organisation, much more perfect than that of the Mamluks; and, so long as it was maintained on the original lines, it was the most formidable rival to the Empire in the 16th century. The Janissaries were the only equals of the Spanish infantry. The analogy between the Ottoman and Mamluk systems, however, breaks down in one essential point. The Ottoman troops were the slaves of the Sultan of Turkey, and remained his slaves; there was always the real head of the state, the heir of 'Othman, above them, at whose mercy they stood, so long as he retained the manly qualities of his forefathers. It was never a matter of *primus inter pares*. On the other hand, the Mamluk Sultan rarely had the prestige of ancestry; and the majority of the Mamluks were not his slaves but the slaves of freed men and possible supplanters.

There seem here to be all the seeds of anarchy and disruption; but what kept the Mamluk organisation going for so long (and indeed in a modified form down to the days of Napoleon and of Mohammed Ali) was its tenacious *esprit de corps*. The Mamluk emirs and their splendid troops of lifeguards might fight with each other in a bloody struggle for supremacy, but the moment an outside force came against them they became as one man. They came of superb fighting stocks, and few armies could withstand the shock of their charge. Four times this magnificent cavalry routed the Mongols, before whom all Asia trembled and bowed down. The battlefields of Goliath's Spring, of Abulusteyn, of Emesa, of Marj-es-Suffar witnessed what Mamluk discipline could achieve against the Tartar hordes. When at last they were conquered, it was by another and even finer discipline, founded like theirs on slavery. In the very earliest years of their domination, they had proved themselves strong enough to drive off the assaults of various legitimist claimants to Saladin's throne, to suppress a 'nationalist' rising whose cry was 'Egypt for the Arabs, not the Turks,' to expel the remaining Latin intruders from Palestine and Antioch, and to disarm the formidable and pervasive Secret Society of the Assassins. As they had repulsed the Mongols, so they defied even Tamerlane, who found it his policy to come to terms,

The Empire of Beybars stretched from the Cyrenaica to the Pyramus and the Euphrates, and southwards to the Holy Cities of the Hijaz and the fourth cataract of the Nile; and, until the Ottoman advance 250 years later, its limits had scarcely shrunk. In spite of intestine discord and a precarious tenure of power, the Mamluk Sultans managed to keep their heritage almost intact and to make their weight felt in the councils of Europe for a period as long as from the Restoration of 1660 to the present year. The Kings of France, of Castile, of Aragon, the Emperors both east and west, the Pope himself, as well as the powerful Khan of the Golden Horde, thought it worth while to conciliate the Sultans of Egypt by embassies and gifts and alliances. The great merchant republics, Venice, Genoa, Pisa, eagerly accepted the privileges accorded to their agents, and established marts and consulates to watch over their vast eastern trade. Bars-Bey sent fleets to Cyprus and took King James of Lusignan captive, and made him kiss the ground in the Citadel of Cairo. His ransom cost 100,000 gold pieces; and Cyprus paid tribute to Egypt down to the end of the Mamluk rule.

Strong and permanent foundations must have underlain a political edifice that endured so many grievous shocks, exerted so wide an influence, and held its head high for two and a half centuries. Its success is the more remarkable when it is considered that it was the triumph of a foreign military oligarchy, however knit together, with no support whatsoever from the population it ruled. It is true that, until lately, the patient East has always been accustomed to the oppression of its rulers; but seldom has a foreign oligarchy more cynically ignored the prosperity of the people, except so far as it affected its own revenues. An armed and disciplined force of martial race will naturally control a rabble; but the time usually comes when that force loses its discipline and breaks into factions. The Mamluks did often break into factions, but the iron discipline remained. The secret probably lay not only in the *esprit de corps* already noticed, but in the fact that they were led by Sultans who had to be strong on peril of their lives. This may sound absurd when we look at the long list of ephemeral puppets in both the Mamluk dynasties; but the point

is that no *roi fainéant* was tolerated for long. As soon as he was found out, steps were taken to replace him by a real king.

It must be remembered that the race and qualities and training which went to the making of the splendid Mamluk soldiery went also to the making of a Sultan. He was a Mamluk before he was a Sultan, except in the negligible cases of hereditary succession; and to have won the first place in competition with a *corps d'élite* is proof of unusual talent. In the corrupt times of the later Circassian Sultans, bribes and intrigues may sometimes have succeeded where better claims failed; but most of the Sultans fought their way to the top by sheer merit. Beybars would have come to the front anywhere. He began with no advantages, for he was bought in Kipchak for the low price of 30*l.*, because of the defect of a cataract in the eye, which in the slave market counterbalanced the vigour of his iron frame and the ruddy health of his colour. He passed into the service of an emir who was known as 'the arbalesteer,' whence Beybars was called el-Bundukdari, the name familiar to William of Tripolis. 'Bondogar,' he says, 'as a soldier was not inferior to Julius Cæsar, nor in malignity to Nero,' but he was 'sober, chaste, just to his own people, and even kind to his Christian subjects.' He was, indeed, a just and strict ruler, suppressed wine, beer, and hashish throughout his dominions, and kept a tight rein on the morals of his subjects. He was a punctual and indefatigable man of business, and dealt with an enormous correspondence with method and despatch. He was in touch with every part of the wide Empire, and seemed to be ubiquitous; he was sometimes met with in Damascus when his sentries believed him to be asleep in the Citadel of Cairo. He was a skilful diplomatist, and by his alliance with the Golden Horde of his native land of Tartary he put a curb on the Persian Mongols; he made friends with Michael Palaeologus, Manfred, James of Aragon, and the Seljuk Sultan of Anatolia, and crowned his statesmanship by the masterstroke of reviving the old Abbasid Caliphate at Cairo, and so making Egypt the premier state of Islam, and the Azhar the university of the whole Muslim world.

If he was dreaded and distrusted by his officers, who found him suspicious and perfidious—as might be expected in the circumstances of his time and the conditions of his own rise to power—he was the idol of the people, who for centuries loved to listen to his exploits recited in a coffee-house romance. They dearly loved a fighting Sultan, and admired the accomplished sportsman and athlete; for Beybars was as great in the hunting-field or on the polo-ground or at the butts as he was when leading his matchless Mamluks against Bohemond of Antioch or the Knights Hospitallers of Crac. He was a man all over, and if he came to his throne through blood, he left the State founded on rock.

Of a very different character was En-Nasir, whose reign, twice interrupted, was the longest of all the Mamluk Sultans and formed the climax of Egyptian civilisation under Muslim rule. He was no soldier, and came to the throne by inheritance, not through the Mamluk ranks. The unhappy experiences of his youth, when he had twice been driven from the Sultanate by the intrigues of his emirs, had made him at twenty-five a cynic, a double-dealer, and a 'good hater.' He was a statesman, nevertheless; and Egypt was never more respected by the Mediterranean Powers than in his reign. His name was put up in the public prayers at Mekka and even at Tunis; the King of Delhi, no less than the Eastern Emperor and the Pope, sent embassies to Cairo. En-Nasir was a great builder, as his capital witnesses to this day; but he was also a great administrator, and, like Beybars, abolished burdensome taxes, developed agriculture, and rigorously put down wine-bibbing and vice of every kind. His public works, such as the Alexandrian canal, the great causeway by the Nile, and the aqueduct to the Citadel, showed public spirit and foresight, and like his mosques and other foundations cost vast sums.

'This self-possessed, iron-willed man, absolutely despotic, ruling alone, physically insignificant, small of stature, lame of a foot, and with a cataract in the eye, with his plain dress and strict morals, his keen intellect and unwearied energy, his enlightened tastes and interests, his shrewd diplomacy degenerating into fruitless deceit, his unsleeping suspicion

and cruel vengeance, his superb court, his magnificent buildings, is one of the most remarkable characters of the Middle Ages.*

No one approached En-Nasir in his magnificent public works and religious foundations except Kaït Bey, one of the latest of the Circassian Sultans, whose exquisite tomb-mosque in the eastern cemetery of Cairo, miscalled the 'Tombs of the Caliphs,' is among the purest gems of Saracenic architecture. Indeed for most artists the many lovely Circassian mosques form the chief beauty of Cairo. They were built out of the huge profits of the transit dues of the Indian trade, in an age of shameless corruption, when justice and place were openly sold, and the soldiery, mixed with a rabble of Levantines and Mongols, got out of hand, without, however, quite losing their old capacity for collective action at a crisis. Several of the Circassian Sultans, while guilty of barbarous cruelty and abominable treachery, were men of strict and even austere life, keeping the Muslim fasts, drinking no wine, and dressing with studied simplicity. Of one it is recorded that he lived with only one wife, but could not write his own name. Other Sultans were men of literary tastes; some were learned theologians; and of one it is mentioned that he spoke and read Arabic, though it was considered rather 'bad form' for Mamluk Sultans to know the language of the common people. Bars-Bey, a singularly stern and oppressive ruler, took pleasure in having historical books read to him. Muayyad was a poet, an orator, a musician, and a lover of art. In short, many of these Sultans were accomplished men, and it is evident that they must have possessed political sagacity. Few of them, indeed, were born soldiers; and the martial character of the famous Mamluk cavalry must have degenerated under such leaders, as the end proved. Yet Egypt still kept a bold front to the enemy gradually encroaching from Asia Minor, sent her fleets to Cyprus and to India, and maintained a show of her old solidarity and state. A Venetian ambassador who had audience of the last ruling Mamluk Sultan, Kansuh el-Ghuri, in

* 'History of Egypt in the Middle Ages,' 2nd ed., 316-317.

1503, records his reception at the Citadel. After passing the iron gate at the head of the fifty steps, where some 300 Mamluks in white stood silent and respectful 'like observant Franciscan friars,' the embassy passed through eleven more doors, each with its guards, till, tired out, they 'had to sit down to rest themselves.'

'They then entered the area or courtyard of the castle, which they judged to be six times the area of St Mark's Square. On either side of this space 6000 Mamluks dressed in white and with green and black caps were drawn up; at the end of the court was a silken tent with a raised platform covered with a carpet, on which was seated Sultan Kansuh el-Ghuri, his undergarment being white surmounted with dark green cloth, and the muslin turban on his head with three points or horns, and by his side was a naked scimitar.*

Thirteen years later, on Aug. 24, 1516, the brave old Sultan fell fighting against the Ottomans in the disastrous battle near Aleppo. Tuman Bey, who reluctantly took up the sceptre at Cairo, and made a gallant stand, was defeated and hanged at the Zuweyla gate. Selim of Turkey was hailed Sultan in the Friday prayers of the mosque of Cairo in January 1517; and the last of the shadowy caliphs was carried a prisoner to Constantinople.

So ended the Mamluk Sultanate of Egypt, of which it may at least be recorded that it staved off the flood of barbarism, both east and west, of Mongols and of Crusaders, rescued Egypt from the fate of Persia, and preserved the unbroken continuity of Muslim learning and civilisation, as it was preserved nowhere else, in the city which the Mamluks made beautiful and renowned as the capital of imperial Islam.

STANLEY LANE-POOLE.

* Paton's 'Egyptian Revolution,' quoted in Prof. Margoliouth's interesting sketch of the history of 'Cairo, Jerusalem, and Damascus,' p. 135.

Art. 13.—A VISIT TO RUSSIA.

It may not be without value to sum up in a few pages some personal observations made in Petrograd and Moscow in the course of a visit to Russia this winter. Blood is thicker than water; and, as a Russian, I felt intensely the desire to come into direct touch with Russian society, to learn about its needs and aims, to convey tidings from England and, possibly, to help by deed or advice. It would be out of the question to trouble the readers of the 'Quarterly Review' on the present occasion with dry data and statistics, but something may be gleaned from opinions and impressions; and it is in this unassuming spirit that I should like to submit some recollections and thoughts.

I may say at once that what impressed me most was the spectacle of a grand mobilisation of society in the service of the Commonwealth, a mobilisation not decreed nor ordered but spontaneous and organic. The best introduction to what I saw in Russia was provided by what I saw in England. Those who have lived in England during the momentous autumn and winter months of 1914 will never forget the transformation of the country at sight, the all-pervading khaki which spread over the land, the martial aspect of doctors, the dwindling of the Universities in their hibernating state, the tramping and drilling of recruits on all roads and squares. The British were indeed showing that they were in earnest about their voluntary army system, and one did not want to read about the feats of the United States volunteers in the Civil War in order to feel that a great national force has been roused to action.

I saw something of the same kind in Russia; but, if I may say so, the dominating emblem was not the khaki uniform, but the Red Cross. Not that Russia had sent out fewer soldiers, but the millions of armed men had already, to a great extent, been pushed to the front; and the reservists and conscripts on drill did not make the same show in contrast with the rest of the population as in England. On the other hand, everybody was more or less engaged in hospital work or in preparing equipment for the troops.

I am speaking from personal experience about the

two capitals—Moscow and Petrograd, but I have been assured on reliable authority that the same characteristic applies to the provinces as well. I witnessed, for example, the hospital work done by the personnel of a large girls' school in Moscow. After a full day's teaching, the mistresses started off to help in the daily routine of two hospitals, one of which was organised and maintained at their cost in co-operation with other high schools, while the other was supported by voluntary contributions from the pupils, each of the eighteen forms providing for the maintenance of one patient. The pupils were naturally full of personal interest for their patients, and were allowed to visit them at certain hours. There was accommodation for some 100,000 wounded in Moscow alone; and 64,000 beds were actually occupied in December when I visited the city.

The only complaint on the side of the military authorities was that the patients were too well cared for and rather spoilt as regards commodities of life. Such a consideration may have some weight from the point of view of a strict disciplinarian, looking forward to a new career of hardships in the trenches for those many who were able to go back to their regiments. But, humanly speaking, it was touching to see how assiduously the poor heroes from the Bzura or the Carpathians were tended and comforted after the terrible days of fighting and privation, and thus received some acknowledgment of their unstinted efforts in the cause of their country. One scene comes back to my memory with special vividness. A Christmas tree gathering in the hall of one of those hospitals, a crowd of swarthy men around the room, some with pale, emaciated faces, all with some sign of suffering about them, eagerly watching a figure in a Pierrot dress dancing a lively jig. The merry dancer, a sergeant with a shattered arm and a 'George' on his breast, had led his company under a hellish fire when all the officers had fallen.

The communion between the army at the front and the nation in its rear makes itself felt in many small but significant facts. The regular medical service of the Army would have been powerless to cope with the unheard-of requirements of this gigantic war. The medical staff of the Army is fully absorbed by the

immediate assistance to the wounded in the field. Even in this respect the Red Cross organisation, with its sanitary trains and hospital installations immediately behind the front, is giving efficient help. But the base hospitals had to be practically given over to the management of voluntary organisations; and it is this that one sees at work in the interior of the country. The most powerful are the Union of the Counties (*Zemstvos*) and the Union of Municipalities, but there are many others. Moscow city, for example, acts both as a member of the municipal union and as a separate city unit; and it may be said without fear of contradiction that the ancient capital has assumed a unique position in the competition of efforts and sacrifices. The State has assigned over 100 million roubles (10,000,000*l.*) to finance the work of the unions; but great sums are being levied and contributed daily in addition to the State grants. And the value of the personal services entailed by these huge organisations cannot be gauged even approximately. Men like Prince Lvoff, President of the County Union, or Mr Avinoff, the manager of the 'evacuation' department of the County Union, give their whole time to the work of organisation and supervision; others, like Mr Chelnokoff, Mayor of Moscow and President of the Municipal Union, somehow contrive by dint of energy and unceasing labour to combine their war duties with an enormous quantity of ordinary business.

The work performed is conspicuous by the orderly, efficient and energetic manner in which it is being carried out. In the beginning the organisations formed in the provinces were met by unexpected and trying emergencies. In Kaluga, for instance, the town had volunteered to provide accommodation for 600 wounded; towards the beginning of September 2000 were dumped down on one day. Hospital attendance and accommodation had to be literally improvised; and this was done by calling to aid the owners of all the likely houses in the town. It has happened that people came from the street with the wounded in order to assist in these hurried arrangements, and have remained in these improvised hospitals as improvised attendants ever since. A similar miracle of speedy organisation was achieved by the infirmary of the Women's College in Moscow.

Gradually, however, action became more and more systematic; and now the Unions of self-governing bodies control not only the base hospitals in the interior, but a very large number of hospital centres at the front, and are sending out numerous hospital trains to assist in the transport of the wounded from the field. It would have been impossible to carry out such a gigantic task if the workers had not been animated by ardent patriotism and by the sense of self-imposed duty. This voluntary character of the machinery is very remarkable in a country which is supposed to be entirely ruled by discipline and compulsion. The truth is that behind the frontage of the official hierarchy an immense power of self-government and independent action is rapidly growing, and that in seasons of great stress and peril like the present this force becomes irresistible, and brushes away all the restrictions of red-tape and officialism.

This feature of the situation was forcibly brought home to me almost on the first day of my stay in Moscow. A young graduate and a girl student called to ask me to deliver a public lecture in aid of a relief organisation acting in a distant quarter of the city. It came out in the course of conversation that the relief committee in question, formed under the auspices of the City executive, consisted largely of students and young graduates. No special police formalities had to be gone through; people joined and left the committee of their free accord; and the work was going on splendidly, with self-denial and energy. I went to look at their local centre, and found by the side of hospitals a canteen providing meals at half-price, a large factory building turned into barracks for homeless families, and a labour dispensary in which the staff distributed materials to the wives and daughters of soldiers at the front and other unemployed persons for the making of underwear ordered by the Commissariat. The dispensary was crowded with women taking work; most of these were using cheap Singer machines bought at a discount, while those who had no such machines went to a central workshop provided with some forty machines by the organising committee. I may add that the price paid for making a shirt ranged from 7 to 9 kopecks (from 1½d. to 2d.). A skilful worker was able to make nine or ten shirts in one day.

In this way voluntary social organisation met not only the problems of hospital assistance but also those of unemployment and of the distribution of public work. The committee I refer to was by no means an isolated venture. Moscow was covered with similar institutions; and they provide the natural centres for utilising and co-ordinating the enormous work of equipment and supply which goes on in the rear of the army. As I have already mentioned, orders from the Commissariat of the army are directed through these channels, and not only for underwear, but for warm clothing, boots, etc. Curiously enough, the lack of surgical instruments consequent on the cutting off of German supplies is being met to a great extent by the house industry traditional in certain districts of the government of Nishni Novgorod.

The initiative in social organisation is by no means restricted to the members of the so-called 'intellectual' class. My friends of the committee already mentioned took me on to visit a distributive centre of work just over the way, which was managed by a co-operative society of factory workmen. This society had sprung into existence several years ago and had as its chief object the provision of necessary articles of consumption of good quality and at low prices. I found the manager of the executive and two assistants receiving Commissariat work and distributing it to women in the same way as in the committee workshop. I may remark that the manager had been serving his association for about eight years without salary, as a matter of 'elective duty,' as he expressed it. Truly an aristocratic conception!

Society is thus really mobilised in Russia. The temper of this formidable body is characterised not by any fervid excitement but by a calm settling down into work which has to be done at any cost. It would be preposterous to suppose that the strain and the sacrifices entailed by such work are not felt, that there is no occasional grumbling, no criticism of this or that measure or action. The duties undertaken may be irksome, but no one thinks of shirking them.

The attitude towards military events and the strategic progress of the war is also characteristic. When one talks with the wounded singly, many of them seem

weary and certainly do not minimise the hardships and dangers through which they have gone. But they are keen to hear news from the front; they are proud of their regiments and of their commanders; and the spirit of brotherhood in arms is exceedingly strong. Poles and Jews share in this spirit with born Russians.

An interesting scene occurred the other day at one of the Moscow hospitals. It was visited by the wife of a captain in a regiment of Siberian rifles, who had followed her husband as his orderly, was attired as a soldier, and had taken part in several engagements. She had been sent to Moscow to get some stores for the regiment, and came to a ward in the girls' school hospital to visit a convalescent soldier of her company. The whole ward eagerly listened to her tale of what had been taking place, and at the close she bade them 'Come back and help us.' 'We *shall* come back,' they all replied.

The views of the soldiers as to the war are not necessarily the same as those of the working classes in general, because soldiers, even if they do not realise the strategical connexion between different operations, are nevertheless facing the grim realities of the contest. The enemy is not a vague abstraction for them, but a very definite being, manifesting his existence by shell and bayonet, by musketry fire and night attacks. But the attitude of the Russian soldier towards this war is shared by the people at large. Few of the peasants have a clear notion as to the points in dispute and the exact aims to be attained, but they firmly believe that Mother Russia is assailed by an impious and crafty invader. They start for the army with a feeling of submission to a religious command, and, once in the ranks, they display a characteristic quality of corporate cohesion. They stick together and feel together by instinct, quite apart from disciplinary organisation; they act by nature up to the Slavophil ideal of 'choral action'; and it is easy to see how much this psychological feature contributes to the far-famed stubbornness of the Russian army.

The attitude of the 'intellectual' and ruling classes towards this war is also very satisfactory. Fortunately there is no occasion for fundamental criticism of the conduct of the war by the military authorities. The Russian army has at last found chiefs worthy of its

unrivalled soldiery. We are spared a tragic situation like that which existed in Manchuria, when the army had to follow incapable leaders. Criticism is not silent behind the scenes; there are many things, especially as regards equipment and preparation, which might have been better. But, on the whole, it is a great thing to be able to believe in the firmness and insight of the Supreme Command, and to know that most of the armies are led by trusty chiefs and some by men of real talent. One would like to know more about these chiefs and about the exploits of the various units. It seems strange that the victories of Sarakamysh and of Prashnitz should remain anonymous, or that the feats of Brusiloff's regiments in the Carpathians should be relegated to the pages of heavy volumes to be published some day by the General Staff. Skobeleff or Lazareff were not thus eclipsed in the war of 1877-78. This nebulous tendency is not confined to the Russian reports; it obtains also, e.g., in the French army, and is probably connected with the democratisation of the war by the huge masses in action. Still, people do not approve of it in Russia, any more than they do in England. The introduction of the personal element may have its drawbacks, but it would certainly heighten popular interest in the war. In any case there is no trace of the perverse spirit which in the course of the Japanese war made some people more anxious for tidings of defeat than for reports of victory. Not that men are less concerned about home affairs and internal progress, but thinking people feel that, unless German aggression is crushed, all hopes of progress and reform will fade away into nothing, for the simple reason that national humiliation and demoralising defeat are not the proper factors for fostering a healthy development.

It is among reactionaries and absolutists that attempts have been made to influence the Court in order to break away from the Allies and to enter into a compromise with the Germans. These absurd schemes are to be explained partly by intrigues conducted through various more or less influential personages of German descent, and partly by an apprehension that the alliance with Western Powers might undermine the traditions of bureaucratic rule which have grown up during the long

years of Russo-Prussian friendship. The Germans, in spite of their social clumsiness, had succeeded in making capital of the 'splendid isolation' in which reactionary policy had placed the Crown in Russia. Even the best of bureaucrats framed on the German pattern were firmly convinced that they had to play the part of providence to a stupid and lazy people. As the satirist Saltykoff put it, a Russian subject was supposed to have two cries at his disposal; he had to shout either 'hurrah' or 'help' (Karaul); for all other purposes he was dumb. The literary exaggeration points to a very real and customary frame of mind.

I do not mean to imply either that Russian bureaucracy is entirely Germanised, or that the Germans in Russia have exerted only a mischievous influence. Most of our officials at the present day are Russians; and there can be no doubt that in the past Germans have rendered to Russia signal services. Men like Bunge and Totleben will always be remembered with profound gratitude; and it would be impossible to write the administrative or military history of 18th or 19th century Russia without making a very large allowance for the educational value of the German element. But the German school of administrators has been naturally inclined to look down upon the Russian nation as a whole; and in modern times this element has more and more lost touch with national development. One need not take extreme instances like that of Victor Hehn, a distinguished antiquary, who, while spending most of his life in Government service in Petrograd, kept a diary replete with hatred and contempt and full of poisonous gossip in disparagement of Russian society. His book ('*De moribus Ruthenorum*') is characteristic not of the customs and manners of Russians but of the psychology of a learned German who picked up all sorts of malignant stories and failed to notice the great revival of Russian thought and life in the sixties of the last century.

In connexion with present events it is chiefly men of German descent and of bureaucratic tendencies who have tried to sow mischief between Russia and England, and to plead the cause of the Kaiser and of his Junkers. Fortunately such people have very little authority in the

realm of foreign affairs; and their only chance of regaining some authority in that respect consists in misdirecting the domestic policy of Russia and suppressing the political aspirations of Russian society. Now, the intimate connexion between domestic and foreign politics in Russia can hardly be exaggerated. The continuous progress of the country towards enlightenment and fruitful activity cannot be doubted, and is bound to bear fruit; but it must be admitted that the relations between Government and Society are still far from being normal, and that Russian domestic politics are still subject to contradictory tendencies and to the influence of irresponsible factors. The great problems of self-government, equality before the law, freedom of conscience, harmonious combination of nationalities within the Empire, are still unsolved; and the great opportunity for their solution presented by the national upheaval has not been utilised hitherto.

I do not propose to touch on these problems on the present occasion, but I should like to express the view, shared by many representative men in Russia, that our alliance with the Western States must be cemented by Russia's approximation to the fundamental requirements of legal order as accepted in Europe. Those who still dream of bureaucratic providence for Russia are 'working for the King of Prussia.' After all, the general march of events is governed not by reactionary misgivings, but by the main tide of steady national growth; and there is no more occasion to doubt of ultimate progress in the field of domestic politics than there is to be nervous as to the outcome of the struggle in the field on account of occasional and local reverses. Human affairs do not follow straight lines in their development, but rather move in waves; and the really important point is to watch the general direction of the current. There can be no uncertainty on this score; and we may confidently assume that the progressive tide which is favouring the Western alliance will prevail.

In conclusion, I should like to say a few words about the aspirations of Russian society as regards the eventual peace settlement, confining myself, of course, to questions which touch Russian interests. No detailed discussion is appropriate in this respect, for the simple reason that Russians are fully aware that the ultimate recasting of

the map of Europe will depend to a great extent on events which cannot yet be foreseen with sufficient clearness. This applies pre-eminently to the redistribution of Turkish and Austrian territories. It is quite clear that both these luckless Powers will have to go into the melting-pot at the close of the war, as a penalty for having sold their soul to the German tempter; but to what extent they may survive the operation no one can exactly predict. Turkey will probably have to pay more dearly than the Dual Monarchy, but how far the latter will be allowed to continue her parasitical existence, to the detriment of the Slavonic populations, is a matter of vague speculation. Nor can one gauge the amount of concessions which will be extorted by the various Powers who are likely to fly at the eleventh hour to the assistance of the victors.

There are, however, certain points on which Russian public opinion seems emphatically settled. One of these regards the future of Poland. The Russian people is resolved to carry out the promise of Polish autonomy which accompanied the appeal made by the Grand Duke to the Poles. Apart from the promise involved, this appeal gave a definite lead as regards the international situation. Russia is striving to bring together the three fragments of Poland dissected by the partitions of the 18th century. Her own Poles have adopted this policy with enthusiasm; the Austrian Poles are naturally less eager, and many of them still side with the Habsburgs; but even they, it is hoped, will settle down into loyal adherents of the Russian Imperial combination if the Polish province of Prussia is wrested from the claws of the Black Eagle. This is a large order; and it remains to be seen how far military success will enable the Allies to achieve the task. It should be carefully noted, however, that though ultra-patriotic Poles sometimes talk about the reconquest of Dantzic and of the lower Vistula, plans of conquest in regard to the German or thoroughly Germanised districts of Prussia find no support in Russian circles. People realise more and more clearly the mischievous futility of the subjection of foreign populations. The Alsace-Lorraine experiment has been an effective object-lesson in this respect.

The second point which may be said to amount to a

national claim is the acquisition of Constantinople, together with the opening of the Straits. Russia cannot be expected in reason to continue relegated to the background of Europe, with no other access to the world's sea routes than the two outlets of the Baltic and the Black Sea, which may be closed at any moment by more favoured neighbours. Nor can the historical striving towards 'Tsargrad' be taken lightly. It is one of those tendencies which have ceased to be a matter of statesmanship or diplomacy and have become embodied in the psychology of a mighty nation. The peasants of Russia are not versed in the intricacies of the balance of power and of Near-Eastern intercourse, but they know about the great capital of Eastern Christianity conquered by the Turks ages ago.

The present imbroglio seems to have made it clear that the Western Powers at any rate are not interested in closing Russia's path to the Mediterranean. The old rivals, England and Russia, have found themselves ranged shoulder to shoulder not only against the overbearing militarism of Berlin but against an attempted outbreak of Pan-Islamic fury. The Caucasian army fought for European prestige at Sarakamysh; and it is difficult to guess what repercussion a disaster in the Caucasus might have had in Egypt and in India. One may rationally hope by this time that the sense of the brotherhood in arms will prevent any recurrence of Beaconsfieldian notions in British politics. Political anachronisms die hard, but they do die when confronted by inexorable situations. And the imperative requirement of the present situation amounts to this: it is not enough to win this war, it is also necessary to guard against the outbreak of a similar conflagration in the future. This is why it is of vital importance for every one concerned that Russia and the Western Powers should keep together.

PAUL VINOGRADOFF.

Art. 14.—THE WAR AND DOMESTIC POLITICS.

THAT the British genius shuns logical conclusions and loves compromise is a commonplace all the world over. Indeed, as any observer of Canadian politics must realise, it is one of those traits which the British carry with them, modified, it may be, by the presence of other races, but remaining the same in essentials. Seldom, however, has history afforded so striking a contrast of national characteristics as is displayed in the action of the allied French and British nations in the present struggle. For each country the war is a supreme national crisis; and the logical method of meeting a national crisis is a national government. The various members of such a government may continue to entertain their conflicting opinions on matters of domestic policy. They do not compromise about them; they hold them in suspense while they join in pursuing the supreme national interest which is common to all. Such is the course that has been followed in France. Political feeling in that country ran high before the war. In August, however, a Coalition Ministry was formed of the ablest men that all parties could produce. The same appreciation of the national danger combined with the same logical sense led to the law of Dec. 24, 1914, postponing all elections until the war should be over. The contrast in England is striking. Parties still oppose each other. For the most part the surface is unbroken, but underneath it the current of feeling flows almost as strongly as ever. Not only so, but now and again the turmoil breaks out openly. Yet, at the same time, vigorous support is given to the Government both in the legislative and administrative action which it takes to meet the various phases of the crisis.

Thus it would almost appear that the genius of compromise had achieved the impossible, and that the thinly-veiled hostility of political parties did not affect the national conduct of the war. Indeed, if the explicit question were put to well-informed Englishmen, in nine cases out of ten the answer would probably be that the prosecution of the war suffers nothing from the continued division of political parties. Such a conclusion,

however, plausible as it appears, will not bear closer analysis. In any organic body of men, union alone gives to capacity its full efficiency; and union in the present case means cordiality and confidence. Both are lacking in the present relations of the two political parties, though the ill effect of their absence must not, of course, be overestimated. It is not contended that the Government is the less determined to prosecute the war to a successful conclusion, or that the Opposition are the less anxious that this should be done. But the determination is rendered less effective—not greatly so, perhaps, yet perceptibly; and in a crisis like the present every degree is of importance. The Government has acted, and is acting, with great energy, but in all its action it has an eye to party interests. It always has its ear to the ground; and this attitude has affected its action, military, naval, economic, none the less clearly because perhaps unconsciously. So, too, the Opposition claims that it has rendered support such as has been given by no Opposition before. The claim is just. The spirit of its individual members is shown by the fact that one-half of them are on service as compared with one-eighth of the Government 'bloc.' Yet, while the help of the Opposition has been sincere and in some points most valuable, their general attitude is instinct with distrust and criticism; and these feelings are none the less real because they do not find full expression.

The continued severance of parties operates disadvantageously in yet another way, which is not often noticed but can readily be understood. Robust criticism, at once well-informed, well-intentioned and forcible, is of the very highest importance when a Government is confronted with a crisis like the present; and the Prime Minister has emphatically stated that he would welcome it. But under present conditions it is not and cannot be given. Supporters of the Government will not criticise it in important matters, when their criticisms may serve as a future basis for attack by the Opposition. The Opposition, on the other hand, will not press any criticism sufficiently far to make it really effective. For, where parties are still divided, and party spirit though seldom effervescing is still active, it is felt that criticism pushed strongly home may fairly or unfairly be dubbed factious.

The result is obvious. The chase waxes hot on the scent of a minor matter like a timber contract, and Government supporters join in the cry. But matters of great moment escape searching criticism or may pass entirely without debate.

What has just been said applies almost exclusively to the centre of government. Away from the centre this spirit of mutual party antagonism is not exhibited in nearly so acute a degree. In the country at large there is more of real unity, more of a truce in spirit as well as in act. But, just as the brain directs the limbs, so any cause of weakness at the centre is serious. It should not be overestimated; equally clearly, however, it should be remedied; and this is the more necessary if indeed the heaviest fighting and the severest strain are still to come.

The question is one of the present and future, but is essentially conditioned by the past. Not only so, but much of the trouble has arisen from the inability of each side to see the point of view of the other, and from the absence of any 'honest broker' who could mediate between them. A brief summary of the past, therefore, is necessary. The problem contains four principal factors, distinct yet always interacting—the Irish Question, the Welsh Church Bill, the Plural Voting Bill, and the next General Election. Of these, in July last the Irish Question formed the all-absorbing topic. Gun-runnings, the 'Ulster Plot,' the Dublin riots, were incidents of the immediate past. The claims of Ulster for exclusion, the demand of Nationalist Ireland for 'the Bill,' were present dangers, both menacing, if not in equal degree. So far back as March 1914 the Prime Minister had stated * that the danger of civil strife was not confined to Ulster, but also existed in Nationalist Ireland; and the danger had subsequently grown more threatening. The appreciation of the danger in Ulster led him to introduce the Amending Bill. It did not please his own stalwarts; it did not satisfy the Opposition. Nor, perhaps, was it likely that it should do so. From the first, however, the Prime Minister treated it as an integral part of his Irish legislation. Only reasons of convenience made the introduction of a separate Amending Bill preferable to

* March 9, 1914, Hansard, col. 906.

amending the principal Bill. It was intended to send both for the Royal Assent together,* and indeed to proceed with the Amending Bill, even if the Opposition did not endorse it.† Such was the situation when the war broke out.

In the case of the Welsh Bill, the position was not complicated by an Amending Bill. The Government, except on one occasion, constantly pressed it forward. That occasion was Lord St Aldwyn's suggestion of a Committee to look into certain points connected with the disendowment proposals, a Committee which the Government countenanced if it did not welcome. It could not, however, be said that they were in any way pledged to delay the Royal Assent to the Bill until the Committee had reported.

From the Home Rule Bill or the Welsh Bill to the Plural Voting Bill is a great transition. Plural Voting is a question over which the political manager waxes eager, but which leaves the average Englishman cold and the average outsider befogged. Yet it was in truth almost the pivot of the whole situation. The essence of the Bill is that by abolishing the Plural Vote the Government calculated to gain anything from 30 to 80 seats, counting twice that number on a division. Clearly, therefore, the Government thought it a most necessary and salutary reform, and were determined to make it law. Equally clearly, the Opposition were convinced that it was inimical to the true interests of the country, and were determined to obstruct it, unless it were coupled with an equitable Redistribution Bill. The only method, therefore, of passing it would be under the Parliament Act with its three years' curriculum. Now if, as was originally intended, it had started on its course in 1912, together with the other two Bills, the Government would have had a simple proposition to face last summer. But it did not start in 1912—and for the reason *cherchez la femme*. Introduced for the first time in 1913, the earliest date on which it could be passed into law under the Parliament Act was in June 1915. It may seem a pettifogging business, this calculation of dates. But in sober

* Mr Asquith, May 12, Hansard, col. 955-6.

† Mr John Redmond, May 12, Hansard, 1001. Mr Lloyd George, May 12, Hansard, 1010.

truth it was as vital an element in the Parliamentary strategy as was the delay at Liège to the German armies. It meant that the Government last August had to carry on for another ten months of stormy weather if they wished to get the benefit of the Bill. Could they do so? A cataclysm threatened them in the autumn, which it became more and more clear they could not face. Their manifest course, therefore, was to try to last out till June 1915, but, if they were forced to go to the country earlier, to be able to demonstrate their own conciliatoriness and to throw the onus of any outbreak on the Opposition. By this it is not intended to argue that either the Government or the Opposition was not sincerely anxious to avoid civil war; only to make it clear that to be conciliatory, in appearance at any rate, was politic as well as moral.

With the momentous Fourth of August, all minor issues were overshadowed for the time being by the war. Already, on July 30, the Second Reading of the Irish Amending Bill had been postponed, 'without prejudice to the domestic and political position of any party.' This phrase, first used by the Leader of the Opposition,* was adopted by the Prime Minister and applied to the whole of the domestic situation.† It expressed the spirit and intention of both sides, and was repeated by private members. But the fatal defect in it was the absence of a definite application to existing problems. The war would inevitably work some change in the circumstances of all parties. What was needed was that the position of each in August 1914 should be properly estimated in any temporary settlement, the elements of strength and weakness recognised, and no detriment inflicted in essential matters upon any. Parties, however, failed to appreciate each other's standpoint; and there was no accepted arbiter above fear or favour. To Liberal stalwarts, as to Nationalists, the one accepted proposition was the passage into law, during the current session, of the Home Rule Bill and the Welsh Church Bill. Amending Bills or other modifications were non-essentials—acts of grace, and unwelcome at that. If,

* Mr Bonar Law, July 30, 1914, Hansard, 1602.

† Mr Asquith, Aug. 10, Hansard, 2298, and Aug. 31, Hansard, 436.

however, the final stages of the two principal Bills were now postponed, the changes and chances of the war would prejudice the ultimate passage to the Statute Book of the measures for which they had fought so long. So they argued; and there is no reason to think they were not honest in this opinion. It was true that in July the risk of a breakdown had been imminent, rendering nugatory even a technical passage into law. But the dangers which the Government had realised were never so apparent to their supporters; and in any case a risk which is passed soon appears shadowy, while the risk ahead gains in substance. Unionists, on the other hand, took the broad ground of saying that controversial measures should not be pressed. In particular, however, it was urged that the Home Rule Bill and the Amending Bill were integral parts of one whole. On this point the Prime Minister's previous utterances were quoted; and it was contended that to pass the Home Rule Bill without the Amending Bill would essentially 'prejudice the political position' of the party. In the case of the Welsh Church Bill also, the war had introduced new factors, which will be mentioned later, and for which it was claimed that allowance should be made. Indeed, a statement of the Prime Minister* shows that there was substance in the contention.

From this point onwards the course of events moves like that of a Greek drama—the catastrophe inevitable, yet due to misunderstandings which the chorus lament but are impotent to remove. The debate of Aug. 31 showed how beneath the ashes the lava was still glowing; and at length the eruption occurred on Sept. 15. The Prime Minister seems to have been sincerely anxious to find a fair settlement, but failed. It may have been that a waiting policy, often the wisest, was here tried once too often; or else that the preoccupations of the immediate business of the war were too great. In any case the announcement was at last made that the Home Rule Bill, without the Amending Bill, was to be passed into law, as also was the Welsh Bill. A Suspensory Bill † postponing the dates of operation was to be passed

* Aug. 31, Hansard, 437.

† The Suspensory Act discriminates in a curious manner between the Irish and the Welsh Acts. As regards the former, no preparatory action

at the same time, and a promise was given of an Amending Bill in the future. The effect, however, of the Suspensory Bill was doubtful; and Unionists openly scouted the value of the promise. The whole episode was marked by extraordinary bitterness—a bitterness, indeed, so unusual that it has been remarked* with reason that there may have been some incidents in the negotiations which have not yet seen the light.

It is a thankless task to apportion responsibility, but, if thankless, it is yet in some degree necessary in order to determine what ought to be done in the future. On the whole it is fair to say that the greater share of responsibility falls upon the Government.

There were several extenuating features. The Government was conducting a great war, about which at the outset there had been misgivings within its own ranks. It was therefore loth to offend its own stalwarts. The Irish Nationalists, too, presented a difficulty; and after the experience of the Boer War, it was worth much to conciliate their support, primarily in Ireland but also in America. On the other hand, the loyalty of Unionists was secure in any event. The Government view, therefore, may not have been profound, but at least it was natural. At the same time it is clear that injustice was done to an Opposition that had given loyal support, as the Government was in a stronger and the Opposition in a weaker position after what occurred. So far, however, as the Irish Question is concerned, the milk has been spilt. The best that can be done is that any promise of a future Amending Bill should be scrupulously kept in the letter and in the spirit.† With reference to the Welsh Church Act the situation is different, and the position has been growing acute of late.

The essence of the matter lies in the interval prescribed by the Act to elapse between the date of passing and the date of the Bill coming into operation—a minimum of six months, which may be extended to twelve. This interval was to serve two purposes. The Government

can be taken. As regards the latter, not only is such preliminary action not barred, but, not being barred, it becomes obligatory. Hence the trouble.

* 'The Round Table,' Dec. 1914.

† I.e. the mere introduction of a measure in a take-it-or-leave-it attitude is thus barred.

intended to use it in appointing the Commissioners and creating the machinery necessary to administer the Act. On the other hand, a respite was also vital for the Church. Disendowed, it had to collect fresh funds. Disestablished, it had to create a new system of government. In peace these would be difficult tasks; in war they become impossible. Many of the principal supporters of the Church were away on service, and all resources were drained by the war. It was necessary, therefore, to give some period of respite after peace should be restored.

The situation was early foreseen both by the Prime Minister and others. Unfortunately, however, the greatest extension of time given by the Suspensory Act is only till the end of the war; therefore it does not meet the case. Indeed, in some respects it makes the situation worse. Preliminary steps are still obligatory under the Welsh Church Act; and these are actually causing dislocation.* Still more unhappily, the incidents of the passage of the Suspensory Act and the subsequent debates have again rekindled party animosity and distrust. Into this side of the question it is unnecessary to enter further. On the main point, however, a Bill to meet the situation has been introduced by the Duke of Devonshire in the House of Lords; and it appears from the memorials addressed to the Prime Minister that it has received the support of a number of Liberals and Free Churchmen. Undoubtedly the situation ought to be met; and some measure on the lines of the Duke's Bill seems as good a method as any. The opposition to it, moreover, does not appear to be great, except from a comparatively small section. At the time of writing, therefore, events look hopeful, as the Prime Minister appears both to realise the situation and to be anxious to meet it in accordance with the spirit of his earlier speech. If not a *modus vivendi*, at least a *modus moriendi* is in sight.

When so much trouble has arisen over two of the three principal Government bills, it would seem all the more important to avoid controversy over the last. Thus far

* E.g. where a benefice becomes vacant, it is difficult to fill it. Any such appointment since the passing of the Act involves no right to the stipend after the date of Disestablishment is passed, while the state of war precludes a voluntary fund being raised in the meantime.

the problem of the Plural Voting Bill is not prejudiced by anything that has happened; and the Prime Minister in his remarks on Feb. 3 was most guarded in his references to it. What is the fairest course to take? For such a purpose it is necessary to estimate the chances of the Bill at the time when the war broke out. That date was Aug. 4, 1914. The earliest day on which the Bill could pass is June 3, 1915. There was thus, as has been said, an interval of ten months; and this interval was evidently all-important. It is probable that any impartial observer would come to the conclusion, that the chances of the Plural Voting Bill becoming law in this Parliament were infinitesimal. It may be true, as one irreverent supporter of the Prime Minister remarked concerning his political good fortune, 'the greater the hole he is in, the greater the convulsion of nature that gets him out.' But, on the principle of 'no prejudice,' unless some expedient is found of subjecting the Bill to as precarious a chance of existence as it enjoyed last July, the only fair course seems either to drop it or to pass it with a proviso that it should not come into force until after the next contested general election. Whether such a decision would be unpalatable to Liberals, only inside knowledge can tell; but to the outsider any manipulation of the franchise, the fairness of which was at all open to question, would of all measures appear the most provocative, especially after the series of preceding events.

Somewhat similar considerations govern the problem of an Election. Questionings and rumours appear rife. As the end of 1915 completes the five years of existence prescribed by the Parliament Act, much no doubt depends on the course of the war. An election during hostilities is inconceivable. But uncertainty in itself is harmful in view of the prevailing condition of mistrust; and it would be to the general good if some statement could be made. Probably a postponement following the French model would be best, with a proviso that an election should take place, say, six months after the conclusion of peace or armistice for negotiations. This could be effected by an amendment of the Parliament Act, or, if this was considered objectionable by Liberals, by an election, uncontested on both sides, with security

for a contested election six months after the date of peace or of the armistice.*

The preceding suppositions are, of course, all based on the hypothesis that, when the war is ended, British politics will run again on much the same lines as before it began. On the other hand, a coalition, such as has taken place in France, is always a possible eventuality. It would at least be an evidence of national determination, stronger than any speeches or proclamations, welcome at once to our Allies and convincing to friendly neutrals. But the likelihood of such a development is not great, as affairs appear at present. In truth, it would not much matter, provided that there can be conservation of energy, and that efficiency is coupled with determination. Unhappily, in the eyes of a critic, it is just this conservation of force and this efficiency which in their full measure are prejudiced by the present internal distrust and antagonism. Even from the merely party point of view it is likely that that party which could fully rise to the occasion, and which would give its life, would find it. From the national point of view, however, the issue is one of much greater significance. What is a nation worth which cannot attain a real unity in such a crisis as the present? What will be the future of Britain, if even now she knows not the hour of her visitation?

The foregoing pages were written before the Commons debate of March 15. What then happened confirms what has been said above. An agreement as foreshadowed on p. 562 has been reached. Once definitely decided, Mr Lloyd George defended it with characteristic courage, but it is clear that it was only reached after considerable searchings of heart. Again, as pointed out on p. 561, the debate showed how easily the turmoil of party warfare may openly break out; and it is possible that the passage of the Amending Bill in April may show similar expressions of feeling.

* It seems doubtful whether such a 'dummy' election would prove practicable on closer consideration. The idea, however, has secured the influential support of the Chancellor of the Exchequer and others.

Art. 15.—THE LAW OF NEUTRALITY AND THE PRESENT WAR.

INTERNATIONAL 'law' is the label by which, not having a word corresponding to *Droit* and *Recht*, we describe a heterogeneous mass of alleged rules of inter-state conduct. Until, roughly, the last half-century these rules were derived from the practice of States, supplemented by deductions drawn by text-writers from the reason of the case. They constituted a fairly certain nucleus, fringed with uncertainties, and they inevitably lacked precision.

The only really satisfactory way of making international law is that which began with the Declaration of Paris, 1856, namely, by express Convention. The series was continued in the Declaration of St Petersburg, 1868 (forbidding the use of explosive bullets); the (unratified) Declaration of Brussels, 1874 (on the laws of land-war); the Geneva ('Red Cross') Conventions of 1864 and 1906; the Conventions drawn up at the two Peace Conferences of The Hague, 1899 and 1907; and the (unratified) Declaration of London, 1909 (about naval warfare). These 'law-making' treaties are the nearest approach in the international area to enacted municipal law. Inasmuch, however, as none of them has been agreed to by all States, they form what has been called a general, as contrasted with a universal, international law. And as regards the Conventions entered into at The Hague in 1907 it is to be noted that each of those which relate to conduct during war (i.e. Nos IV to XIII) contains a proviso that it is only to apply 'if all the belligerents are parties to the Convention.' Now, Montenegro and Servia and Turkey have ratified none of them and, therefore, they are all technically inoperative as Conventions during the present war. Still, even the unratified Conventions, and those to which this or that State is not a party, or which are inoperative *pro hac vice*, possess a value only less than that of a generally operative Convention. They represent the reasoned convictions of specially-appointed state-agents as to what, having regard to the moral standards of the day, is right state-behaviour, or, in the case of a compromise,

as to what is reasonable in the circumstances. Hence we find that the Declaration of Paris was observed by two non-signatory Powers, Spain and the United States, when at war with each other in 1898; the unratified Declaration of London was appealed to in the Italo-Turkish War of 1912, as also by the Dutch in the recent case of the 'Medea' ('Times,' March 29); and several States, e.g. Argentina and Greece, in their Proclamations of Neutrality during the present war, have taken the technically inoperative Hague Conventions as their standard of conduct.

We propose to review here some of the happenings of the present war which affirm or tend to modify the rules operating between belligerents and neutrals.

Passage of belligerent troops over neutral territory.—This is one of the cases in which there was, until recently, no rule except that which arose from the nature of the case. The jurists were not quite agreed. The opinion of some of the older writers, that a neutral must on demand allow this passage, had, indeed, been rejected in the light of stricter doctrines as to territorial sovereignty; but there were some (e.g. Sir T. Twiss, writing about half a century ago) who thought that a neutral did not compromise his neutrality by granting passage to one belligerent provided he was ready to grant it to the other. Against this it was pointed out (e.g. by Heffter) that this was quite inconsistent with the requisite impartiality, because this passage would always be more advantageous to one belligerent than to the other—a criticism admirably illustrated on the Belgian frontiers at the beginning of the present war. The overwhelming majority of writers was of the same opinion as Heffter. In 1907 the pronouncement agreed to at The Hague resolved all doubts. Convention V ('Neutral Powers and Persons in Land Warfare') said:

'Art. 1. The territory of neutral Powers is inviolable.

'Art. 2. Belligerents are forbidden to move across the territory of a neutral Power troops or convoys, either of munitions of war or of supplies.

'Art. 5. A neutral Power ought not to allow ("tolérer") on its territory any of the acts referred to in Arts. 2 to 4.'

Accordingly, the demands made on these States by Germany in the early days of last August were an invitation to them to violate the duty owed by them to France.

Passage of the Dutch portion of the Scheldt by naval forces of the Powers now belligerent is governed by the same general principles, for whatever rights of navigating the lower waters were granted by the Treaty of Vienna, 1814, were granted 'sous le rapport du commerce' only. The Scheldt being here a territorial river and not a part of the sea, an attack on Antwerp from the sea would come under the rubric 'Land Warfare'; and the articles cited above from Convention V (1907) would forbid its use for that purpose. This being so, it follows that the converse use of the waters by the Power in possession of Antwerp in order to carry on war in the open sea could not be allowed without a violation of the duty of impartiality. If, then, it be true that Germany is building at Antwerp submarines too large to pass to the sea except through the lower Scheldt, an improper use of these waters is contemplated which the Dutch ought to check by all available means.* That the Dutch would take a strict view of their duty is confirmed, if any confirmation be needed, by their refusal, after the fall of Antwerp, to allow the exit of merchantmen which had been taken by the Belgians as prize of war.

It is in China that the most conspicuous instances of the violation of neutral soil have occurred during the present war. These fall under two heads. First, those troops of the belligerent Powers which were guarding their national embassies at Peking when the war began could not join their main bodies without passing over Chinese soil. The President of China forbade this by a provision in his Neutrality Mandate.

'Troops of any of the belligerents,' it ran, 'their munitions of war or supplies, are not allowed to cross the territory of China. . . . The guards attached to the Legations of the various Powers in Peking . . . are not allowed to interfere with the

* When the erection of forts at Flushing and Terneuzen was in contemplation only, the late Mr Westlake pointed out that it would increase for the Dutch the effectiveness of the obligation contained in the words 'not to tolerate' in Art. 5 above mentioned. See 'Revue de Droit International,' 2nd ser., vol. xiii, p. 105.

present war. . . . Those who do not conform to the foregoing provision may be interned and disarmed by China until the termination of the war.'

Nevertheless the guard attached to the German Legation made its way to Kiaochau; and probably the guards of other belligerent Powers paid as little respect to Chinese neutrality. The circumstances of this case were so anomalous—the foreign troops being lawfully in China on the outbreak of the war—that ordinary considerations can hardly apply. The second instance referred to above is a clearer case of violation of neutral rights and of inability to carry out neutral obligations. The Germans had transported troops and material of war into Kiaochau by the Shantung railway, which, though a German concession, ran for 250 miles outside the part of China leased to Germany; the Japanese landed troops at Lungkow and travelled at least an equal distance across Chinese soil in order to invest Tsingtao on the land side. The Chinese Government protested, but to deaf ears. At the same time the President proposed to establish a war-zone such as had been established in the Russo-Japanese war, and disclaimed responsibility for the enforcement of neutrality there. The zone was a defined part of the peninsula north of Kiaochau Bay. Germany in reply warned China that she held her responsible for losses caused by her acquiescence in the use of her territory for hostilities; the Allies in their reply (so it seems) simply justified their conduct as the inevitable result of violations of neutrality previously committed by Germany.*

Passage of belligerent vessels over neutral 'territorial sea.'—No rule, customary or conventional, forbids a belligerent to send his ships of war over neutral territorial waters which are part of the sea. This is one of many instances showing that different considerations apply to water and to land. The question does not assume first-rate importance unless the territorial waters are the only way between two parts of the open sea, as in the case of the Sound and the Belts. The precedent furnished in 1854, when British and French ships, hostile

* The fuller story can be read in the deeply interesting account given by Sir F. Pigcott in the March number of the 'Nineteenth Century,' to which we are indebted for the facts set out above.

to Russia, passed the Sound without protest, is in favour, if not of a right of passage, at any rate of the non-existence of a neutral duty to restrain it. So also is the fact that in 1870 Prussia raised no objection on this score to a blockade of her Baltic coasts by the French. The topic was discussed by the Institute of International Law in 1894; and, while it was conceded that a neutral had a right to *regulate* the passage of its waters by ships of war, it was added, 'Straits which form a channel from one open sea to another can never be closed.' The reasonableness of allowing a neutral to regulate the passage of belligerent war-vessels through its territorial straits is obvious, for the straits might otherwise become the scene of hostilities, to the no small hurt of the adjacent shores. When, however, the matter came up at the second Peace Conference, nothing more was decided than that a neutral was not compromised by 'le simple passage' or the employment of its pilots by a belligerent warship. (Convention XIII (1907), Art. 10, 11.) If it enforced its right of regulating passage by the use of mines, this provision about the employment of pilots would be important. Whether this whole question has become actual in the present war cannot be stated until full information is obtainable with regard to the extent to which free navigation of the Sound and the Belts has been allowed.

Passage of belligerent air-craft over neutral territory.—The modern development of aeronautics has brought new problems before international law. A fundamental question is whether the subjacent state is sovereign of the air at all heights, or whether the air is free from territorial sovereignty, its navigation being merely limited in certain respects in the interest of the subjacent state. The question is an open one as yet. Switzerland made a definite stand in favour of the doctrine of territorial sovereignty of the air in connexion with the raid on the Zeppelin works at Friedrichshafen by British airmen on Nov. 21, 1914. Although the airmen had received instructions not to fly over Swiss territory, the evidence showed that they had done so. The Swiss Federal Council thereupon addressed a protest to both France and Great Britain. Both Governments expressed regret. The British note said that the airmen's failure

to carry out the instructions must be attributed to accident or to the difficulty of knowing, when at a great height, what the exact position of an aeroplane is. The note also contained the following reservation :

'The British Government wishes to take this opportunity of stating that the orders given to the aviators and the expression of regret for the non-observance of its instructions are not to be interpreted as a recognition by the British Government of the existence of a sovereignty of the air.'*

The reply of the Swiss Federal Council was that, as International Law does not recognise any limit to the sovereignty of the air, the Council must claim this sovereignty to its full extent; and it pointed out that, since the mobilisation of the Swiss army, it had issued instructions accordingly. ('Times,' Dec. 8, 1914.) The right thus asserted was maintained in practice a little later. A message to the 'Times' from Berne, dated Feb. 4, 1915, said, 'A foreign aeroplane flew over Swiss territory near Porrentruy at a great height. It was shot at by Swiss soldiers, but escaped.' Holland has repeatedly asserted in the same practical way the right of preventing the flight of belligerent aircraft over its territory; so early as August last the Dutch fired on a German dirigible (see 'Times,' Aug. 22).

Hostilities on neutral territory.—Hostilities are not permitted on neutral land. And although, as we shall see, a belligerent is allowed to use neutral waters in a way which has no parallel as regards neutral land, the rule about hostilities is the same in both cases. The territorial sea is the 'three-mile belt,' a width fixed in the 18th century by reference to the maximum distance commanded at that time by a gun of position. Now, although three miles is still the width for purposes of jurisdiction and sovereignty, much may be said for an increase of the width for purposes of neutrality; for it

* This reservation can only have been inserted out of caution, for the British Government does not seem to have adopted elsewhere an attitude in favour of the rival doctrine of the freedom of the air. Indeed, the British Aerial Navigation Act, 1913, implicitly asserts the doctrine of sovereignty; for it empowers the Government to forbid the navigation of aircraft over 'the whole or any part of the coast-line of the United Kingdom and the territorial waters adjacent thereto.'

is clear that, if a naval engagement took place now just outside the three-mile belt, it might go hard with many miles of neutral coast. The increase to, say, ten miles would have the further advantage of keeping a belligerent cruiser out of range of sight from the shore when it was performing the invidious but legitimate task of watching the neutral waters in order to prevent the escape of an enemy vessel or the transport of contraband. There is reason, then, in the step taken by Turkey, while still neutral in the present war, when she proposed to increase the width of her territorial waters to six miles. France had already, by a decree of Oct. 18, 1912, adopted, to meet the event of her being neutral in a maritime war, a width of eleven kilometres, measured from low-water mark.

A neutral may, of course, take precautionary steps to prevent a violation of its territorial waters. An instance of this occurred lately. The Government of Chile, says a communication printed in the 'Times' of Nov. 5, 1914,

'has . . . in order to procure respect for its neutrality, effectively employed her war-ships, which have convoyed, within territorial waters, merchant-vessels flying a belligerent flag that were threatened by cruisers of a contending nation. The most recent instances are the protection afforded to the British steamships "Ortega" and "Oronsa" by Chilean cruisers—to the first-named in the territorial waters of the Straits of Magellan, and to the other further north.'

Respect for neutral waters led to the escape of the German cruisers 'Breslau' and 'Goeben' from Messina early in the war; but in two cases Germany has taxed Great Britain with a violation of neutral waters. A complaint (not, perhaps, official) was made that when the armed liner 'Kaiser Wilhelm der Grosse' was sunk by the 'Highflyer' off the Atlantic coast of Africa she was in neutral waters, although the engagement had begun in the high seas. And a complaint has been made that the attack on the 'Dresden' was begun when she was but a few hundred yards from the shore of the Chilean island of Juan Fernandez. If the facts were as alleged, a wrong would have been done in both cases, for which redress is due to the neutral; although, as regards the former case, there is the authority of

Bynkershoek for saying that a vessel escaping from battle into neutral waters may be pursued there *dum fervet opus*, provided no harm be done to the neutral. At the same time there may be circumstances which excuse, even if they do not justify, the attacking belligerent. Thus, it is recognised (as we shall see later) that a vessel which seeks in neutral waters an asylum from attack or capture must be detained during the war unless it quits reasonably soon. What, then, if the neutral waters into which a vessel is hunted are so remote that it is futile to look to the home Government to take immediate action? what if there be no local authority or if the local authority be impotent or supine, so that there is nothing to prevent the vessel from abusing the asylum by a stay prolonged until departure be safe? Is not the pursuer excused if in any such case he takes the law into his own hands?

Neutral land and asylum to combatants.—When fugitives from land-war escape into neutral territory, the neutral must, if it receives them, do what in him lies to prevent them from rejoining their army. This doctrine is quite modern. It was applied by Belgium and Switzerland to fugitive French soldiers during the war of 1870–1871. Some think it unduly favourable to the other belligerent, as giving him without fighting all he could hope to get by fighting. But it received the sanction of both the Peace Conferences at The Hague; and so the conduct of the Dutch in disarming and intern-ing British combatants who crossed the Dutch frontier in their retreat from Antwerp was strictly proper. These fugitives are not prisoners of war; their internment is simply a measure of ‘political police.’

Asylum to war-ships of a belligerent.—The rules about asylum on neutral territory are not so severe and uniform in the case of war-ships as in the case of land-troops. The unity of the sea and the nature of the risks shared by all seafarers have bred traditions of international hospitality in ports and roadsteads; the foreign man-of-war is one of the common objects of the seaport. Hence it is everywhere conceded that a neutral may shelter a belligerent war-ship whether fugitive or not. But there are limits. If the sheltering vessel were allowed by the neutral to delay its departure at its

pleasure and until the moment most disadvantageous to its enemy, there would be a breach of what the United States describes in its Proclamation of Neutrality as 'the duty of a neutral government not to permit or suffer the making of its waters subservient to the purposes of war.' The rule is to name a maximum duration for the visit. This rule is new; there was a trend in its direction before, but it was not fixed until the Hague Conference of 1907. The normal length of innocent stay was then fixed at twenty-four hours;* but a neutral may adopt any other period it chooses—France takes thrice twenty-four hours. What if the vessel outstays this period? The Hague Convention simply says that the neutral may take such measures as it considers necessary to render it incapable of putting to sea so long as the war lasts; the officers and crew are to be 'detained' with it; internment is not mentioned.

When Germany signed the Convention (XIII of 1907) containing the rule just mentioned, she made a reservation with regard to the Article in which it is found. But there have been many instances in the present war in which it has been enforced against her. Directly the war broke out, officials searched the German liners then lying in ports of the United States with a view to applying the rule to such of them as had an offensive armament. And the United States has since interned German cruisers under this rule, not only in ports on its mainland, but also, for instance, in Honolulu and at Guam in the Ladrone Archipelago. Norway is reported to have taken the same course; and in February last a German auxiliary cruiser was interned by Argentina. The United States, it may be added, deems it its duty to use due diligence to prevent the escape of vessels so interned. On one occasion when some of them were

* This is really the complement of another much older 'twenty-four hours' rule. The older rule said that, when war-ships of two enemy powers were together in the same neutral port, one of them must not sail within twenty-four hours of the departure of the other. In 1861 a Federal war-ship abused this rule. It arrived in Southampton Water when a Confederate cruiser was in dock there, and, by always being ready to start before its enemy, was able practically to blockade it in British waters. In Jan. 1862, accordingly, Great Britain issued the rule about a maximum stay of twenty-four hours, since adopted by many other powers, notably by the United States and Japan.

reported to be meditating a dash for the sea, Federal officials searched them in order to test the truth of the rumour ('Times,' March 8). The commanders of warships stationed in New York and Boston received orders to use force if necessary to prevent such a departure ('Morning Post,' March 16); and a German vessel which actually made the attempt at San Juan in Puerto Rico was driven back by shell-fire from the American guard-ship ('Times,' March 23). Further, a belligerent war-vessel, which after repairing in a United States port quits as an alternative to detention, will not be allowed to hug the American coast, but must put out into the open sea; this was laid down, according to a Central News message printed in the newspapers for March 31, in the case of the German cruiser 'Prinz Eitel Friedrich.'

Asylum to individual naval combatants.—The circumstances in which combatants may take refuge with a neutral from perils by sea are various. It may be from their own boats or by the enemy that they are landed on neutral soil, or they may have been picked up by a neutral vessel, either a man-of-war or privately owned; they may be the survivors of a naval engagement or the victims of mines, tempest or accident. It would seem as if one and the same rule should govern all these cases, namely, that the enemy might in no case demand their surrender—unless, indeed, the neutral vessel had intruded into an unfinished engagement in order to rescue them—and that in all cases the neutral should take the steps necessary to prevent them from serving again during the war. In fact, however, no such simple and uniform rule is recognised.

A dispute about this matter arose between Great Britain and the United States in 1864 in connexion with the sinking of the 'Alabama' by the 'Kearsage' off Cherbourg. An Englishman who witnessed the fight from his yacht picked up some survivors from the 'Alabama,' including its captain, Semmes. He then sailed straight for Southampton, where the rescued men were landed and allowed to go free. It seems that the 'Alabama' had struck its colours before sinking, so that Semmes and his crew were virtually prisoners of war; but the rescuer was unaware of this and declared that he had been bidden by the captain of the 'Kearsage' to do what

he could to save the men. The United States Government, however, complained that he ought to have handed over all the saved to the victor. The British Government was unable to agree. The matter went no further.

This topic was discussed at the first Peace Conference, but opinions were so divergent that no rule was adopted. More success was attained in 1907. By Convention X ('The Geneva Convention and maritime warfare') an agreement was made concerning wounded, sick, or shipwrecked combatants, which may be roughly summarised as follows:—(I) A belligerent war-ship may demand their surrender* from hospital-ships and private vessels of all nationalities (Art. 12). (II) They must abstain or be prevented from rendering further service during the war in the following cases, (i) when received on board a neutral war-ship (Art. 13), (ii) when landed by their enemy at one of their own ports (Art. 14), and (iii) when landed [by a belligerent] at a neutral port (Art. 15).

We can now see how it came about in this war that sailors sheltering in neutral countries were at one time interned and at another let go free. After the German armed liner 'Cap Trafalgar' was sunk by the British armed liner 'Carmania' on Sept. 14 last, her crew were landed in Argentina by one of her colliers; they were interned under Art. 15. Some of the men of our own navy, however, who were landed in Holland after their ship was torpedoed on Sept. 22 were released unconditionally. This is because they were rescued and brought on to neutral soil by fishing vessels. It will be seen that Art. 13 provides for the internment of those only who have been rescued by war-ships. It might, indeed, be thought that, as Art. 15 does not itself contain the words inserted above—'by a belligerent'—the men should have been interned because they were 'landed at a neutral port.' But it appears from a Report of the Committee which drafted the Convention that the Art. was meant to apply only to men landed by a belligerent; and such an ancillary

* Great Britain made a reservation that she understands this to apply only to combatants rescued during or after a naval engagement in which they have taken part; not, e.g., to men rescued after shipwreck caused by storm or a casual mine.

document has an authority in continental jurisprudence which is not known in the interpretation of a British statute. The men were, therefore, released because, though landed at a neutral port, they were not landed by a belligerent. If the technical reason of their release were explained to them, they would doubtless marvel as well as rejoice—especially as, under Art. 12, an enemy cruiser could have required their surrender to him by the rescuing fishing-vessels. The same rules have been applied to combatant aviators who have been rescued from the sea. In one case, Commander Hewlett who fell into the sea and was picked up by a neutral fishing-boat was allowed to return to England; in another, Flight-Lieutenant Murray, having in a similar predicament been picked up by a neutral war-vessel, was interned.

Supplies from neutral ports for belligerent war-vessels.—A neutral may grant other facilities than asylum to a belligerent war-vessel which enters its ports. Whatever the visitor needs in order to continue its active life as a vessel, as distinguished from a war-vessel—fuel, victuals, men, repairs—may be supplied in the neutral port without any breach of neutrality. Limits must, however, be observed; for it is obviously inconsistent with neutrality that such assistance should be rendered in the port as would make it a base of operations for the ship. The difficulty is to draw the line. This topic was discussed at the second Hague Peace Conference, and certain articles were agreed on which turn into general law rules previously enforced by this or that individual state. These articles are in Convention XIII of 1907 ('Neutral rights and duties in maritime war'). By them a belligerent war-ship in a neutral port is allowed to carry out such repairs as are absolutely necessary to render it seaworthy, but not such as in any way to put it in better fighting trim; to revictual so as to bring its supplies up to the peace standard; and, as regards fuel, to take in sufficient to enable it to reach the nearest port in its own country or even to fill its bunkers if this be the limit fixed by the neutral. What the Convention forbids is that the ship should replenish or increase its supplies of war material or its armament in neutral waters, or complete its crew, or, if it has once shipped

fuel in a neutral port, replenish its supply in a port of the same Power within the three succeeding months.

It will be noticed that no distinction is drawn above between repairs necessitated by injuries sustained in battle and other repairs. A proposal was indeed made to forbid the former, but it was abandoned on the ground that it might sometimes be impossible to assign the exact cause of the need for repairs. Instead it was expressly left to the neutral to indicate in each case what repairs might be carried out. Nothing in the Convention prevents the neutral from declining to allow the repair of injuries sustained in battle. The proper course would seem to be to disallow such repairs. This was the course adopted in the Russo-Japanese war, two years before the date of the Convention, by the United States; three Russian war-ships put into Manila in May 1905, after having been badly damaged in action; leave to repair them there was asked, but it was refused on the ground that no extension of the 'twenty-four hours' rule could be granted in such circumstances. The precedent is a valuable one. No similar question seems to have arisen as yet in the present war. After the battle off the Falkland Islands the German cruiser 'Dresden' is reported to have made for Punta Arenas, a Chilean settlement on the eastern part of the Straits of Magellan, and to have coaled there, but no mention is made of any repairing.* In the case of the small German cruiser 'Geier,' the need of repair was, it may be presumed, not due to battle; the successive telegrams appearing in the 'Times' concerning this vessel furnish, all the same, an interesting illustration of neutral diligence on the matter before us. They are as follows:

'October 19, 1914.—Honolulu, Oct. 17.—The German cruiser "Geier" will remain here indefinitely, repairing her engines, which will require several weeks. . . . American naval experts will determine what repairs are necessary. . . .

'November 1.—Tokio, Oct. 31.—The "Nichi Nichi Shimbun" to-day publishes a message from Honolulu which says that although the repairs to the German cruiser "Geier" are finished, the vessel is now seeking an excuse to remain in port for the purpose of keeping a Japanese war-ship occupied

* See official French announcement in the 'Times' of Dec. 26, 1914.

in watching her. A joint British and Japanese protest to the local authorities has proved futile, and joint representations will now be made at Washington.

'November 6.—Washington, Nov. 4.—The authorities here have fixed a date by which the German cruiser "Geier," which has been under repair for some weeks at Honolulu, must either leave port or be interned. In order to give the "Geier" a chance of avoiding the Japanese cruisers, the date is being kept secret.

'November 10.—Washington, Nov. 9.—The German cruiser "Geier" has been interned at Honolulu until the end of the war. She failed to leave the port within the time-limit set by the United States.'

Another admirable instance of United States sensitiveness to the claims of neutral duty is afforded—according to a message from Washington printed in the 'Morning Post' for March 16—in connexion with the flight of the German cruiser 'Prinz Eitel Friedrich' into American waters. The message says:

'Unofficially a report has reached Washington that Capt. Thierichsen declares his boilers are in such a bad condition from the continued use of sea-water that he must have new boilers to put the vessel in a seaworthy condition, but there is a very grave doubt as to whether the Government will permit new boilers to be installed. Lawyers hold that under the strict construction of international law repairs may be made to a belligerent vessel in a neutral port, but that the terms of the repairs must not be made so elastic as to include rebuilding. To replace damaged boiler-tubes would be proper, but to replace worn-out boilers with new ones would violate the well-established practice of nations.'

If a belligerent war-vessel were repeatedly to come into a given neutral port and fill up its fuel-bunkers, it would undoubtedly be abusing the hospitality of the neutral, and the neutral who knowingly allowed this would commit a breach of neutral duty. But suppose the war-vessel never enters territorial waters of the neutral but arranges for a number of merchantmen to bring fuel out from the neutral port and deliver it on the high seas; is the neutral bound to put a stop to this if he can? It might be argued that the belligerent in such a case is not making the neutral port a base of operations, for it never enters that port, but is simply

drawing supplies from a neutral country by sea, an operation which renders the goods liable to capture as contraband but does not involve the neutral in any breach of duty. On the other hand, it may be urged that the merchantman is practically turning itself into a tender to the belligerent fleet and, as such, is itself become a belligerent war-vessel. The United States adopts the latter view. This is clear from the Rules issued on Sept. 19, 1914, for the guidance of its port-officials in dealing with cases like these; the Rules speak of the supply of fuel, etc., to a belligerent war-vessel either 'directly or by means of . . . merchant vessels of belligerent or neutral nationality acting as tenders.'

The State of Chile has carried the same view into practice. It has been ascertained that German cruisers in the Pacific have been systematically supplied with provisions and fuel by German merchantmen which have loaded in American, especially South American, ports. These merchantmen would declare that they were bound for Hamburg or Bremen and would load enough coal to take them to those ports and also large amounts of food-stuffs. A letter from Santiago (Chile) dated Nov. 9 and printed in the 'Times' of Dec. 16, 1914, cites an instance in which wireless communications between one of these steamers and German cruisers were intercepted by Chilean wireless stations. In the same letter it is pointed out how difficult it was for the port authorities, suspicious as they might be, to refuse the request of German steamers to be allowed to load the coal, seeing that British steamers sailing for Liverpool were regularly obtaining the large amount of coal required to take them to their destination. The German merchantmen, after delivering the coal, etc., to their cruisers, made as a rule for some other neutral state than that from which they had sailed.* It was not until the 'Karnak' broke that

* The Rules of Sept. 19, 1914, mentioned in the text, show that on this point the United States authorities were 'ware and waking.' In describing matters which would amount to circumstantial evidence that a merchant vessel laden with fuel or other naval supplies intended to deliver its cargo to a belligerent war-ship, Rule 3 includes the following: 'Where a merchant vessel has on a previous voyage between ports of the United States and ports of other neutral states failed to have on board at the port of arrival a cargo consisting of naval supplies shipped at the port of departure, . . .'

rule that the Chilean authorities were able to act. The 'Karnak' left Iquique on Oct. 2 with 6000 tons of coal, declaring her destination to be San Francisco via Callao. On Oct. 26 she arrived empty at another Chilean port, Antofagasta, 'with indications in her appearance that she had transferred her cargo at sea. She declared to the authorities that she had been chased by a British cruiser and had jettisoned her coal' ('Times,' Nov. 9, 1914). This excuse was transparently false; and the Chilean Government, on the British minister protesting, ordered an enquiry, and laid it down that, if steamers are proved or strongly suspected in these circumstances to have made false declarations, 'such steamers will be treated as ships forming part of a belligerent navy' ('Times,' Dec. 16) and will be detained until the end of the war. Subsequently two other German steamers, the 'Luxor' and the 'Memphis,' left a Chilean port without clearance-papers in order to take supplies to German cruisers. The Chilean Government not only ordered the capture of both vessels but, in consequence of this and other breaches of neutrality by ships of the 'Kosmos' line, forbade any of the vessels of this line to take on coal or provisions in any Chilean port pending investigations ('Times,' Nov. 23).

JOHN PAWLEY BATE.

Further remarks on the Law of Neutrality as illustrated by the present war will be made in a subsequent article.

Art. 16.—THE WAR.

I.—BY LAND.

DURING the past three months of war the principal scenes of the great drama have continued to be enacted on the Russian front. While the Allied armies, undeterred by conditions of weather that have in some localities made movement almost impossible, have, by ceaseless activity, compelled the Germans to keep very large forces in France, the latter, with their Austrian allies, have continued their offensive against Russia with a perseverance which in a better cause could not fail to command admiration. But, despite continuous fighting in both theatres of war, neither the Allies nor the enemy have achieved more than local and partial successes.

In order to apprehend the significance of military operations and the degree of success attending them it is first necessary to understand the object they are designed to attain. In this lies one great difficulty of reviewing a current campaign—that the object of the operations on either side is not definitely known. It can only be conjectured; and an erroneous conjecture not only vitiates all deductions based upon it, but may lead to distorted views on general questions. Thus, at the beginning of the war, it was generally supposed by non-military critics that the object of the German invasion of France was to attack or invest Paris; and because Paris escaped its supposed fate and the Germans turned aside to attack the Allied armies south of the Marne, the enemy's whole plan was assumed to have failed. On this occasion the reputation of the German General Staff became so discredited that many of the critics have never since been able to discern anything but flurry and ineptitude in many skilful and dashing strokes designed by a body of officers among whose failings lack of coolness and ability certainly finds no place. It is quite true that the Germans laid their march on Paris; and, partly to inspire their troops to great exertions, partly, perhaps, with the idea of intimidating the Allies, announced their intention of being in the capital by a certain date. But this presupposed the defeat of the Allied armies, after which the investment of Paris would

probably have been effected principally by second-line troops, the field army being released to operate against Russia. The Germans, in fact, acted in accordance with the principle which has governed the opening of nearly every offensive campaign since field armies became mobile, namely, to strike straight at the enemy's capital, or at some great centre of the nation's life and population which the hostile army cannot afford to abandon to its fate. The first object of war being the destruction of the enemy's army, the surest step towards that end at the beginning of a campaign is to strike along a line on which the enemy is certain to be found. A general engagement is thus ensured at the earliest possible moment, while the defending army is yet, perhaps, not fully prepared. The Germans turned aside from Paris at the beginning of September because the Allied army, though severely handled, was still unbeaten; and while it remained unbeaten any attempt to attack the Capital would have been unsafe and useless. For it is not to be imagined that the Allied army would have played the part of spectator at the sack of Paris; and the Germans were not strong enough to combine an attack on the great fortress with an offensive campaign in the field.

While the Germans at the outset of the French campaign were animated by the single purpose of defeating the Allied army as the first step towards the subjugation of the French nation, and as a preliminary to throwing their field army against Russia, the conditions of the campaign on the eastern front are more complex, making it impossible to determine precisely what object the enemy has in view. In every case the object can be conjectured only by determining from military considerations what would be the best course of action, and assuming that this course will be adopted. But without full knowledge of all the conditions the best course cannot be determined with any confidence; and, even when the military conditions are sufficiently known, political considerations may exercise an unforeseen influence which upsets the calculation. In the case of the Russian campaign, among many uncertain quantities there is one fact which dominates the German aims. For reasons dealt with in our article last January, Germany must bring the French campaign to a conclusion

before seeking a final decision against Russia. In no other way can she hope to dictate terms to the Allied Governments. It is therefore safe to conclude that in the present operations Germany does not expect to accomplish more than to reduce the Russian armies to a condition of inactivity for a sufficient period to permit of her throwing all her available strength against the Allied army, in order to destroy it and compel France to come to terms. If that were accomplished, Russia and Great Britain could be dealt with at leisure.

The circumstances which make Warsaw a point of great military importance were referred to in the last article. Briefly, it is one of the keys to the whole defensive system of Eastern Poland. This region, in its turn, constitutes a great *place d'armes*, well provided with railway communications, where Russian armies may assemble for operations against either Germany or Austria. It is enclosed on the north and west by the rivers Bobr, Narew, and Vistula, fortified bridges on the roads and railways providing for free egress; on the south it lies open to Galicia. In rear of it to the east the wilderness of the Pinsk Marshes fills the space between the Dnieper in the east and the Bug in the west, with a breadth from north to south varying from two hundred to three hundred miles. This vast area of marsh and forest, intersected by innumerable rivers, is quite impracticable for military operations.

The significance of the struggle for possession of the line of the Vistula, which has continued since early in October, may now be imagined. If the Germans gained the Vistula, the Russian armies would have to fall back from Western Galicia and the Carpathians, and the line of the Bobr and Narew would be turned. The further proceedings would depend on the state of the Russian armies after the series of defeats by which the Germans would have gained these advantages, and on the demands of the situation in France and elsewhere. The Germans might attempt to throw the Russians back on the Pinsk Marshes, advancing to the line of the Bug; but if, as is more likely, they were to rest content with holding the line of the Polish rivers, the invasion of Germany would at least be indefinitely deferred; and such troops as could be spared might be transferred to France to

assist in a final effort to overcome the Allied armies. In the absence of any practical alternative suggestion it will be assumed that the German plans have been formulated somewhat on the above lines.

At the beginning of the new year the Germans, by a rapid advance on Warsaw, had for the second time obliged the Russians to relinquish the offensive operations on which they were intent, and to concentrate considerable forces to defend the Polish capital. This second stroke had failed, less disastrously indeed than the earlier one, for reasons which need not be recapitulated. The Russian armies were firmly established on the line of the rivers Bzura, Rawka and Nida in Poland, and in Western Galicia on the Dunajetz. Further south fighting was proceeding on the Carpathian front in favour of the Russians, who were, moreover, again invading the Bukowina.

The failure of the Germans either to crush the Russian army in Poland or to possess themselves of the line of the Vistula, resulting, as it did, in a complete deadlock in Central and South Poland, invested the Carpathian front with quite a new importance. Its defence became as vital to the Germans as that of the Vistula had been to the Russians. Owing to the strength of the defences which had grown up in the course of the fighting during December, Poland had ceased to be a practicable area of active operations. Similarly the gap between the Upper Vistula and the Carpathians had become impregnable to either side. Only in the Carpathians was it reasonably possible for either army to break through or outflank the other. The complete command of the mountains once secured, the Austrians might endeavour to clear Galicia and turn the line of the Vistula; or the Russians might operate against the enemy's flank in Hungary, where it would find no secure support either from natural obstacles or neutral frontiers. Having regard to the deadlock which had existed for some months in France and East Prussia, and which had recently extended to Poland, the situation seemed pregnant with possibilities. Roumania was believed only to await a favourable opportunity and security against Turkish attack to throw in her lot with the Triple

Entente. Serbia, with her army reorganised and its equipment completed, was ready to exact vengeance from her assailant. It seemed not incredible that the plains of Hungary might be the scene of the penultimate act of the great drama; and that, when Austria had been beaten into submission, the invasion of Germany might come from the south.

These possibilities were not hidden from the minds of the German General Staff, who took immediate steps to guard against them. Rumour became very busy about events in Hungary. A fresh expedition against Serbia in which a couple of German army corps were to take part was sedulously advertised. The Hungarian railways were crowded with troops, Austrian and German. The Austrians made a show of bombarding Belgrade and occupying islands in the Danube. The thing was done so skilfully that the Serbians themselves were misled; and, in spite of military expediency and probability, it was generally believed in this country that Serbia was to be invaded in overwhelming force. It proved, however, to be only a clever ruse to cover the concentration on the Carpathian front of large German and Austrian forces, which quickly gained possession of all the passes east of and including the Uzok, and, by the end of the first week in February, were pouring into the Bukowina.

Concurrently with the despatch of troops (supposed to amount to at least four army corps) to help on the Carpathian front, the Germans began to prepare for a complementary move on the opposite wing. During the last week of January they renewed their attacks on the line of the River Rawka in the neighbourhood of Bolimoff with forces which, by Feb. 3, reached a total of seven divisions and a hundred batteries (probably about 100,000 men with 500 guns) on a front of about seven miles. Though this force was clearly inadequate, in the light of previous experience, to break through the Russian position in front of Warsaw unless highly favoured by fortune, the persistent violence of the attack was calculated to suggest such a design. Whether the Russian General Staff were misled is not certain, but they were admittedly surprised by the new move from which these attacks were intended to distract attention, namely, the

concentration of considerable forces on the eastern, or Niemen, front of East Prussia. In this region the Russian Tenth Army had embarked on an offensive movement towards the end of January, which by Feb. 2 reached the main German position on the River Angerap near Darkemen, and, further north, arrived within fifteen miles of Tilsit. Two days later the German concentration was detected, and the Russians were in the act of retiring when, on the 8th, a sudden attack combined with an outflanking movement led to the hurried retreat of the Russian right wing. This left the centre exposed, resulting in the twentieth army corps being enveloped and sustaining severe losses. The German right wing had meanwhile moved on Johannisberg and Lyck, driving the Russian left in the direction of Ossowetz, a fortress of the third class which guards the bridge by which the Königsberg—Bielostok railway crosses the River Bobr. The concentration of troops by which these rapid successes were attained comprised the 21st active army corps transferred from France, two newly-raised corps, and probably three or four army corps drawn from the Vistula front. These reinforcements, added to the force already on the Niemen front, probably made a total of nine or ten army corps, or from 400,000 to 440,000 men, who, according to German statements, were opposed by eleven Russian divisions, or about 200,000 men.

Having thus for the second time expelled the Russians from East Prussia, the Germans transferred a great part of the troops to reinforce the army corps, probably four or five in number, which had been deployed on the Narew front between Kolno and the Mława railway. Those which remained pursued the retiring Russians nearly as far as the Niemen, and detachments attempted to cross the river, apparently with the intention of destroying the Vilna-Warsaw railway. The Russian General Staff had meanwhile stated that the object of the retirement was to reorganise and reinforce the army under cover of the fortresses.

In spite of the unquestioned fact that a large part of the German forces had been promptly transferred to the Narew front, the view has been generally held by non-military commentators that the Germans intended to seize the line of the Niemen; and, because they did not

carry out this supposed intention, it has been assumed that they failed to give effect to their plans through exhaustion of their offensive power. The matter is obviously of some importance as indicating the value of the German army as an instrument for giving effect to the strategical plans of the General Staff. It also illustrates the importance of forming a correct idea of the object of military operations. If it was the purpose of the German General Staff to gain possession of the line of the Niemen, they failed in their purpose because of the inability of the army to develop the requisite offensive power. If, on the other hand, it had never been their intention to gain possession of the line of the Niemen, the commentators referred to have fallen into the error of underestimating the value of the German army; an error which, by misleading public opinion as to the magnitude of the effort needed to overcome the enemy's military power, might have serious consequences.

Considerations of space preclude a full discussion of the subject; but it may be said without hesitation that the view generally held is opposed to every consideration of military expediency. To hold the line of the Niemen is, from the German point of view, unnecessary at the present stage; it would entail unjustifiable extension of front; and, as a defensive line, the position is very disadvantageous because the country in rear of it, as far as the Prussian frontier, is a wilderness of swamp and forest, almost devoid of communications either by road or rail. For these reasons, among others not less weighty, it must be concluded that the German plan was successful in all essential points. The operations were prompt and decisive; the Russian army was severely handled and driven into the shelter of its fortresses; and a position was gained near the frontier which from the nature of the country and the communications is advantageous for the defence, and equally disadvantageous for the attack.

Concurrently with the fighting on the Niemen front there were daily encounters, from Feb. 7 onwards, along the whole Narew front from Johannisberg to the Vistula in the vicinity of Plock. On this front the Russians were favoured by the railway communications; and, as the German troops arrived from the Niemen front, they

were opposed by equal or superior Russian reinforcements. By Feb. 17 the fighting had become violent along the entire front, and on the 20th large German forces advanced with great impetuosity in the vicinity of Przasnysz. The battle, which raged furiously for ten days, appears to have culminated in a midnight panic, which caused the Germans to abandon their positions about Przasnysz on the night of the 26th—27th. The arrival of further reinforcements enabled the Germans to renew the offensive in this region on March 8, but the Russians gradually established a preponderance of force, and the enemy were being steadily pressed back towards the frontier when a general thaw, setting in about the 15th, made the continuance of connected operations impracticable.

The Germans have thus failed in three separate attempts to gain the control of the line of the Polish rivers. The first two attempts were made against the Vistula front; the last against the line of the Bobr and Narew, with the object of taking the line of the Vistula in rear. They have only succeeded in reaching the river-line at one point—Ossowetz on the Bobr—which they have attacked with heavy artillery, stated to comprise two 42-cm. howitzers, since Feb. 20. The fortress artillery appears to have had the advantage throughout, and the latest reports indicate that the attack is weakening.

The Russians, on the other hand, have attained their principal object, which has been essentially defensive. An invasion of East Prussia, or an advance from Western Poland on Posen, whatever might be the political effect, would not be justified on military grounds. The conquest of East Prussia would not end the war; and the further advance on Berlin is barred by the formidable obstacle of the Lower Vistula, so strongly guarded by fortresses as to be practically insurmountable. The province of Posen, though it lies on the shortest route to Berlin, is girt with swamps and forests; and beyond it the way is barred by the fortresses of the Oder. The fortress of Posen blocks the principal communications. The province itself is not of great political significance, and its lakes and marshes make it unsuitable for operations. An offensive from North or West

Poland would, therefore, offer no advantages. The Russians at the beginning of the war turned their attention to Silesia, for reasons which were indicated in the last article. The Austrian positions in Western Galicia have since become so strong that the Russians have concentrated their forces further south, and directed their efforts to the invasion of Hungary.

The situation on the Carpathian front has already been broadly outlined; it will now be examined more closely. The entrenched positions in Western Galicia, following the line of the rivers Dunajetz and Bialla, appear to merge in the broken country of the Carpathians in the region of Gorlice and Zmigrod. The Russian front is then thrown forward, beyond the Dukla and Lupkow passes, into the upper valleys of the Ondava and Laborcz. These advanced positions have been maintained since the end of January against numerous attacks. East of the Lupkow Pass the Russian line falls back into the valley of the Upper San in the neighbourhood of Baligrod, whence it runs parallel to the main ridge as far as the neighbourhood of the Wyskow Pass. This portion of the front has been the scene of heavy fighting, which has been especially severe at Koziowa, where the Russians occupy a formidable position on the high ground west of the railway from Stryj to Munkacs. Although the enemy hold the passes over this portion of the range, they have been unable to descend into the Galician plain. East of the Wyskow Pass they have been more successful. Early in February, while the Russians were developing their offensive in the region of the Dukla and Lupkow Passes, the Austrians concentrated large forces between Munkacs and the Roumanian frontier, and speedily drove the Russians from the Bukowina. The right of the line was then thrown forward, marching in the direction of Lemberg, while the centre advanced through the passes and co-operated with the movement. By Feb. 23 the Austrians had reached the line Dolina—Halicz, which seems to have been about the high-water mark of their offensive; for the Russians, having brought up reinforcements, defeated them in a series of engagements fought during the latter part of March in different localities between Halicz and Kolomea.

The purpose of these operations, regarded from the point of view of the Germanic Alliance, scarcely admits of doubt. The recovery of the Carpathians, the ejection of the Russians from Galicia, and, incidentally, the relief of Przemyśl were adequate objects to justify a campaign undertaken in the depth of winter, when snow lay deep in the higher regions, and frequent blizzards swept the frost-bound plains and valleys. The operations were complementary to those on the East Prussian front, and formed part of the general plan for holding back the Russian armies while a final bid should be made for victory in France.

The Russians, when confronted with the formidable concentration of German and Austrian troops in the Eastern Carpathians, suffered the disadvantages which are incidental to the defence of a mountain range. The entire front cannot be held in strength. The only practicable course is to hold all likely points of attack by fortified posts, and to place reserves at convenient places on the lateral communications in rear, from which they may be moved to threatened localities. The lateral movement of reserves is, however, hampered by the spurs which project from the main ridge; and the lateral roads usually, and railways invariably, keep to the more level country beyond the extremities of these spurs. Troops moving from point to point may, therefore, have to make considerable detours. On the other hand, the army which assumes the offensive enjoys the great advantage of being able to select the point of attack, where it can assemble secretly behind the mountain screen while making feints at other points. The locality of the real attack may be determined too late to enable the advanced position in the passes to be saved. When the problem of the defence is applied to the Russian front in the Carpathians, which had an extent of nearly 250 miles, the difficulties need no demonstration. They were much enhanced by the Russians being themselves engaged in an offensive against the Dukla—Lupkow front, where they had concentrated the bulk of their forces for the invasion of Hungary by the most direct route; while the scene of the enemy's concentration was 150 miles distant, in the locality where the Russian front was weakest. It is not, therefore,

surprising that our Allies were taken at a disadvantage, and that the Austrians made considerable progress in Eastern Galicia before they could be opposed in adequate strength.

The operations were admirably conceived, and it seemed for some time that they might be crowned with success. The advance from the Bukowina nearly as far as Stanislau was rapid, and was effected without much difficulty. The columns which descended from the Carpathian passes were in a position to turn the right flank of the Russian forces opposing the advance; while, having the passes open in their rear, they were themselves secure against being cut off. On reaching the vicinity of Stanislau, however, the conditions were changed; the advance came to a standstill, and the Austrians were defeated in several engagements. The details of the operations have not been disclosed, and the exact course of events can only be conjectured. It seems safe to conclude that the sudden collapse of an offensive which up to this point had been remarkably successful was due to two principal causes. The Russian arrangements for the redistribution of troops having begun to take effect, the Austrians found themselves confronted by formidable forces. The resistance thus encountered might have been overcome but for the failure of the flanking columns, which had secured the passes on the left of the advance, to carry the Russian positions on the lower spurs which barred their progress. Chief among these positions were those in the region of Koziowa, which a considerable German force had assailed almost without intermission since Feb. 8, but without success. Had these positions been carried, an attack would soon have been developed against the right flank of the Russian army in the Stanislau region, which would probably have been decisive. This suffices to explain the desperation of the German attacks on the Koziowa—Wyskow line, and the stubborn determination of the Russian defence which undoubtedly saved the situation.

So far as can be seen at present the only effect of the Austro-German offensive in Eastern Galicia has been to stop the advance of the Russians on the Dukla—Lupkow front, throwing them on the defensive; and to oblige

the Russians to effect a considerable redistribution of their troops, in order to concentrate large forces in Eastern Galicia. The invasion of Hungary, which seemed imminent in January, has, in consequence, been deferred. When the Austro-German army has been expelled from Eastern Galicia, the Russians will, however, be as well situated as in January to resume the offensive, having succeeded in retaining their advanced positions in the Ondava—Laborcz region, which the further progress of the enemy's offensive would soon have obliged them to relinquish.

Some points of resemblance may be observed between the strategical conception of the German invasion of Poland in November and the recent offensive on the Carpathian front. It was pointed out in the last article how, in the former case, the Russians were obliged by the nature of the German attack to abandon their project of invading Silesia, and to withdraw the troops which they had been concentrating for that purpose in the neighbourhood of Cracow. In the latter case the Austrian advance in Eastern Galicia stopped the invasion of Hungary because it jeopardised the lines of communication of the Russian armies in Western Galicia and the Carpathians. The danger threatening the communications was more imminent than any conceivable consequences of the invasion of Hungary. The Austrians could afford to ignore the latter, because, had the Russians persisted in their offensive, their communications would have been cut long before they could make any sensible impression on the Austrian army or territory. This is a consequence of the relation between the line of the Carpathians and the Russian line of communication Lemberg—Sanok. The former flanks the latter in such a degree that the Austrians, while operating against the rear of the Russian army, were able to ensure the safety of several alternative lines of retreat.

The situation in Eastern Galicia at the time of writing is not very clear. The official reports indicate that subsequent to March 15 the fighting south of the Dniester became less severe, and that since March 20 only isolated engagements have occurred. The coincidence of this change with the beginning of the thaw suggests the

explanation that the swollen condition of the rivers has necessitated the suspension of operations. About the same period the Russians resumed their offensive in the Dukla—Lupkow region, extending their front so as to embrace Bartfeld on the west and the Uzok Pass on the east. Success in the latter direction would soon oblige the enemy to withdraw from the Beskid Pass; and our Allies would then have control of the three principal railways leading across the Carpathians to Homonna, Ungvar and Munkacs respectively. Unofficial reports indicate that the Germans, appreciating the gravity of the situation, have despatched further reinforcements, probably consisting of new formations, to the assistance of their Allies.

The prolonged resistance of Przemyśl, and the successful defence of the third-class fortress of Ossowetz against the Germans' heaviest siege artillery, stand out in sharp contrast to the speedy subjugation of Antwerp and other strong places in the West. In the case of Przemyśl the Russian artillery appears to have been out-ranged and out-classed by the guns of the fortress, which were able to keep the Russian guns beyond effective range. It is stated that at the period of the Balkan wars, when there was some prospect of Austria becoming involved, the defences had been brought up to date, and that guns of the newest design and of great power had been mounted. Accounts are, however, somewhat conflicting, for there have been reports on several occasions of out-lying forts having been reduced and captured, which could not have been accomplished without effective artillery bombardment. In the case of Ossowetz it has been stated officially that the armoured cupolas providing shelter for the heavy guns escaped scatheless, which can only be explained by supposing either that the fortress artillery overmastered that of the attack, or that the latter failed to determine the range and position of the cupolas. It seems probable that both these causes contributed to the result. Owing to swamps and forests the country round Ossowetz provides few practicable positions for artillery, and the ranges of these had, no doubt, been accurately determined. On the other hand, the Germans probably

lacked the information regarding the effect of their fire which, certainly at Maubeuge and probably at other places, they obtained through such agencies as spies and subterranean telephone communication.

While Ossowetz has successfully filled its rôle by preventing the enemy from gaining the line of the Upper Bobr, thus setting the Russian field army free to deal with the formidable German concentration in the Przasnysz region, where the country, under normal conditions of weather, is more favourable for military operations than elsewhere in North Poland, Przemyśl has been of little, if any, assistance to the Austrians at any stage of the war in Galicia. Its situation at the angle formed by the course of the River San was theoretically admirable both for defence and to serve as a pivot of manœuvre for a field army actively defending Galicia. In the latter rôle it failed signally. It did not enable the Austrians to make a stand during the retreat after the battle fought near Lemberg in September, nor does it seem to have helped them materially in the fighting on the line of the San in the following month. Its usefulness appears to have been restricted to blocking the main line of railway Lemberg—Przemysl—Jaroslav—Cracow, thus obliging the Russians to rely on the cross-country line Lemberg—Rawarusska—Jaroslav for the supply of their army in Western Galicia. Its defence absorbed a large number of troops who are now finally lost through its fall; while the army of investment provides a timely reinforcement for the Russian forces on the Carpathian front.

Before dismissing the subject of the Russian campaign, it may be well to observe that there is another theory, alternative to that suggested in the preceding pages, which may be thought to provide the solution of the German operations. It is this—that the Germans hope, by inflicting a series of blows on the Russian armies, to bring about a situation which may lead the Russian Government to abandon the Alliance and treat separately for peace. Having regard to the German doctrine concerning the sanctity of international obligations, this theory is not devoid of plausibility; but, being political rather than military in character, it will not be discussed here.

During the early part of the period under review the alliance between German and Turk ripened into a kind of forced and ephemeral activity. The invasion of the Caucasus, begun at the close of last year, was speedily brought to an end by the battles of Ardahan, Sarikamish, and Kara Urgan, fought in snow breast-deep. The excursion into north-western Persia, undertaken soon afterwards, effected nothing beyond inflicting great sufferings on the inhabitants, and causing a temporary redistribution of the Russian local forces. Most abortive of all was the attack on the Suez Canal on Feb. 3, for which a force said to exceed 50,000 Turks, with numerous Beduin auxiliaries, had been preparing for three months. The German dreams of a *jihad*, which would at least chain the British forces to India and Egypt, and which might result in the overthrow of British power in the East, were quickly dispelled. Even the hope that the Russians and the British might be driven to an embarrassing dissipation of force was not realised. The situation in the Caucasus was met by the three local army corps with the aid of a corps from Turkestan. Egypt proved a convenient halting-place for troops coming from Australia, New Zealand and India, where their organisation and training could be completed. On the other hand, the Turks were deprived of the suzerainty of Egypt, and lost all their ports on the Persian Gulf. The net result of the alliance has been that the Germans gained nothing, the Turks lost much, while the forces of the Allies in France and Poland suffered no diminution.

But the participation of Turkey in the war had more far-reaching results, which are all to the advantage of the Allies. Turkey was more valuable to Germany as a secret friend than as an active ally. To the Allies her open hostility was less dangerous than a doubtful neutrality. So long as her attitude should continue undefined, the situation on the vulnerable flank of the Germanic armies must remain indeterminate. Bulgaria was an uncertain factor. Greece and Rumania, whatever their inclinations might be, dared not risk making a false move, and were therefore forced to remain inactive, waiting on events. Turkey, by yielding to German influence, provided the opportunity for clearing up the situation. Of this the Allies availed themselves, as soon

as the course of events set free the necessary naval force, by striking straight at the heart of the Turkish Empire.

The attack on the Dardanelles has unfortunately been impeded by adverse weather, robbing it of some of its moral effect, and increasing its difficulty by giving time for the defensive measures which its initial stages showed to be advisable. The increased power of modern artillery having rendered fixed defences liable to destruction, the artillery of the defence, equally with that of the attack, must seek immunity in concealment and mobility. The Turks, under German guidance, appear to have done much, during the prolonged intervals of the attack, to prepare a mobile defence by means of heavy guns and howitzers mounted on trucks having an extended range of movement by means of concealed railways. Hidden batteries have also proved a source of annoyance difficult to cope with. This system of defence seems likely to prove more effective against ships confined by the narrow waters of the straits than any combination of armour-protected guns in fixed positions; and it can be adequately met only by a force on land co-operating with the naval attack. The two operations must go hand in hand, the ships supplying highly mobile artillery of great power, while the military force operates against the enemy's field army, and occupies the country adjoining the straits on either side. It is evident that the operation must prove one of considerable magnitude. The distribution of the Turkish army is not publicly known, for it is likely that drafts have been made on the force in Europe to reinforce the army in the Caucasus. At the end of last year five army corps and three or four cavalry brigades were quartered in European Turkey, the total strength, including fortress troops, amounting to between 200,000 and 250,000 men. It would be unsafe to put the force now available for the defence of Constantinople below the former figure.

It would be inexpedient to discuss the probable course of the operations. Enough has been said to show that a military force of considerable strength will be required. It was announced at Paris on March 6 that a French force was being concentrated in Northern Africa; and it has since become known that a British contingent is to take part in the operations. It may be presumed that,

when the weather conditions permit the resumption of the attack, it will be pushed forward simultaneously by sea and land. Success will depend largely on unity of purpose and close co-operation between the naval and military commanders; and those who recall the ill-success which on various occasions attended such combined operations in the past, under conditions far less formidable, may feel doubtful as to the result. Fears on that account may, however, be dismissed. The failures of the past were due chiefly to jealousy or differences of opinion between the two commanders. There was also a want of knowledge and appreciation of the respective functions and powers of naval and military forces. The two services, when called on to co-operate in war, suffered from lack of association during peace. These defects have been remedied since the formation of the Naval War Staff and the General Staff of the Army. During recent years the best brains of the Navy and Army have been trained and exercised together under competent instructors; community of thought has been inculcated; and a closer association between the Services generally has promoted mutual confidence and an appreciation by each of the capabilities and limitations of the other which was lacking in former years.

Dispersion of force consequent on the employment of troops on subsidiary enterprises away from the principal scene of operations is a violation of the great principle of war which enjoins the concentration of all available forces for the accomplishment of a single object. The attack on the Dardanelles may seem open to objection on this account; but a survey of the general situation will dispel what is certainly an illusion due to a too rigid application of the principle and a narrow view of the issues involved. While France is a principal theatre of war, six months of fighting have failed to bring about a decision; and experience has given some reason to doubt whether the results of the offensive are commensurate with the losses involved. Unless the existing balance of force undergoes material change, it may be doubted whether the ultimate decision of the war will be obtained in France. Instead of a general advance to the Rhine and a march to Berlin, the talk is now of a war of attrition; and the results of engagements are

estimated by the supposed losses of the enemy, as though the object of war were to kill rather than to conquer.

This being the situation, there may be room for doubt as to the expediency of locking up superfluous troops in France. Now, as to the situation in South-eastern Europe, there are three main issues involved—first, the destruction of Turkey's military power, releasing Russian troops from the Caucasus and British troops from Egypt, and giving liberty of action to the Balkan States; secondly, the opening of the Black Sea, enabling much-needed munitions of war to reach the Russian armies, and allowing the export of Russian corn; lastly, the possible exposure of the southern flank of the Germanic armies, the only flank in either theatre of war that can be considered vulnerable. Incidentally the operation brings into play the amphibious power of the Allies—that elusive power which magnifies the merely numerical value of forces by reason of the speed and secrecy with which they can be transported, and brought into action in unexpected localities. The possibilities of the situation are fully apparent to the German General Staff. Hence the strenuous efforts made to keep the Russians out of Hungary, which have made the Carpathians the scene of the most persistent fighting and the bloodiest battles of the whole war.

The events of the past three months in France admit of little notice in a brief review which attempts to deal with the larger problems of the war. The story is one of unrelenting activity, resulting in the improvement of the Allies' positions in certain localities. In some instances this progress has been effected by slow degrees, as in Champagne, where the French by continuous fighting have made a substantial advance in the neighbourhood of Perthes and Beau Séjour on a front exceeding two miles. In others it has been the result of one concentrated effort, as at Neuve Chapelle, and on the heights of Notre Dame de Lorette north of Arras. But, looking at the situation from a broader point of view, the most important effect of the operations has been to keep the Germans in a state of constant disquietude, and thus to oblige them to retain large forces in France while reinforcements have been urgently needed in the

East. Official statements issued at Paris show that, since November, while the Germans have been restricted to the defensive, the German army in France has been reduced by only $4\frac{1}{2}$ army corps—probably about 150,000 men—to which must be added about 20,000 cavalry and an uncertain force of heavy artillery. The 47 army corps which remain have been allowed to fall considerably below establishment.

All the Powers engaged have been busy training new troops and improvising new armies. Germany has lately put four new army corps into the field, the accommodation thus vacated being filled by fresh batches of recruits called to the depôts for training. During the war Austria has augmented her field army by the addition of six new army corps, and is also assiduously training fresh levies. An official Note recently issued at Paris states that the field army of France numbers $2\frac{1}{2}$ millions, with approximately half that number in reserve. The state of British recruiting has not been disclosed. Strict secrecy is also maintained concerning the Russian preparations for the Spring campaign.

Apart from the supply of men, the provision of guns, arms, and munitions of war has been a serious problem for all the Powers concerned. Guns are not everlasting; and heavy demands have been made on their endurance. The consumption of ammunition has far exceeded even the anticipations of the Germans, who had made careful provision for the war. All armies have at times suffered a shortage in this respect. The British army has not been the least affected, for our means of manufacture, though sufficient to meet normal requirements, have naturally proved inadequate for the supply of the large force now in the field. An ample supply of ammunition for artillery, especially for heavy guns, is a matter of the first moment, because, both in attack and defence, artillery superiority, besides being a material factor of success, saves many lives.

While our voluntary system of recruiting seems thus far to have produced the men required, it has proved a source of weakness in some ways that had not been generally anticipated. The chief of these is the promiscuous withdrawal of men from industrial occupations, especially those on which the supply of the army depends.

The consequences are diverse and complex, the mere shortage of labour not being the most important. The men who enlist are the cream of the factory or workshop; the most intelligent, the most patriotic and public-spirited. Among those that remain the self-seeking element acquires an undue predominance. The better influences being removed, evil counsels are the more likely to prevail. Increased wages encourage idleness; and, while our soldiers endure danger and privation in the trenches, and suffer through the lack of adequate support from the artillery, many of their comrades, who should supply the deficiency, loaf away the week-ends, or strike for a rise of wage. Nor can employers be absolved from blame. There seems to be a tendency among both classes, happily not very widespread, to use the nation's necessities and the distress of the army as means for extorting concessions or amassing profits. In a crisis which demands a united effort the sordid selfishness of a few threatens to paralyse the energies of the nation. Those who during the years of peace found more congenial occupation in sowing the seeds of discord than in preparing for the great struggle which they knew could not be long deferred have now to taste the bitter fruit of their labours. And Germany is jubilant at having been correct in her diagnosis of one of the many sources of weakness which she believed would sap the military strength of Great Britain.

W. P. BLOOD.

II.—AT SEA.

THE series of British naval despatches recently issued, and the short summaries published from time to time of the progress of the bombardment of the forts in the Dardanelles, have shown a number of preconceived opinions to be unfounded. On the one hand, the battle-fleets of Germany and Austria-Hungary have been condemned to continued inactivity; on the other, battle cruisers, light cruisers, destroyers and submarines have been in action. Some data have been forthcoming as

to the relative efficiency of the gun and the torpedo; the gun has apparently maintained its position as the primary weapon. There have been some indications of the value of armour; it has failed to save vessels from being sunk, even when attacked by gunfire at long range. A good deal has been learnt as to the influence of the submarine on operations in circumscribed waters; it has been greater than most naval officers anticipated. Light has been thrown on the relation of ships to coast defences; the latter have been shown to be not impregnable. The conclusions formed on these and other matters may require revision in the light of information which a battle on the grand scale or the bombardment of the German coast might supply; but in the meantime they rest not on hearsay statements, but on despatches or official reports open to the study of the world. The issues may therefore be freely discussed.

The success with which the great fleet of Germany and the smaller fleet of Austria-Hungary have been contained and reduced to complete inactivity for about two-thirds of a year must have constituted one of the greatest surprises which the German and Austro-Hungarian naval staffs have experienced. It was always assumed by Grand-Admiral von Tirpitz and those associated with him, that circumstances would occur in which German battle-squadrons would be able to 'sally forth' periodically to fight details of the British Fleet, thereby doing considerable injury and assisting in the war of attrition in which their hopes resided. This expectation found expression again and again during the debates on the German naval legislation. It had no small influence in reconciling the people of the German Empire to the large expenditure which the new fleet involved, after it was realised by them that the British nation was determined to maintain a Navy of unquestionable superiority. The argument which carried weight with uninstructed opinion in Germany was somewhat on these lines. 'It is true that, owing to our activity, the actual strength of the British Fleet is being increased, and that the relative margin against us in capital ships will be approximately sixty per cent. While we should be at a grave disadvantage if we possessed only ten capital ships to Britain's sixteen, the disadvantage when the

numbers are roughly sixty to ninety-six will be considerably less marked, as it is improbable, under the conditions of war, that the enemy will be able to bring the guns of all these vessels into action at one and the same time.'

The Germans have always been the victims of methodical thinking. The naval staff appears to have worked in one water-tight compartment and the military staff in another. It was only after war actually broke out that these two bodies appear to have realised that the Navy and the Army of Germany, as of Great Britain, are complementary the one to the other, though their relative importance is reversed. When hostilities began, the theories of the naval staff proved fallacious. They realised that Grand-Admiral von Tirpitz's idea of a 'sally fleet,' useful as it had been during the discussions in the Reichstag, was a fallacious one, because it left entirely out of account the responsibility devolving upon the German Navy as a coastal defence force.

It remained for Grand-Admiral von Koester to break to the German people the bitter truth that for the main purpose for which their fleet was created, namely, to fight the British Fleet on the high seas—and hence the title High Sea Fleet—it was useless in existing conditions. The former Commander-in-Chief of the High Sea Fleet assembled a large audience at Kiel for the express purpose of conveying to them the facts of the situation, which contrasted unpleasantly with the hopes hitherto entertained. This officer, the special confidant of the Emperor William on naval affairs and President of the Navy League, first directed attention to the overwhelming strength of the British Fleet, and then reminded his hearers that a naval battle meant 'death or victory'; once a fleet had been destroyed it could not be renewed during the course of the same war, even if the campaign went on for years. He proceeded to urge that the German population should not be impatient, because the naval authorities 'must refuse to be tempted into taking any action in the performance of which they might be defeated.' 'Our Fleet (he declared) must in all circumstances protect us and must accept battle only when it can count on success.'

When can a fleet count on success? Villeneuve, when he went into action with thirty-three ships of the line of the allies against Nelson's twenty-seven, thought that he could count on success. He was mistaken; the human factor more than counterbalanced the material advantage which lay with the enemy at the battle of Trafalgar. Since the present war opened, engagements have been fought which show that our guns are more powerful than the German guns, our admirals not less skilled in tactics, and our gunnery at least not inferior to the German gunnery. It is impossible to conceive, in view of our great margin of strength, the possibility of conditions existing in the North Sea which would correspond with Grand-Admiral von Koester's *sine qua non* that the German Fleet 'must accept battle only when it can count on success.' In the absence of an assurance of victory, the splendid battleships under the German and Austro-Hungarian flags are reduced, not to impotence, but to employment as coast-defence forces in order to prevent the two armies being taken in the rear by oversea military expeditions of British or French troops.

In containing the enemy's fleet, the fleets of Great Britain and France have not, however, been condemned to inactivity. Germany possesses only ten pre-Dreadnought battleships carrying as large a weapon as the 11-inch gun, and Austria has only three vessels falling in a similar category. The other nineteen older battleships belonging to our enemies are armed only with the 9·4-inch gun, which is comparatively ineffective. On the other hand, the British Fleet includes thirty-six ships of the pre-Dreadnought era,* each carrying four 12-inch guns (10-inch in the case of the 'Swiftsure' and the 'Triumph'), and France possesses fifteen heavily gunned vessels of the same period, apart in both cases from a superiority in ships built since the general adoption of the big-gun principle embodied in the 'Dreadnought,' and apart from the great British predominance in large armoured cruisers, some of which are superior to Germany's older battleships. Owing to the increased speed

* There were 40; but the battleship 'Bulwark' was blown up in the Medway, the 'Formidable' lost by submarine attack in the Channel, and the 'Irresistible' and 'Ocean' sunk by mines in the Dardanelles.

and gun-power of the all-big-gun ships, the older vessels of the Allied fleets are unsuited to act with the newer vessels in fleet formation; nor is their support needed. The intervention of Turkey in the war suggested a useful purpose to which these less modern battleships could be put, since the capital of the Porte was approached by a well-defended strait. It was unlikely that, if a battle action occurred, the older battleships of the Allied fleets would be employed. On the other hand, these vessels, deficient in speed and lacking the concentrated gunfire which distinguishes the Dreadnought and her successors, carry guns which, though of older and less powerful types, are still of considerable value.

The suggestion that these older battleships should be employed in the destruction of the fortifications of the Dardanelles raised afresh a problem which it had hitherto been contended had been decided for all time, namely, the impossibility of reducing coast defences by gunfire from ships. That conclusion was based mainly on the unfortunate experience of British ships in attacking Sevastopol and other Russian fortifications. The verdict of sixty years ago had never been seriously contested; nor can it be said that the foundation upon which it rested had been examined with an open mind. As soon as it became known that the British and French Governments had decided to utilise some of their older battleships to force the passage of the Dardanelles, it became apparent that the conditions had changed since the Crimean War and had changed in favour of the naval gun. During the attack on Sevastopol the sailing ships which engaged in that operation were towed to their firing positions, and then, while in a stationary condition, opened at a range of 2000 yards. The modern naval gun can fire and, as experience has shown, with considerable accuracy, at a distance of as much as 20,000 yards. The powder chamber of the naval gun is larger and the range, other things being equal, longer than in the case of the shore gun. The naval gun is submitted to pressures far greater than those of the shore gun, for the simple reason that it can more readily be replaced. When the rifling of a naval gun wears and the firing becomes erratic, as it does after a limited number of rounds, the ship can proceed under her own steam to

a dockyard and the impaired weapon can be replaced by another one taken from the reserve; the worn gun is then speedily relined. A gun in a shore fortification cannot be easily removed for relining. Once, owing to wear, its fire has become inaccurate, its life, probably for the duration of the war, is at an end. In view of these considerations the shore guns, such as are (or were) mounted in the Dardanelles, have smaller chambers—so that they may wear less rapidly—and have a shorter range than naval guns. Nor is this the only advantage possessed by a naval force in attacking shore defences. Apart from the advantage which steam has conferred on the ship of war since the Crimean period, enabling a moving target to be presented, aeronautics have been developed to a stage which enables aircraft to assist in 'spotting' long range fire, and directing ships' gunners. In the light of these advantages resting with the modern naval gun it was decided to begin the bombardment of the Dardanelles forts. The gunners ashore, it was assumed, would not have the assistance of aircraft, would suffer under the disadvantage, becoming more and more apparent as the operations proceeded, of a shortage of ammunition, and would be inexpert in using the weapons in their charge upon ships under steam.

The task of forcing the Dardanelles was commenced on Feb. 19. Shortly afterwards the Admiralty revealed that, in addition to a number of older battleships of the Allied Fleets, they were employing the battle-cruiser 'Inflexible,' with modern 12-inch guns, and the battleship 'Queen Elizabeth,' carrying eight of the new 15-inch guns. The forts guarding the entrance to the Straits were soon silenced and the mines which had been laid by the enemy swept up. It then remained to demolish the redoubtable defences at the Narrows, about fourteen miles from the Ægean Sea. In this work aircraft, judging by Vice-Admiral Sackville Carden's reports, proved of the greatest assistance. Seaplanes, acting from the new mother-ship 'Ark Royal,' directed gunfire at long range over the high land of the Gallipoli Peninsula. By indirect fire, the forts of the Narrows, as well as the defences on the Bulair line, were attacked. Subsequently direct fire was opened. The fortifications

replied ineffectively, but unfortunately two British battleships—the 'Irresistible' and the 'Ocean'—and the French battleship 'Bouvet' were sunk by floating mines, apparently carried down on them by the current. At the time of writing, though unfavourable weather has interfered with the progress of the Allied Fleet, there is good prospect of the forts on either bank of the Straits being silenced, while the fire on the Bulair line has effectually cut communication between Constantinople and the Gallipoli Peninsula. The mine rather than the gun has proved effective against the attackers. It is well, however, that final deductions should not yet be drawn from these operations. The doctrine hitherto accepted as to the relation between ships and forts may require revision; but not until something more is known of the character of the Turkish forts and the efficiency of their gunners, together with the value of the aerial observations, utilised by one side only, will it be possible to tell whether the conditions existing at the time of the Crimean War have been so completely reversed as to depreciate seriously the value of shore fortifications when confronted with modern ships carrying high-powered guns.

The bombardment of the forts of the Dardanelles, however difficult the operation may prove, will serve to illustrate the long arm of sea-power and the influence which it can exercise over land warfare. When Turkey threw in her lot with Germany and Austria-Hungary, she assumed that, owing to her large expenditure on fixed defences in the Dardanelles and at Smyrna, she was beyond the reach of the British and French fleets. The Germans professed complete confidence that the defences of the Straits and of the great Turkish commercial port constituted an effective barrier against naval attack. In the circumstances, therefore, there is no reason to think that they paused to consider what influence the intervention of the Allied Fleets in and about the *Ægean* Sea might have upon the course of the operations ashore. Events have since shown the intimate relations between sea-power and land-power. Immediately the bombardment of the Dardanelles was begun, the enemy abandoned the farcical expedition for

the conquest of Egypt. Probably other changes occurred in the disposition of the enemy's military forces, to the derangement of the strategic plans which had hitherto been in process of development. It was realised that, once the Dardanelles had been forced, the whole military situation in Southern Europe would undergo a change, apart from the economic value which the safe passage from the Black Sea, with its stores of grain to the Mediterranean, would confer on Russia and her Allies.

Nothing in the naval despatches undermines the general conclusions reached in a former article in the 'Quarterly Review' as to the engagement off the Falkland Islands; they have indeed been confirmed by the action in the North Sea on Jan. 24. On both occasions the results achieved were traceable to the employment of the battle-cruiser. This is a type of ship which was more severely criticised than any other introduced in the British Fleet in the past ten years. Experience has shown that the combination of the high-powered gun of the battleship with the speed of the swiftest cruiser represents a compromise of high military value. Such vessels may form the fast wing of a battle fleet, or they can be employed with dramatic effect on detached service. Off the Falkland Islands the battle-cruisers 'Inflexible' and 'Invincible' held the two principal ships of Admiral Graf von Spee's squadron under heavy fire, to which, owing to the German guns being outranged, no effective reply could be made. The two British battle-cruisers were able to sink, with very little loss, the two big ships under the enemy's flag, while other British cruisers chased the three small vessels and succeeded in destroying two of them. One vessel only, the 'Dresden,' managed to escape; she owed her temporary deliverance to her efficient high-speed engines. Whether in the later stage of the engagement, after the 'Scharnhorst' had been sunk and the 'Gneisenau' seriously damaged, Vice-Admiral Sir Doveton Sturdee could, or could not, have detached one of his battle-cruisers to round up the 'Dresden,' the swiftest of the German vessels, and destroy her, is a subject upon which in the absence of fuller information it is impossible to judge. Fortunately, though the 'Dresden' escaped on Dec. 8, she was caught off the island of Juan Fernandez by the British cruisers

'Glasgow' and 'Kent,' supported by the auxiliary cruiser 'Orama,' on March 14 and destroyed.

Sir David Beatty's despatch describing the engagement in the North Sea on Jan. 24 supplies further confirmatory evidence of the high value of the battle-cruiser. The brunt of the fighting fell to the 'Lion,' flying the flag of the Vice-Admiral, and the 'Tiger,' owing to the fact that their fast steaming enabled them to get within effective range of the flying battle-cruisers of the enemy after the 'Blücher' had been abandoned to her fate. After the action had been in progress for some time, the 'Lion' had to leave the line owing to 'a lucky shot' on the part of the enemy. By this time the large armoured cruiser 'Blücher' was doomed, and two of the enemy's three battle-cruisers, the 'Derfflinger' and 'Seydlitz,' had been seriously damaged. The engagement promised to result in the sinking not only of the 'Blücher,' but of the other two vessels which, in an injured condition, were making for their home ports. In Sir David Beatty's despatch no explanation is given of the reason why the pursuit of the enemy was not continued when it promised such fortunate results. In the first announcement by the Admiralty, however, it was stated that the enemy's ships 'reached an area where danger from German submarines and mines prevented further pursuit.' In the fuller statement subsequently issued by the Admiralty and based upon a 'preliminary report' from Sir David Beatty, no mention was made of mines, but it was remarked that 'the presence of the enemy's submarines subsequently necessitated the action being broken off.' In the full and later despatch from Sir David Beatty reference is made to submarines, but it is not suggested that the Admiral considered their presence justified the discontinuance of the action. Judging by the various reports, Sir David Beatty, owing to the injury sustained by the 'Lion,' had to relinquish his command for about an hour, during which time he was shifting his flag from his injured ship to the 'Princess Royal.' It was presumably during this period that the chase was abandoned.

In the light of the various conflicting statements, the cause of the escape of the two badly damaged German battle-cruisers remains obscure. It is admitted that the enemy's submarines were active; Sir David Beatty refers

to their presence in his despatch. On the other hand, the British cruisers were steaming at 25 or more knots; and the experience of war suggests that submarine attack upon any vessel travelling at 15 knots or more will probably fail. There is no evidence which supports the suggestion that, when the action was broken off, the British ships were in dangerously close proximity to the enemy's mines. Not until the war is at an end and the full official records are available will it be possible to decide whether, in fact, the British success might or might not have been converted into a notable victory. In any event it is unfortunate that an action which offered such good prospect of inflicting grave military loss upon the enemy resulted merely in the sinking of one cruiser, and that the least valuable of the quartette which took part in the attempted coast raid of Jan. 24, and serious damage to two others. Ships which are not sunk or captured are ships which can be repaired and can again do mischief.

At the beginning of February the Germans declared 'the waters round Great Britain and Ireland, including the English Channel,' to be 'a military area.' It was added that from 'Feb. 18 every hostile merchant ship will be destroyed, even if it is not always possible to avoid thereby the dangers which threaten the crews and passengers.' Neutral ships were at the same time warned that they would incur danger in 'the military area.' German newspapers, officially inspired, confessed that the attack on merchant shipping would be carried out by mines and submarines. It was pleaded that the frail character of the underwater craft, their want of accommodation for crews of ships attacked, and their inability to provide prize crews, furnished excuse for disregarding not merely the ordinary usages of war but the dictates of humanity. In making this declaration, the enemy, conscious of the inadequate number of his submarines for such a purpose, trusted to the moral effect of his threat upon neutral shipping. Neutral nations, however, were not dismayed; the flow of shipping to and from British ports actually increased.

Thus the policy of destruction which was decided upon with the boasted intention 'to starve England' was revealed from the first as a failure. A relatively small

number of ships, belonging to neutral as well as to British owners, were sunk with some loss of life, but no appreciable effect was produced on the economic condition of the United Kingdom, with arrivals and sailings averaging from 1400 to 1500 weekly. On the other hand, the German Government, by its procedure, not only robbed itself of whatever sympathy on the part of neutrals it may have hitherto enjoyed, but gave the British Government an opportunity of using its sea-power with greater effect in order to put increased economic pressure on the enemy. The British Government, in association with France and Russia, determined not to endeavour to adapt to the peculiar geographical situation of Germany the recognised rules governing an effective blockade. Thereby they favoured neutrals, since a blockade involves the confiscation of neutral shipping and cargoes endeavouring to leave or reach the enemy. The course decided upon was to extend the list of contraband and to prevent commodities of any kind from reaching or leaving Germany. The Order in Council was framed in order to spare neutrals, while at the same time condemning Germany to all the effects of a blockade. On the part of those who realise the close connexion between naval and economic power and who are also conscious of the importance of retaining the sympathy of the neutral world, there will be no inclination to condemn the Allied Governments for showing the utmost consideration to nations not actually engaged in war.

ARCHIBALD HURD.

